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Abstract 
 
There has been considerable scholarship over the last fifty years on the causes of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century British railway industry’s declining profitability. 
Nonetheless, scholars have largely avoided studying how individual companies’ were managed, 
instead making general conclusions about the challenges industry leaders faced and the quality 
of their responses.  
 
This thesis examines the management of one of the British railway industry’s largest companies, 
the London and South Western Railway (LSWR), during the tenures of three of its General 
Managers: Archibald Scott, who was in the post between 1870 and 1884, Charles Scotter, who 
succeeded him from 1885 to 1897, and Charles Owens, who held the position between 1898 and 
1911. Compared with other major British railways the LSWR’s profitability ranged from being 
poor under Scott, to excellent under Scotter and then average under Owens. This thesis will 
explore what internal and external factors caused these changes. Furthermore, it considers how 
the business’ organisational form, senior managers’ career paths and directors’ external business 
interests all played a role in shaping the company’s operational efficiency and financial 
performance. Ultimately, the thesis will argue that while external factors were an influence on 
the LSWR’s profitability between 1870 and 1911, primarily its financial performance was 
determined by the quality of the strategies and policies enacted by its directors and managers. 
 
Ultimately, this thesis brings clarity to the existing debates and, by using the LSWR as a case 
study, provides important suggestions as to what actually caused the British railway industry’s 
declining profitability between 1870 and 1911.  
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Chapter 1 – British Railways 1870-1914 
 
This thesis investigates the factors that shaped the London and South Western Railway’s (LSWR) 
financial performance between 1870 and 1911. Through doing so it contributes to the debate 
surrounding the causes of the British railway industry’s declining profitability between 1870 and 
1900 and the recovery between then and 1914. 
 
The debate on the British railway industry’s declining financial performance between 1870 and 
1900 has not provided satisfactory answers as to what caused this trend. Scholars have mostly 
utilised companies’ financial results or econometric estimates to infer which factors influenced 
industry performance the most, while making little reference to the strategies and policies 
corporate decision-makers actually employed. Consequently, numerous different explanations, 
some of which are incompatible with each other, have been provided for the railway industry’s 
declining profitability before 1900. Parliamentary legislation, increased material and wage costs, 
competition, lack of competition and decision-makers acting against the interests of shareholders 
have all been blamed.  
 
Moreover, in the face of decreased industry profitability, it is generally accepted that British 
railway management improved after 1900. Yet, few studies have examined in detail the policies 
and practices directors and managers pursued. Most scholars have simply attributed the 
enhanced efficiency to developments in goods operations, with little reference to other 
economies decision-makers found. Limitations on directors’ and managers’ freedom to act have 
also been largely ignored. 
 
I therefore consider that scholars have not yet isolated the principal factors that influenced the 
British railway industry’s financial performance between 1870 and 1914, and therefore this 
thesis’ significance is its contribution towards resolving this issue by examining the factors that 
shaped the LSWR’s profitability in this period. Only Irving’s study of the North Eastern Railway 
showed directly how a railway’s policies and strategies between 1870 and 1914 impacted on its 
financial performance, making my study only the second of its kind.2 
 
This chapter reviews previous scholarship on British railway management and profitability 
between 1870 and 1914, to show this thesis’ value. Firstly, the nature of British railway 
management in this period is analysed to identify possible influences on companies’ financial 
                                                          
2
 R.J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, (Leicester, 1976) 
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performance. It thereafter examines scholars’ explanations for the railway industry’s declining 
profitability between 1870 and 1900, and the causes of a recovery that occurred between then 
and 1914. Finally, the LSWR’s interest as a case study is discussed, after which the thesis’ 
structure is outlined.  
 
Section 1 – Management in the British railway industry, 1870-1914 
 
Over the last fifty years there has been considerable scholarship on management within 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century British railway companies. It is important to understand 
this work so that the nature and workings of the LSWR’s management can be compared and 
contrasted with industry-wide trends and developments.  I have identified five strands of work 
on British railway management between 1870 and 1914 that are relevant to my work: who had 
control of railway companies’ policies; railways’ management structures; traffic managers’ 
careers paths; the impact of interlocking directorships on companies’ policies; and the 
information available to decision-makers when making decisions. The literature pertaining to 
these topics will now be discussed. 
 
1.1. The ‘visible hand’ of management  
 
Rowlinson, Toms and Wilson argued that the ‘enduring question’ of business history is ‘who 
controls the large modern corporations?’ This thesis is no different; one of its central goals is to 
determine who had the most influence over the LSWR’s policies between 1870 and 1911, and 
how this impacted on its financial performance. 
 
This thesis contributes to discussions surrounding the rise of Alfred Chandler’s ‘visible hand’ of 
management within industry, where it was management, rather than investors or the market, 
that were most important in determining the policies and strategies companies pursued. 
Accordingly, Rowlinson, Toms and Wilson argued that business history is ‘dominated by the 
consideration of managerial groups as rational strategy makers,’ and in their estimation the 
principal purpose of this Chandlerian approach to business history is to examine the ‘history of 
decisions taken at crucial points by managers and managerial groupings’ and to ‘trace the 
evolution of management practice as a set of techniques, designed to improve the efficiency of 
the organisation.’3  
 
                                                          
3
 Michael Rowlinson, Steven Toms and John F. Wilson, ‘Competing perspectives on the ‘Managerial 
Revolution’: From ‘Managerialist’ to ‘Anti-Managerialist, Business History, 49 (July, 2007), p.464-465; 
Geoffrey Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, (Aldershot, 2001) p.2 
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Germane to this thesis is Chandler’s book The Visible Hand, the first part of which focussed on 
management within America’s first large-scale businesses: the railroads. Traditionally, before 
1900 their policies were perceived to have been controlled by financiers and ‘robber barons’. 
Chandler, however, placed salaried managers centrally within his history. He argued that after 
the 1840s railroads’ geographical growth presented challenges, such as safety issues, increased 
traffic volumes and increasing train speeds. Because many railroad leaders felt that coordination 
within the firm was superior to other forms of coordination, for example the market, they 
evaluated management structures and processes, resulting in salaried managers becoming more 
important to companies’ operations. Consequently, these managers became principally 
responsible for formulating and controlling companies’ policies. 4 Ward, for example, argued that 
chief executives like J. Edgar Thomson on the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Erie’s D.C. McCallum, 
and B. Latrobe on the Baltimore and Ohio, captured policy control from the investors who owned 
the companies. Thus, by 1873 on the Pennsylvania ‘paramount executive authority had 
emerged’, directors were by then ‘pliant acceders,’ and shareholders were virtually impotent.5 
Nonetheless, despite highlighting managers’ important role in the American railroad industry, 
Chandler showed that many companies, such as the New York Central, had no executives and 
their policies remained under financiers’ control. 6 He therefore demonstrated that there was 
never an absolute rise of the ‘visible hand’ of management in American railroads.  
 
1.2. Management forms in the nineteenth-century British railways 
 
Like in America, railways were Britain’s first modern large-scale businesses and remained so until 
at least World War One. Wardley showed that by market value railways constituted twenty-two 
of the top fifty largest companies nationally in 1904/5, occupying the top ten positions.7  
 
Firstly, scholars generally agree that, like in the American railroad context, by the 1870s 
shareholders had little or no influence over British railways’ policies, as Channon, Wilson and 
Thomson argued. Arnold and McCartney stated that because of this separation of ‘ownership and 
control,’ as Berle and Means described it in the 1930s, managers abandoned shareholder’s 
interests, while Mitchell, Chambers, Crafts, Leunig, Mulatu, and Mills argued it led to 
                                                          
4
 Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, p.5 
5
 Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, (London, 1977), p.5 
and p.186; James A. Ward, ‘Power and Accountability on the Pennsylvania Railroad, 1846-1878’, Business 
History Review, XLIX (1975), p.58 
6
 Chandler, The Visible Hand, p.5 and p.186;  
7
 Peter Wardley, ‘The anatomy of big business: aspects of corporate development in the twentieth 
century,’ Business History, 33 (1991), p.279 
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management failure before 1900.8 Nevertheless, shareholder’s weak influence over late 
nineteenth-century British railway companies’ policies has largely been presumed by scholars. 
This thesis examines if this was so in the LSWR’s case between 1870 and 1911. 
 
Academics also generally agree that by the 1870s British railway companies’ policies were 
controlled by their directors and senior managers. Chandler in Scale and Scope, which assessed 
the history of management in America, Britain and Germany, argued that British railways took on 
all the characteristics of large businesses by developing hierarchies of managers; a fact supported 
by Channon, Cassis, and Wilson and Thomson, amongst others.9 Nevertheless, no academics have 
addressed the extent to which British railway managers between 1870 and 1914 influenced 
companies’ policies or, in more extreme scenarios, usurped the decision-making authority of 
their boards. Channon posed two specific questions; ‘Where in…[companies] were ‘high’ and 
‘low’ order decisions made’ and ‘who controlled information, and therefore policy options?’10  
 
These questions can begin to be answered for nineteenth-century British railway companies by 
analysing their management structures. Bonavia and Channon argued that most, if not all 
companies had adopted functional department structures as the standard pattern of operation 
by the 1850s and 1860s. Under the board and General Manager, departments had particular 
functions, for example locomotive construction and maintenance, engineering, traffic movement 
or cartage. The heads of these departments only reported to those above them in the hierarchy, 
with departmental officials having little mutual contact below senior management level. Within 
the departments there also usually existed geographical districts and divisions, usually headed by 
superintendents who reported to those above them in the management structure (see Figure 
                                                          
8
 John F. Wilson and Andrew Thomson, The Making of Modern Management: British Management in 
Historical Perspective, (Oxford, 2006) p.56; Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, 
p.107; A.J. Arnold and S. McCartney, ‘Rates of return, concentration levels and strategic change in the 
British railway industry, 1830-1912’, Journal of Transport History, 26 (2005) p.54-57; Brian Mitchell, David 
Chambers, and Nick Crafts, ‘How good was the profitability of British railways 1870-1912?’, Economic 
History Review, 64 (2011) p.829; A.A. Berle, and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
(New York, 1932); Nicholas Crafts, Timothy Leunig, and Abay Mulatu,  ‘Corrigendum: Were British railway 
companies well managed in the early twentieth century?’, The Economic History Review, 64 (2011), p.355; 
Nicholas Crafts, Terence C. Mills, and Abay Mulatu,  ‘Total factor productivity growth on Britain’s railways, 
1852–1912: a reappraisal of the evidence’, Explorations in Economic History, 44 (2007), p.632 
9
 Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, (London, 1990) p.253; 
Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, p.22; Yousseff Cassis, ‘Big Business: Big Business and 
the First Industrial Revolution’ in Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin, (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Business History, (Oxford, 2009) pp.176  
10
 Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.44 
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Figure 1: A ‘typical’ British railway management structure in 1910, Source: Ray Morris, Railroad 
Administration, (New York, 1910), p.133 
18 
 
  
1)11 Before 1914 few British railways’ management structures deviated from this pattern of 
operation; only the North Eastern (NER) and the Great Northern Railways’ (GNR) did so from 
around 1900 by separating the commercial and operating sides of their businesses, which 
clarified functions along what Irving called ‘natural lines’.12 Therefore, the question is why there 
was so little change in companies’ corporate forms? Chandler argued that British railway 
companies’ smaller geographical size meant managers were not challenged to the same extent as 
their American counterparts to pioneer more advanced forms of organisation.13 Alternatively, 
Channon suggested that functional department structures persisted within British railways 
because department heads vied for resources and guarded their own authority.14  This thesis 
supports the first argument; the LSWR’s overall management structure was not altered between 
1870 and 1911 because decision-makers were never under pressure from any source to do so. 
 
Scholars have generally described how features of functional department structures possibly, and 
usually negatively, impact on business’ performance. Wilson and Thomson argued they require 
many specialist managers to run departments, as well as production and distribution functions 
lower down the hierarchy.  More importantly, within functional structures decision-making 
authority is highly centralised, and, thus, Quail argued that this may weaken businesses 
performance given directors’ disinclination to delegate responsibility to individuals in ‘functional 
and production posts.’15  Indeed, as this chapter shows, scholars have highlighted how such 
structures negatively impacted on British railways’ financial performance and management 
quality before 1914.16 Following this trend, one of the thesis’ central arguments is that because 
the LSWR utilised a functional department structure between 1870 and 1911, its business 
performance was frequently undermined by its policies and strategies being formulated by a 
small number of individuals at the organisation’s head. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Michael R. Bonavia, The Organisation of British Railways, (Shepperton, 1971) p.21-23; Ray Morris, 
Railroad Administration, (New York, 1910), p.132; Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 
1830-1940, p.41-42 
12
 Bonavia, The Organisation of British Railways, p.16; Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 
p.41-42; T.R. Gourvish, ‘British business and the transition to a corporate economy,’ Business History, 29 
(1987), p.26; Irving, The North Eastern Railway, p.255 
13
 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p.253 
14
 Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.42 
15
 Wilson and Thomson, The Making of Modern Management, p.12; John Quail, ‘The Proprietorial Theory 
of the Firm and its Consequences’, discussed in Wilson and Thomson The Making of Modern Management, 
p.13 
16
 Bonavia, The Organisation of British Railways, p.21-23, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-
1940, p. 41-42 and p.107 
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1.3. The rise of the ‘visible hand’ in the British railway context? 
 
If decision-making authority within British railway companies was held by a handful of individuals 
at the organisation’s head, an important consideration is whether management acquired control 
of their policies after 1870 – as per the Chandlerian paradigm. Cain argued that by the 1870s 
chief executives were the industry’s single most important decision-makers and Channon stated 
that ‘managerial ascendency cannot be assumed before 1870.17 Nevertheless, a brief historical 
survey reveals that managerial ascendency cannot be assumed at all within the British railway 
industry between 1870 and 1914, as cases have been found where both directors and managers 
controlled major companies’ strategic direction.  
  
Before 1900, cases can be found where boards or individual directors had considerable or 
absolute charge of companies’ policies; for example Richard Moon’s domineering chairmanship 
of the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) between 1861 and 1893; Robert Cecil, the 
Great Eastern Railway’s (GER) chairman, saving it from ruin between 1868 and 1872, and the fact 
that the Great Northern Railway’s (GNR) board between the 1850s and 1870s felt ‘they knew 
more about the business than the company’s senior officers.’ Furthermore, after George Gibb left 
as the NER’s General Manager in 1906 the board re-asserted control over the company’s affairs.18   
 
Alternatively, some senior managers came to dominate major railway companies’ policies. 
George Gibb dominated the NER’s strategic direction between 1891 and 1906; two managers, 
Granet and Paget, controlled the Midland Railway’s policies after 1900; while Sam Fay had a 
similar level of influence over the Great Central Railway’s (GCR) policies in the same period.19  
 
Cases also exist after 1870 where ex-railwaymen were raised to companies’ boards and then 
dominated their strategic direction; for example James Staats Forbes’ chairmanship of the 
London, Chatham and Dover (LCDR) and Metropolitan District Railways (MDR); Daniel Gooch’s 
time as chairman of the Great Western Railway (GWR) between 1865 and 1889; and Sir Edward 
                                                          
17
 P.J. Cain, ‘Railways 1870-1914: the maturity of the private system,’ in Michael J. Freeman, and Derek H. 
Aldcroft, Transport in Victorian Britain, pp.112; Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-
1940, (Manchester, 1988), p.44 
18
 Braine, The Railway Moon; Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, p.261-264; T.C. Barker, 'Lord 
Salisbury, Chairman of the Great Eastern Railway 1868-1872' in S. Marriner, Business and Businessmen: 
Studies in Business, Economic and Accounting History, (Liverpool, 1972), 81-103;  Jack Simmons, The 
Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, (Leicester, 1978), p.247 
19
 Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, p.261-264; E.G. Barnes, The Midland Main Line – 1875-1922, 
(London, 1969), p.226; Jack Simmons, ‘Fay, Sir Sam,’ in Jack Simmons and Gordon Biddle (eds.) The Oxford 
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Watkin’s chairmanship of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire (MSLR), South Eastern (SER) 
and Metropolitan Railways.20  
 
In sum, with such a variance in who controlled, or at very least heavily influenced British railway 
companies’ policies between 1870 and 1914, an industry-wide rise in the ‘visible hand’ of 
management cannot be presumed in this period. This thesis reinforces this conclusion by 
demonstrating how at different points after 1870 both directors and senior managers dominated 
the LSWR’s strategic direction.  
 
It is important to understand who controlled railway companies’ financial performance because 
this potentially impacted on their business performance. As Raff, Lamoreaux and Temin argued 
of business generally, managers and directors can possibly have unaligned or conflicting aims 
when formulating policies and strategies, causing disagreements over companies’ strategic 
direction. For example, directors may be interested in maximising company profits, whereas 
managers can prioritise personal benefits, job-security or career progression.21  This thesis 
therefore describes the objectives of the LSWR’s directors, General Managers, and department 
heads between 1870 and 1911, and shows how the interactions between their views and 
objectives impacted on the company’s management quality and overall financial performance.  
 
1.4. Directors’ goals and the benefits and drawbacks of interlocking directorships 
 
Apart from simply identifying what LSWR directors and managers’ immediate objectives were, 
this thesis also determines how their careers, lives and backgrounds shaped the policies and 
strategies they adopted. The general scholarship on topic is discussed in the next two sections. 
 
Considerable literature exists on why individuals join boards, the goals they wish to pursue once 
appointed, and how this influenced companies’ management quality. Much of this work pertains 
to how interlocking directorships impact on performance, which are defined as where ‘one 
person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another organization.’22 
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Modern business studies literature has highlighted interlocking directorships’ positive effects on 
companies’ performance.  Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin argued that such relationships are 
used by businesses to improve contractual relationships, reducing uncertainty in the trading 
environment. Burt similarly argued that directorial interlocks possibly allow one company to 
control another without the need to acquire them, again reducing uncertainty.23 Mizruchi and 
Stearns have also identified that interlocking directorships may allow firms to monitor each 
other’s activities, which may benefit their performance; while Davis highlighted the possibility 
companies use interlocks to gain information on innovative business practices used elsewhere in 
industry. Furthermore, Perry and Peyer argued that firms could enhance their value if their 
directors were appointed to a company board in related industries or the same economic sector. 
Lastly, Fama and Jensen contended that directors who obtained multiple directorships could 
acquire prestige within their industry, further adding value to the firms of which they were board 
members.24 
 
Nonetheless, interlocking directorships have received criticism. Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 
contended that individuals with multiple directorships may be over-committed, leading them to 
neglect their responsibilities within all the firms of which they were a director. Consequently, this 
may hinder the effective monitoring of managers, giving them the freedom to pursue their own 
interests to the detriment of company profitability. Indeed, Fich and Shivdasani’s study of 
modern businesses showed that companies where the majority of directors possessed three or 
more other directorships had lower profitability and operating returns on sales. Conversely, the 
value of companies where most directors had below three external directorial commitments was 
on average 4.2 percent higher than those where the majority of board members had more.25  
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Naturally, the way late nineteenth and early-twentieth railway directors engaged with their 
businesses will be different from directors in modern business environments. Nonetheless, these 
studies have shown the importance of considering how LSWR directors’ external business 
activities may have impacted on the company’s financial performance between 1870 and 1911. 
Indeed, this thesis shows that throughout the period they did have an effect. 
 
1.5. The nature of the late nineteenth and early-twentieth century railway director. 
 
The business backgrounds of nineteenth and early-twentieth century railway directors – which 
potentially influenced companies’ policies (see Section 1.6) - can, I consider, be roughly be split 
into five groups; merchants, individuals in finance, industrialists, the landed and ex-railwaymen. 
What follows is a survey of these five groups to ascertain, insomuch as is possible, when and why 
such individuals became railway company directors. Nevertheless, because the scholarship on 
British railway company directors’ backgrounds between 1830 and 1914 is limited, the following 
survey demonstrates the need for more detailed study on this topic; something this thesis 
provides in the LSWR’s case. 26 
 
Merchants 
 
Scholars have generally considered that merchants dominated railway companies’ boards in the 
early years of the industry and Bonavia argued that in 1830s and 1840s railway directors were 
predominantly individuals with ‘a financial interest in better transport’. For example, he stated 
that the GWR was promoted and formed by a committee of Bristol-based businessmen 
representing various local bodies such as the ‘Bristol Corporation, the Society of Merchant 
Venturers, The Bristol Dock Company and the Bristol and Gloucestershire Railway.’ Nevertheless, 
Channon’s research on the same company showed that by the 1870s it had moved away from 
recruiting merchants as directors, favouring shipping magnates such as ‘Bates, Brocklebank, 
Cunard and Maciver’ because of their valued connections in international trade and commerce.27  
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Bankers 
 
Bankers were appointed to railway companies’ boards throughout the nineteenth and early-
twentieth century; even if the extent of their presence varied across the period. Some of the 
most prominent individuals on the boards of the early railways were bankers, for example 
George Carr Glynn the LNWR chairman. Yet, in the GWR’s case Channon stated that between the 
1830s and 1910s few of its directors had their primary interest in banking, although the number 
for whom it became a secondary activity increased, especially after 1870. Between 1881 and 
1885 23.8 percent of GWR directors held positions in finance; but by the period 1906 to 1910 the 
proportion had risen to 31.6 percent. Channon argued railways, due to their high debt-equity 
ratio, recruited bankers because such links to financial institutions gave them access to capital on 
‘favourable terms’.28   
 
Industrialists 
 
The role of industrialists on railway companies’ boards in the period is unclear, but the evidence 
suggests it was limited. Channon showed that between 1833 and 1915 only nineteen of the 106 
directors that served on the GWR’s board had interests in ‘manufacturing and industry’ and ‘Food 
Drink and Tobacco’, and the number representing these economic sectors only increased after 
1900 when individuals were recruited who were involved in ‘important’ firms on the company’s 
network. Alternatively, Irving argued that between 1872 and 1900 the NER board was constituted 
of ‘industrialists and those actively engaged in the trade and commerce of the region’, and it 
appointed new directors because they headed their ‘respective callings in the different areas 
served by the company.’ Nonetheless, Irving argued that the NER’s board constitution was 
unique within the British railway industry; suggesting that industrialists’ level of involvement in 
the GWR was more typical within the British railway industry before 1914.29   
 
Aristocrats and Landed Gentry 
 
Aristocrats and landed gentry had a prominent role on British railway companies’ boards 
between the 1830s and 1914. Channon argued that while initially such individuals joined the 
GWR’s board to develop the resources within their estates, they soon came to appreciate the 
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benefit of owning railway stocks and shares. However, the literature suggests that after 1870 
landed individuals played their most prominent role on railway companies’ boards. Channon 
showed that between 1876 and 1895 nine of the GWR’s twenty-one directors (forty-three 
percent) had ‘land and agriculture’ as their primary occupation. Stanworth and Giddens showed 
that seventy-eight percent of railway company chairmen born between 1820 and 1939 had 
‘upper class’ origins, with forty-three percent having parents who appeared in Burke’s Peerage. 
Indeed, the period when the most landed chairmen were born was between 1820 and 1859, 
meaning they would have taken up their positions from around 1870 onwards. Channon argued 
that landed individuals’ significant uptake of railway directorships after 1870 was because they 
were diversifying their portfolios at a time when income from their estates possibly worsened 
due to the agricultural recession.30  
 
Ex-Railwaymen 
 
Numerous railway companies appointed ex-railwaymen as directors in the nineteenth-century, 
possibly suggesting that such directorships were designed to retain an individuals’ expertise or 
reward them for services rendered. Gourvish showed that between 1870 and 1889 six out of 
fifteen (forty percent) railway company chief executives became directors on retirement; with 
the proportion increasing to eighteen out of twenty-eight (sixty-eight percent) between 1890 and 
1909. Overall, however, the literature suggests that between the 1830s and 1914 few railways’ 
directors had worked in the industry. Channon argued that within the GWR a strict separation of 
powers existed between directorate and management, and only two of the company’s senior 
managers, Gooch and Saunders, were appointed to the board.31 Furthermore, Stanworth and 
Giddens also showed that a ‘minute’ number of professional railwaymen rose to become 
companies’ chairmen.’32  
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Conclusion 
 
This survey of the business background of British railway directors’ between the 1830s and 1914 
has demonstrated the paucity of information that exists on the subject. Indeed, only Channon’s 
work on the GWR’s board, cited extensively above, has comprehensively investigated the 
business interests of a single railway company’s directorate. This thesis is therefore important as 
it examines how the primary occupations and interlocking directorships of the LSWR’s directorate 
changed between 1870 and 1911.  
 
1.6. Interlocking directorships and railway companies’ policies  
 
Given that decision-making authority within the LSWR was highly centralised between 1870 and 
1911, this thesis also investigates how directors’ external business interests influenced the 
policies and strategies the company adopted. Only three previous studies of British railways’ 
boards have addressed this matter. These were Channon’s study of the GWR’s board between 
1833 and 1947, Hughes’ analysis of the London and North Eastern Railway’s (LNER) directorate 
between 1923 and 1947 ( and therefore outside my period) and Irving’s study of the NER 
between 1870 and 1914.  
 
Channon and Hughes’ studies never firmly established how directors’ external business interests 
shaped their railways’ policies or strategies. Only Hughes’ work suggested how the LNER’s 
policies and financial performance may have been influenced by its directors’ external business 
activities. He argued that by observing ‘the occupations of the fifty-one directors, it is difficult to 
find more than a handful whose outside interests did not conflict with their responsibility to the 
railway.’ For example, some directors were involved in coal, iron and steel businesses within the 
area the LNER served, possibly allowing them to influence its policies in the favour of these 
interests.33 Yet, Hughes only speculated that directors’ external directorships influenced LNER 
policy, he did not show where they actually did. Channon similarly did not show how the GWR 
directors’ external business activities influenced its policies, concluding that: 
 
'…the anatomy of the GWR's board – of where its members originated, their 
education, wealth, social status, economic connections… suggests very little about 
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what it all meant for the management performance of the company or for the 
railways as a whole.'34 
 
For him 'certain questions, especially those to do with operating policies and company 
performance, require a more disaggregated, contextualised approach'; something this thesis 
provides in the LSWR’s case.35   
 
Irving’s study established better the links between the NER’s policies and its directors’ external 
business interests. He argued that because the board consisted of ‘industrialists and those 
actively engaged in the trade and commerce of the region,’ the directorate was not greatly 
interested in railway affairs, but managed the company’s resources ‘in such a way as to satisfy 
local industry and the shareholders.’ Irving therefore considered the NER acted as a ‘holding 
company’ for the region’s industry. Nonetheless, given he considered the constitution of this 
directorate to be ‘unique’ within the British railway industry between 1870 and 1914, this may 
suggest its approach to company policy was also atypical.36 
 
What has, however, been established in the literature is that between 1870 and 1914 railway 
company directors took up many positions on the boards of other transport concerns, in many 
cases to benefit the railway. Channon showed that between 1881 and 1885 48.6 percent of GWR 
directors sat on other foreign and domestic railway companies’ boards, constituting 69.0 percent 
of all the directorships they held. By the period 1906 to 1910 these proportions were still large, 
despite declining to 30.9 and 46.9 percent respectively.37 The strength of inter-railway interlocks 
before 1914 was confirmed by Scott and Griff. They examined the networks that existed amongst 
directors of Britain’s major railway companies in 1904. The directors of nineteen out of thirty-
four main line companies had interlocking directorships with other railways, with two major 
networks being identified amongst them. One was centred on the LNWR and Central London 
Railways, while the other was centred on the Midland Railway.38   
 
It has been argued that such interlocks existed because of the policies and strategies the railways 
were pursuing. Channon suggested the GWR used interlocking directorships to control the 
policies of domestic ‘feeder’ railways and dock companies it had a financial and operational 
interest in. Indeed, to an extent this eliminated the need for the company to pursue costly 
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mergers or purchases to gain control over elements within its business environment.39 
Alternatively, Scott and Griff argued that most interlocks between companies in 1904 were ‘not 
strictly horizontal,’ as they did not exist between railways operating competing routes. However, 
numerous interlocks existed between adjacent railways. These facilitated cooperation between 
them, allowing them to better secure through routes and engage in competition with other 
companies.40  
 
This short survey therefore shows the paucity of research that exists on how railway companies’ 
policies were influenced by directors’ interlocking directorships. This thesis’ importance to the 
literature is, therefore, that it attempts to establish, as far as is possible, how the LSWR’s policies 
and financial performance was determined by its directors’ activities outside the company.  
 
1.7. Traffic managers careers before 1914 
 
While between 1870 and 1914 railways’ policies and strategies were possibly influenced by 
directors’ objectives, senior managers, who also had the position within the industry to shape 
companies’ strategic course, may have had divergent or opposite goals because of the nature of 
their careers and working experiences. Therefore, this thesis examines senior LSWR traffic 
managers’ career – the Traffic Department being the most important department to the 
company’s strategic direction – to determine how these shaped their views and opinions on 
railway policy and strategy.  
 
Traffic manager’s careers 
 
Howlett undertook the most detailed work on a nineteenth-century railway’s internal labour 
markets (ILM) by studying promotional ladders within the GER’s Traffic Department after 1870. 
He argued that within British railway companies there developed two ILMs; a primary ILM, 
encompassing salaried employees (clerks, managers), and a secondary ILM, in which most other 
staff members were employed.41 These ILMs developed by the 1870s because the railway had 
internalised their process of recruitment, where initially they had engaged the external labour 
market. Such systems reduced companies’ labour turnover, reduced the search costs that 
engaging the external labour market incurred, and diminished uncertainty of labour supply. 
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Furthermore, ILMs meant companies could train individuals knowing their investment would not 
be wasted. 42  
 
Traffic managers were usually employed in railways’ primary ILMs between 1870 and 1914, yet 
these have received far less analysis than companies’ secondary ILMs. There is general consensus 
that by the 1870s the railway industry’s clerks – who populated primary ILMs below management 
level – were locked into rigid promotional ladders within the companies that had recruited them. 
Howlett argued that recruitment to primary ILMs was limited to a few entry points, usually at the 
bottom of the promotional tree, with higher positions being filled predominantly by internal 
promotion from below. Indeed, Strangleman argued that for blue-collar workers employment 
patterns became ‘increasingly dependent on seniority, vacancies being increasingly filled by the 
senior applicant in the grade or company, underpinned by formal rules based on length of 
service.’ These rigid promotional structures were buttressed by companies’ department 
structures which did not give much, if any room for cross-departmental movement within 
companies. It was also uncommon for employees to move from the secondary ILM to the 
primary.43 Lastly, Gourvish demonstrated and Pollins argued that when managers did leave the 
railways that recruited them they predominantly moved to other companies within the industry. 
Consequently, because of these facets of railways’ primary ILMs, Wilson and Thomson argued 
that before 1914 they had a ‘highly introverted approach to [management] recruitment,’ while 
Pollins stated railway managers were in-bred. Nevertheless, Gourvish did argue that between 
1850 and 1922 a significant number of British railways’ chief executives had had employment 
experiences outside of the industry at some point in their careers.44   
 
It should also be considered, as Kingsford and Bagwell argued, that as the railway industry 
matured clerks’ promotional prospects within primary ILMs decreased as managers shrunk as a 
proportion of railway employees. Indeed, Savage statistically showed that GWR employees took 
longer to be promoted into supervisory posts later in the company’s history (Station Master, 
Foreman etc.); this duration after their first promotion on average increasing from nine years 
between 1870 and 1889 to seventeen years between 1890 and 1915.45  
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These studies are, however, the extent of the existing research on British railway companies’ 
primary ILMs between 1870 and 1914, and there has never been a dedicated study on the 
subject. This is surprising given that the products of these labour markets, the industry’s senior 
managers, were important influences on railways’ financial performance in the period. Therefore, 
by analysing in detail the LSWR’s primary ILM between 1870 and 1911, this thesis is a significant 
first study of this topic.   
 
Traffic Manager’s outlooks 
 
Indeed, building on this research, this thesis explores how the LSWR’s primary ILM shaped senior 
traffic managers’ perspectives on railway management and policy between 1870 and 1911.  
 
It was generally recognised from the 1890s that railways’ rigidly hierarchical primary ILMs 
produced managers whose experience of the many facets of railway work was limited, as was 
their capacity to think creatively. George Gibb, the NER’s General Manager between 1891 and 
1906, felt managers who had risen through the company’s ranks possessed a ‘narrowness of 
vision.’ 46 Stephenson, a lecturer at the London School of Economics (LSE) Railway Department, 
stated in 1911 that the clerks who attended his lectures came ‘from a variety of departments and 
offices. In many cases their knowledge of railway work is confined strictly to the limits of work 
done in their own departments, and often to only a small section of such work. Of the rest of the 
work of the railway they are supremely ignorant.’47 
  
The inability of British railway managers to think creatively and innovate has been recognised 
more recently by scholars between 1870 and 1914. Gourvish suggested that to some extent 
within the industry there was ‘excessive adherence to tradition and a consequent fear of 
innovation,’ and managers were not incentivised to ‘act opportunistically.’ Consequently, 
operating practices established in the 1870s and 1880s were not modernised. Indeed, with 
creativity limited in the industry it is unsurprising that Arnold and McCartney called the whole 
period between 1870 and 1914 one of ‘structural stasis.’48 Nevertheless, as Thomson and Wilson 
argued of British industry generally, it was hard for companies to change recruitment patterns 
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given the ‘highly path-dependent nature of British management history’ and ‘the strength of the 
embedded processes that persisted for so long.’49  
 
Nonetheless, despite the consensus that railway managers were institutionalised and 
conservative in outlook by the late nineteenth-century, only Irving’s study of the NER suggested 
how this thinking directly affected a railway’s policies and financial performance. This thesis 
therefore attempts to do this in the LSWR’s case, adding a valuable second study to the 
literature. Indeed, it does this at the same time as determining the effect on its financial 
performance of the degree of alignment between managers’ and directors’ views on corporate 
policy and strategy. 
 
1.8. General Managers, traffic managers and other agents within the firm  
 
Given that this thesis argues that the LSWR’s financial performance between 1870 and 1911 was 
principally determined by those at the organisation’s head, it importantly establishes how 
department heads’ actions may have influenced corporate policies. Principally, scholars have 
discussed how department heads’ actions negatively affected railways’ profitability in the period.  
 
Because department heads had almost complete authority within their functionally independent 
departments, conflicts could possibly arise between them where their interests overlapped. 
Bonavia described one such conflict. When planning train movements Traffic Departments, 
headed by superintendents of the line, would require use of variable numbers of locomotives at 
different times of the year dependent on seasonal traffic levels. Yet, locomotive superintendents, 
who usually managed companies’ locomotive works, needed to plan locomotive maintenance so 
as not to overwhelm the works or render them idle. They therefore preferred locomotives to 
enter the works at a steady rate through the year. As such, Bonavia argued there was a tendency 
for ‘friction to develop’ between these department heads as they were required to manage the 
company’s locomotives in different ways. Indeed, he stated that in some cases inter-
departmental conflicts continued for years, damaging corporate efficiency.50 
 
Scholars have also suggested that department heads could harm companies’ efficient operation 
in other ways. Bonavia argued they could possibly become overly concerned with the operational 
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efficiency of their own departments, neglecting consideration of the company’s overall revenue 
position.51  Channon concurred, stating that because departments were ‘strong and isolated’ that 
for the ‘spending departments’, such as engineering, ‘technical efficiency and engineering values 
were stressed rather than financial costs.’ He considered that Locomotive Superintendents 
particularly may have self-identified as having an elevated ‘professional identity.’52 
Unsurprisingly, Gibb recognised that such issues existed within the NER, and Irving stated its 
functional department structure meant that the inherent:  
 
…separation made for excessive sectional loyalty with each department regarding its 
particular function as an end in itself. By carrying out functions with regard to 
departmental rather than functional interests…waste and extravagance was often 
the result.53 
 
It was the problems with railways’ traditional functional structures that Gibb was trying to solve 
when he reorganised the NER’s departments into ‘commercial’ and ‘operating’ functions in 1902 
(see section 1.2). Irving argued that the new arrangement contributed to improving the 
company’s efficiency by ‘eliminating dual control and clarifying [operating and commercial] 
functions along their natural lines.’ However, despite the restructuring, the Locomotive and 
Engineering Departments’ position remained unchanged, and with each department answering 
to ‘their own head and conscious of its own importance, full efficiency was not achieved.’ Thus, 
while some efficiency gains resulted from Gibb’s reorganisation of the NER’s structure, the 
operating weaknesses of British railways’ traditional functional structures were never 
eliminated.54 
 
The existence within railways that utilised functional department structures of the issues outlined 
suggests that responsibility for getting department chiefs to cooperate and consider issues 
beyond their departments lay with those at the organisation’s head: the directors and General 
Managers. Yet, Channon stated the extent to which General Manager had the ‘authority, skill and 
energy’ to persuade department heads to cooperate was unclear.55   Furthermore, both he and 
Bonavia argued that because department heads met directly with board sub-committees, which 
oversaw particular company functions, they could directly influence the decisions directors made 
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in their favour or in ways that conflicted with the goals of the General Manager or other decision-
makers. This too had the potential to weaken companies’ internal cohesiveness, efficiency and 
profitability.56 
 
In sum, this is the extent of the scholarship on how department heads’ actions and objectives 
possibly affected British railways’ financial performance between 1870 and 1914. Yet, few studies 
have presented specific examples of where department heads acted in ways that damaged their 
companies’ efficiency and internal cohesion. The importance of this thesis is, therefore, that it 
presents such examples in the LSWR’s case between 1870 and 1911. 
 
 
1.9. Knowledge and decision-making within the British railway industry 1870 to 1914 
 
It should also be considered that between 1870 and 1914 railway companies’ performance was 
not solely related to who was making decisions or the organisational frameworks within which 
decision-makers worked. The quality of the information they possessed about the potential 
trade, possible revenues and costs of enacting policies or making investments was an important 
issue as this helped guide the decisions they made. Nevertheless, like other areas of the 
literature mentioned above, Channon argued the subject has been touched on little.57 Despite 
scholars talking at length about the defective decisions and strategies employed by industry 
leaders (see Section 1.12), few have discussed the knowledge and information that underpinned 
them.  
 
The little discussion there has been focused on the nineteenth-century railway companies’ lack of 
project appraisal and long-term planning. Gourvish argued that in the period ‘project appraisal 
was inadequately developed within most [railway] companies’; while Pollins contended there 
was a ‘general lack of statistical information on which decisions were made’ and ‘one looks in 
vain for examples of forward planning or for the use of accounts as aids to management 
decisions.’58 
 
Channon’s work on the Midland Railway’s extension to London, opened in 1869, is the only study 
that has provided detailed analysis of the information a railway company’s decision-makers used 
when formulating a major investment decision. He argued that those who drove forward the 
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decision, the General Manager and a small group of directors, could not be considered traditional 
‘profit maximisers’ as their ‘knowledge of costs, revenues and alternatives was either too 
rudimentary or too incomplete to form the basis of accurate profit forecasts.’ Construction costs, 
especially in London, were also particularly hard to predict. Nonetheless, Channon argued that 
detailed project appraisal was not undertaken because ‘the disciplining role of the market was 
limited’ and the ‘availability of investment funds and shareholder passivity freed the decision-
makers from making rigorous predictions of profitability.’59 This case therefore supports Crafts, 
Leunig, Mulatu and Mills’ arguments that before 1900 railway decision-makers possessed 
considerable freedom of action because the extent to which they were constrained by the 
market, legislation or shareholders was limited.60 
 
Consequently, scholars generally accept that before 1914 British railways’ decision-makers only 
possessed rudimentary information regarding the cost of and potential revenues that could be 
generated from their ventures. This thesis therefore adds to this literature by establishing what 
information the LSWR’s decision-makers possessed when making decisions between 1870 and 
1911, and how this influenced the quality of the company’s investment policies and 
management.  
 
1.10. Conclusion 
 
This section has repeatedly demonstrated that the existing scholarship on British railway 
management between 1870 and 1914 is very limited. Consequently, it is not completely 
understood how companies were managed, which factors influenced the decisions industry 
leaders took, and how these things directly affected railways’ profitability. Therefore, by 
examining how the LSWR’s policies, strategies and management practices shaped its financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911, this thesis is a valuable addition to the existing literature. 
Most importantly, the thesis will feed into wider debates surrounding the causes of the British 
railway industry’s declining performance in this period. Indeed, interest in this subject has been 
recently renewed, re-igniting debates that occurred intermittently between the 1960s and 1980s. 
These debates will now be discussed. 
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Section 2 – British railway industry performance - 1870-1914 
 
1.11. British railway industry profitability, 1870-1914 
 
Table 1: The return on capital employed of Britain's fifteen largest railways 1870-1910. Source: Brian 
Mitchell, David Chambers, and Nick Crafts, ‘How good was the profitability of British railways 1870-
1912?’, Economic History Review, 64 (2011), p.806 
 
The British railway industry’s declining profitability after 1870 is undisputed, as many scholars 
including as Dodgson, Arnold and McCartney and Gourvish have argued.61 Mitchell, Chambers 
and Crafts recently calculated the return on paid up capital (ROCE) and return on actual capital 
spent (ROCS) of the industry’s fifteen largest companies between 1870 and 1910. As Table 1 
shows these both declined between 1870 and 1900, after which there was a slight increase. It is 
these changes that have interested scholars.62 
 
1.12. Possible internal influences that diminished industry profitability, 1870-1900 
 
There is no consensus on what diminished British railways’ profitability before 1900. 
Nevertheless, the majority of scholars have blamed companies’ defective management – 
although, which aspect of their management they place the greatest blame on has been 
disputed. Consequently, by establishing which policies and management practices most impacted 
on the LSWR’s financial performance between 1870 and 1911, the thesis contributes towards 
resolving these debates. 
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Year 
Percentage 
return on paid-up 
capital 
(ROCE) 
Percentage 
return on paid-up 
capital (5-year 
moving average) 
Percentage 
return on capital 
expended 
(ROCS) 
Percentage 
return on capital 
expended (5-year 
moving average) 
1870 4.90 - 5.43 - 
1875 4.99 4.95 5.50 5.49 
1880 4.93 4.84 5.49 5.39 
1885 4.64 4.73 5.09 5.19 
1890 4.84 4.80 5.22 5.16 
1895 4.57 4.32 4.87 4.59 
1900 4.41 4.46 4.58 4.65 
1905 4.41 4.41 4.56 4.57 
1910 4.56 4.46 4.73 4.62 
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Some scholars, such as Aldcroft and Dodgson, argued that railways’ damaged their profitability 
and performance after 1870 through the construction of weakly performing lines. This built in 
excess capacity into the British railway network, as Casson demonstrated. He constructed a 
counterfactual railway network that served every location the real one did in 1914, but which  
possessed 7,000 fewer route miles and cost twenty-five percent less capital.63 Two reasons this 
excess network capacity was built have been suggested. Cain and Dodgson argued that 
companies constructed lines for competitive reasons or for territorial defence.64 Indeed, Casson 
argued that many routes constructed to keep competitors out of territories deliberately linked 
towns directly to keep construction costs down, meaning they bypassed communities where 
profitable trade potentially could have been developed.65 Alternatively, Irving and Hodgkins 
argued that companies built unremunerative or poorly performing lines for non-competitive 
reasons, such as filling gaps in their network or serving specific customers. 66  
 
How excess network capacity and poorly performing lines actually diminished British railways’ 
ROCEs and profitability is unclear, although some scholars have argued the affect was minimal. 
Drawing on a very small number of cases, Gourvish argued the capital the railways of Sir Edward 
Watkin and James Staats Forbes’ spent on lines that generated poor returns between 1870 and 
1899 was modest, suggesting they only lowered the companies’ ROCEs by small amounts. 
Hodgkins also contended that the effect of line building competition on the profitability of the 
South Eastern (SER) and London, Chatham and Dover Railways (LCDR) was ‘overdone.’67  Arnold 
and McCartney disputed completely the idea that industry decision-makers purposefully 
constructed poorly performing lines. They argued that given the British railway network was 
mostly completed by 1872 companies’ rates of return were not large enough to allow the 
construction of inevitably unremunerative lines. In cases where they were built this was 
unplanned.68   
 
Another proposed explanation for the British railway industry’s declining profitability after 1870 
was that decision-makers abandoned profit maximisation and shareholder’s interests, while 
favouring other objectives. Arnold and McCartney, Channon, Gourvish and Irving have all argued 
                                                          
63
 Mark Casson, The World's First Railway System: Enterprise, Competition, and Regulation on the Railway 
Network in Victorian Britain, (Oxford, 2009) p.104 
64
 Dodgson, ‘New, disaggregated, British railway total factor productivity growth estimates, 1875 to 1912’, 
p.639; Derek H. Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition, (London, 1968), p.9-14  
65
 Casson, The world’s first railway system, p.307-308 
66
 Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, p.180; Hodgkins, The Second Railway King, p.48  
67
 T.R. Gourvish, ‘The Performance of British Railway Management after 1860: The Railways of Watkin and 
Forbes’, Business History, 20 (1978), p.192-193; Hodgkins, The Second Railway King, p.639 
68
 Arnold, and McCartney, ‘Rates of return’, p.56 
36 
 
that to some extent railways tailored policies to the communities and businesses they served, 
reducing their profitability. This was in an effort to preserve their commercial freedom by 
placating traders and parliament’s demands over rates and safety, especially as the latter 
increasingly legislated on these things after 1870 (see below).69 
 
Other scholars have argued that after 1870 railways’ decision-makers pursued personal goals at 
the expense of profit maximisation. Cain contended that while decision-makers kept profits and 
dividends high enough not to rouse investor ire (profit satisficing), they adopted strategies and 
policies they personally desired, for example maintaining unnecessarily high technical standards, 
furthering company growth or building lines that served their other business interests. Crafts, 
Mills and Mulatu similarly argued that improvements in railways’ operational practices after 1900 
showed that before then decision-makers had ‘ample opportunity’ to neglect cost reductions and 
productivity improvements while pursuing their own goals.70  
 
Some academics have attributed decreased industry profitability before 1900 to service 
competition. While Channon, Irving and Hodgkins argued that competitive rate cutting had 
mostly ended by 1870,71 most scholars agree that railways increasingly engaged in service 
competition in the 1880s in attempts to attract custom. For example, Divall and Shin argued that 
companies increased train speeds as they desired commercial advantage over rivals, while Irving 
argued that service competition after 1870 became intense, with trains increasing in speed, 
goods facilities being augmented and more luxurious passenger stock being built.72 Consequently, 
Aldcroft and Cain argued that competition was seriously damaging companies’ profitability in the 
period after 1870.73 Nevertheless, recent studies have downplayed competition’s role in reducing 
the British railways’ profitability between 1870 and 1900. Mitchell, Chambers, Mulatu, Crafts, 
Leunig and Mills argued that a lack of competition caused management failure in this period, as 
market forces – amongst other pressures acting on decision-makers - were not strong enough to 
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compel companies into eliminating operational waste and inefficiency.74 Indeed, this thesis 
presents evidence that supports this conclusion in the LSWR’s case. 
 
Numerous scholars have also attributed the railway industry’s diminished profitability between 
1870 and 1900 to factors beyond decision-makers’ control. Although, given the limited study of 
this subject and the small number of business histories on individual railway companies operating 
in the period, there is no consensus as to which external pressures most affected their financial 
performance. Ashworth contended, without presenting any substantive evidence, that in the 
1870s significant increases in high-volume low-margin traffic depressed railways’ profits as they 
generated less revenue per passenger and per ton of goods hauled.75 Surprisingly, since 
Ashworth made this argument in 1960 no known scholars have reconsidered his argument in 
detail; however, this thesis shows that the LSWR’s profit margins were, indeed, pressured by a 
growth in high-volume low-margin traffic third class passenger traffic after 1870.  
 
Scholars have also argued that increasing fuel, material and wage costs depressed companies’ 
profitability. Irving and Pollins contended that wage increases in the early 1870s grew companies’ 
operating ratios (OR - companies’ operating expenses expressed as a percentage of their gross 
receipts) and reduced their ROCEs. 76 These increases were to an extent off-set in the 1880s and 
early-1890s by falling material costs; yet rising material, wage and fuel costs in the late 1890s 
increased the industry’s expenditure to its highest ever level by 1900. Nonetheless, Gourvish and 
Cain argued it was too easy suggest changing price trends caused the industry’s declining 
profitability after 1870, preferring to blame poor operational and managerial practices.77 
 
Some scholars have also claimed that from the late-1880s augmented government legislation on 
rates and safety harmed railway companies’ profitability. Most significantly, the government 
legislated on the rates companies’ could charge for the conveyance of goods. In the 1880s 
traders increasingly complained that railways gave preferential rates to imported foreign bulk 
goods (usually foodstuffs). Consequently, in 1888 the Railway and Canal Traffic Act renamed the 
Railway Commissioners (set up in 1873 to hear trader’s complaints over rates and goods 
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facilities) to the Railway and Canal Commission and gave it powers to investigate railway 
companies’ goods classification systems and schedule of maximum charges. Its investigation 
resulted in the 1894 Railway and Canal Traffic Act which fixed the maximum rates railways could 
charge for goods haulage at 1892 levels.78 Cain argued the Act was a ‘millstone around [railway] 
companies’ necks’ as they could not raise rates to offset increased working costs in the late-
1890s.79 Kirby argued the Act ‘confronted the railway companies with vital questions of future 
strategy, especially in a general context of increasingly expensive non-price competition and 
when operating costs were on a rising trajectory.’80  
 
In the 1880s the government also introduced safety legislation in response to public pressure, 
which it could be argued drove up railways’ expenditure. Government action on safety was 
limited before 1889. The Board of Trade simply monitored companies’ usage of safety 
technology. Yet, in 1889 after the Armagh accident, in which eighty people died because of the 
absence of continuous braking on carriages (where each carriage wheel was braked when the 
locomotive brake was applied), the government rushed through parliament legislation to make 
this, interlocking points (where the actions of points and signals were interlocked to prevent 
conflicts), and block working mandatory on British railways.81 The companies were consequently 
encumbered with the cost of installing and maintaining these safety devices. Furthermore, in 
1893 the Regulation of Railways Act also attempted to limit the hours railway employees worked 
in an effort to prevent safety being compromised through their fatigue. Consequently, as the act 
reduced the length of many employees’ working day, this theoretically raised industry costs given 
companies had to employ more staff to maintain operational effectiveness. Yet, as Gourvish 
stated, the effect of the act diminished considerably after 1900 as business picked up.82  
 
Overall, academics such as Cain and Gourvish did not support the idea government legislation 
significantly reduced railway industry profitability from the 1890s onwards. 83 Recently Mitchell, 
Chambers, Crafts, Leunig, Mulatu and Mills have supported this argument, contending that 
before 1900 railways’ decision-makers were subject to weak governmental and regulatory 
pressures – in addition to few constraints on their actions from shareholders and the market – 
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and, consequently, they were not under pressure from this source to regularly reassess or reform 
existing management practices, leading to cost inefficiencies developing within the industry.84 
Nevertheless, few studies have examined how government legislation actually affected 
companies’ profitability, meaning that this thesis, which attempts to achieve this in the LSWR’s 
case, is an important addition to the literature. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This survey of literature has revealed scholars have attributed the British railway industry’s 
declining profitability between 1870 and 1900 to numerous factors. But apart from Irving’s work, 
no study has comprehensively assessed which factors most affected industry performance or 
ruled out those that did not. This thesis’ importance is that it adds clarity to existing debates by 
demonstrating how it was the policies and strategies the LSWR’s senior managers and directors 
enacted that had the greatest bearing on the company’s financial performance before 1900. It 
does, nonetheless, demonstrate that some external factors, particularly the growth in high-
volume low-margin traffic after 1870, did lower the LSWR’s profitability; while also ruling out the 
idea that after 1889 government legislation significantly impacted on company costs.  
 
1.13. Improvements in the management of the British railway industry, 1900-1914 
 
From the late-1890s onwards numerous factors negatively impacted on the British railway 
industry’s financial performance. These included an inability to raise capital,85 augmented 
government legislation, rising fuel and material prices, slowing traffic growth and increased union 
activity. Scholars generally agree that in the face of these new challenges railways innovated and 
found efficiencies as they were forced to reassess, adapt and reform their operating practices.  
 
Principally, scholars including Crafts, Leunig, Mulatu, Irving, Gourvish and Pollins have argued 
that after 1900 railways attempted to reduce expenditure through improving train operations’ 
efficiency. Pollins, for example, mentioned that companies built larger locomotives and higher 
capacity wagons, while others introduced electrical and pneumatic methods of signalling. Irving 
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argued the NER’s goods services became substantially more efficient after 1900, with improved 
management statistics and larger wagons being introduced.86  
 
Additionally, Irving and Cain argued that railways attempted to reduce expenditure through 
comprehensive working agreements, where resources were pooled, facilities were shared and, 
most importantly, service competition was eliminated.  For example, the LNWR, Lancashire and 
Yorkshire (L&YR) and Midland Railways affected savings through such arrangements. Indeed, Cain 
argued that by 1910 the country was effectively divided into six railway groups. Channon also 
contended that railways explored creating pooling agreements, despite governments looking 
unfavourably on their efforts to temper competition through such means.87 
 
Nevertheless, after 1900 decision-makers were not always successful in improving railway 
companies’ performance, and Crafts, Mills, Mutual,, Leunig and Dodgson all argued the industry’s 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth fell in the period. The reason for this has not been clarified 
in the literature, but one explanation can be suggested. Irving contended that after 1900 
railways’ freedom of action was constrained by limited capital supplies, with large quantities 
going to fund overseas railways and other businesses in Britain’s growing corporate economy. 
Consequently, this factor caused the NER and LNWR to delay the adoption of electric traction on 
some lines, and therefore this suggests that capital supply shortages to some extent contributed 
to railways’ TFP growth falling in the period.88   
 
Irving did not absolve decision-makers of all responsibility for the NER and LNWR’s delay in 
adopting electric traction; he believed they failed to fully acknowledge its benefits. The LNWR’s 
General Manager was reluctant to raise interest rates to increase capital returns that would pay 
for it, and the NER lacked strategic momentum after George Gibb’s departure as general 
manager in 1906. To some extent, he argued, managerial failure continued within the LNWR and 
NER after 1900, despite senior company officials being pressured by the changed trading 
environment to improve their management quality and innovate.89  
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I have shown that the scholarship pertaining to the management of the British railway industry 
between 1900 and 1914 is very limited. It has not been decisively established how the operating 
reforms senior industry leaders implemented directly influenced companies’ performance. 
Consequently, by analysing in detail the LSWR’s management and policies after 1900, this thesis 
suggests better than previous studies how companies possibly responded to the changed trading 
environment they faced. 
 
Section 3 – Case study selection 
 
This thesis’ analysis of the LSWR’s management quality and financial performance between 1870 
and 1911 is a valuable addition to the existing literature for three reasons. Firstly, the existing 
scholarship on British railways’ management between 1870 and 1914 has largely focussed on 
how railways north of London were managed, while neglecting companies operating in the 
southern part of the country where the trading environment was different. Secondly, academics 
have largely examined the management of companies that were exceptional in some way. Yet, 
because the LSWR was never considered an excellent or poor performer financially within the 
British railway industry between 1870 and 1911, studying it provides information on the policies 
and strategies adopted by a company that was not an industry leader, nor an industry failure. 
Lastly, the company’s financial performance was very varied between 1870 and 1911, and, thus, 
analysing what caused these results provides suggestions as to what constituted ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
railway management in the period.
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Figure 2. LSWR network in 1890, Source: ‘Afterbrunel’, File: Lswr map 
1890.gif, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Lswr_map_1890.gif, 
8 September 2007 
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1.14. The literature’s neglect of southern British railways 
 
To begin to fully explain why studying the LSWR’s management between 1870 and 1911 is 
significant to the historiography, it is important to briefly describe the company’s history and the 
nature of its business.  After 1870 the British railway industry was dominated by fifteen major 
companies (fourteen after 1899) that in that year generated 88.7 percent of the industry’s 
output. By 1910 this figure had only marginally increased to 89.6 percent.90  These companies, 
which in 1885 controlled 81.14 percent of the nation’s route mileage,91 had oligopolistic control 
over the territories they served.  
 
The LSWR, nicknamed the ‘Royal Road’ presumably because it conveyed royalty frequently (the 
reason is unknown), was one of Britain’s fifteen largest companies between 1870 and 1911, and 
by market value it was the ninth largest in 1904/5.92 It was also throughout its history (1838-
1922) the largest railway in terms of geographical size and market value serving Britain’s 
southern regions.  Like many British railways, by 1870 the company had already built, leased or 
was working all of the lines that made up the core of its network until 1914. Its London terminus 
was Waterloo Station; it served a dense inner commuter zone and was connected to the south 
coast at Southampton, Portsmouth and Bournemouth. Indeed, it was, to a small degree, in 
competition with coastal shipping for traffic between London and the south coast, especially 
after the 1890s.93 Furthermore, it also operated lines to the West Country which served Exeter 
and Dorchester, and it frequently competed with the GWR for passenger traffic to these places. 
After 1870 the company both grew and consolidated its network. By the 1890s it had purchased 
most of the lines it leased or worked. It also had leased (with the Midland) the Somerset and 
Dorset Railway (SDR) in 1876 and opened the ‘new’ Guildford line in 1885.  The company 
extended its lines westward in the 1890s, connecting to Plymouth in 1890, Bude in 1898 and the 
furthest point west it reached was Padstow in 1899. Furthermore, it consolidated its territory by 
opening the Basingstoke and Alton Light Railway in 1901 and the Meon Valley line in 1903. Lastly, 
in 1892 the LSWR acquired the Southampton Dock Company (SDC), the largest single capital 
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expense in its history. It subsequently developed this into one of Britain’s major trading ports.94 
Therefore, while the LSWR’s network developed between 1870 and 1911, it never extended its 
lines or operations beyond the south of the country, or served many heavily industrialised 
regions.  
Table 2: Proportion of train miles run by passenger and goods trains on eight principal British railway 
companies in 1872, 1885 and 1897. Source: Board of Trade railway returns. 
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Railway 
Company 
1872 1885 1898 
Passenger Goods Passenger Goods Passenger Goods 
So
u
th
e
rn
 
London & 
South 
Western  
5,177,012 1,899,329 8,239,965 3,129,279 12,424,574 4,633,649 
73.2% 26.8% 72.5% 27.5% 72.8% 27.2% 
London, 
Brighton 
& South 
Coast 
4,294,533 839,035 6,725,104 1,411,797 8,523,726 1,933,225 
83.7% 16.3% 82.7% 17.4% 81.5% 18.5% 
South 
Eastern 
3,468,930 791,595 5,248,610 1,442,026 6,951,803 2,193,013 
81.4% 18.6% 78.5% 21.6% 76.0% 24.0% 
Total 
12,940,475 3,529,959 20,213,679 5,983,102 27,900,103 8,759,887 
78.6% 21.4% 77.2% 22.8% 76.1% 23.9% 
                
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
 
Lancashire 
& 
Yorkshire 
5,607,118 5,120,357 8,348,265 5,598,017 11,874,754 6,648,999 
52.3% 47.7% 59.9% 40.1% 64.1% 35.9% 
London & 
North 
Western 
13,760,992 15,074,924 19,823,887 18,395,935 25,483,452 22,065,200 
47.7% 52.3% 51.9% 48.1% 53.6% 46.4% 
Midland 
Railway 
7,090,532 12,071,918 13,867,257 19,706,141 18,358,699 27,711,617 
37.0% 63.0% 41.3% 58.7% 39.9% 60.2% 
North 
British 
3,627,940 4,602,480 5,344,192 6,338,390 8,801,802 8,446,014 
44.1% 55.9% 45.7% 54.3% 51.0% 49.0% 
North 
Eastern 
6,572,831 12,203,287 9,896,548 13,264,698 14,093,698 16,800,086 
35.0% 65.0% 42.7% 57.3% 45.6% 54.4% 
Total 
36,659,413 49,072,966 57,280,149 63,303,181 78,612,405 81,671,916 
42.8% 57.2% 47.5% 52.5% 49.1% 51.0% 
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Consequently, the nature of the LSWR’s trade was decidedly different to that of railways serving 
industrialised, mainly northern areas of Britain, and Table 2 shows that like other southern 
companies a greater proportion of its train mileage was run conveying passengers compared to 
goods. Because of this, the majority of the LSWR’s capital expenditure after 1870 went on 
adapting its infrastructure to accommodate growing passenger numbers, which rose from 13.3 
million in 1870 to 63.7 million in 1901 (362.62 percent). For example, Waterloo Station was 
enlarged in 1878 and 1885, and a complete rebuilding of it was begun in 1900 (this was 
completed in 1922). Capacity issues on its main lines near London also led to widening projects 
being initiated in 1878 and 1897.95 The LSWR’s dependence on passenger traffic for its financial 
success is revealed by the fact that the most significant threat to its profitability after 1870 was 
when suburban passengers deserted the railway for new tram systems after 1901. Indeed, by 
February 1913 the railway was losing £100,000 and one million passengers to them yearly.96 
 
 
When compared to northern railways a greater proportion of the LSWR’s business was passenger 
conveyance, and it is reasonable to suggest that between 1870 and 1911 the company may have 
been managed differently to them also. Yet, this currently cannot be ascertained as scholars have 
largely neglected analysing the management and financial performance of southern British 
railways during this period. For example, Irving wrote an economic history of the NER and also 
studied the electrification prospects of it and the LNWR (both companies serving the north); 
Gourvish studied Mark Huish’s general managership of the LNWR; Channon’s work has focussed 
on the GWR (serving the West of England and Wales) and the Midland Railway; Barker studied 
Lord Salisbury’s reforms of the GER’s management (serving East Anglia); while Dodgson’s 
econometric work focussed on five northern railways: the GCR, L&YR, LNWR, NER and Midland. 
Only Gourvish’s analysis of the railways of Watkin and Forbes has discussed the management of 
southern companies, these being the SER and LCDR. 97 
 
Overall, because scholars have largely focussed their attention on the management of railways 
serving northern and industrial regions of the country, the management of southern companies 
operating within a distinct business and trading environment, and whose decision-makers 
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possibly responded to challenges in alternative ways, has been neglected in the literature.  My 
study of the LSWR’s management and financial performance between 1870 and 1911 is therefore 
a valuable addition to the literature for this reason. 
 
 
1.15. The bad, the good and the average: the LSWR’s position in the industry 1870-1914 
 
The virtue of studying the LSWR’s management quality between 1870 and 1911 is not simply the 
company’s geographical location; its financial performance in the period also makes it an 
interesting subject of analysis.Prior to this study scholars have principally assessed nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century railway companies where a feature of their management marked 
them out as being of particular interest. Research has been undertaken on companies that 
excelled or innovated; for example, Irving studied the NER which was considered by many to be 
Britain’s best managed company between 1891 and 1914. Other work has focussed companies 
within which dynamic or interesting personalities were working, such as Hodgkins’ study of Sir 
Edward Watkin’s life, Braine’s biography of the LNWR’s chairman Richard Moon, or Baker’s study 
of Lord Salisbury’s chairmanship of GER. Companies with cultural gravitas have also been looked 
at and Channon researched the GWR extensively. 98  Lastly, companies perceived to have 
performed poorly have also been of interest, for example Gourvish analysed the railways of 
Watkin and Forbes.99  
 
However, up to the current time the LSWR has been overlooked by academics. This may initially 
suggest the company was managerially and financially unremarkable between 1870 and 1914. 
Indeed, Klapper expressed this sentiment by stating that in 1912 it was ‘endowed with some 
qualities of Victorian greatness streaked with some excessively drab patches.’100 Yet, the LSWR is 
a worthy subject of study because compared to other British railways its financial performance 
was highly variable between 1870 and 1911. The best available measures of the LSWR’s financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911 are its return on capital employed (ROCE), return on 
capital spent (ROCS) and operating ratio (OR). Initially, it is important to note how these figures 
were calculated. Mitchell, Chambers and Crafts calculated more accurately than previous studies 
the ROCEs of Britain’s fifteen largest railways and produced two sets of figures for this using 
different definitions of ‘capital employed’ (five year moving averages). Their first set of figures in 
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Table A, Appendix 1.1, shows the railways’ ROCEs excluding all debt and interest charges, which 
most companies charged to revenue, and nominal additions to capital, which inflated the actual 
capital at their disposal. Added to this was the balance of payments and discounts on stock issues 
and the capital of, and subscriptions to, smaller companies they operated, as these enhanced 
their revenue earning capacity.  Table B (Appendix 1.1) shows the companies’ return on capital 
expended (which I have designated for the rest of the thesis ROCS, the ‘S’ representing 
‘spent’).101  Finally, I have extracted from the Board of Trade’s Railway Returns102 figures for the 
railways’ ORs (Table C Appendix 1.2), which are their operating expenditure expressed as a 
proportion of their revenue and, thus, show the amount of profit companies had at their disposal 
for dividends or re-investment. These measures will now be used to briefly survey the LSWR’s 
financial performance between 1870 and 1911 compared to other British railway companies. 
 
Throughout Scott’s general managership (1870-1884) the LSWR was one of the poorest 
performing British railway companies. However, Table A shows that its ROCE scores were 
generally mid-ranked between 1870 and 1889. This did not indicate that the company was 
managed adequately in the period. Rather, while the return on the capital the company raised 
was adequate, the return on that which was spent was less good. Indeed, as Chapter 4 shows, 
the LSWR was managed very poorly after 1870 because of deficient internal coordination of the 
company’s departments by senior decision-makers and the persistence of out-dated and 
inefficient management practices. Reflecting this, compared to other major British railways the 
LSWR’s ROCS was poorly ranked before 1887, as Table B displays. It also had one of the industry’s 
highest ORs, shown in Table C. Furthermore, Figure A (Appendix 1.2) illustrates that the LSWR’s 
OR was eight percent higher than the fifteen largest companies’ average by 1885.  
 
During Charles Scotter’s general managership (1885-1897) the LSWR’s financial performance 
significantly improved. Tables A and B show that before 1890 its ROCE and ROCS followed the 
industry-wide trend of deterioration. Yet, thereafter they improved and by 1897 the company’s 
ROCE was 0.16 percent higher than it had been in 1872, while its ROCS was only 0.01 percent 
lower.103 Similarly, the LSWR’s OR also improved after 1885 and Table C shows that in this respect 
it was a mid-ranking performer from the 1890s onwards. Indeed, Figure A illustrates that 
between 1885 and 1889 the company’s OR aligned with the average of Britain’s fifteen largest 
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companies, after which it followed it closely. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the company’s 
improved financial performance after 1885 was the result of Scotter’s wide-ranging reforms of its 
administration and operations. 
 
Throughout Charles Owens’ tenure as general manager (1898-1911) the LSWR’s financial 
performance was unremarkable. Despite Tables A and B showing its ROCE and ROCS continued to 
rank highly between 1897 and 1910, unlike ten other companies and the national average they 
marginally fell in this period. Also, Table C shows that between 1897 and 1907 the company’s OR 
was ranked mid-table amongst the ORs of the industry’s fifteen largest companies, with Figure A 
illustrating that it was slightly above the average until 1910. The LSWR’s financial performance 
was unexceptional after 1900 because, as this Chapter 6 shows, the company did not initiate 
managerial reforms or innovate to the same extent other British railway companies did in the 
period. 
 
As this thesis argues, between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR’s financial performance fluctuated 
depending on how well it was managed. Thus, by contrasting the causes of the LSWR’s varied 
financial performance in this period, this thesis makes valuable new suggestions as to what 
constituted ‘good’ and ‘bad’ management practice in the British railway industry after 1870. 
These suggestions can therefore be compared with management practice in other British 
railways at the time, helping to clarify what caused the industry’s declining financial 
performance. 
 
Section 4 – The nature and format of the study 
1.16. The archival material 
 
For numerous reasons archival material pertaining to the LSWR’s management between 1870 
and 1914 is limited, as is the case with most British railway companies operating in this period. 
The company’s board and committee minute books are a major source of evidence for this thesis. 
However, those held at The National Archives and Hampshire Record Office possess gaps in their 
sequences. For example, the board minute books between 1861 and August 1876 are lost, as are 
all of the Way and Works Committee minute books. Secondly, minute books usually only note the 
final decisions directors and managers made, and rarely reference who had the greatest 
influence on the decisions, any deliberations surrounding their formulation, or the information 
that was used to make them. Furthermore, the archives contain little correspondence between 
company officials, memoranda relating to policy, or detailed reports on individual issues. 
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Consequently, to understand LSWR decision-makers’ actions better, evidence has been gathered 
from numerous other sources including diaries, anecdotal evidence, newspaper reports, staff 
records, obituaries and magazines. Moreover, from 1881 LSWR clerks ran the British railway 
industry’s first staff magazine, the South Western Gazette (SWG), which has been invaluable to 
my research. As such, I have developed a good understanding of what influenced the LSWR’s 
financial performance were between 1870 and 1911. 
 
1.17. Thesis plan 
 
This chapter has repeatedly demonstrated this thesis’ importance to the debate on the causes of 
the British railway industry’s declining profitability between 1870 and 1914. This last section 
details how the next five chapters collectively analyse the influences on the LSWR’s financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911. 
 
Chapter 2 details the nature and development of the LSWR’s management structures between 
1864 and 1911. Firstly, it argues the company’s functional department structure was clearly 
adequate for its administrative requirements. However, it also demonstrates that the structure 
frequently undermined the company’s business performance. Because it concentrated decision-
making authority at the organisation’s head, the company’s management quality was largely 
dependent on the changeable skills, experiences and relationships between its directors and 
senior managers. Additionally, the structure also meant that many individuals stayed for decades 
in posts where they had little criticism of their actions and almost complete authority over those 
below them, and, thus, there was a natural tendency for their thinking on railway management 
to stagnate or become conservative in nature, meaning established practices were not frequently 
reassessed or, where necessary, reformed. This tendency was only mitigated by when new senior 
managers were appointed from external sources. Overall, by describing the features of the 
LSWR’s management structure between 1870 and 1911, this chapter’s findings underpin those 
later in the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 considers how LSWR senior traffic managers’ and directors’ backgrounds and careers 
influenced the quality of the company’s management between 1870 and 1911. The chapter’s first 
section argues that traffic managers had rigid and introvert career paths before reaching 
influential positions. Most had few employment experiences outside of the Traffic Department, 
or even the section of it in which they worked, the result being that their views on railway 
management were narrow, they were deferential to authority and had limited capacity to 
innovate. Thereafter, LSWR directors’ activities inside and outside the company are discussed. It 
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is argued that between 1870 and 1880 most directors were active in the company’s affairs 
because few had business interests outside it. Moreover, between 1898 and 1911 the majority of 
LSWR directors had too many business commitments to become heavily engaged with the 
company, while a small number were particularly active because they lacked these demands on 
their time.  
 
Chapter 4 looks the LSWR’s profitability and performance during Archibald Scott’s general 
managership between 1870 and 1884. Firstly, the chapter demonstrates how the company’s poor 
financial performance in this period was not principally caused by network extensions, the 
purchase of lines it was leasing or working, or government legislation. Rather, the company was 
managed inefficiently. Its departments were inadequately coordinated and overseen, firstly by 
the directorate until around 1881 and then by Scott thereafter, and it lacked an overarching 
strategic direction throughout the period. Most importantly, Scott, who became Traffic Manager 
in 1852, persisted with using outdated and highly inefficient operational methods in the Traffic 
Department because since that time he had never been challenged to reform them. Ultimately, 
this chapter argues that directors’ and senior managers’ managerial failings chiefly caused the 
LSWR’s poor financial performance between 1870 and 1884. Although, will be noted that the 
company’s profitability was also depressed by growing high-volume, low-margin third class 
passenger traffic and wage increases. 
 
Chapter 5’s subject is the LSWR’s profitability and performance during Charles Scotter’s general 
managership between 1885 and 1897. Scotter vastly improved the company’s fortunes by 
positioning himself at the apex of its management structure and gaining authority over the 
department heads. From there he coordinated the departments’ activities and got them working 
together towards his goals of economisation and expanding the business. Consequently, by 1892 
the LSWR was one of Britain’s best performing railway companies, and because the directors 
trusted Scotter as a result he soon gained control of the company’s investment policies which, 
ultimately, led to it purchasing the Southampton Docks in 1892.  Overall, while not all decisions 
Scotter made benefitted the LSWR’s profitability, this chapter argues that the company’s 
improved financial performance after 1885 was principally the result of his strong leadership. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 6 examines what caused the LSWR’s unremarkable financial performance 
between 1898 and 1911. After 1900, like all British railway companies, the LSWR’s profitability 
was diminished because its trading circumstances changed; material, wage and fuel costs had 
increased, capital became harder to access, and traffic growth slowed, chiefly because its 
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suburban passenger services were competing with new electric trams. The company’s decision-
makers did innovate and find some economies in response. Nonetheless, because its highly active 
directors had been with the concern for decades (both as directors and managers) and most 
senior traffic managers had passed through the Traffic Department’s rigid promotional 
structures, both groups of decision-makers held narrow and somewhat conservative views on 
railway management, policy and strategy. Consequently, potential operational efficiencies were 
not effected and, most importantly, the electrification of the company’s suburban lines, which 
was considered the best means of winning passengers back from the trams, was unnecessarily 
delayed after 1905. Ultimately, the chapter shows that underpinning the LSWR’s unremarkable 
financial performance between 1898 and 1911 was decision-makers’ inability to completely 
reform their embedded thinking on railway management. 
 
The conclusion summarises the thesis’ main findings, shows how they move on debates over the 
British railway industry’s declining profitability and performance between 1870 and 1914, and 
discusses where my work has highlighted avenues for future research. 
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Section 5 – Appendices 
1.1 British Railways’ Rates of Return on capital employed (5-year moving average centred on 
year shown %)  
 
A) Adjusted Paid-Up Capital of All Lines Worked Basis 
Railway Company 1872 1877 1882 1887 1892 1897 1902 1907 1910 
Caledonian 4.73 4.78 4.29 4.38 4.14 4.48 4.07 3.93 3.89 
Great Eastern 3.62 3.62 4.00 4.16 3.96 4.33 4.17 4.17 4.00 
Great Northern 5.86 5.03 5.12 5.09 4.72 4.51 4.28 4.40 4.49 
Great Western 5.00 4.47 4.67 4.67 4.64 4.59 4.52 4.61 4.73 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 6.23 5.20 4.61 4.14 3.95 4.24 3.78 3.92 3.97 
London & North Western 6.23 5.52 5.64 5.35 5.17 5.33 4.84 4.97 5.11 
London & South Western 5.12 5.34 5.11 4.86 5.05 5.28 4.80 4.77 4.73 
London, Brighton & South 
Coast 
3.80 4.45 4.31 5.08 5.31 5.26 4.74 4.65 4.72 
London, Chatham & Dover 1.75 2.11 2.40 2.34 2.43 2.73 2.70 2.67 2.84 
Manchester, Sheffield & 
Lincolnshire* 
5.01 5.12 5.11 4.83 4.41 3.54 3.09 3.53 3.67 
Midland 5.85 5.31 5.34 5.17 5.02 4.99 4.56 4.48 4.69 
North British 3.56 4.40 4.15 4.40 4.12 4.51 4.57 4.36 4.29 
North Eastern 6.17 5.47 5.78 4.96 5.19 5.13 4.91 5.15 5.21 
South Eastern 4.56 4.99 4.96 4.80 4.53 4.47 3.46 3.38 3.59 
Taff Vale 7.61 7.30 9.05 8.01 5.93 5.78 5.92 6.57 6.24 
Average 5.11 4.83 4.89 4.74 4.35 4.67 4.34 4.39 4.46 
LSWR Rank 7th 4th 6th 7th 5th 3rd 4th 4th 4th 
 
B) Cumulative Capital Expenditure of All Lines Worked Basis 
Railway Company 1872 1877 1882 1887 1892 1897 1902 1907 1910 
Caledonian 5.31 5.19 4.65 4.65 4.37 4.60 4.09 3.88 3.79 
Great Eastern 3.90 3.88 4.08 4.03 3.88 4.29 4.14 4.16 3.97 
Great Northern 5.46 4.77 4.82 4.75 4.49 4.32 4.11 4.19 4.25 
Great Western 5.03 4.65 4.80 4.81 4.68 4.52 4.41 4.43 4.54 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 6.31 5.24 4.68 4.17 3.99 4.24 3.75 3.87 3.90 
London & North Western 6.15 5.56 5.65 5.29 5.06 5.18 4.68 4.76 4.87 
London & South Western 4.97 5.17 4.90 4.61 4.77 4.96 4.54 4.44 4.42 
London, Brighton & South 
Coast 
4.41 5.02 4.81 4.86 5.05 5.08 4.44 4.35 4.36 
London, Chatham & Dover 2.03 2.54 2.85 2.78 2.87 3.17 3.05 3.08 3.33 
Manchester, Sheffield & 
Lincolnshire* 
5.33 5.31 5.24 4.90 4.40 3.48 2.88 3.34 3.53 
Midland 5.94 5.42 5.53 5.32 5.19 5.09 4.55 4.40 4.54 
North British 3.58 4.18 4.19 4.38 3.99 4.20 4.24 4.03 3.97 
North Eastern 6.19 5.38 5.66 4.80 4.75 4.79 4.45 4.59 4.61 
South Eastern 4.53 4.91 4.80 4.63 4.34 4.30 3.32 3.26 3.46 
Taff Vale 6.73 6.37 8.04 7.24 5.40 5.21 5.37 5.82 5.49 
Average 5.63 5.39 5.43 5.16 4.65 4.93 4.51 4.55 4.62 
LSWR Rank 10th 8th 6th 11th 5th 5th 4th 4th 6th 
Source: Mitchell, Chambers and Crafts, ‘How good was the profitability of British railways 1870-1912?’, 
The Economic History Review, 64 (2011), p.807 *Great Central Railway from 1897 
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1.2 British Railways’ Operating Ratio  
Table C) Operating Ratio of Britain’s fifteen largest companies (five year moving average) 
Railway Company 1872 1877 1882 1887 1892 1897 1902 1907 
Caledonian 50 50 52 49 52 51 56 56 
Great Eastern 53 56 54 53 58 58 64 64 
Great Northern 51 55 55 56 58 61 65 65 
Great Western 48 52 50 49 54 57 62 63 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 50 55 55 55 58 57 61 62 
London & North Western 49 54 51 52 56 57 63 64 
London & South Western 53 56 58 56 56 58 63 64 
London, Brighton & South Coast 50 48 50 48 51 56 60 60 
London, Chatham & Dover 57 55 53 52 55 54 
  
Manchester, Sheffield & 
Lincolnshire* 
51 51 49 51 54 57 68 66 
Midland 49 53 52 52 56 57 63 64 
North British 56 54 51 48 52 50 53 55 
North Eastern 49 53 51 53 57 59 64 64 
South Eastern 47 47 48 47 53 54 
  
South Eastern & Chatham+ 
      
62 62 
Taff Vale 54 53 51 51 59 55 58 57 
LSWR Rank =11th =14th 15th =14th =8th =12th =8th =8th 
Source: Board of Trade, Railway Returns 1870-1912, *Great Central Railway from 1897. +Formed by a 
working agreement between the South Eastern and London, Chatham and Dover Railways in 1899. 
 
Figure A) The LSWR and fifteen largest British railway companies’ Operating Ratio  1870-1910 
 
 
Source: Board of Trade, Railway Returns 1870-1912 
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Chapter 2 – The LSWR’s Management Structures 
 
This chapter analyses how the LSWR’s management structures developed between 1870 and 
1911, and how they affected the company’s management quality and financial performance. It 
has three main arguments. Firstly, the LSWR’s functional management structure was adequate 
for the company’s administrative needs. Indeed, at no point was the company’s overall corporate 
form or the major departments’ internal structures – developed between 1864 and 1872 – put 
under enough administrative stress by the company’s traffic or geographical growth for decision-
makers to consider comprehensively reforming them. There was, broadly, structural stasis within 
the LSWR between 1870 and 1911. 
 
However, Quail argued that businesses’ performance could be undermined by functional 
management structures. This was frequently so in the LSWR’s case.  As with most companies 
possessing functional forms, as Quail, Wilson and Thomson argued, within the LSWR there was 
little delegation of decision-making authority to individuals below senior management level, and 
only the company’s directors, General Managers and department heads influenced corporate 
strategy and policy.104 Consequently, between 1870 and 1911 the company’s management 
quality was determined by the often variable skills, experiences and relationships between these 
decision-makers. Indeed, particularly critical to the company’s operational cohesiveness and 
management quality was the extent to which department heads’ – who possessed considerable 
authority within their functionally isolated departments – were encouraged to work together and 
consider matters beyond their immediate remits by directors or, usually, the General Manager. 
 
Moreover, it will be argued that because the LSWR’s structure was excessively centralised, and 
senior officials could potentially occupy positions of authority for decades with a high degree of 
autonomy over their activities, there was a propensity for their thinking on railway management 
to stagnate over time, meaning established operational practices were infrequently reassessed 
and could become obsolete. Conservatism at the organisation’s head was also bolstered by few 
traffic managers having worked outside the Traffic Department. Thus, because they had only 
learnt about railway management from within the LSWR, this limited their capacity effectively 
critique existing practices or think creatively (see Chapter 3). For these reasons, between 1870 
and 1911 the LSWR’s operating practices principally advanced or were improved when new 
senior managers joined the company who had worked outside it. Indeed, as later chapters show, 
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there was little original innovation in, or development of management techniques within the 
LSWR in this period.  
 
The chapter has three parts that demonstrate these arguments. Firstly, I analyse the format of 
the LSWR’s board and sub-committee structures, which strengthened and sustained influence on 
decision-making being limited to the directors and senior managers. Thereafter, I discuss why the 
LSWR’s structures prevailed without change between 1870 and 1911, followed by an analysis of 
the structures within the company’s three main spending departments: Traffic; Locomotive, 
Carriage and Wagon; and Engineering. Lastly, and, most importantly, how the company’s overall 
corporate form undermined its operational and financial performance is assessed. 
 
Section 1 – The LSWR’s board and its committees 
 
2.1. The LSWR board and committee structures 
 
Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter argue the LSWR’s functional department structure frequently 
undermined its business effectiveness between 1870 and 1911. This was because, in large part, 
the company’s board and committee structure strengthened and sustained the input on 
operational policies being limited to the self-reinforcing directorate, the General Manager and a 
small cadre of senior managers. It is therefore important to describe these structures. 
 
The LSWR’s board and committee format – which was established in the company’s formative 
years – followed that which Bonavia argued most British railway companies possessed before 
1900.105  The LSWR’s board, which met fortnightly, was the highest decision-making authority 
within the company and technically represented the shareholders. It possessed twelve members, 
which included a chairman and a deputy chairman.106 Between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR board 
itself controlled the appointment of new directors. Before 1876 vacancies in the directorate 
were, theoretically, filled by shareholders electing replacements at half-yearly general meetings. 
Yet, in practice, when vacancies occurred the existing directors put forward applicants they had 
chosen to fill it and the proprietors’ meeting always confirmed their choices. In 1876 the LSWR’s 
Various Powers Act removed even the theoretical hold shareholders had over the board’s 
makeup, and gave the directors power to appoint individuals to vacancies as they required.107 
Therefore, between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR board controlled its own character; determining 
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the skills, knowledge, links to external businesses, and political weight it possessed. As Chapter 3 
discusses, the appointment of new directors in the period usually reflected the board’s existing 
concerns and objectives. There was almost no scope for shareholders to bring their concerns to 
bear on the board’s constitution after 1870. 
 
Additionally, the LSWR directors formed numerous sub-committees that oversaw particular 
departments, thereby allowing the board to focus on major strategic managers. Made up of 
between three or five directors and attended by the relevant chief officers, these met on the day 
or morning before board meetings. Most business related to the day-to-day running of the 
company was decided at this level: the committees’ minutes were then read and confirmed at 
the beginning of board meetings.108 The number of sub-committees varied between 1870 and 
1911. Three existed throughout; ‘Traffic’109 and ‘Engineering’110 (Way and Works before 1880), 
which oversaw the correspondingly named departments, and ‘Accounts and Finance’, which 
supervised the company’s shares, banking and accounts.111 In 1870 the Traffic Committee also 
handled the Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Department’s affairs; but the Engineering 
Committee acquired this responsibility in 1880. Then, in 1885, to improve oversight of these 
matters, Scotter obtained the establishment of an independent Locomotive Committee. This was 
formed from two members of the Engineering Committee and two members of the Traffic 
Committee (see Chapter 5).112 In 1892 a Docks Committee was established to supervise the 
Southampton Docks, which the company purchased that year.113 Other company functions, for 
example the Stores Department and steam packet services were overseen by different 
committees at different times. 
 
It is important to note that between 1870 and 1911 the Traffic Committee was the LSWR’s most 
important committee as it played a central role in determining the company’s policies and 
strategic direction. Based on information received from subordinates, senior Traffic Department 
officials formulated what the company needed to facilitate traffic movement; for instance larger 
goods yards, augmented station accommodation or more rolling stock. Once the Traffic 
Committee and General Manager (or alternatively the head of the Traffic Department when the 
General Manager was absent) had decided upon what was required, the matter would then be 
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passed to the Engineering or Locomotive Committees, depending on the request, who then 
ordered the departments they oversaw to undertake the necessary work. Furthermore, the 
Traffic Committee also supervised the company’s train timetables, the majority of the company’s 
staff, and fare structures, because these were managed by the Traffic Department’s. Therefore, 
the Traffic Committee and traffic managers were both theoretically and practically central to 
determining the LSWR’s operational strategies and policies and, to a large extent, its financial 
performance (see Chapter 3).  
 
2.2. Sustaining centralisation 
 
It was important to describe the dynamics of the company’s board and committee structures as 
these undermined the LSWR’s business effectiveness between 1870 and 1911. In this period 
most, if not all of the company’s operational decisions had to receive the oversight of the 
directors. Ordinarily the decision-making process was as follows: a problem was identified below 
senior management level, this was passed up the hierarchy to the company’s senior officials, who 
then formulated a response in consultation with the relevant committee or the board. For 
example, in November 1884 a junior Traffic Department official reported to Verrinder, the Traffic 
Superintendent, that the company had inadequate brake vans for the goods trains. After 
investigation he passed the matter to Scott, the General Manager, with the recommendation 
that twenty brake vans be built. Scott presented this suggestion to the Traffic Committee and the 
additions to rolling stock were agreed to. The matter was then passed to the Engineering 
Committee, which oversaw the Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Department at that time, which 
arranged their construction with the Locomotive Superintendent.114 Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
only one instance has been found where a senior manager enacted a policy without notifying a 
committee. Shortly after his appointment in 1895, Dugald Drummond, the Locomotive 
Superintendent, replaced the designs of a planned series of goods locomotives with his own. 
Having not been notified, the Locomotive Committee directors expressed their annoyance that 
the change had been made without their consultation.115 
 
Thus, because all the LSWR’s significant decisions required, formally, the oversight of the 
directors, this strengthened and sustained input into the company’s operational policies being 
limited to the self-reinforcing directorate, the General Manager and a small cadre of functionally 
organised senior managers; with no decision-making authority being delegated to those below 
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Figure 1: The LSWR’s management structure in 1910, Source: Ray Morris, Railroad Administration, (New 
York, 1910), p.133 
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the level of the department head. As will now be explained, this arrangement frequently 
undermined the company’s management quality and financial performance.   
 
Section 2 – Operational Structure 
 
2.3. Structures fit for purpose? 
 
Given it will be described how the centralisation of decision-making authority within the LSWR 
harmed its operational and financial performance between 1870 and 1911, it is important to 
understand why the company’s operational structures were never altered in this period. Like 
most British railway companies before 1914116  the LSWR possessed a functional department 
structure. Indeed, 1910 Ray Morris used its corporate form to demonstrate that ‘typically’ found 
within the British railway industry (Figure 1).117 Within it departments performed specific roles 
and only the directors and a small number of senior managers at the head of the organisation 
controlled corporate policy, as well as coordinated the subordinate departments’ activities.118  
 
Channon proposed one explanation for the functional department structures’ persistence within 
British railways in the period, which could possibly apply in the LSWR’s case. He suggested – 
without providing examples - that department heads vied for resources and guarded their 
authority.119 Yet there is little evidence that demonstrates this was so in the LSWR’s case 
between 1870 and 1911, with only one example found where a department head guarded his 
authority. Between 1881 and 1885 the directors wished to separate the Carriage and Wagon 
Works from the remit of the Locomotive Superintendent, William Adams, to improve 
departmental oversight. After he objected the change was not made.120 Nevertheless, the 
company’s structure was not left alone because Adams was attempting to preserve his authority; 
rather, the General Manager, Scott, supported Adams’ perspective. Contrastingly, when Scotter 
became General Manager in 1885 he advocated creating a separate Carriage and Wagon 
Department, and Adams was unable to prevent him doing this.121   
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This case highlights that only those above department heads in the LSWR’s hierarchy, the General 
Manager and directors, had the position within the organisation to initiate change in, or 
complete reform of its overarching management structures. Indicative of this, the only major 
changes in the arrangement of the LSWR’s departments before 1911 were initiated by Scotter, 
the General Manager; he pushed for the Locomotive and Carriage and Wagon Departments to be 
separated in 1885,122 and in 1888 he removed the Goods Department directly from the 
Superintendent of the Line’s remit and made its head directly answerable to him.123 Conversely, 
the LSWR’s department heads, who had complete authority over their functionally independent 
departments, only seemed to focus on their own concerns and, as Section 2 demonstrates, 
structural reorganisation was always thus regarded by them as being a department-specific 
activity. 124  Indeed, the functional department structure was so embedded within the LSWR’s 
operations (and in the railway industry generally) – it having been established by 1840 – that 
departmental decision-makers are unlikely to have considered the question of structural 
reorganisations outside the bounds of their remits.  Therefore, the LSWR’s case does not support 
Channon’s suggestion that functional department structures’ persisted within the British railway 
industry between 1870 and 1914 because department heads ‘guarded their authority.’125 
 
Fundamentally, the LSWR’s functional departmental structure survived between 1870 and 1911 
because there was no clear necessity to reform or replace it. Its disadvantages – which are 
described at length below – were not so obvious as they are today, and, most importantly, it 
remained adequate for administering the company’s growing network and traffic. This growth is 
worth considering. Between 1870 and 1911 the company’s network lengthened from 665 to 964 
route miles. Yet, the geographical area the company administered did not expand greatly; by 
1870 the LSWR had already established its core network and major traffic centres, such as Exeter, 
Southampton and Salisbury, and subsequent growth in route mileage can largely be attributed to 
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the company filling gaps in its network and extending its lines beyond Exeter.126  Additionally, the 
company’s train movements increased by a large, but not extraordinary amount. Table 1 shows 
that in each decade between 1870 and 1910 the average yearly increase in the number of train 
miles per track mile the company ran was always less than 2.1 percent.  
 
 
Train mile 
per track 
mile in first 
year 
Train mile 
per track 
mile ten 
years later 
Difference 
Average 
yearly 
growth 
Overall 
percentage 
increase 
Average 
yearly 
percentage 
increase 
1870-1880 6,294 7,851 1,557 156 24.74% 2.03% 
1880-1890 7,851 9,129 1,278 128 16.29% 1.38% 
1890-1900 9,129 11,162 2,033 203 22.27% 1.84% 
1900-1910 11,163 11,480 317 32 2.84% 0.26% 
1870-1910 6,294 11,480 5,186 126 82.41% 1.48% 
Table 1: Train mile per track mile LSWR trains ran 1870-1910. Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/281, 283 and 284, 
LSWR reports and accounts 1870-1910 
 
It can, therefore, be suggested that these levels of network and traffic growth were never large 
enough to threaten the LSWR’s operational efficiency between 1870 and 1911, and so the 
company’s directors and General Managers never considered, or felt the need, to replace its 
functional department structure. The adequacy of the company’s structures is also supported by 
the fact that before 1911 the LSWR’s traffic and geographical growth never compelled 
department heads to develop more complex management structures within the departments 
beyond those they had established between 1864 and 1872 (see sections 2.4. to 2.6); the 
Engineering and Locomotive Department possessed three districts throughout the period, while 
in the Traffic Department the number shrank from seven to four. The LSWR’s case therefore 
supports Chandler’s argument that British railway companies’ level of operational complexity and 
smaller geographical size meant their managers were not challenged to the same extent as their 
American counterparts to pioneer more advanced management structures.127  
 
Despite the LSWR’s functional department structure adequately serving the company’s 
administrative needs between 1870 and 1911, it frequently disrupted and undermined the 
company’s operational cohesiveness, management quality and, consequently, its financial 
performance.  Principally this was because decision-making authority was centralised with little 
authority being delegated to individuals below the department head. Section 3 discusses the 
impact of this arrangement on the LSWR’s overall business effectiveness; however, through 
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describing the establishment and development of the three main spending departments’ internal 
structures, the next three sections demonstrate how it negatively impacted on their 
management quality between 1870 and 1911. The LSWR’s three spending departments were: 
Traffic, which oversaw goods and passengers’ safe transit, and formulated the train timetables; 
Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon, which maintained and built the company’s rolling stock and 
oversaw train crews; and Engineering (Way and Works before 1880), which built and maintained 
the infrastructure.  
 
2.4. Traffic Department 
 
Like all of the LSWR’s departments, the Traffic Department’s structure was strictly hierarchical 
under the department head. Between 1838 and 1870 this was the Traffic Manager; a post filled 
from 1852 by Archibald Scott. However, when his title was changed to General Manager in 1870 
he retained direct oversight of the department, and he only relinquished this responsibility in 
1881128 when Verrinder, the Superintendent of the Line, was made Traffic Superintendent.129  
When Verrinder died in 1892, the post was re-titled ‘Superintendent of the Line’ and filled by 
numerous individuals thereafter.  
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Figure 2: LSWR Traffic Department Structure in 1870, Source: TNA, RAIL 411/219, Special Committee 
Minute Book, Memorandum from Mr Scott to the Board of Directors, 8 January 1868 
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Firstly, it is important to assess the character of the Traffic Department’s internal structures. 
Chapter 1 discussed how there have been few studies of the managerial differences between 
British railway companies operating in the north of the country before 1914 and those operating 
in the south. However, it is in the company’s operating structure that the main such differences 
can be found. Because a large proportion of the northern companies’ traffic was freight and 
minerals (see Chapter 1 – Table 2), and a considerable portion of their revenue was derived from 
these traffics, this meant that their goods managers possessed positions of high status within 
them. Furthermore, many northern companies, for example the GCR, GNR and the LNWR, 
established dedicated Mineral Departments under Mineral Managers, to oversee and administer 
this trade effectively.130 Yet, in the case of the LSWR, because only a third of its revenue was 
generated by goods and mineral traffic, this led to important differences in its Traffic 
Department’s organisational form. Firstly, the Goods Manager’s post, while a senior management 
position within the company, never had the same status as it did in other railways. Indicative of 
this, the LSWR’s Goods Department never had any degree of influence over operational matters, 
as it did elsewhere,131 and its role was simply to liaise with traders and administer the transit of 
goods.132 Furthermore, the LSWR never established the post of Minerals Manager. Thus, 
throughout the period 1870 and 1911 it was individuals who came from the coaching section of 
the Traffic Department, which oversaw the passenger traffic, which had the greatest influence 
over the department’s operational policies (see Chapters 4 to 6). However, taking into account 
the findings of this thesis and those found in the existing literature, it is still unclear how these 
different structural arrangements impacted on companies’ financial performance. 
 
Because of the Traffic Department’s operations were almost wholly separated from those of the 
other departments, reorganisation of its internal structures were undertaken without reference 
to the company’s broader operational concerns. The creation of the Traffic Department’s internal 
structures had their origins in the Egham accident of 1864 and a subsequent letter from Queen 
Victoria requesting the directors to improve safety on the line. Following this they initiated the 
installation of block working throughout the company’s system (described in Chapter 4)..133 
Additionally, Scott established the Traffic Department’s district structures to provide better 
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oversight of the company’s train operations. These structures also strengthened the oversight of 
staff at stations and goods yards. These structures were refined in 1868, and Figure 2 shows their 
format. 134 Under Scott, the Superintendent of the Line (Williams) oversaw two assistants (Tyler 
and Verrinder), who administered the company’s network either side of Salisbury in addition to 
one of seven smaller districts the line was split into. Additionally, Superintendents oversaw five 
other districts.135  
 
As with all the company’s departments, authority within the Traffic Department was centralised. 
Yet, until 1884 the level of control the department head had over its functions was excessive 
compared with the arrangements in the Locomotive and Engineering Departments. Before 1881 
Scott retained almost absolute control of decision-making within the department; and while 
Williams (Superintendent of the Line from 1868) administered train timetables (under Scott’s 
guidance), Tyler, Verrinder and the District Superintendents had no decision-making powers 
delegated to them. In 1865 it was explicitly stated that they were not to alter trains’ makeup, 
timetables, staff locations or fares, except in emergencies. Their responsibilities were simply to 
pass up to Scott information on company operations, oversee staff efficiency, advise station 
agents, and monitor trains’ regularity and safety.136 The superintendents therefore existed to 
enable Scott to maintain his authority over the Traffic Department’s affairs, while ensuring its 
functions remained adequately supervised. Thus, as Chapter 4 discusses, as the company’s 
network and traffic grew, his excessively close management of the department overburdened 
him with work and his administration reacted poorly to the challenges it faced. This was a major 
contributory factor in the LSWR’s poor performance between 1870 and 1881.137  Scott finally 
addressed the issue of his excessive workload in 1881 and relinquished direct authority over the 
Traffic Department to Verrinder, who became Traffic Superintendent. 138   
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Numerous changes to the Traffic Department’s structure occurred after 1870. Firstly, through the 
1870s and early 1880s most of the small districts that had been established in 1864 had their 
authority progressively reduced; they were gradually phased out by the 1890s. 139 However, the 
Assistant Superintendencies remained – at some point around 1875 the Western 
superintendency became a ‘division’ and the eastern superintendency was renamed the 
Metropolitan District.140  Furthermore, the Dorchester District was enlarged in 1882141 and a new 
Central District was created in 1884.142 The number of districts of consequence the Traffic 
Department possessed therefore shrunk between 1864 and 1885, and by the latter year it had 
three large districts and the western division (Figure 3).143  The number of districts the 
department shrunk further in 1893 when Holliday, the Dorchester District Superintendent, 
retired and his district was absorbed into the Central District.144 The only modification thereafter 
came in 1899 when the new department head, Sam Fay, added a Main Line District (Figure 5). 145  
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Figure 3: LSWR Traffic Department Structure 1884-1893, Source: TNA, RAIL 411/253, Traffic Committee 
Minute Book, Minute 1328, 15 October 1884 
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Overall, between 1870 and 1911 the Traffic Department’s districts reduced in number from two 
large and seven small districts, to four large. It can be suggested this shrinkage was the result of 
block working’s introduction. After the Egham accident this was installed across the company’s 
network between 1865 and 1875. Consequently, signalmen’s control of the trains became 
increasingly governed by formal rules, with changes in local signalling arrangements coming via 
circulars, rather than through oral instructions from senior officers. For instance, signalling 
instructions in working timetables progressively grew in number after 1865.146 Consequently, 
because train working became increasingly formalised, district superintendents were not 
required to monitor their subordinate’s actions so closely, reducing the need for the Traffic 
Department to possess so many districts.  
 
These changes in the Traffic Department’s districts did, however, undermine the department’s 
operational performance and management quality between 1870 and 1911– principally because 
they strengthened the centralisation of authority within it. Even though after 1884 the heads of 
the Traffic Department did not control its functions as closely as Scott did,147 because the number 
of districts shrunk the number of senior officers within the department who had any influence on 
policy remained small, despite the company’s geographical size, traffic and operational 
complexity increasing (see Table 1). In 1870 the structure had, at most, four individuals that had  
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Figure 4: LSWR Traffic Department Structure, 1899-1912. Source: TNA, RAIL 411/424, General 
Instructions to Staff issued at Farnborough Station, Circular 271 – Rearrangement of Traffic Districts 
31 May 1899, p.269 
an input into policy; the General Manager, Superintendent of the Line and his two assistants. By 
1911 the number had only increased to six: the Superintendent of the Line, his assistant and the 
four district superintendents.  
 
Thus, throughout the period the department’s management quality was largely contingent on a 
very small group of individuals’ capacity to innovate and manage their affairs efficiently. 
However, because traffic managers could occupy positions for decades – for instance Scott 
remained at the department’s head between 1852 and 1881 – without experiencing 
developments in railway organization outside the company and without many constraints on 
their independence, their thinking potentially could stagnate, the value of established 
management practices were not questioned and inefficiencies could develop within the 
company, as was the case with Scott’s methods of train control before 1884 (see Section 2.6). 
 
Furthermore, as Chapter 3 elaborates on, this propensity for senior officials’ thinking to tend 
towards conservatism or stagnate was compounded by the fact that the Traffic Department’s 
structure increasingly hindered skilled and innovative individuals lower down the department’s 
hierarchy reaching positions of influence quickly, if at all.  As the company’s traffic and trade rose 
after 1870 this was, accordingly, administered by an increasing number of clerks – who were 
realistically the only department employees who could rise into senior management posts. Yet, 
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because the number of influential senior traffic management posts remained small, and 
managers stayed in position for long periods, those individuals who were particularly talented 
had far fewer opportunities to reach positions where they could bring their skills and ideas to 
bear on company policy. For example, as Chapter 3 discusses in more detail, Sam Fay – who was 
arguably one of the most talented managers of his generation – was hindered from reaching an 
influential management post by a lack of promotional opportunities. 
 
Lastly, because between 1870 and 1911 senior traffic managers did not delegate decision-making 
powers to subordinates, this created and sustained a culture of deference to authority within the 
department. The South Western Gazette (SWG), the LSWR’s staff magazine which was largely 
written by traffic clerks, the company’s future managers, frequently praised senior managers and 
directors’ management of the company’s affairs, irrespective of their actual performance. This 
could cause what in retrospect appears to be amusing about-turns of opinion. For example, Sam 
Fay wrote in 1905 that when Scotter became General Manager norms of behaviour he had 
acquired during Scott’s poor General Managership had to be totally disregarded. 148 Yet, Fay 
overlooked the fact that in the early 1880s he had praised Scott’s management of the company in 
his diary and as editor of SWG.149 Therefore, for Fay what constituted ‘good’ management 
technique in the 1880s was defined by the officials who headed the department; not his own 
judgement. Thus, the combination of the lack of delegation of authority, and clerks and 
managers’ deference to it, meant senior traffic officials’ actions were rarely questioned by 
subordinates, even if they had ability or knowledge to do so.  
 
It is important to note, however, that at different points between 1870 and 1911 the Traffic 
Department’s management practices did advance and modernise. However, this was rarely 
because of traffic managers who had spent most of their careers within the department. As 
chapter 3 discusses, most traffic managers had passed through the department’s introvert and 
rigid clerical promotional trees, had never worked outside the company and did not have the 
range of employment experiences that would have allowed them to critically appraise its 
established operational practices. There was consequently little natural development, 
advancement or even improvement of managerial or operational techniques from within the 
Traffic Department between 1870 and 1911 (see Chapter 3). Indeed, as Chapter 6 shows, even 
after 1900 when career LSWR traffic managers were challenged by the company’s depressed 
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profitability to innovate and find cost efficiencies, they were seemingly unable to reform the 
department’s established management practices to any great degree.  
 
Thus, advancements in operational practice principally occurred when new senior managers 
were appointed who previously had been employed in other railways. For example, when Scotter 
joined the company as General Manager from the MSLR in 1885 he completely reformed the 
Traffic Department’s management (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, while Fay had spent much of his 
career within the LSWR, when he returned after seven years outside it to become 
Superintendent of the Line he introduced a new spirit of innovation into the department (see 
Chapter 6).  
 
Overall, the Traffic Department’s internal structures strengthened and sustained influence and 
authority over its policies being restricted to the few individuals at its head. As this section has 
shown, and Chapters 4 to 6 discusses in detail, these structures harmed the LSWR’s managerial 
performance between 1870 and 1911 in three main ways: senior managers could sit in posts for 
decades, meaning management practice and thought could stagnate; innovative and skilled 
managers were hindered from reaching positions where they could positively influence policy, 
and the lack of delegation of authority within the department created deference to it. 
 
2.5. Locomotive (Carriage and Wagon) Department 
 
Beattie 
(Locomotive 
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Foreman (Unknown)  
Shop Foremen 
Figure 5: LSWR Locomotive Department Structure 1872-1885. Source: TNA, RAIL 411/182, Traffic & 
Locomotive and Locomotive Committees, Minute 371, 4th January 1872 
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The Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Department’s (hereon known as the ‘Locomotive 
Department’) overall structure changed little between 1870 and 1911. Like the company overall, 
the department was strictly hierarchical. The Locomotive Superintendent (Chief Mechanical 
Engineer from 1904150) had overall responsibility for managing its functions efficiently. He 
reported to the committee that oversaw the department and in discussion with it made decisions 
regarding all matters of policy.151 Like in the Traffic Department’s case, the Locomotive 
Department’s functions were separate from those of the other departments and, therefore, 
changes to its structure were made without reference to their heads’ concerns. 
 
Running Department 
 
 
In 1870 the Locomotive Superintendent oversaw two sections, each headed by a supervisor. The 
first of these was the Running Department, which administered the company’s locomotive sheds 
and oversaw the drivers and firemen, except when they were working on the line when they 
were under the Superintendent of the Line’s charge. 152 It established its district structures in 
1872. In 1870 Anwell, the chief foreman, oversaw the whole of the department directly. In late 
1871 Joseph Beattie, the Locomotive Superintendent, died and his son, William, replaced him. 
Presumably to improve the administration and oversight within the department he created three 
districts. Anwell retained overall charge of the Running Department and control of all sheds in the 
London District; while Porter and Higgs became Southern and Western District Foremen 
respectively (Figure 5).153 In this structure larger running sheds – for example Nine Elms – 
oversaw smaller satellites – like Hampton Court.154  
 
The three-district structure did not change after 1872; Table 2 shows it was still in place in 
1906.155 This was despite traffic and network growth placing considerable extra administrative 
demands on the department between 1870 and 1911. Locomotive numbers increased 
significantly over this period. In 1870 the department was operating 280 locomotives, but by 
1911 the total was 748.156 Accordingly, the number of footplate crew the department oversaw 
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would have increased, although these figures are unknown. The LSWR’s growing network also 
meant the number of locomotive sheds the Running Department was administering increased 
from twenty-seven in 1878157  to forty-two in 1911. While many of these new sheds were small, 
housing only one or two locomotives where lines terminated (so as to stable locomotives at the 
end of branch lines overnight, ready for early trains), many established sheds were enlarged. For 
example, the Salisbury shed was enlarged in 1885, while the shed at Exeter was replaced in 1887 
by a larger building at Exmouth Junction.158   
 
London  Southern Western 
NINE ELMS NORTHAM SALISBURY 
Fulwell Junction Bishopstoke/Eastleigh YEOVIL 
Ascot Andover Junction Templecombe 
Windsor Gosport Chard 
Reading Bishops Waltham EXMOUTH JUNCTION 
Leatherhead Southampton Docks Seaton 
Hampton Court 
PORTSMOUTH 
(Fratton) 
Sidmouth 
Chertsey Midhurst Budleigh Salterton 
Woking BOURNEMOUTH Exmouth   
GUILDFORD Hamworthy Jct Okehampton 
Ash Wimborne Bude 
BASINGSTOKE Swanage Holsworthy 
  DORCHESTER BARNSTAPLE 
  Weymouth Ilfracombe 
    Torrington 
    PLYMOUTH (Friary) 
    Devonport 
    WADEBRIDGE 
    Launceston 
Table 2:  LSWR locomotive shed structure in 1906. Locomotive numbers are only known for the Western 
District. Source: Chris Hawkins and George Reeve, London and South Western Railway Engine Sheds: 
Western District, (Pinner, 1990) p.3 and p.138 
 
Despite the administrative work of the Running Department growing after 1872, its three-district 
structure was simply adapted to accommodate network expansion, additional sheds and 
increased locomotive and staff numbers. The result was that after 1870 the workload of those at 
the department’s head, who had ultimate responsibility for overseeing its functions, would have 
increased considerably. For instance, when Higgs, the Western District Locomotive Foreman 
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between 1872 and 1882, died in 1913, his obituary stated that while in the position his 
responsibilities had increased as the company had extended westward and its business had 
grown.159  It is, however, plausible to suggest that senior officials’ progressively increasing 
workload diminished their ability to oversee the Running Department’s functions effectively, 
harming its efficiency. This argument is supported by the fact that after 1900 – when the 
company’s profitability came under significant pressure from external sources – Drummond, the 
Locomotive Superintendent, established a Running Department inspectorate to strengthen 
oversight of the company’s traincrews in an attempt to improve their operational efficiency (see 
Chapter 6). 160   
 
The Running Department’s inspectorate could also reflect how the centralisation of authority in 
the department was weakening its management quality in another way. The absence of 
structural change in the Running Department after 1872 meant that some senior officials in 
influential positions stayed in place for decades. Anwell was Running Department foreman 
between 1857 and 1880;161 while his successor, Higgs, retired in 1902.162 As such, because only a 
small number of senior officials could influence the Running Department’s policies, this 
potentially meant that over time – if their activities were not adequately critiqued by the 
Locomotive Superintendent, as was the case with William Beattie in the 1870s (see Chapter 4)163 
–  an environment was established where their ideas on railway administration could tend 
towards conservatism, meaning that established management practices were not frequently 
reassessed and inefficiencies within the department were allowed to develop. Additionally, 
because there was so little turnover in the department’s senior officials between 1870 and 1911, 
it is plausible to suggest that talented individuals lower down its hierarchy, if they did exist, were 
blocked from rising into influential positions where they could have improved or positively 
reformed its management. As such, the Running Department inspectorate may have reflected a 
conservatism that had developed amongst its senior officials, which led to a stagnation of its 
management practices. Without more evidence this remains conjecture. 
 
Irrespective of the primary reason the Running Department inspectorate was established in 1908, 
it was undeniably instituted to counter weaknesses that had developed in the oversight of the 
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department; weaknesses that were principally the result of authority and oversight within the 
department being centralised.  
 
Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Works 
 
The LSWR’s Locomotive Department also oversaw the locomotive, carriage and wagon works. 
Once again, an analysis of the how these works were managed highlights that because authority 
within the company’s departments was centralised, its management quality and financial 
performance could be undermined. 
 
Between 1870 and 1885 the Locomotive Superintendent had direct charge of the locomotive 
carriage and works – aided by an assistant164 – and these mostly built and always maintained the 
company’s locomotives and rolling stock. By the early-1880s, as the company built and acquired 
more locomotives, carriages and wagons to facilitate increased levels of traffic, by the early 
1880s the superintendent’s burden of work had increased to the point where the efficient 
oversight of the works was weakened, causing inefficiencies to develop, raising company costs.165  
To alleviate this situation, in August 1885, under Scotter’s advisement, director Guest suggested 
to the Locomotive Committee that a separate Carriage and Wagon Department be created.166  
This was agreed to; the locomotive works remained under Adams, and the Carriage and Wagon 
Department was overseen by a new superintendent, Panter.167 As Chapter 5 discusses, this move 
enhanced the management quality within both the locomotive and the carriage and wagon 
works, which improved their cost position. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that Adams 
particularly had more time to dedicate to innovation, experimentation, gauging efficiently the 
company’s locomotive needs, and effectively managing the works.168 
 
The centralisation of authority within the works’ administrative structures created a situation 
where, it would seem, Adams was blind to the weaknesses in his management. He would not, or 
could not, acknowledge the potential efficiency gains that could have been achieved by removing 
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the carriage and wagon works from his remit. Indicative of this, in 1882 he successfully prevented 
the carriage and wagon works being split from his remit.169   Thus, only the directors and General 
Manager had the position above Adams in the company’s hierarchy to recognise where changes 
in his remit were required to improve corporate efficiency.  
 
The centralisation of authority within the works was also injurious to its management quality for 
another reason. Because Locomotive Superintendents retained their positions for decades, with 
almost complete control over policy in their fiefdoms, this meant there was huge potential over 
time for their thinking on administrative practices and policy to become narrow, and established 
management practices to continue without their value being reassessed frequently. For instance, 
between 1878 and 1887 Adams considerably improved the Locomotive Works’ efficiency through 
expanding, re-equipping and reorganising them.170 Yet, without pressure being placed on him to 
improve his management, he did not adapt his informal style of works management, which was 
suitable for a smaller locomotive works of the 1870s, to cope with LSWR’s locomotive stock 
growing from 386 in 1878 to 664 in 1895.171 Thus, compounded by his increasing vagueness and 
reliance on Pettigrew, his works manager, to run his affairs,172 by his retirement in 1895 the 
quality of management in the works had weakened and inefficiencies had developed (See 
Chapters 4 to 6). 
 
Conversely, his successor, Drummond, reformed the Locomotive Works’ management after 1895, 
highlighting how the natural tendency for a department’s management practice to stagnate 
under one head could be remedied by the appointment of another. He introduced more 
systematic and modern management techniques into the works. Section heads received greater 
independence and minimal day-to-day contact with Drummond; whilst weekly progress meetings 
were held in his presence at which they reported on locomotive repairs and construction, 
schedules were agreed to, and, if prior schedules had not been met, explanations why would be 
demanded.173 These reforms, which devolved greater responsibility to section heads for their 
own working performance, better suited the management of the larger works. Consequently, by 
1896 the works had reached full operational capacity, general locomotive repairs had been 
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reduced to five days and the construction of locomotives was governed by fixed terms  (see 
Chapter 6).174  
 
Overall, this section has again demonstrated that because within the LSWR departments 
responsibility for ensuring their management quality rested with the few individuals at their 
head, this undermined the company’s managerial and financial performance between 1870 and 
1911. The management quality within the works declined after 1878 because Adams, who had 
few constraints on his freedom to manage the department as he so wished, was the sole 
individual with decision-making authority within it. Before 1885 he was apparently unable to see, 
or did not acknowledge, that his excessive workload was harming the efficient management of 
the works, while thereafter he lacked the experience or knowledge to adapt the management 
practices he had introduced in 1878 to the increasingly complex industrial operation the works 
had become. For both these reasons, under Adams the works was never as efficient as 
Drummond’s reforms suggest they could have been.  
 
2.6. Engineering (Way and Works before 1880) Department Structures 
 
In the Engineering Department’s case, (Way and Works before 1880) weaknesses created by the 
centralisation of authority in the company’s management are again evident. In early-1870 the 
LSWR’s Way and Works Department, which was under the charge of Strapp, the Resident 
Engineer, oversaw the maintenance and renewal of the company’s lines, 175  the Telegraph 
Department,176 the Signal and Gas Department,177 and supervised, in cooperation with the 
Consulting Engineer, the activities of contractors working on significant construction projects.178  
 
The Way and Works’ Department’s district structures were established because of a scandal. In 
April 1870 the directors found within the department cases of paybill fraud, misappropriation of 
funds, men working privately for station agents during railway hours, illegal material sales and 
over-measurement of work. A board investigatory committee concluded that deficient internal 
oversight had created an environment where such activities could occur, and examined 
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alternative administrative models for the department. 179 After consulting the GWR and Great 
Northern Railway’s (GNR) Chief Engineers the committee initially concluded that under the 
Resident Engineer there should be two districts headed by district engineers. 180 However, when 
William Jacomb replaced Strapp in June 1870, the latter resigning in ignominy, three districts 
were established (Figure 6). No evidence has been found explaining why the three-district 
structure was eventually adopted; 181  yet it remained in place until 1911 (and thereafter).182  
 
The District Engineers oversaw all engineering activities in their districts. They supervised major 
construction projects (including some design work), monitored infrastructure upkeep and 
authorised maintenance works, to which they appointed superintendents, inspectors, foreman, 
gangers and look-out men.183 Furthermore, they liaised with contractors, who in 1885 handled all 
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‘repairs of and alterations to stations, house property, bridges, viaducts, warehouses, workshops, 
wharves, piers, docks, receiving houses, offices and depots’.184  
 
The scandal’s positive outcome was that oversight of the Way and Works Department’s functions 
was strengthened. But the scandal again reveals how the centralisation of authority within the 
LSWR’s departments weakened the company’s operational performance. The department had 
taken over track-maintenance responsibilities from contractors in 1856,185 with Strapp, as 
department head, being solely responsible for ensuring that this was carried on in an effective 
manner. Evidently, his oversight of track maintenance thereafter waned, yet the scandal suggests 
he was not aware of, or was not willing to acknowledge, this fact. Strapp’s case therefore 
demonstrates that because only the LSWR’s department heads had the position to influence and 
determine policy in their fiefdoms, how effective departmental oversight was, at a time when the 
business was growing, was reliant on their ability to recognise what departments needed in 
terms of the district and supervisory officers.  
 
Section 3 – Conclusion: Structure and management weaknesses 
 
The previous sections have shown the numerous ways in which the concentration of authority at 
the head of the LSWR’s three main spending departments harmed their management quality 
between 1870 and 1911. This section summarises these findings, but also contributes examples 
of how the centralisation of authority over the company’s overall policies and strategies affected 
its operational and financial performance in this period. Additionally, this section highlights 
another central argument of this thesis: that the company’s financial performance was also 
reliant on the ability of the directors and, most importantly, the General Manager to coordinate 
and oversee effectively the department heads’ activities. 
 
2.5. Weakness in innovation 
 
As this thesis demonstrates throughout, the LSWR’s functional department structure frequently 
undermined its operational and financial performance. As described above and Chapter 3 
demonstrates in detail, senior managers, particularly department heads, made policy with little 
internal criticism of their activities from directors or other managers. Therefore, as such 
individuals operated largely independently, over time their views on railway management 
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potentially stagnated. Consequently, the worth of established operational practices was not 
regularly evaluated, and the company could develop inefficiencies. Examples have been cited 
where this was so, but the case of Scott’s management of the Traffic Department after 1870 
most exemplifies how these trends affected the company’s overall profitability. Scott had 
successfully reformed the department’s poor administration in 1852. 186 Nonetheless, having 
never experienced railway management in other companies since that time, and with few 
constraints on his autonomy, between 1870 and 1884 he did not adapt the train control practices 
he had established in the 1860s to the LSWR’s increasing traffic and operational complexity. This 
stagnation of the company’s operational practices was the primary reason for the company’s 
terrible financial performance in the period (see Chapter 4).  
 
However, conservative thinking on railway management amongst those at the LSWR’s head also 
occurred because most of the company’s senior traffic managers had passed through the Traffic 
Department’s rigid and introvert clerical promotional structures. Indeed, they had a very limited 
range of employment experiences, were only familiar management practices within the 
company, and therefore lacked the capacity to think creatively (see Chapter 3). This had 
significant implications for the company’s financial performance between 1870 and 1911. For 
example, after 1900 the company’s profitability came under pressure from external numerous 
factors. This challenged the General Manager and Superintendent of the Line, who had spent 
their entire careers as traffic managers, to find efficiencies and effect productivity gains. Yet, they 
found it difficult to do this; they lacked a range of employment experiences that would have 
given them the skills to effectively appraise the company’s established operational practices, to 
innovate or to find the cost efficiencies that the General Manager from 1912, Walker, showed 
were possible. Consequently, this contributed to the company’s financial performance not 
improving between 1900 and 1911 (see Chapter 6). Indeed, as is shown through the thesis, senior 
managers who had spent their career within the company was rarely developed or acquired by 
themselves innovations in management practice. One exceptional case is of note. After visiting 
America to investigate how railroads were managed there, Jacomb-Hood, the company’s 
Resident Engineer who had worked for the company since the 1880s,187 introduced in 1903 a new 
track maintenance system which vastly improved the Engineering Department’s efficiency (see 
Chapter 6).188   
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Fundamentally, as this thesis argues throughout, because senior managers infrequently 
developed new management techniques, the tendency for those in place to stagnate between 
1870 and 1911 was primarily mitigated by the appointment of new senior managers who had 
worked in other railways. Drummond’s improvement of the Locomotive Department’s 
management after 1895 has been cited. But the most notable example of this was when Scotter 
became the LSWR’s General Manager in 1885. After having spent his career in the MSLR, he used 
his extensive knowledge of how railway administration and operation had advanced in the wider 
railway industry to initiate managerial improvements and find efficiencies throughout the LSWR 
(see Chapter 5). 189  Thus, as this thesis demonstrates, the appointment of new individuals to 
senior management posts was vital for the rejuvenation, improvement and modernisation of the 
LSWR’s managerial practices between 1870 and 1911. 
 
2.6. The importance of coordination 
 
The LSWR’s functional department structure could undermine the company’s management 
performance in other ways. As has been argued, department heads had almost sole responsibility 
for their functionally separated departments’ efficient day-to-day working, and recommended to 
the relevant committee of directors or the General Manager what policies they needed enacted 
to achieve this (see section 2.3). As will now be discussed, the departments’ operational isolation 
also had the potential to weaken the company’s management quality and harm its financial 
performance. 
 
Firstly, responsibility for overseeing whether department heads were managing their 
departments efficiently fell to the General Managers and directors. Yet, as the LSWR’s case 
shows, in many instances, and for numerous reasons, these individuals were not alert to the 
heads’ failings. For instance, in the 1870s the board did not recognise that Beattie and Scott were 
inefficiently managing the Locomotive and Traffic Departments. This was because most directors 
lacked external business experiences from which they could have acquired knowledge that would 
have enabled them to challenge Scott and Beattie’s policies. In the 1870s most of them had been 
with the company since the 1850s, thus meaning their knowledge of railway management only 
came from practices used within the LSWR (see Chapter 3 and 4). Consequently, the company’s 
financial performance declined after 1870. 
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Additionally, this chapter has highlighted how department heads had the freedom to manage 
their fiefdoms as they saw fit between 1870 and 1911. As Irving, Bonavia and Channon argued 
occurred in most nineteenth-century railway companies, their independence meant they 
frequently lost sight of the company’s overall cost position and enacted policies that harmed 
other departments’ efficiency.190 For example, in the early-1880s Adams, the Locomotive 
Superintendent, resolved the problem of the company’s insufficient locomotive stock by 
introducing a new class of heavy locomotive. Yet, he did not fully inform the Resident Engineer, 
Jacomb, that this would increase the wear on the company’s tracks, and, thus, maintenance costs 
were rapidly and unexpectedly raised (see Chapter 4).191 
 
But as Chapter 4 suggests, department heads’ cohesive working between 1870 and 1911 did not 
solely depend on their consideration of their colleague’s concerns – the alignment between 
senior managers’ philosophies of railway management was also important. For example, 
between 1870 and 1881 Scott poorly managed the Traffic Department because his thinking on 
railway operation had originated in the 1850s, when he had become Traffic Manager. However, 
when Adams joined the LSWR in 1878, after having experienced how railway management 
developed in the wider British railway industry, he challenged Scott’s backward methods where 
his and the Traffic Department’s responsibilities overlapped (operational and rolling stock 
policies). The conflicts between the two men, and the fact the directors increasingly - but never 
completely - favoured Adams’ suggestions on policy over Scott’s (despite the latter being given a 
position akin to a modern Chief Executive in 1881), meant that before 1884 the LSWR never 
developed coherent operational strategies to counter its excessive costs.  
 
Overall, because the functional department structure separated the LSWR departments’ 
functions between 1870 and 1911, the largely independent department heads regularly acted in 
ways that damaged the company’s management quality and financial performance. However, as 
Scotter’s example demonstrates, this weakness of the functional department structure was 
eliminated when they received strong leadership from an individual above them in the 
company’s hierarchy. After 1885, and using knowledge he had gained of railway management in 
the wider British railway industry, Scotter gained authority over the department heads, 
coordinated their actions effectively and set them two corporate goals: to expand the business 
and reduce operating costs. These changes contributed significantly to improving the LSWR’s 
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profitability (see Chapter 5). The LSWR’s case therefore supports Channon’s suggestion that in 
nineteenth century railways the capacity of functionally independent department heads to 
cooperate and consider matters outside their immediate remit could be contingent on General 
Managers’ ‘authority, skill and energy.’192 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
Until now few studies have analysed the development of a British railway company’s 
management structures between 1870 and 1914, and how, possibly, they impacted on its 
operational and managerial performance. This chapter has done this in the LSWR’s case. Section 
2 argued that the company’s functional department structure was never reformed because it was 
adequate for administering its functions. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated throughout the 
thesis, between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR’s functional department structure undermined the 
company’s management quality and financial performance because only a small number of 
individuals at its head possessed decision-making authority. With many decision-makers staying 
in position for decades – with little constraining their ability to manage their affairs as they so 
wished – their thinking on railway management could tend towards conservatism and, 
potentially, the value of established practices were not frequently reassessed, which harmed 
company performance. Furthermore, because of a lack of managerial innovation within the 
company between 1870 and 1911, this problem only lessened when new senior managers were 
appointed who had been employed outside the company. Lastly, department heads, who 
dominated policy within their own fiefdoms, could act in ways that suited their own goals, but 
which conflicted with other decision-makers’ objectives or harmed the company’s overall 
performance. This problem was only resolved by the company possessing strong and 
knowledgeable leadership from directors or a General Manager.  
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Chapter 3 – LSWR decision-makers 
 
This chapter investigates how the professional and business backgrounds of LSWR decision-
makers – the directors, General Manager and senior traffic managers – influenced how they 
managed the company.  
 
Chapter 2’s findings make such analysis important. It contended that since decision-making 
authority was concentrated at the LSWR’s head between 1870 and 1911, this frequently 
undermined the company’s managerial and financial performance. Decision-makers could occupy 
senior positions for decades. Thus, with few constraints on their freedom to manage their affairs 
as they so wished, there was a propensity for their thinking on railway management to stagnate 
or tend towards conservatism, and, consequently, the value and efficiency of established 
practices was infrequently reassessed, meaning operating inefficiencies possibly developed. 
 
However, what Chapter 2 contended is that this weakness in the LSWR’s management was 
unlikely to be mitigated by anyone from within it. Between 1870 and 1911 the company’s 
operational and managerial practices were rarely developed or advanced by senor manages who 
had been with it for decades. Thus, as this thesis contends, the rejuvenation and improvement of 
the company’s operational practices was primarily dependent on new senior managers being 
appointed from external sources. This chapter starts to explain why this was so. Firstly, it 
demonstrates that the majority of LSWR directors had little scope to acquire experience of 
railway or industrial management from their activities outside the company, while all senior 
traffic managers had passed through the Traffic Department’s rigid, introvert and isolating 
clerical promotional trees. Thus, these decision-makers’ careers and backgrounds meant their 
thinking on railway management was largely, if not totally, shaped by their experiences of 
working in and for the LSWR. Consequently, for the most part they uncritically accepted the 
company’s established operating practices, and were unable to effectively analyse or reappraise 
them to determine where they may be improved. Additionally, the majority lacked the capacity 
to bring to the LSWR new or innovative thinking on railway operation from external sources that 
might have enhanced its management quality, efficiency and financial performance.  
 
This thesis’s second central argument is that the LSWR’s operational cohesiveness was 
dependent on the functionally independent department heads’ actions being effectively 
coordinated and supervised by those above them in the hierarchy. This chapter demonstrates 
that, for the most part, between 1870 and 1911 the directors had little experience of railway or 
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industrial management outside the company, and, consequently, had no basis upon which to 
criticise department heads actions. However, in the 1870s the board had close oversight of the 
department heads’ actions – the LSWR not possessing an individual with responsibilities akin to a 
modern chief executive – because many directors had been with the company for decades and 
had few activities outside it to occupy their time. Because the business’ operational complexity 
increased in the 1870s, the directorate was increasingly unable to supervise or coordinate senior 
officer’s actions closely. Consequently, the company never developed clear operational 
stratagems and the department heads acted independently in ways that damaged corporate 
efficiency. 
 
These arguments are developed in three parts. Firstly, I analyse how sixty-two senior traffic 
managers’ views on railway administration and operation were possibly fashioned by their 
careers. Secondly, I explore how directors’ external business interests may have influenced their 
approaches to policy and potentially benefitted the company’s management. Lastly, the chapter 
examines the factors that determined the directors’ level of involvement in the company’s affairs 
at different points between 1870 and 1911, and how their involvement shaped its policies and 
strategic direction. 
 
Section 1 – The LSWR’s clerical labour market and traffic managers’ careers 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This section demonstrates that between 1870 and 1911 all the LSWR’s senior traffic managers 
(defined posts in the hierarchy including and higher than District Superintendents, District Goods 
Superintendents or superintendents of major stations) were trained on-the-job and then passed 
through the Traffic Department’s rigid, hierarchical and introvert clerical promotional ladder. 
Thus, on reaching senior management level they had learnt all they knew about railway 
management from within the LSWR and, thus, their capacity to innovate was limited, 
consequently harming the company’s management quality and financial performance. Sam Fay 
was, however, an important exception.193  
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 I have chosen to study only the careers of the LSWR’s senior traffic managers because the evidence 
available for study other departments’ senior officials was poor. Also, the Traffic Department, as Chapter 2 
argued, was most important to the LSWR’s operational policies and strategic direction between 1870 and 
1911. 
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3.2. Managers’ positions on joining the LSWR 
 
Managers’ starting positions 
 
Decade 
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1858-1869 
 
11 4 
 
1 
  
16 
1870-1879 1 6 4 
   
1 12 
1880-1889 
 
6 1 
    
7 
1890-1899 
 
4 10 
    
14 
1900-1911 
 
2 9 1 
 
1 
 
13 
Total 1 29 28 1 1 1 1 62 
         
1858-1869 
 
68.75% 25.00% 
 
6.25% 
  
100.00% 
1870-1879 8.33% 50.00% 33.33% 
   
8.33% 100.00% 
1880-1889 
 
85.71% 14.29% 
    
100.00% 
1890-1899 
 
28.57% 71.43% 
    
100.00% 
1900-1911 
 
15.38% 69.23% 7.69% 
 
7.69% 
 
100.00% 
Total 1.61% 46.77% 45.16% 1.61% 1.61% 1.61% 1.61% 100.00% 
Table 1: The position in which LSWR traffic managers appointed between 1858 and 1870 began their 
career, sorted by the decade in which they first became a senior traffic manager. Source: Staff Records, 
South Western Gazette, Traffic Committee Minute Books 
 
To understand why LSWR senior traffic managers developed deference to authority and 
conservative thinking between 1870 and 1911, it is important to examine the uniformity of the 
career paths. The best way to do this is to study the position in which they started their railway 
careers. Table 1 shows the starting position of sixty-two LSWR senior traffic managers who 
worked between 1870 and 1911. This data is organized by the decade in which they were 
appointed to their first senior management position.194 
 
The evidence shows that most senior traffic managers begun their LSWR careers in clerical 
positions. There were three exceptions: one had joined as a ticket collector, another as a 
policeman and another as a porter. This indicates that promotional paths within the Traffic 
Department’s secondary labour market – that is all non-clerical staff – were largely separated 
from those in the primary labour market. This mirrors Howlett’s findings in the GER’s case.195 It is 
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 No LSWR traffic managers were directly appointed from external sources between 1870 and 1911. 
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 Howlett, 'The Internal Labour Dynamics of the Great Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1913', p.404 
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unclear why these individuals transferred to the primary labour market. Two, Spencer 
(policeman) and Veazey (ticket collector), transferred in the company’s formative years (1852 
and 1860), suggesting that in the period management structures’ evolving nature meant the 
boundaries between the white and blue-collar employees had not yet solidified. In short, before 
1870 the Traffic Department felt free to look beyond existing clerical staff to fill vacancies at 
higher levels, and it extended its labour pool by using the secondary labour market.196 
 
Between 1870 and 1911 the overwhelming majority of the LSWR’s senior traffic managers, fifty-
nine in total, began their careers on the clerical promotional ladder (lad, messenger, apprentice 
clerk, junior clerk, senior clerk, chief clerk). This meant their career experiences were broadly 
similar, and Table 2 gives an idea of the positions they passed through before reaching senior 
management.  
 
1 Lad/Messenger 
2 Junior/Telegraph Clerk 
3 
Senior Clerk 
Senior Clerk 
Goods Clerk 
4 Station Master-1 
5 Station Master-2 
Goods Agent 
6 
Chief Clerk 
Station Master-3 
7 Station Master-4 
Goods Canvasser/Chief 
Goods Clerk 8 
Station Master/Assistant 
District Superintendent-5 
9 District Superintendent-1 Goods Superintendent-1 
10 District Superintendent-2 Goods Superintendent-2 
11 District Superintendent-3 Goods Superintendent-3 
12 Department Head (Superintendent of the Line/Goods Manager) 
Table 2: Typical promotional paths of LSWR traffic managers 1870-1911; senior management positions 
are shaded. Source: Staff records 
 
These career ladders were very rigid, with vacancies always being filled by individuals lower in 
the hierarchy. We can get a sense of what this meant in practice from a diary written by Sam Fay 
– who later became Superintendent of the Line – when he was employed as a clerk at Kingston 
Station between 1871 and 1881. In February 1878 the Chief Clerk at Queens Road Station was 
rumoured to be leaving. Fay asked Petit, the Kingston Station Agent (now more commonly known 
as Station Master), for permission to apply for the vacancy. Petit advised him against it and he did 
not.197 By 1881 Petit was more amenable to Fay being promoted, given his ambition, and 
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 TNA, RAIL 411/492, Clerical staff character book No. 2, p543; South Western Gazette, September 1888, 
p.11-12 
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 William Fay Collection [WFC], Sam Fay’s Diary, 25 February 1878 
86 
 
submitted to Scott Fay’s application for an unknown agency that had become vacant.198 These 
were two of many instances where Fay attempted to gain promotion. On each occasion, like 
most traffic managers in the sample, he applied for positions directly above him in the Traffic 
Department’s clerical staff hierarchy.  
 
Between 1870 and 1911 senior traffic managers’ narrow views on railway management and 
limited capacity to innovate, which Chapters 4 to 6 demonstrate, was therefore rooted in the fact 
most of them had only directly experienced the clerical side of railway work throughout their 
careers. This did not mean they completely lacked understanding of manual railway work; but 
their career paths meant they could not bring a range of employment experiences to their work 
as managers.  
 
All in the section 
 
The situation was worse than this:  most managers spent their careers within the sub-sections of 
the Traffic Department that recruited them, limiting their range of working experiences even 
further. Table 3 shows the sampled traffic managers’ career paths. The Coaching Section broadly 
covered activities not specifically related to goods traffic (which the Goods Department 
administered), and ‘general’ positions dealt with both the Coaching and Goods Departments, or 
were in the General Managers’ office.  Thirty-eight out of the sixty-two traffic managers sampled 
reached senior management posts in the sections of the Traffic Department where they began 
their careers, while twelve followed similar career paths and finally entered general management 
positions. Consequently, between 1870 and 1911 fifty of the sixty-two senior traffic managers 
were promoted vertically up the Traffic Department’s hierarchy.  
 
Few senior traffic managers were transferred into the Traffic Department’s sections from 
elsewhere in the LSWR. Seven moved between the sections; while five moved into the Traffic 
Department from another department. One joined from the Law Clerk’s office,199 another from 
the company’s police service, 200 two from the Goods Audit Office201 and one from the Passenger 
Audit Office. 202 None of these individuals are likely to have brought to the Traffic Department 
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 WFC, Sam Fay’s Diary, 13 May 1881  
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 TNA, RAIL 411/492, Clerical staff character book No. 2, p.263 
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 TNA, RAIL 411/492, Clerical staff character book No. 2, p.543 
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 TNA, RAIL 411/492, Clerical staff character book No. 2, p.18; TNA, RAIL 411/499, Salaried staff register 
No. 2, p.559 
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significantly experience of management practices found elsewhere in the company; especially as 
three had started their careers in audit offices related to the Traffic Department’s work.  
 
Consequently, between 1870 and 1911 senior traffic managers’ traditional viewpoints on railway 
management and limited ability to think creatively was likely strengthened by the fact that few 
had experienced railway work outside their particular section of the Traffic Department. 
 
Promotional Path  
(From-To) 
1858-
1869 
1870-
1879 
1880-
1889 
1890-
1899 
1900-
1911 
Total 
Coaching-Coaching 6 3 2 2 5 18 
Goods- Goods 2 6 1 6 4 19 
General-General 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Promotions solely within 
the Department 
9 9 3 8 9 38 
56.25% 75.00% 42.86% 57.14% 69.23% 61.29% 
 
      Coaching-General 2 1 0 3 2 8 
Goods-General 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Other-General 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total into General 
Management 
3 1 1 5 2 12 
18.75% 8.33% 14.29% 35.71% 15.38% 19.35% 
Total Straight Promotion 
12 10 4 13 11 50 
75.00% 83.33% 57.14% 92.86% 84.62% 80.65% 
 
      Coaching-Goods 2 0 0 0 2 4 
Other-Goods 1 1 0 0 0 2 
General-Coaching 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Goods-Coaching 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Other-Coaching 1 0 2 0 0 3 
Total inter-sectional 
movement 
4 2 3 1 2 12 
25.00% 16.67% 42.86% 7.14% 15.38% 19.35% 
Total 16 12 7 14 13 62 
Table 3: LSWR traffic managers’ career paths 1870-1911, according to the decade in which they were 
appointed. Source: Staff Records, South Western Gazette 
 
Clerical work 
 
Therefore, between 1870 and 1911 the senior traffic managers would have known little of 
railway work outside their particular section of the Traffic Department, which contributed to 
their capacity to innovate or think opportunistically being limited. This was compounded by most 
traffic managers having spent years – sometimes decades – in clerical posts requiring dedication 
to highly routine and mundane work where the hours were long. While Kingsford and McKenna 
argued this was the nature of clerical work on Britain’s nineteenth-century railways, Fay’s diary 
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gives first-hand examples.203  In April 1878 he wrote: ‘Mr Osborne did not turn up so I had to 
check another weeks work, the member went home on Saturday with bad face ache.’204 On 
Christmas Day 1879 he stated he ‘had to work duced hard this week with the parcels work, have 
taken to the abstracts which Barnard has got a week behind with.’205 Lastly, in August 1880 he 
recorded: ‘This goods relief is rather too much of a good thing, have to work till 9 o'clock at 
night.’206 These and other examples demonstrate that LSWR clerks’ work was repetitive and 
laborious. Most importantly, such work gave future traffic managers little scope or time to gain 
direct experience of railway practices outside of the tasks they were performing. Indeed, the 
nature of traffic managers’ careers was exemplified by a statement made by a clerk in September 
1909; an LSWR clerk was ‘shut up in his office during the whole of the day and has no opportunity 
of seeing what is going on outside.’207 
 
Employment experiences narrowing 
 
Additionally, LSWR traffic managers’ narrow perspectives on railway management likely became 
progressively more pronounced between 1870 and 1911. Over this period a decreasing 
proportion of traffic managers had worked in other industries and professions before coming to 
the railway. Table 1 demonstrates that most senior traffic managers appointed between 1858 
and 1869 were not appointed directly to junior positions and it is presumed they were employed 
elsewhere before joining the LSWR. The previous occupations of three such traffic managers 
suggest the experiences the company was looking for before the mid-1860s. William Snow, 
Exeter Goods Superintendent between 1875 and 1899, joined the company in 1863 after a short 
period working for its delivery agents, Pickfords. 208 James Haddow, who was recruited in 1852 
and was the company’s Goods Manager between 1862 and 1888, was employed by the LSWR’s 
solicitors, Bircham and Son, until he was nineteen.209 Lastly, the 1861 census lists Joshua Avery, 
who became a clerk in 1867 at the age of twenty-nine and was the Plymouth Goods 
Superintendent between 1876 and 1899, as a railway carrier’s agent.210 All these individuals were 
employed by companies or in occupations that served the LSWR’s needs; suggesting that before 
the mid-1860s the Traffic Department used businesses it worked with to increase its pool of 
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available clerks when vacancies occurred. Nonetheless, it cannot be assumed that Snow, Haddow 
and Avery, despite coming from outside the industry, were more likely to be innovators 
compared to their colleagues. All had had close contact with the LSWR before being employed by 
it and their understanding of railway operations had possibly been thus conditioned. 
Furthermore, before being appointed to senior management positions they served the LSWR for 
twelve, ten and nine years respectively. Consequently, they had considerable time to be inducted 
into the company’s management practices.  
 
As the LSWR’s management structures settled in the 1860s, the company’s labour markets were 
deliberately narrowed. In 1863 a board special committee altered the rules regarding clerical 
appointments, ordering that ‘all vacancies for senior clerks be filled up from the junior clerks list,’ 
and specifying that individuals could only be appointed directly to senior positions if no suitable 
junior was available.211 Consequently, after 1880 most new senior traffic managers had begun 
their LSWR careers as juniors. Table 1 shows that in the 1880s only one out of seven new senior 
traffic managers had joined the railway in a junior position. But closer scrutiny shows that only 
two of the seven had joined above the age of eighteen, and it is thus considered that their time 
as junior clerks was not mentioned in their staff records.212  Of the fourteen senior traffic 
managers appointed in the 1890s (all of whom joined the company after 1863) ten began their 
careers in junior positions; while between 1900 and 1911 ten of the thirteen new managers had 
also begun as junior clerks or lads.  
 
Senior traffic managers appointed after 1880 increasingly spent all their working lives as clerks in 
the Traffic Department, probably meaning that as a group the diversity of their employment 
experiences narrowed over time. While considerable knowledge of an organisation’s practices is 
important when reforming outdated routines, it is possible that towards the end of the period 
LSWR traffic managers’ conservative outlooks on railway management became more pronounced 
and their capacity to innovate diminished. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, the Traffic Department’s clerical promotional ladders between 1870 and 1911 meant that 
once clerks reached senior management positions in the department their views on railway 
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management had only been shaped by their experience of practice within it. Thus, traffic 
managers’ opinions on railway management were conservative in nature and they had little 
capacity to innovate. These factors had important ramifications for the LSWR’s management 
quality and financial performance, as Section 3.4 discusses.  
 
 
3.3. Managers’ career lengths 
 
Decade of 
appointment to first 
senior management 
post 
Average number of 
years between 
appointment and first 
senior management 
post 
Average age 
individuals 
reached their 
first 
management 
post Sample Size 
1858-1869 14.81 37.06 16 
1870-1879 16.25 36.27 12* 
1880-1889 26.86 43.71 7 
1890-1899 25.86 41.86 14 
1900-1911 30.08 45.15 13 
1858-1911 22.15 40.51 62 
Table 4: The average time managers took to reach their first senior management post and their age 
when they reached it, sorted by the decade in which they were appointed. *One manager’s starting age 
was unavailable. Source: Staff Records, South Western Gazette,  
 
The traditionalism and lack of innovation amongst the LSWR senior traffic managers after 1870 
was also encouraged by the fact that as the decades passed the time it took for individuals to 
reach their first senior management post lengthened. Thus, new traffic managers were 
progressively more likely to have been socialised within the Traffic Department’s established 
operating practices, and possibly found it hard to think outside what they knew. Table 4 shows 
that between 1858 and 1869 it took managers on average about fifteen years from joining the 
company to being appointed to their first management position. However, between the 1870s 
and early-1900s this time grew, and by the period 1900 to 1911 the average duration was thirty 
years.  
 
This increase can be attributed, firstly, to the board’s 1863 ruling that except in exceptional 
circumstances all new clerical appointees should be juniors. Thereafter, all future traffic 
managers joined the LSWR as teenagers, meaning the time it took them to reach management 
was longer than those individuals who had previously been appointed as full clerks at later points 
in their lives.213  Secondly, the number of opportunities for clerks to advance up the hierarchy 
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progressively shrunk between 1870 and 1911. Between 1884 and 1914 the Traffic Department’s 
clerical staff increased from 805 to 1,505; while the last chapter discussed how the number of 
districts, and consequently influential senior traffic management positions, shrunk over this 
period.214 Therefore, as promotional opportunities decreased, clerks would have stayed in more 
junior posts for longer. Consequently, this possibly impeded skilled and innovative employees 
moving into influential positions within the Traffic Department; and in 1909 one clerk wrote to 
the South Western Gazette that ‘a great deal of talent is being wasted by our young people for 
want of opportunity…’215  
 
Sam Fay’s LSWR career usefully demonstrates how from the 1880s the rate at which talented and 
innovative individuals entered senior traffic management positions slowed. Fay, who was 
arguably one of the most talented railway managers of his generation, joined the company as a 
Junior Clerk at Itchen Abbas Station in 1872. He was advanced quickly and after only twelve years 
was moved to the Traffic Superintendent’s office. Despite being appointed its Chief Clerk in 1885, 
his career then stalled. In consideration of other managers’ career paths, logically his next 
promotion would have been into a District Superintendent’s post. Yet, the next such vacancy only 
became available in March 1896 when Adkins, the Central District Superintendent, resigned.216 
Thus blocked, in 1891 Fay ‘came to a deadlock’ over his promotion with his immediate superior, 
Verrinder, and he appealed directly to Scotter, who advanced his career by giving him the 
position of Assistant Storekeeper. Fay was then seconded to the struggling Midland and South 
Western Junction Railway (MSWJR) as General Manager in 1893,217 and after skilfully removing 
the company from chancery, became the LSWR’s Superintendent of the Line in 1899.218 He 
occupied this post for only a short time, becoming the GCR’s General Manager in 1902.219  
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Few clerks were of Fay’s potential. Nevertheless, the lack of opportunity that hindered him rising 
into a senior traffic management position in the LSWR suggests the company may have lost the 
ideas and skills of others who had much to offer it between 1870 and 1911. It is, therefore, 
realistic to suggest that this inability to bring on talented managers was detrimental to the Traffic 
Department’s management quality for reasons outlined above. Indeed, as Chapter 2 showed, 
because the turnover of senior managers was low, the thinking on railway management of those 
already high in the department would tend towards conservatism, meaning operational practices 
potentially stagnated and became inefficient. 
 
3.4. Traffic managers’ careers and management quality 
 
Chapter 2 argued that within the LSWR – where authority was centralised – officials could 
potentially occupy positions of authority for decades with considerable freedom to manage their 
affairs as they saw fit and, thus, their thinking on railway management could become 
conservative over time, meaning established operational practices were infrequently reassessed. 
However, as this section has shown, this tendency was unlikely to be countered by the 
company’s senior traffic managers. 
 
The evidence strongly suggests that between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR’s senior traffic managers 
were largely ignorant of management practices in other railways or industries, and their views on 
railway operation and administration were highly conditioned by their work within the company. 
For instance, Scott had complete charge of the Traffic Department since 1852; yet by the 1870s 
and early-1880s how he was running it was obsolete compared with management practices in 
the wider British railway industry. The company’s traffic managers and clerks – the future traffic 
managers – were, however, seemingly unaware of this fact, as many Gazette articles indicate.220 
Indeed, when Scotter joined the LSWR from the MSLR in 1885 and completely reformed the 
department’s operation and administration, Fay described the managerial practices he 
introduced as being ‘revolutionary,’ despite them being found throughout the industry (see 
Chapters 4 and 5).221 
 
This limited experience of alternative operating practices also meant traffic managers had little 
scope to critically assess their departmental heads’ quality. As Chapter 2 discussed, managers 
lower in the Traffic Department’s hierarchy were not in a position to put pressure on decision-
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makers above them to reassess or improve the quality of the departmental management.  This 
atmosphere of deference was unhelpful; but if this had been absent, it is unlikely that 
subordinates possessed much idea of what was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ about existing practices.  
 
The ways in which senior traffic managers’ careers affected the LSWR’s management quality 
were most apparent between 1890 and 1911. After 1890 almost all newly appointed senior 
traffic managers had spent their entire careers within the LSWR, had taken considerable time 
reaching senior management posts, and talented individuals were being held back by insufficient 
promotional opportunities. Therefore, despite Scotter transforming the company’s management 
after 1885, limited competence and knowledge below him meant that in the 1890s no one within 
the Traffic Department pressured him to regularly reassess the operational practices he had 
established. The Traffic Department’s management practices stagnated and developed 
inefficiencies as a result. Indicative of this stagnation, when after 1900 the LSWR’s profitability 
came under pressure from rising costs, government legislation and competition from trams, 
senior traffic officials found some economies which thereto had been unrealised (see Chapter 5 
and 6).  
 
Furthermore, contrasts in the Traffic Department’s management quality after 1900 highlight how 
LSWR traffic managers’ rigid and introverted careers affected the company’s financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911 when they reached positions that had decision-making 
authority.  In 1899 Sam Fay was appointed Superintendent of the Line. He initiated many far-
sighted and innovative projects – some of which were inspired by railroad management in the 
United States – to improve the Traffic Department’s operational practices and cost position. Yet, 
when Fay left the company in 1902, Owens, the General Manager, and Holmes, the new 
Superintendent of the Line, did not progress with many of his ideas and further innovations were 
not investigated. Furthermore, their attempts to improve the company’s cost position cannot be 
realistically called innovative as they simply adapted existing operating practices. Consequently, 
the company’s financial performance did not improve. Fay, however, went on to significantly 
reform the GCR’s management and better its very poor financial situation (see Chapter 6).222  
 
Fay was clearly a far more astute and innovative railway manager than Owens and Holmes. Apart 
from his natural talents, what stood him apart from them was that he had worked outside the 
LSWR as the MSWJR’s General Manager (and Secretary) between 1892 and 1899, whereas they 
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had spent all of their careers within its Traffic Department’s rigid and introvert clerical 
promotional ladder. Fay therefore had a broader range of management experiences, was not so 
committed to the LSWR’s existing operating practices, and had more capacity to think creatively. 
Conversely, as Owens and Holmes’ only experience of railway administration was from within the 
LSWR, they found it difficult to innovate and think imaginatively about improving many of its 
established management practices.  
 
Overall, this section has demonstrated that senior traffic managers’ narrow career paths 
negatively influenced the LSWR’s operating performance between 1870 and 1911. Traffic 
managers had limited knowledge of railways’ practices outside the company, became overly 
familiar with those within it, and, thus, had limited their capacity to innovate or critically appraise 
the virtue of established management practices. Consequently, these findings suggest one reason 
why, as this thesis argues throughout, innovation in management technique from within the 
LSWR was largely absent over this period. Furthermore, it can also be considered that, perhaps, 
LSWR traffic managers’ careers put greater restrictions on their ability to innovate than it did on 
other companies’ managers. Indeed, as has been discussed and later chapters show, it was 
principally senior managers appointed from outside the company that advanced and modernised 
the Traffic Department’s operating practices. This could tentatively suggest that other 
companies’ traffic managers, for example Scotter, were provided with careers that had a broader 
range of working experiences and gave them greater scope to think creatively. Although, without 
comparative case studies this remains conjecture. 
 
Section 2 – LSWR directors’ external business interests 
 
This section explores how LSWR directors’ external business interests – if they had any – may 
have influenced the company’s policies and strategies between 1870 and 1911. Ultimately, this 
section attempts to achieve what Chapter 1 stated Channon and Hughes’ studies did not in the 
case of the GWR and LNER: to suggest how a railway company’s performance was influenced by 
its directors’ interlocking directorships and primary occupations.223 
 
Chapter 1 discussed the numerous ways directors’ external activities possibly affected railways’ 
management quality. It is likely similar considerations applied in the LSWR’s case. For example, 
directors possibly used their positions to influence the railway’s decision-making processes in 
favour of their businesses or wider economic networks. They also possibly took up positions on 
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other companies’ boards to allow them to influence their policies and strategies in ways that 
favoured the LSWR. All these possible links between directors’ external business activities and 
the company’s policies will be considered. 
 
However, most importantly, this section’s findings suggest that between 1870 and 1911 LSWR 
directors’ external business interests rarely gave them the capacity to introduce to the railway 
management practices that may have enhanced its operational effectiveness. Furthermore, 
because most directors probably learned about railway operation from within the LSWR, this 
limited their capacity to adequately critique senior managers’ actions. Combined these factors 
also likely contributed to the lack of advancement or innovation in operational and managerial 
practices from within the company in this period. 
 
3.5. Directors’ external business interests 1870-1880 
 
Determining LSWR directors’ external business interests before 1880 has been challenging, 
because it was only then that the Directory of Directors (DofD), which listed the directors of 
public companies,224 began publication. However, other sources have provided this 
information.225  
 
Occupation 1870 1875 1880 
Military 
1 0 0 
16.67% 8.33% 8.33% 
Land and Agriculture 
4 5 6 
33.33% 41.67% 50.00% 
Manufacturing and 
Industry 
1 1 0 
8.33% 8.33% 0.00% 
Commerce and 
Finance 
2 2 2 
16.67% 16.67% 16.67% 
Legal 
3 3 3 
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 
Unknown 
1 1 1 
8.33% 8.33% 8.33% 
Total 12 12 12 
Table 5: Primary occupations of LSWR directors 1870-1880 (August). Source: Obituaries, Who’s Who, 
South Western Gazette, Dictionary of National Biography 
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Between 1870 and 1880 individuals whose primary occupations were in land and agriculture 
dominated the LSWR’s board. Table 5 shows that of the company’s twelve directors, four such 
individuals were on the board in 1870 (twenty-five percent), five in 1875 (forty-two percent) and 
six in 1880 (fifty percent). Channon argued that in the GWR’s case individuals working in law 
were also likely to have had aristocratic or landed parentage. Consequently, the three LSWR 
directors in this profession in each year also possibly possessed landed backgrounds. Lastly, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Laurd (1854-1871), a retired career soldier, also had a landed background. 226  
Overall, the maximum number of LSWR directors who possibly had connections to land and 
agriculture was eight in 1870 and 1875 (sixty-seven percent) and nine in 1880 (seventy-five 
percent).  
 
Why landed men dominated the LSWR’s board in such large numbers between 1870 and 1880 is 
unclear without further evidence. Possibly they joined because the company principally served 
agricultural districts and they saw the opportunity to increase their estates’ business through 
influencing its commercial policies. Yet, there is little evidence company policy was directed 
towards serving their interests, as Chapters 4 to 6 demonstrate. Perhaps, as Channon argued in 
the GWR’s case, falling capital land values during the agricultural depression meant many 
landowners’ capacity to service their debts declined, and, as such, a diversification of their 
portfolios was deemed by them to be a sensible course of action.227  
 
Most likely is the possibility the board looked to recruit landed individuals because of their 
connections within the territory the company served. In 1875 Arthur Guest, a prospective (and 
future) director who came from a landed background, sent circulars to LSWR shareholders urging 
them to elect him to the board. He claimed his credentials for the post were his experience with 
railway matters while he was a Member of Parliament (M.P.), his thirty-year residence in the 
West Country and his relationships with many LSWR stockholders.228 Between 1870 and 1880 the 
LSWR was purchasing many of the companies it already leased and worked (see Chapter 4), as 
well as expanding into the West Country. Thus, by recruiting directors who had regional links, like 
Guest’s, this may have made negotiations easier for the board and the final agreements more 
favourable.  
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It has been largely impossible to demonstrate exactly how directors external interests impacted 
on the LSWR’s strategies and policies between 1870 and 1880, or if they brought knowledge of 
innovative, alternative and new management practices to the company. Thus, only 
impressionistic conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, given most landed directors were unlikely to 
have possessed experience of running industrial organisations of the railway’s scale, it is doubtful 
they brought any valuable knowledge or experience to its management. Only two had relevant 
business interests or experience. Wyndham Spencer Portal (1861-1901) owned Laverstoke Paper 
Mills and, therefore, had some familiarity with running an industrial business;229 while Laurd had 
received administrative responsibilities when in the army in India, demonstrating that he 
possessed knowledge of managing large bodies of men.230 Indeed, Gourvish showed how Captain 
Mark Huish similarly transferred administrative skills he learnt in the army to the management of 
three railways: the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway between 1837 and 1841, the Grand 
Junction Railway between 1841 and 1846, and the LNWR between 1846 and 1858.231   
 
It is conceivable that the external activities of non-landed directors’ positively impacted on the 
LSWR’s business. Three directors, Govett (1878-1905), James Mangles (1876-1884) and Mortimer 
(1851-1891) worked in finance (in Mangles’ case as a secondary activity). Therefore, the LSWR’s 
case mirrors the GWR’s where Channon showed that until 1896 only a small proportion of its 
directors worked in this economic sector.232 Nonetheless, these directors may have permitted the 
LSWR access to capital on favourable terms. They also may have brought to the railway 
management skills given that banks were some of the first joint-stock companies to develop, as 
Wilson and Thomson argued,  ‘effective bureaucratic structures,’ ‘robust internal labour 
markets,’ and a ‘tightly controlled, hierarchical employment regime.’233  
 
Other directors also potentially transferred knowledge of running industrial businesses to the 
LSWR. Hutchins (1854-1875) was chairman of the Rhymney Iron Works from 1851234 and Charles 
Edward Mangles (1854-1873) was the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company’s chairman. 
Additionally, Mangles likely provided the LSWR with connections in the shipping industry, helping 
the railway to increase the trade through the south coast docks and ports it served, principally 
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Southampton.235  These directors therefore had the most potential to positively contribute to the 
LSWR’s business between 1870 and 1880. Indeed, this is possibly why Mangles was the 
company’s chairman between 1859 and 1872, while Hutchins became deputy between 1872 and 
1874.236    
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that most LSWR directors between 1870 and 1880 brought no 
valuable knowledge or experience of industrial management to the company. The likelihood is, 
therefore, that they learnt about railway organization through sitting on the LSWR’s board and 
had little capacity to analyse or challenge senior officials’ views and actions effectively. The 
ramifications of this situation for the LSWR’s managerial and financial performance are discussed 
in section 2.9 and later chapters. 
 
3.6. Directors’ external business interests 1880-1911  
 
This section develops the argument that LSWR directors’ external activities may have affected 
the company’s management quality between 1880 and 1911. These are better understood after 
1880 because of availability of the DofD. This source is used in a new way here. When Channon 
used it to investigate the GWR directors’ external directorships up to 1930, he failed to 
distinguish between the directorships individuals had on joining the board and those they 
acquired thereafter.237 My study makes this distinction and highlights other useful information 
the DofD provides about LSWR directors’ activities. Initially, I analyse how many external 
directorships directors held and how this possibly influenced the extent of their engagement with 
the company’s affairs.  Following this, I show in which economic sectors LSWR directors’ held 
directorships before and after joining the board. This enables me to examine how directors’ 
external business interests possibly influenced, or were influenced by, the company’s policies, 
strategic aims and profitability between 1880 and 1911. 
 
 
The LSWR board in 1880 
 
Firstly, to link the last section’s findings on LSWR directors’ external business interests with that 
extracted from the DofD, Table 6 compares both sets of information for 1880. This comparison 
reinforces the last section’s conclusions. In 1880 six landed directors had no directorships beyond 
the railway. Two other directors, one in legal and one in stockbroking professions, also had no 
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other activities apart from the LSWR. This supports the claim that before 1880 most LSWR 
directors held no external directorships, and again highlights that between 1852 and 1880 
directors were probably not recruited to the board because of their external business interests.   
 
Director 
Primary 
Occupations 
External Directorships  
Beach M.P, William Wither 
Branstom 
Landed None 
Campbell, Lt-Col. Henry Walter Landed None 
Dutton, Ralph Heneage. 
(Chairman) 
Landed None 
Eyre, Count John Lewis Landed None 
Gaselee, Serjeant Legal 
London and Provincial Law Assurance 
Society 
Guest, Arthur Edward. Landed None 
Govett, Adolphus Frederick Banker 
Whitby, Redcar and Middlesbrough 
Railway Co. 
Johnston, Captain James Gilbert Unknown  
South Indian Railway Company, 
Southampton Dock Company, West 
London Extension Railway 
Mangles, James Henry Legal None 
Mortimer, Charles Smith Stockbroker None 
Portal, Wyndham Spencer (D. 
Chairman) 
Landowner (Paper 
Maker) 
None 
Snell, William Phillip Legal West London Extension Railway 
Table 6: Directors' primary occupations and external directorships in 1880, Source: Directory of Directors 
and various others 
 
Only three directors, Gaselee (1852-1880), Govett (1878-1906) and Johnston (1853-1897) had 
directorships with companies that were not physically, financially or organisationally related to 
the LSWR’s business. These were the London and Provincial Law Assurance Society; the Whitby, 
Redcar and Middlesbrough Railway (WRMR) and the South Indian Railway Company. Arguably, 
the LSWR’s management quality benefited from Govett and Johnston’s experience of other 
railways’ practices. Yet it should be noted that, the WRMR, a small railway in the North East, was 
poorly managed, took ten years to build between 1871 and 1881, had defective infrastructure 
when opened and was loss-making.238 It is therefore inconceivable that Govett brought any 
valuable insights on railway management from this company to the LSWR. 
  
Contrastingly, two directors were on the boards of companies that were directly related to the 
LSWR’s business. Johnston and Snell were directors of the West London Extension Railway. This 
                                                          
238
 Michael Aufrere Williams, A more spectacular example of a loss-making branch would be hard to find': A 
financial history of the Whitby-Loftus line 1871-1958, (Unpublished MA Thesis. University of York, 2010), 
p.25-50 
100 
 
was jointly owned by the LSWR and consequently such positions were presumably considered 
part of these directors’ duties. Johnston was also on the Southampton Dock Company’s (SDC) 
board, which fed goods and passenger traffic onto the LSWR. Johnston was presumably and 
usefully able to provide the LSWR board with information on the SDC’s policies, as well as 
conveyed to that company the LSWR directors’ opinions. 
 
Overall, this evidence reinforces the conclusion that between 1870 and 1880 most LSWR 
directors had few business interests outside the company, and that most learned about railway 
management from within it. Therefore, they lacked the knowledge and experience to critically 
assess senior officials’ opinions and actions. But also, they likely had little capacity to bring from 
their external business interests ideas that that might help improve the railway’s operating 
practices. 
 
3.8. The nature of LSWR directorships in 1880-1911 
 
Number on 
Joining 
1880-
1884 
1885-
1889 
1890-
1894 
1895-
1899 
1900-
1904 
1905-
1909 
1910-
1911 
Total % 
0 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 11 55% 
1 1     1       3 15% 
2-3     1 1     1 2 10% 
4-6         2   1 3 15% 
7-8               0 0% 
9-12           1   1 5% 
Total 2 1 2 3 7 2 3 20 100% 
Table 7: The number of directorships LSWR directors had on joining the company. Source: Directory of 
Directors 
 
The DofD allows analysis of the LSWR directors’ external business activities between 1880 and 
1911. Examining the economic sectors directors represented could suggest why they were 
recruited to the board, their motivations for taking up directorships once on it, and, therefore, 
the concerns and interests of the directorate at different points. Furthermore, examining LSWR 
directors’ interlocking directorships’ possibly reveals their value to rejuvenating and improving 
the company’s management quality and financial performance 
 
Firstly, the possible reasons individuals were recruited to the LSWR’s board will be examined. 
Table 7 shows that eleven of the twenty individuals who joined the board between 1880 and 
1911 had no other directorships on appointment. Some of these directors were appointed 
because of their already close links with the company. Scott, Scotter239  and Macaulay (ex-
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secretary)240 were all former LSWR senior managers and were presumably selected because their 
long experience of the railway’s management may have been useful. Yet, as will be shown, by the 
1900s Scotter and Macaulay had been with the LSWR for considerable periods (Macaulay had 
joined it in 1850241), and like many of its decision-makers their opinions and outlooks on railway 
management were narrow. Their presence on the board therefore reinforced similar views held 
by influential traffic managers (see Section 1), meaning that after Fay’s departure in 1902 – a 
period when the company’s profitability was depressed by external factors – there were few 
individuals who had the experience or knowledge to challenge established operational practices 
or innovate effectively.  
 
 Three other directors were seemingly appointed because of familial ties. Barrington-Simeon 
(1892-1907) was the son-in-law of the late chairman, Dutton; 242 William Wyndham Portal (1902-
1922) was the son of Wyndham Portal, who had served between 1872 and 1901;243 while James 
Mangles (1876-1884)244 joined the board three years after his father, Charles (1854-1873), had 
left it.245 There was, therefore, also a dynastic element to the appointment of LSWR directors 
between 1870 and 1911, although it is unclear whether this had an impact on the company’s 
management quality. 
 
Five directors, who have no other directorships listed in the DofD, were landed. These were 
Clinton (1907-1922), Crichton (1903-1922), Drummond (1899-1922),246 Leigh-Bennett (1900-
1903) and Marshall (1880-1900). Given that four of these individuals were recruited in the 1900s, 
it suggests that up to 1911 having local knowledge and close social and economic connections 
within the LSWR’s territory were still considered valuable traits. In Drummond’s case, for 
example, The South Western Gazette argued that ‘his appointment to the board was a well-
merited one insomuch as his social and business connections in Exeter and the surrounding 
districts…should contribute to the interests of the company.’247  Nevertheless, without further 
evidence it is unclear how these directors’ regional connections benefited the company’s 
business.  
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Actual No. Of Directorships 
1880-
1884 
1885-
1889 
1890-
1894 
1895-
1899 
1900-
1904 
1905-
1909 
1910-
1911 To
ta
l 
Manufacturing and Industry 
    
1 2 2 4 
Publishing and Misc 
   
2 
   
2 
Commerce, Banking and Finance 
  
3 
 
6 2 3 14 
Communications and Utilities 
    
1 1 
 
1 
Railways (home and abroad) 1 
  
1 
   
2 
Shipping 
     
7 2 9 
Docks 
       
0 
Total 1 0 3 3 6 12 7 32 
Table 8: Sectors in which new directors held directorships. Source: Directory of Directors 
 
Lastly, one individual who joined the board, while possessing no other directorships, seemingly 
did so for what would now be labelled public relations purposes. When Arthur Fraser Walter 
(1901-1910) was appointed in 1901 he was ‘chief proprietor’ of The Times.248 In the late 1890s 
the LSWR’s train services had received much bad publicity and criticism in the national press (see 
Chapter 6). It is therefore conceivable that Walter was recruited as a means to improve the 
company’s image, both in The Times and through his links in the newspaper industry. Yet, 
without more evidence this is speculation.  
 
Nine directors appointed between 1880 and 1911 sat on other companies’ boards when they 
joined the LSWR, and some were possibly recruited because these positions had the potential to 
benefit the railway’s business. Table 8 shows the number of positions new directors held in 
different economic sectors. 
 
Between 1870 and 1900 just four individuals who joined the LSWR’s directorate were already 
serving on other companies’ boards. Only one director’s interlocking directorship potentially had 
considerable benefit for the railway’s management quality. Arthur Mills (1881-1898) was a North 
Staffordshire Railway (NSR) director. He possibly brought to the LSWR knowledge and experience 
of management practice in the wider British railway industry. Even then, he only joined the 
Traffic Committee for six years in the 1890s, meaning that for much of his tenure he was not in a 
position where he could criticise the operational practices used in the Traffic Department. Also 
the next section demonstrates that he was very inactive in the company’s affairs generally. 
Therefore, it is unlikely his presence on the LSWR’s board was of much benefit to its management 
quality. Additionally, Michael Williams, who joined the LSWR for one year in 1899, was a director 
of the Newquay Baths and Sanitary Steam Laundry Company and the Hotel Victoria (Newquay), 
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two businesses the LSWR would have had little interest in, except, perhaps, insomuch as they 
represented the growing traffic to the West Country for leisure. 
 
Principally, both men were appointed because of their connections within the regions the LSWR 
served. Mills had been M.P. for Exeter before joining the company and was well connected in the 
district; 249 while the South Western Gazette stated that Williams had ‘influence with the business 
community’ and knowledge of the trade around his three homes in Morfa, Newquay and 
Plymouth.250 This evidence therefore reaffirms the suggestion that between 1870 and 1911 new 
directors were predominantly appointed because of their potentially beneficial contacts within 
the company’s territory. 
 
Only one director appointed before 1900 had an existing directorship that may have directly 
benefitted the LSWR’s business. Robert Williams (1892-1922) held three directorships in 
commerce, banking and finance, one of which was on the Williams Deacon and Manchester and 
Salford Bank’s board. This owned the Williams Deacon Bank, the LSWR’s banker.251 When the 
LSWR took over the Southampton Docks in 1892, which required heavy investment, the directors 
presumably deemed it sensible for the company’s bank to be represented on the board to ease 
access to capital.  
  
After 1900 the LSWR’s directorial hiring policies were altered. As stated, in this period the 
railway’s profitability came under pressure from numerous factors: its traffic stagnated, material 
and fuel costs grew, and capital was in short supply. Consequently, the company recruited more 
directors whose business connections potentially could have benefited it. Like in the GWR’s case, 
the LSWR recruited directors who held positions in commerce and finance. These were Cecil 
(1902-1922), Grant (1900-1912), Martin-Holland (1910-1922), Pirrie (1907-1922), and Philips 
(1910-1922); of which Grant, Martin-Holland and Pirrie held positions on banks’ boards. As 
Channon suggested occurred in the GWR’s case, at a time when interest in railways’ securities 
declined, limiting the LSWR’s access to finance,252 strong links to financial institutions possibly 
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allowed access to capital on more favourable terms.253  Indeed, these links may have allowed it to 
sustain investment in numerous long-term capital projects it had initiated between 1897 and 
1901, and purchase the Waterloo and City Railway (WCR) in 1906 (see Chapter 6). 
 
The LSWR had purchased Southampton Docks in 1892, and unsurprisingly the two directors, 
William Pirrie and Owen Philips, held seven and two positions in shipping when they were 
appointed. These contacts likely helped the LSWR augment its seaborne trade, offsetting a stall in 
traffic growth in the period and the fall in its average revenue per ton of merchandise hauled 
before 1900 (see Chapter 6). Pirrie and Philips were directors of shipping lines that sailed from 
the Southampton Docks. Philips was the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company’s Managing Director 
and Pirrie was a director of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company (White Star Line [WSL]). 
Their positions on the LSWR board would have allowed informal communication and a cohesive 
relationship to exist between these shipping lines and the railway – improving the management 
performance of both. 254 The two directors would have also provided the railway with extensive 
expertise on steamship and dock management; shortly after appointment Pirrie joined the Docks 
and Marine committee.255 This quickly paid off for the LSWR. Soon after Pirrie’s appointment in 
May 1907, the WSL moved its operation to Southampton. Subsequently, he influenced the 
LSWR’s policies, and in October 1907 work began at Southampton on what became the ‘White 
Star’ dock. This was constructed to berth the WSL’s new ships, Titanic and Olympic, which were 
being built in Belfast by Harland and Wolff, of which Pirrie was also chairman.256 Pirrie’s LSWR 
directorship therefore allowed him to influence the railway’s policies to benefit his other 
business interests, but not to the detriment of the railway’s performance. It should be noted the 
evidence suggests that no other directors used their position on the LSWR board to influence 
company policy in favour of their external business interests between 1870 and 1911.  
 
Overall, this section has argued that the majority of individuals recruited to the LSWR’s board 
between 1880 and 1911 were so because their social and economic connections outside the 
company had the potential to benefit it somehow. Directors were appointed because of their 
contacts in the LSWR’s territory or the shipping industry; because they could provide the 
company with access to capital on favourable terms; or even because they could give the railway 
good publicity.  
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Importantly, this section has demonstrated how few new directors could have transferred to the 
company knowledge of management practices used outside it. Indeed, even Mills’ position on 
the NSR’s board was of doubtful benefit to the LSWR; while the three ex-LSWR railwaymen 
appointed to the board – Scott, Scotter and Macaulay – lacked the scope to bring new and 
innovative ideas to the company given they had worked within it for decades and had few 
external business interests. Indeed, as discussed, after 1900 their appointments may have 
actually harmed the company’s ability to find efficiencies and effect productivity gains. 
 
Post-appointment directorships 
 
However, LSWR directors also acquired external directorships once on the board. This section 
suggests how these positions possibly reflected the directorate’s concerns and objectives 
between 1880 and 1911, and possibly improved the company’s business. Table 9 shows the 
economic sectors in which LSWR directors took up positions after appointment.  
 
The evidence confirms Channon’s argument that before about 1900 there existed for railway 
directors few directorial opportunities beyond the railway industry. Indeed, in this period LSWR 
board members acquired no fewer than twenty-eight directorships in other railways (seventy-
two percent). Eight of these were in companies that the LSWR had no links to whatsoever 
(including overseas railways).  Yet, twenty-eight directorships were taken up in companies the 
railway had a direct financial, trading or physical interest in. Channon argued that GWR directors 
used such positions within companies to exert influence over their policies.257 The same likely 
applied in the LSWR’s case. Eight of the twenty-eight directorships were within two railways the 
LSWR jointly owned, the Somerset and Dorset (SDR) and West London Extension Railways 
(WLER). Consequently, sitting on these companies’ boards was presumably part of directors’ 
duties. Realistically these are the only interlocking directorships that directors acquired after 
1880 that potentially allowed them to transfer knowledge to the LSWR that may have improved 
its management quality. On the SDR’s board LSWR directors worked with directors from the 
Midland Railway, while the WLER’s board was also made up of directors from the LNWR, GWR 
and LBSCR. By having working relationships with these individuals, LSWR board members possibly 
acquired information on innovations and advancements in operational practice in the wider 
British railway industry that could have been be applied to the company’s operations, yet without 
further evidence it is unclear whether this knowledge transfer took place. 
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1880-
1884 
1885-
1889 
1890-
1894 
1895-
1899 
Before 
1900 
1900-
1904 
1905-
1909 
1910-
1911 
After 
1900 
Total 
Manufacturing 
and Industry 
  1     1 1 1 1 3 4 
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco 
  1     1     1 1 2 
Publishing and 
Misc. 
        0       0 0 
Commerce, 
Banking and 
Finance 
  1   1 2 3 3 5 11 13 
Communications 
and Utilities 
        0     0 0 0 
Railways (Not 
Associated with 
the LSWR) 
3 2 2 1 8       0 8 
Railways 
(Associated with 
LSWR) 
4 2 4 10 20 7   1 8 28 
Shipping   1     1     5 5 6 
Docks (all 
associated with 
the LSWR) 
1 5   1 7 3 1   4 11 
Total 8 13 6 13 40 14 5 14 32 72 
Table 9: Directorships LSWR directors were appointed to after joining the board. No individual serving 
the LSWR in a management position is known to have taken up an interlocking directorship between 
1870 and 1911. Source: Directory of Directors. N.B. this does not take into account the length of 
directors’ tenures 
 
Directors also acquired eighteen directorships within independent companies the LSWR had a 
direct business interest in. For example, when in 1885 it loaned the SDC £250,000 to construct a 
new dock, four of its directors received positions on the SDC’s board, which allowed them to 
steer its policies.258 Furthermore, nine of the twelve companies LSWR directors took positions in, 
including the SDC, were eventually purchased by the railway. Therefore, by taking up these 
positions the directors could possibly gather strategically useful information on the companies, 
build stronger relationships with them, influence their policies, and improve the terms on which 
they were purchased. These directorships probably benefitted the LSWR’s financial performance 
between 1870 and 1911; although, the extent to which they did cannot be precisely determined 
without further information. 
 
After 1900, LSWR directors still acquired positions in railways and docks directly associated with 
its business. In total these accounted for twelve of the thirty-two directorships they took up. 
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However, the need for such connections was decreasing. By the 1900s the LSWR had absorbed 
most of the companies it had a direct financial, physical or trading interest in, and, consequently, 
such directorships were acquired less frequently. Given the company undertaking numerous 
major infrastructure projects, and in light of the difficulties it was having raising capital, the 
directors pursued a policy of obtaining directorships on financial institutions’ boards. Indeed, 
eleven positions were taken up in banking, commerce and finance after 1904, and it is possibly 
no coincidence that this was the year in which the LSWR board formed a special committee to 
address its capital supply problems.259 As stated, such links may have permitted the railway to 
sustain investment in its major capital projects and purchase the WCR in 1906 (see Chapter 6). 
 
Lastly, Pirrie and Philips acquired further directorships on one and four shipping lines 
respectively. Presumably they continued to expand their interests in this economic sector for 
personal gain. Nonetheless, these new positions would have provided the LSWR with further 
links in the shipping industry that possibly helped augment its trade at Southampton. 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
This section has highlighted how LSWR directors’ external business activities potentially impacted 
on the company’s management quality and financial performance between 1870 and 1911. 
Firstly, most directors were appointed because of their contacts within the territory the company 
served, rather than their business interests; however, it is unknown how these connections 
directly influenced company policy or benefited the business. Furthermore, especially before 
1900, LSWR directors also acquired directorships on the boards of companies that fed the 
railway’s business and trade, quite possibly with a view to influencing their policies, gathering 
information on their activities, or eventually taking them over. Indeed, on many occasions LSWR 
directors successfully exerted their influence over such companies, as was so in the case of the 
Southampton Dock Company.  
 
Through its directors the LSWR also established links after 1900 with financial institutions and the 
shipping industry to address specific problems. In a period when capital supplies were poor, the 
positions directors held within financial institutions possibly gave the company access to capital 
on favourable terms. Additionally, despite the company’s rail-borne trade stagnating, Pirrie and 
Philips’ positions and contacts within the shipping industry potentially contributed to growing the 
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trade at the Southampton Docks. Therefore, these external directorships potentially had positive 
effects on the LSWR’s business. 
 
This section’s findings are important for another reason. Throughout this thesis it is argued that a 
major weakness of the LSWR’s management between 1870 and 1911 was its functional 
department structure. Within this highly centralised system of corporate governance decision-
makers, particularly senior managers, frequently occupied their posts for decades, with little 
restricting how they managed their affairs. This consequently meant that there was a potential 
for their views on railway management to stagnate, for established operational practices to be 
reassessed infrequently, and for inefficiencies to develop; all of which harmed the company’s 
performance (see Chapter 2). 
 
However, this section has suggested the directors’ outside business interests did not, for the 
most part, facilitate any movement of new or innovative management concepts from external 
sources into the company. Most directors, particularly when joining the board, were not involved 
in businesses that were similar in terms of their size, their use of technology or the sectors of the 
economy they were operating in, to the LSWR. Indeed, the majority of directors throughout the 
period had their primary business interests in land and agriculture. Consequently, as Chapters 4 
to 6 suggest, the vast majority of the company’s directors learned about running a railway from 
within the LSWR and, as such, had little basis upon which to criticise or challenge senior decision-
makers’ opinions, actions or policy suggestions, which led to poor management practices 
developing within the company. 
 
The most notable example that demonstrates this is the directors’ attitudes to the competing 
management philosophies of Scott, the General Manager, and Adams, the Locomotive 
Superintendent, between 1881 and 1884. The former had been in charge of the company’s 
Traffic Department since 1852. But after 1870 the practices he was using in the department 
became progressively unsuitable for managing the company’s increasing traffic and working 
complexity. This was the root cause of the company’s poor profitability before 1884. However, 
the directors allowed this situation to develop. Their external business interests did not give 
them experience how railways were managed outside the company, and, consequently, they had 
no knowledge base upon which to challenge Scott’s operational practices. But when Adams 
joined the LSWR in 1878, after having gained experience of how other British railways were 
managed, he used this knowledge to challenged Scott’s backward methods where their 
responsibilities overlapped (operational and rolling stock policies). This was, therefore, the first 
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time the directorate had ever been alerted to the weaknesses in Scott’s management. 
Confronted with the company’s overall financial performance deteriorating further, and given 
Adams had considerably improved the Locomotive Department’s management, they increasingly 
favoured his opinions on matters of policy over Scott’s. 
 
As this and other cases in Chapters 4 to 6 demonstrate, the LSWR’s management quality and 
financial performance between 1870 and 1911 was therefore not shaped by knowledge or 
experience of industrial organization being brought to the company by directors. Thus, this 
section’s findings propose another reason why, as the thesis argues throughout, in this period the 
advancement, improvement or innovation in railway management from within the company was 
minimal. 
Section 3 – The LSWR’s ‘activist’ directors 
 
As Chapter 2 highlighted, and is a central argument of this thesis, how effectively department 
heads’ activities were coordinated and overseen was an important influence on the LSWR’s 
management quality between 1870 and 1911. This section is therefore important; by 
determining which directors were most active in the LSWR’s business in the period, it can be 
ascertained when the board as a whole was taking on these responsibilities. Additionally, it can 
be also determined when it was most in charge of the company’s overall strategic direction. 
Ultimately, this section shows how directors’ activism, or lack thereof, influenced company’s 
financial performance between 1870 and 1911.  
 
Establishing which board members were most engaged in the business has not been simple as 
the dry minute books do not give much sense of who most influenced discussions and decision-
making. As a substitute, I have analysed which directors were most active in four areas of the 
board’s business. As the Traffic Committee played such an important role in the company’s 
strategy and policy (see Chapter 2) its membership was a priority for analysis. Secondly, I 
established which individuals sat on the various Special committees of the board; directors 
formed these to handle significant policy issues which needed detailed investigation. Thirdly, the 
LSWR’s chairmen and deputy chairman have been noted. Finally, the directors active in inter-
company diplomacy have also been determined; their role was clearly an important one that 
would not have been left to directors who were unfamiliar with the LSWR’s objectives and 
policies.  By collating this information, a list has been produced of the directors that were 
probably the most active in the LSWR business between 1870 and 1911. These individuals will 
hereafter be called ‘activists’. 
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3.10. Traffic Committee membership 
 
As Chapter 2 discussed, the Traffic Committee was the LSWR’s most important board committee 
as it made decisions regarding infrastructure investment, additions to rolling stock, staff matters, 
timetables and operational policy. Consequently, the directors who joined it had considerable 
influence over how the LSWR’s strategies and policies were developed. 
 
Figure 1: The number of directors that sat on the LSWR's Traffic Committee 1870-1911. Source, TNA, RAIL 
411/239-269, Traffic Committee minute books 
 
From 1870 to 1911 the number of directors that sat on the Traffic Committee at any one time 
varied between three and six, as Figure 1 shows, with twenty-one different directors filling these 
positions across the period (Appendix, Table 1.1.). It is considered that of these twenty-one 
directors those who were members of the committee for considerable portions of their 
directorships were the most engaged with LSWR’s business. On this basis, eight directors 
(Campbell, Crichton, Dummond, Dutton Marshall, Mortimer, Scotter and Walter), who served the 
Traffic Committee for more than seventy-five percent of the years they were on the board, can 
be considered potential ‘activists’. Another candidate was Beach, who, despite only sitting on the 
committee for fifty-nine percent of the years he was a LSWR director, was on it for the lengthy 
period of sixteen years. 
 
3.11. Diplomatic functions 
 
Directors’ activism was also possibly indicated by their involvement in diplomacy for the 
company. This has been determined by analysing the LSWR’s representation on the following 
boards and committees between 1870 and 1911: 
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 The Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway Board (S&DJR): The LSWR jointly owned this with 
the Midland Railway between 1875 and 1923.260 
 The West London Extension Railway (WLER): The LSWR owned one sixth of the company 
for the entire period studied. 
 The London Brighton and South Coast Railway (LBSCR) Joint Committee: The two 
companies discussed intercompany issues at this committee between 1870 and 1922.261 
 The GWR consultation committee: This sat between 1877 and 1882, with one meeting in 
1906. The companies’ officials discussed the same issues as on the LBSCR joint 
committee. 262 
 The Railway Clearing House (RCH) Committee: The LSWR erratically sent one delegate to 
this committee throughout the period.263 
 
To determine the most active board members in this field, I have calculated the average number 
of diplomatic positions they held in each year of their directorships. This is their ‘diplomatic 
engagement score.’ I calculated this by totalling the number of years they were in each 
diplomatic position and then divided this figure by the number of years they were LSWR 
directors. For instance, Henry Walter Campbell’s ‘diplomatic engagement score’ was calculated 
as follows: 
Committee or Board Duration (years) 
Somerset & Dorset Railway Board 1894-1909 16 
West London Extension Railway Board 1898 1 
LB&SCR Joint Committee 1872-1910 39 
GWR Joint Committee 1881-1882 & 1906 3 
Railway Clearing House Committee 1872-1904 33 
Total 'years' performing diplomatic functions 92 (a) 
      
Duration of LSWR Directorship 1872-1910 39 (b) 
Diplomatic Engagement Score 2.36 (a ÷ b) 
Table 10: Example of how a diplomatic engagement score is calculated, Source: See Appendix 1.2 
Twenty-four LSWR directors in Table 1.2 (Appendix 1) undertook diplomatic functions for the company 
between 1870 and 1911. Five of these, Campbell, Dutton, Mortimer, Grant and Scotter, can be 
definitely considered as potential ‘activists’ given their diplomatic engagement scores were 
greater than one. One director, Wyndham S. Portal, performed three diplomatic roles and, 
despite his score being less than one, he is considered a potential an ‘activist’ given his high level 
of activity.  
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3.12. Special committee membership 
 
 
Figure 2: The number of Special Committees held by the LSWR board, 1870-1911. Source: TNA, RAIL 
411/220 and RAIL 411/221, Special committee Minute Books 
 
The third area where LSWR directors possibly demonstrated their level of engagement with the 
company’s affairs was their service on Special committees. The board established these to 
discuss and resolve significant issues of policy and strategy, and, therefore, the directors that sat 
on them were important in shaping the company’s strategic course.264 Eighty-two Special 
committees were formed between 1870 and 1904 (Figure 2), which were twenty-one directors 
attended (Table 1.3, Appendix 1).  
 
I consider that directors who joined a high proportion of committees during their directorships 
were most likely the ‘activists’. This approach is problematic. In each decade after 1870 the 
number of Special committees declined, which reflected the board’s progressive withdrawal from 
the company’s day-to-day management (see Chapter 4). Therefore, in the 1870s active directors 
may have joined many committees, but as the number formed was considerable, they attended a 
small proportion of them. Conversely, after 1880 directors who were not highly active in the 
company’s affairs could have attended a high proportion of committees given the number held in 
this period was much lower. Yet, the changing nature of Special committees must also be 
considered. After about 1880 they were only established to address significant issues, for 
instance the Southampton Docks’ purchase.265 Therefore, directors attending them in this period 
were likely taking leading roles in corporate decision-making and strategy formation.   
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The directors who attended the highest proportion of Special Committees held throughout their 
directorships were Scotter (100 percent), Scott (seventy-eight percent) and Macaulay (sixty-
seven percent). They can therefore be considered potential ‘activists’. Four directors joined 
above fifty percent of the special committees available to them and were also highly active in the 
company’s affairs: Campbell (sixty-five percent), Portal (sixty-one percent), Mortimer (fifty-two 
percent) and Drummond (fifty percent). Drummond, however, only attended one of the two 
Special committees formed during his directorship. Yet, given Special committees after 1890 
discussed very important issues, he too is considered a probable ‘activist.’ 
 
Other directors were on many Special committees, but because they joined most before 1880, 
when committee numbers were high, they only attended a low proportion of those formed 
during their directorships. Dutton attended thirty (forty-seven percent), Gaselee joined twenty-
one (forty percent) and Snell was present at twenty (thirty percent).  These directors were, 
therefore, considerably active in the company’s affairs and can also be considered potential 
‘activists’. 
 
3.13. The activist directors and the board’s role 
 
Combining this evidence with information on who became the LSWR’s chairmen and deputy 
chairmen, Table 1.4 (Appendix 1) shows the fifteen individuals I consider were the company’s 
most active directors between 1870 and 1911. However, my analysis of LSWR directors’ activism 
between 1870 and 1911 has been more detailed than previous works. Unlike Channon, who in 
his study of the Midland Railway’s London extension simply divided its directors into ‘activists’ 
and ‘backwoodsmen’,  I have been able to classify the LSWR’s board members as ‘higher’, 
‘significant’ and ‘lesser’ activists.266  
 
Eight directors – labelled ‘higher’ activists – Campbell, Castleman, Drummond, Dutton, Charles 
Mangles, Mortimer, Portal and Scotter, engaged the most with the company’s business between 
1870 and 1911. All were involved in the three areas of board activity analysed, and only one, 
Mortimer, never became company chairman or deputy chairman. As Chapters 4 to 6 show, these 
individuals were significant in formulating and developing the LSWR’s strategies and policies in 
the period. These directors were supported by three others, Beach, Gaselee and James Mangles, 
who are considered ‘significant activists.’ None of them became chairman or deputy chairman, 
but to varying degrees they were active in the areas of board activity analysed. Lastly, four 
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directors, Johnson, Macaulay, Scott and Snell, have been classified as ‘lesser activists’. None 
joined the Traffic Committee, but all engaged in diplomacy for the company or sat on Special 
committees.  
 
The directorate – as Chapter 4 shows – had the most influence over the LSWR’s investment 
strategies in the 1870s, but also retained charge of supervising and overseeing the activities of 
the company’s departments. Indeed, despite being re-titled ‘General Manager’ in 1870,267 Scott 
did not possess these responsibilities and was still the Traffic Department’s head. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, eleven of the fifteen directors considered ‘activists’ served in this decade: Beach, 
Campbell, Castleman, Dutton, Gaselee, Johnston, Charles Mangles, James Mangles, Mortimer, 
Wyndham S. Portal and Snell.  
 
The board was particularly active in this period for two reasons. Firstly, eight of these directors 
are known to have had few activities outside the LSWR, and consequently they had time to 
dedicate to the railway’s business. Secondly, there was a low turnover of directors between the 
1850s and 1870s. In 1870 nine board members had joined the company between before 1854 
(Snell, Johnson, Dutton, Mortimer, Hutchins, Gaselee, Castleman, Eyre and Charles Mangles) –in 
1878 six of these men still remained on the board).268 In the 1850s the directorate was almost 
certainly closely involved in managing the smaller and less complex LSWR. Indicative of this, while 
there were fifty-one Special Committees held in the 1870s, between 1852 and 1862 the figure 
was eighty-five.269 Thus, by the 1870s the board retained many men who expected to take a 
dominant role in company policy and operations. Exemplifying this, in 1879 Gaselee – a long-
standing ‘activist’ director who had been deeply engaged in the company’s affairs since 
the1850s270 – unsuccessfully suggested the committees be abolished and the entire board 
oversee all its functions as a means, presumably, of reducing company costs.271 
 
In the 1870s the board’s hold over overseeing and coordinating the LSWR’s functions was 
injurious to the company performance. As its traffic and operational complexity grew the board, 
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which only met fortnightly, was progressively unable to manage the railway’s operational affairs 
as effectively as it had been. Consequently, senior managers lacked effective leadership; resulting 
in the company failing to develop coherent operational strategies and the functionally 
independent department heads having the freedom to act in ways that damaged corporate 
profitability. This state of affairs significantly contributed to the LSWR’s inefficiency and poor 
financial performance between 1870 and 1880 (see Chapter 4). As such, this case supports the 
thesis’ central argument – discussed at length in Chapter 2 – that the quality of leadership, 
oversight and coordination department heads received significantly influenced the LSWR’s 
performance between 1870 and 1911.   
 
Between the 1878 and mid-1890s the board’s ‘activist’ directors fell in number, and by 1895 six 
were present, of which only two were ‘higher activists’: Campbell and Wyndham S. Portal. Three 
factors caused this change (see Chapters 4 and 5). Firstly, by the early-1880s the directors 
realised they were unable oversee the day-to-day running of the concern effectively, and 
consequently delegated responsibility for this to Scott. Furthermore, many directors who joined 
the company in the late-1870s and early-1880s started obtaining external directorships, as shown 
above, and as such they had less time to dedicate to the railway’s management. Finally, Scotter, 
the company’s General Manager from 1885, considerably improved the company’s efficiency and 
profitability. Thus, the directors, who had learned about railway management from within the 
company (see section 2), increasingly trusted him to determine the LSWR’s capital investment 
and operational policies. These factors meant that by the mid-1890s the directorate’s influence 
over the company’s management and strategic direction had waned considerably, as reflected by 
the smaller number of ‘activist’ directors on the board (See Chapter 5). 
  
Nevertheless, around 1900 the dynamics of directors’ activism again changed. For a short period 
the number of ‘activists’ on the LSWR board rose to eight because Scotter and Macaulay joined it 
(Macaulay was the company’s secretary between 1880 and 1898272). With the support of 
numerous long-standing active directors, as well as Scott and Macaulay, Scotter strengthened his 
control of the company’s strategic direction, and continued to pursue the policies that he had 
established as General Manager of expanding the concern and improving its services. Indeed, the 
company began work on numerous major capital projects after 1898, such as the rebuilding of 
Waterloo, the expansion of the Southampton Docks, the widening of the main lines and the 
removal of the locomotive works to Eastleigh (see chapter 6).  
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Between 1897 and 1904 eight directors joined the board that had, or eventually obtained, 
considerable external business interests, as Section 2 discussed. Because most of these 
individuals could not dedicate their time to the company, between 1902 and 1911 only four 
‘activist’ directors were on the board, three of which were ‘higher activists’ (Campbell, 
Drummond, Scotter and Macaulay). The oversight and direction of the company’s business was, 
therefore, largely left to them.  
 
This was problematic for the company’s management performance after 1900. This thesis’ other 
major argument is that because only those at the head of the organisation had decision-making  
authority and could sit in position for decades with few constraints on their autonomy, 
potentially their thinking on railway management stagnated and established operational 
practices’ worth were infrequently reassessed.  This argument applies in the case of the LSWR’s 
‘activist’ directors after 1900. As three of the four of them had been influential within the 
company since the 1880s (Scotter, Macaulay and Campbell), and since that time had not worked 
outside it, their views on railway management – most notably Scotter’s – had by the 1900s 
stagnated and become conservative in nature. Coupled with similar views on railway 
administration being held by the company’s senior traffic managers (see Section 1), this meant 
that after Sam Fay’s departure from the company in 1902, it did not effectively tackle the 
problem of its profitability coming under pressure from external sources. Indeed, led by Scotter, 
the company did not persist with innovations Fay had initiated, did not reassess fully existing 
operational practices and, most notably, after 1905 delayed the electrification of its suburban 
lines to win back traffic that had been lost to the trams. 
 
Section 4 – Conclusion  
 
As this thesis will argue throughout, from within the LSWR between 1870 and 1911 there was 
very little original or innovative thinking on railway management or operating practice. This 
Chapter has demonstrated some of the factors that underpinned this state of affairs. It has 
revealed that the backgrounds and careers of LSWR decision-makers made it more likely that 
their views on management practice would be narrow and they would in many cases uncritically 
accept the company’s established and embedded operating practices.  
 
Section 1 showed that apart from Sam Fay, all the LSWR’s senior traffic managers between 1870 
and 1911 (including Owens, the General Manager between 1898 and 1911) had spent their entire 
careers within the Traffic Department’s rigidly hierarchical and introverted promotional trees. 
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Thus, when they reached senior management level they only knew of the department’s existing 
operating practices, limiting their ability to analyse their value, think creatively, or even accept 
new innovations. Additionally, Section 2 demonstrated that most LSWR directors would have 
learnt about railway management from within the company, as they had few external business 
interests. Consequently, as later chapters show, this situation was injurious to the company’s 
financial performance as it limited their ability to critically assess senior officials’ actions or the 
value of the company’s embedded management practices. Indeed, few, if any directors had 
scope to bring to the LSWR knowledge of management practices used outside the company, that 
may have improved those within it. Finally, after 1900 the LSWR’s most active directors had been 
with the company for decades, either as board members or senior managers, and consequently 
they too had developed traditional outlooks on railway management, which reinforced similar 
views held by most senior traffic managers and the General Manager (see Chapter 6). In sum, 
between 1870 and 1911 the careers and lives of the LSWR’s directors and managers underpinned 
the slow pace of development or advancement in operating and management practices within 
the company in this period. This meant, as this thesis has suggested throughout, the primary way 
the railway’s operating practices advanced in this period was through individuals being appointed 
to senior management positions from external sources. 
 
The thesis’ second major argument is that the occasions when the LSWR’s overall management 
quality was at its best was when the company’s functionally independent department heads 
were provided with strong leadership by those above them in the hierarchy and, consequently, 
their actions were synchronised and supervised effectively. Firstly, Section 3 argued that in the 
1870s the board had close oversight of the department heads’ activities for two reasons: they 
had few external business activities, and so could commit themselves to the business, and they 
had been with the company for decades and expected to take a leading role in its operational 
management. But this situation was problematic for the company’s operational cohesiveness 
and, ultimately, its financial performance, as Chapter 4 shows. Because of the company’s 
increasing operational complexity after 1870, the directorate was progressively unable to closely 
oversee the activities of the department heads effectively. Furthermore, the directors had little 
experience of industrial or railway organisation outside the LSWR, and thus they had no basis 
upon to which to critique department heads’ policy suggestions or activities. Consequently, these 
two factors combined meant the company never established coherent operational strategies, 
and the poor management of the Traffic and Locomotive Departments by their heads went 
unchecked, harming company efficiency and profitability. 
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Overall, this chapter described how LSWR directors’ and senior traffic managers’ lives, careers 
and business interests potentially influenced the company’s strategies, policies and financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911. In the detailed discussion on the company’s policies, 
strategies and management quality in the next three chapters, I will expand on the arguments 
made in this chapter and the last. 
  
119 
 
Section 5 – Appendices 
 
3.1. All LSWR directors that sat on the Traffic Committee 1870-1911 (taken at the start of the 
year). Source, TNA, RAIL 411/239-269, Traffic Committee minute books 
No. Name 
Decade 
Y
e
ar
s 
o
n
 T
ra
ff
ic
 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e
 1
8
7
0
-1
9
1
1
 
Y
e
ar
s 
a 
B
o
ar
d
 
M
e
m
b
e
rs
h
ip
 1
8
7
0
-1
9
1
1
 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ye
ar
s 
a 
D
ir
e
ct
o
r 
o
n
 T
ra
ff
ic
 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e
 
1
8
7
0
s 
1
8
8
0
s 
1
8
9
0
s 
1
9
0
0
-1
1
 
1 Marshall, Lt- Gen Frederick   8 10 1 19 19 100.00% 
2 Mortimer, Charles Smith 10 10 2   22 22 100.00% 
3 Drummond, Hugh Williams       12 12 13 92.31% 
4 Dutton, Ralph H. 9 8 3   20 23 86.96% 
5 Scotter, Sir Charles       11 11 13 84.62% 
6 Walter, Arthur Fraser       8 8 10 80.00% 
7 
Crichton A.D.C, Col the Hon 
H.G.L. 
      7 7 9 77.78% 
8 Campbell, Lt-Col. H.W. 2 9 10 9 30 39 76.92% 
9 Leigh-Bennett, Henry Curry       3 3 4 75.00% 
10 Cecil M.P., Evelyn       8 8 11 72.73% 
11 Castleman, Charles 5       5 7 71.43% 
12 Beach M.P, W.W.B   4 10 2 16 27 59.26% 
13 Gaselee, Serjeant 7       7 12 58.33% 
14 Williams, Michael     1   1 2 50.00% 
15 Philips, Owen       1 1 2 50.00% 
16 Mills, Arthur     6   6 18 33.33% 
17 Mangles, Captain Charles Edward 1       1 4 25.00% 
18 Mangles, James Henry   2     2 9 22.22% 
19 Portal, William W.       1 1 11 9.09% 
20 Portal, Wyndham S. 2       2 32 6.25% 
21 Guest, Arthur E. 1       1 23 4.35% 
No. of Directors in each Decade 8 6 7 12       
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3.2. Joint committees, part-owned companies and bodies LSWR directors sat on 1870-1911, 
Source:  TNA, RAIL 414/198 and RAIL 414/200, LSWR and London, Brighton and South Coast Joint 
committee Minute Books; TNA RAIL 240/5, Great Western and LSWR Committee of Consultation 
Minute Books; TNA, RAIL 626/1 to RAIL 626/5, Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway Board Minute 
Books; TNA, RAIL 732/2 to RAIL 732/6, West London Extension Railway Board Minute Books; TNA, 
RAIL 1080/6 to RAIL 1080/11, Railway Clearing House Committee Minute Books. 
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Campbell, 
Lt-Col. 
H.W. 
1872 1910 
1894-
1909 
1898 
1872-
1910 
1881-
1882 
-1906 
1872-
1904 
92 39 2.36 
Mangles, 
James 
Henry 
1876 1884 
1875-
1884 
    
1877-
1882 
  16 9 1.78 
Dutton, 
Ralph H. 
1854 1892 
1878-
1892 
  
1870-
1873, 
1878-
1891 
1877-
1882 
  39 23 1.7 
Mortimer, 
Charles 
Smith 
1852 1891     
1874-
1891 
1877-
1882 
  24 22 1.09 
Scotter, 
Sir 
Charles 
1898 1910 
1900-
1908 
  
1907-
1910 
1906   14 13 1.08 
Grant, 
William 
1901 1912   
1902-
1910 
1907-
1910 
    13 13 1 
Johnston, 
Captain 
James 
Gilbert 
1853 1897   
1870-
1896 
      27 28 0.96 
Portal, 
Wyndham 
S. 
1872 1902 
1875-
1892 
  
1893-
1898 
1878-
1882 
  29 32 0.91 
Snell, 
William 
Phillip 
1855 1900   
1870-
1897 
      28 31 0.9 
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Table 3.3. All directors who served on a LSWR Special committee 1870-1904, Source: TNA, RAIL 
411/220 and RAIL 411/221, Special committee Minute Books 
Name 
Start 
Year 
End 
Year 
No. 
Attended 
No. 
Held 
During 
Tenure 
Proportion 
Attended 
Scotter, Sir Charles 1898 1910 3 3 100.00% 
Scott, Archibald 1885 1902 7 9 77.78% 
Macaulay, Frederic Julius 1898 1911 2 3 66.67% 
Campbell, Lt-Col. H.W. 1872 1910 41 63 65.08% 
Portal, Wyndham S. 1871 1902 37 61 60.66% 
Mortimer, Charles Smith 1852 1891 34 65 52.31% 
Drummond, Hugh Williams 1899 1922 1 2 50.00% 
Dutton, Ralph H. 1854 1892 30 64 46.88% 
Mangles, James Henry 1876 1884 12 26 46.15% 
Govett, A.F. 1878 1907 12 28 42.86% 
Gaselee, Serjeant 1852 1881 21 52 40.38% 
Mangles, Captain Charles Edward 1854 1873 5 13 38.46% 
Guest, Arthur E. 1876 1898 10 28 35.71% 
Castleman, Charles 1855 1875 12 40 30.00% 
Snell, William Phillip 1855 1900 20 67 29.85% 
Johnston, Captain James Gilbert 1853 1897 19 66 28.79% 
Marshall, Lt- Gen Frederick 1880 1900 4 15 26.67% 
Barrington-Simeon, Sir John Stephen 1892 1907 1 4 25.00% 
Hutchins, Edward J. 1854 1878 8 32 25.00% 
Bury, Viscount 1865 1878 4 41 9.76% 
Beach M.P, W.W.B 1875 1901 3 35 8.57% 
Mills, Arthur 1881 1898 1 14 7.14% 
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Table 3.4. All LSWR directors 1870-1911 identified as ‘activists’. 
C
at
e
go
ry
 
Name 
Board 
Tenure 
Years 
on 
Board 
1870 -  
1911 
% of 
the 
period 
1870 - 
1911 
on the 
board 
C
h
ai
rm
an
 
D
e
p
u
ty
 C
h
ai
rm
an
 
Tr
af
fi
c 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e
 
D
ip
lo
m
ac
y 
En
ga
ge
m
e
n
t 
Sp
e
ci
al
 c
o
m
m
it
te
e
 
A
tt
e
n
d
an
ce
 
H
ig
h
e
r 
A
ct
iv
is
ts
 
Campbell, 
Lt-Col. H.W. 
1872-
1911 
39 92.86% 
1899-
1903 
1893-
1898 
76.92% 2.36 65.08% 
Castleman, 
Charles 
1855-
1875 
6 14.29% 
1873-
1874 
1859-
1872 
71.43% 0.57 30.00% 
Drummond, 
Hugh 
Williams 
1900-
1922 
12 28.57% 
1911-
1922 
1904-
1910 
92.31% 0.69 50.00% 
Dutton, 
Ralph H. 
1854-
1892 
23 54.76% 
1875-
1892 
- 86.96% 1.7 46.88% 
Mangles, 
Charles 
Edward 
1854-
1873 
4 9.52% 
1859-
1873 
- 25.00% 0.5 38.46% 
Mortimer, 
Charles 
Smith 
1852-
1891 
22 52.38% - - 100.00% 1.09 52.31% 
Portal, 
Wyndham 
S. 
1872-
1901 
30 71.43% 
1892-
1899 
1875-
1892 
6.25% 0.91 60.66% 
Scotter, Sir 
Charles 
1898-
1910 
13 30.95% 
1904-
1910 
1899-
1903 
84.62% 1.09 100.00% 
Si
gn
if
ic
an
t 
A
ct
iv
is
ts
 Beach M.P, 
W.W.B 
1876-
1901 
26 61.90% - - 59.29% 0.63 8.57% 
Gaselee, 
Serjeant 
1852-
1880 
11 26.19% - - 58.33% 0.38 40.38% 
Mangles, 
James 
Henry 
1875-
1884 
9 21.43% - - 22.22% 1.78 46.15% 
Le
ss
e
r 
A
ct
iv
is
ts
 
Johnston, 
Captain 
James 
Gilbert 
1853-
1897 
28 66.67% - - - 0.96 28.79% 
Macaulay, 
Frederic 
Julius 
1898-
1912 
15 35.71% - - - 0.79 66.67% 
Scott, 
Archibald 
1885-
1902 
18 42.86% - - - 0.22 77.78% 
Snell, 
William 
Phillip 
1855-
1900 
31 73.81% - - - 0.9 29.85% 
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Chapter 4 – Company policy during Archibald Scott’s tenure: 
1870-1884 
 
This chapter assesses the LSWR’s financial performance during Archibald Scott’s General 
Managership between 1870 and 1884. The LSWR was a below financial average performer 
amongst the fifteen major British railway companies in this period (see Chapter 1). Its OR 
increased from 50.11 in 1870, to 55.60 percent in 1877 and to 59.01 percent in 1884; 
approximately seven percent above the fifteen largest railway companies’ average. Additionally, 
the company’s ROCS decreased from 4.97 to 4.61 percent between 1872 and 1887 (five year 
moving average), with its rank in this respect falling from tenth to eleventh. This chapter explains 
what caused these results. The chapter’s first two sections argue that the company’s profitability 
was depressed by weakly performing lines being added to its network, increases in wages and 
growing high-volume, low-margin third class passenger traffic.  
 
The chapter’s main argument is, however, that between 1870 and 1884 the LSWR was beset by 
severe managerial weaknesses that reduced its profitability. Through describing these problems 
the chapter develops the thesis’ principal arguments. As previous chapters argued, decision-
making authority within the company’s functional department structure was highly centralised. 
Therefore, senior officials, particularly department heads, could potentially occupy senior posts 
for decades, with little challenge of their authority within their fiefdoms, causing their thinking on 
railway management to stagnate. Thus, the worth of established practices were, possibly, 
infrequently assessed, which meant inefficiencies developed within them that harmed the 
company’s financial performance. This chapter demonstrates this was so in the LSWR’s case 
before 1884. The General Manager, Scott, had been the Traffic Department’s head since 1852. 
He had complete authority in the department, and with almost no criticism of his activities from 
any source, which included the company’s senior traffic managers, he did not adapt operating 
practices he had established before 1870 to the LSWR’s increasing traffic and operational 
complexity thereafter. The consequent inefficiencies in the company’s train operations were the 
primary cause of the LSWR’s poor profitability between 1870 and 1884. 
 
The last two chapters also contended that the lack of development in operational practices 
within the LSWR between 1870 and 1911 was principally mitigated by individuals being 
appointed to senior management positions who had worked outside the company. This chapter 
develops this argument. In 1878 William Adams joined the company as Locomotive 
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Superintendent. He reformed the Locomotive Department’s poor management, but also 
challenged, with limited success, the company’s established and inefficient operational practices.  
 
Another major argument of the thesis is that because departments were functionally separated 
within the LSWR’s structure, its management quality was considerably dependent on how 
effectively the department heads’ actions were coordinated and overseen by those above them 
in the hierarchy. This chapter supports this argument. The LSWR’s board between 1870 and 
1881, and then Scott until 1884, were unable to get department heads working together and 
could not critique their policies effectively. Indeed, particularly after 1881, because Adams and 
Scott’s philosophies of railway management were out of alignment, they came into conflict over 
policy and, because the directors increasingly favoured the formers’ views on policy, but the 
latter still had authority in the Traffic Department, the company never developed a coherent 
strategy to bring down its excessive operating costs. 
 
Overall, this chapter argues that operating weaknesses chiefly caused the LSWR’s poor financial 
performance between 1870 and 1884.  
 
Section 1 – Major Capital Expense 
 
4.1. Capital Expenditure 
 
Firstly, I analyse the LSWR’s considerable network expansion between 1870 and 1884. The 
directorate – who had charge of such decisions in the period (see Chapter 3) – expended 
£3,200,492 on purchasing fifteen lines the company leased and worked (thirty-three percent of 
the total capital expended in the period), in addition to spending £1,363,476 on network 
extensions (fourteen percent). Furthermore, in 1876 the company jointly leased the Somerset 
and Dorset Railway (SDR) with the Midland Railway; this line required considerable investment to 
modernise its operations and infrastructure.273  
 
This chapter’s first part discusses the directors’ objectives when formulating these investment 
decisions and how they influenced the company’s profitability. Case studies will demonstrate 
that between 1870 and 1884 lines were built or purchased to defend the company’s territory, 
profits and potentially unrealised profits. This investment activity was broadly in line with those 
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Figure 1: The Somerset and Dorset Railway in 1890 (in bold); 
Source: ‘Afterbrunel’, File S7d 1890.gif, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:S%26d_1890.gif, 23 July 2007 
of several other major companies at 
the time, for example the LCDR and 
SER.274 However, many lines the 
LSWR acquired and built gave 
poorer returns than older parts of 
its network. Like in many 
nineteenth-century railway 
companies, decision-making was 
weak. 275  Without much pressure 
on directors to critique in detail the 
quality of the decisions they were 
making, they engaged in minimal 
project appraisal and no 
information was available to them 
on alternative courses of action that 
may have led to superior outcomes 
for company profitability. 
Furthermore, the company never 
developed cogent investment strategies that may have guided directors’ decisions, and most 
were taken in an unplanned and ad hoc manner. Directors’ did instinctively and correctly believe 
that the new lines the company built and acquired would not be as remunerative as established 
parts of its network. However, they overrode these instincts, preferring to defend the company’s 
territory. The directors were not attempting to maximise the company’s profits.  
 
4.2. Motivations behind extensions 
 
To examine directors’ decisions to extend the LSWR’s network between 1870 and 1884, three 
case studies are used: the company’s joint lease with the Midland Railway of the Somerset and 
Dorset Railway (SDR) in 1876; the ‘new’ Guildford line’s construction between 1882 and 1885; 
and the West Country extensions in the 1870s. I assess directors’ immediate motivations for 
investing in these lines, the lines’ impact on the company’s financial performance, and the beliefs 
that underpinned directors’ thinking when making the decisions. 
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 Gourvish, ‘The Performance of British Railway Management after 1860’, p.198; Hodgkins, The Second 
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Somerset and Dorset Railway lease 
 
In 1875 the SDR’s line was strategically important to the GWR, LSWR and Midland Railway. In the 
north it connected with the GWR at Burnham and Bath, where it also linked with the Midland; 
while in the south it crossed the LSWR’s main line at Templecombe and connected with it at 
Wimborne near Bournemouth (Figure 1). Therefore, if any of these companies gained control of 
the line, they could dominate traffic travelling between the north, Wales, and the south coast, 
and potentially tap a lucrative source of revenue. 
 
After opening a line to Bath in 1874, and despite considerable trade with the Midland and GWR 
at that place, the SDR was in financial trouble because of the high cost of servicing the loans it 
had funded the extension with. Consequently, its directors approached the GWR to offer the 
company for purchase. The GWR directors subsequently consulted their Bristol and Exeter 
Railway (BER) allies, and both companies agreed to take the line if the terms were acceptable.276 
 
Such a move would have angered the LSWR directors. Since the 1850s both they and the GWR 
had been in line-building competition for regional dominance in the West Country.277 On the 12 
August 1875 Grierson and Wall, the GWR and BER’s respective General Managers, visited 
Waterloo to inform Scott of their plans and offer the LSWR a working agreement south of 
Templecombe to maintain peaceful relations.278 Scott expressed his alarm as irrespective of what 
was being offered the GWR would still possess territorial dominance in the region and control of 
the north-south trade.279 He requested another meeting with them on the 16 August, saying he 
needed time to consult his board.280   
 
Scott met the LSWR board on 13 August, who immediately sent him to Birmingham to confer 
with the Midland’s directors and propose that the two companies jointly lease the SDR.281 Yet, at 
his meeting on the 16th Scott did not inform Grierson and Wall of these negotiations,282 and 
stated that a half-yearly meeting had prevented the LSWR board from considering the matter. 
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This was untrue,283 but the lie gave the LSWR and Midland (who by then had accepted the LSWR 
directors’ proposal) time to offer the SDR a superior leasing agreement to the GWR and BER’s 
purchase offer. The SDR board rejected the GWR and BER’s offer on the 19 August and accepted 
the LSWR’s and MR’s. The agreement was finalised on the 1 November 1875, with the bill 
authorising the lease passing on 13 July 1876. 284  
 
The question is, therefore, what motivated the LSWR directors to acquire control of the SDR. 
Undoubtedly, the SDR’s acquisition was seen by LSWR officials as being potentially beneficial. 
Scott told the parliamentary committee investigating the matter that despite considerable capital 
investment being required to make the line efficient, its traffic was ‘in its infancy’ and he 
expected it to be ‘very large indeed.’285 Nevertheless, the lease of the SDR was clearly an 
extension of the line-building competition and quest for regional dominance the LSWR and GWR 
had been engaging in for decades.286 The LSWR’s actions were wholly reactive. Its directors’ 
proposal to the Midland was spurred by the GWR and BER threat to the LSWR’s territorial 
dominance. Indeed, Portal, the LSWR Deputy-Chairman, admitted that the GWR and BER’s 
acquisition of the SDR would have been ‘highly injurious to the interests of the public, contrary to 
the interests of Parliament and hurtful to the South Western Company.’287   
 
Furthermore, the timing and manner of the LSWR directors’ decision to lease the SDR strongly 
suggests that they had little or no strategy regarding network development. Indeed, the revenues 
the line could potentially generate and the considerable capital expenditure they soon found was 
required were not considerations in the decision-making process: only a fear of losing territorial 
dominance compelled the LSWR directors’ to approach the Midland’s board.  
 
‘New’ Guildford line 
 
Similarly, the LSWR directors’ motivation for constructing the ‘new’ Guildford line between 1882 
and 1885 was to protect the company’s regional hegemony. This was LSWR’s largest line-building 
project between 1870 and 1884; although, because the company’s financial reports before 1885 
lack detail, the total capital expended on it is uncertain. It is however known that between 1878 
and 1881 the LSWR’s capital expenditure on ‘lines in the course of construction’ was £111,227; 
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whereas between 1882 and 1885 it was much higher at £898,405. Thus, it is reasonable to 
suggest that the majority of the increased expenditure can be attributed to the ‘new’ Guildford 
line’s construction.288  
 
For reasons that are unclear, the LSWR directors had professed publically their desire to build 
lines in the Cobham district before 1881.289 In practice, poor potential traffic in the area meant 
they had not supported numerous schemes to do so and actively opposed others, as the 
company may have had to operate these lines, which potentially would have performed poorly 
financially, to retain dominance of the territory.290  
 
In October 1880 local residents and traders, frustrated at the region’s lack of railway 
communication, supported the promotion of the Guildford, Kingston and London Railway (GKLR). 
It was proposed that this would run from Putney, where it would connect with the Metropolitan 
District Railway (MDR), through Surbiton and onto Guildford via Cobham. The railway had MDR’s 
informal backing291 and George Cubitt, M.P. for West Surrey, stated that ‘the landowners, finding 
that they had no hope of obtaining anything from the South-Western Company, went to the 
Metropolitan Company.’292   
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Before 1880 the LSWR’s dominant 
local position had allowed it to 
thwart the building of railways in 
the district in 1845, 1862, 1870 
and 1880.293 However, the stated 
support for the GKLR bill from the 
MDR, who never actually gave it 
any formal assistance or made an 
agreement with the company, 
strengthened the idea in the LSWR 
directors’ minds that the line 
would be constructed. If this 
occurred, it potentially would 
diminish the LSWR’s traffic by 
extracting trade from places the 
company already served. In 1881 
Dutton stated the project would 
potentially ‘divert traffic from this 
company’s railway at various 
important points’ beyond the 
Cobham district.294  Moreover, the 
MDR, who principally served 
central London, would have likely operated the GKLR, allowing it to compete for traffic from 
towns within the LSWR’s profitable suburban zone; for example Richmond, Kingston and Surbiton 
(Figure 2).  
 
In response to the GKLR bill, in the same session of parliament the LSWR submitted its bill for the 
‘new’ Guildford line. Cubitt stated that ‘The South Western Company met that [GK&LR] proposal 
in a peculiar way. They did not say that they thought there was no need for additional railway 
accommodation; but they said—“If you want fresh railway accommodation we will supply it.”’295 
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Eventually, on the urging of landowners who favoured the LSWR’s scheme,296 an agreement was 
reached in May to let its bill pass.297 The line opened in February 1885.298  
 
Like their SDR lease the LSWR directors’ decision to build the ‘new’ Guildford line was not part of 
a strategy to extend the company’s network or increase its profits. Their lack of support for 
previous schemes in the Cobham district demonstrates that they fundamentally believed lines in 
the region would perform poorly. Yet, when the GKLR was promoted they downplayed these 
concerns and, as Dutton confirmed in February 1885, built the ‘new’ Guildford line to defend the 
LSWR’s territorial dominance and revenues.299   Thus, as in the SDR case, the directors’ need to 
defend the company’s regional hegemony overrode their other concerns. Although, in this case 
the probability of traffic extraction seems rather higher than in that of the SDR. 
 
The Devon and Cornwall Line 
 
Similar motivations were behind the directors’ decision to extend the LSWR’s lines into Devon 
and Cornwall in the 1870s, which was part of the company’s long-running competition for 
dominance in the West Country with GWR.300 In 1873 the Devon and Cornwall Railway (DCR) had 
had its ‘Western Extension Act’ passed by Parliament which authorised it to build four different 
lines west of Okehampton. Given that the DCR was within both the LSWR and GWR’s territorial 
spheres the act interested both companies.301 The LSWR acted quickest and in 1874 made an 
agreement with the DCR to work any lines it built for half the revenue. Furthermore, the LSWR 
received the option to purchase them within two years of opening and, most importantly, could 
decide which of the four proposed extensions were built.302 Accordingly, the line to Lydford was 
opened and purchased by the LSWR in 1874, and the Holsworthy extension was worked from 
1878 and purchased in 1880 (Figure 3).303 
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Despite Dutton calling this (and other) western extensions the ‘most important features of the 
railway since its commencement,’304 realistically between 1870 and 1884 the directors never 
possessed much urgency to extend the company’s lines west of Exeter. Fay stated in 1881  that 
they had ‘eschewed’ directly projecting West Country routes.305  This reluctance to extend 
westward probably reflected awareness that lines in the territories would not be wholly 
profitable. For example, in 1860 the chairman of the nearby South Devon Railway stated, 
incorrectly as it turned out, that it was unlikely the LSWR ‘would be anxious to spend their money 
upon a barren district.’306 Thus, it seems highly unlikely that when the LSWR directors decided to 
support and acquire the DCR’s lines they were unaware that – as Thomas later put matters – 
agriculture in the district was in the ‘doldrums’ and the population was ‘depleted.’307 
Nevertheless, because of the GWR’s territorial interests, when the DCR’s bill was passed the 
LSWR directors overrode their concerns about how much trade lines in the region could 
potentially generate and acted to extend the company’s regional dominance.308  
 
4.3. The extensions’ performance 
 
These case studies suggest there 
was no strategy behind the LSWR 
directors’ decision to expand the 
company’s network between 
1870 and 1884, and that they 
only did so when its territorial 
dominance, trade or unrealised 
revenues were threatened. It is 
important to consider how this 
largely unplanned and reactive 
extension of the LSWR’s network 
impacted on its financial 
performance; but inadequate 
data means that any assessment is necessarily tentative.  
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Figure 3: The LSWR's western extensions between 1874 and 
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Firstly, the SDR was a drain on the LSWR and Midland’s capital and revenue accounts for little 
return. A serious accident at Radstock on 13 August 1876, in which thirteen people died and 
thirty-four were injured, highlighted severe deficiencies in the SDR’s working practices and the 
quality of its infrastructure. Consequently, the LSWR and Midland expended considerable 
amounts to bring up the line’s standard. The LSWR bore much of this burden, because it had 
responsibility for maintaining the line’s infrastructure (whereas, the Midland maintained the 
locomotives and rolling stock).309 The total the LSWR expended on the SDR between 1876 and 
1885 is unknown because the company’s accounts lack this detail. It is known that after 1886 – 
when it is presumed much of the improvement work had been completed – the LSWR’s 
investment in the line was of note, and between then and 1910 the company expended £238,464 
on it, or 1.17 percent of its total capital expenditure in this period.310 
 
Despite the capital investment in the SDR, the profits the line generated were never large. The 
1876 Act stated that combined the parent companies paid the SDR £43,056 in 1876; £47,840 in 
1877; £52,624 in 1878; and £57,408 from 1879 onwards. This was in addition to one tenth of all 
receipts above £114,816.311 Yet, until 1891, when the LSWR and Midland gained full ownership of 
the SDR, its operating profits never rose above the amounts the parent companies had to pay it. 
Indeed, the SDR ran at a loss from 1876 to 1878, and net revenue only rose above £40,000 in 
1890. The SDR’s poor performance therefore diminished the LSWR and Midland’s profitability 
between 1876 and 1891. 312 But even after, the SDR’s revenues were not high, with its 
contribution to the LSWR’s gross revenue never exceeding two percent before 1911.313 All that 
can be said of the SDR’s contribution to the LSWR and Midland’s profitability is that it fed traffic 
onto their networks. Unfortunately, the data is unavailable to determine the extent to which this 
was so.  
 
The ‘new’ Guildford line was also less profitable than older parts of the LSWR’s network between 
1885 and the first decade of the 1900s. Given that the district it served was sparsely populated, 
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its train services were light and poorly used. 314 For example, in February 1903 the local farmers 
and traders of Leatherhead asked for extra trains on Tuesday and Saturday afternoons to take 
them to market in Guildford. When the company experimented with such services they were 
found to have only carried on average six passengers.315  Such was the paucity of traffic on the 
line that staff at one station reputedly played cricket in-between trains.316 Unsurprisingly, shortly 
after its opening Dutton reported it was ‘not paying.’317  Thus, it can be reasonably considered 
that after 1885 the ‘new’ Guildford line was a drag on the LSWR’s financial performance 
thereafter.  
 
The likelihood is that the western extensions’ financial performance was also very poor.  
Simmons – who analysed in detail the line-building competition between the GWR and LSWR in 
the West Country – argued that it led to ‘an over-investment in lines beyond the point at which 
they were remunerative.’318 Furthermore, Casson argued the company’s competition to build 
lines in the region ‘did not materially improve the provision of railway services, except in north 
Devon.’319 This implies that LSWR’s lines generated less revenue than if the two companies had 
cooperated and planned their respective routes so as to avoid competition. 
 
In conclusion, the performance of the SDR, ‘new’ Guildford line and western extensions was poor 
compared with established parts of the LSWR’s network, making them drags on its profitability. 
Given that the directors initiated these network extensions to defend the company’s territories, 
overriding their justified concerns that the lines would be poor performers, they clearly were not 
profit-maximising. Indeed, this is behaviour scholars have argued railways’ decision-makers 
engaged in generally in this period.320  
 
4.4. Absent pressures on decision-makers 
 
Before 1885 the directors could build lines to defend the company’s territory, overriding their 
concerns regarding territories’ poor revenue-generating potential, because they had few 
constraints on their freedom of action and could pursue their own goals. Indeed, as Simmons 
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argued of the LSWR and GWR’s West Country extensions, there was ‘rivalry for its own sake, 
without reference to the interests of the consumer or the investor, merely for the purpose of 
spiking an opponent’s guns.’321 Indicative of the fact that the LSWR directors had great freedom 
to pursue their own objectives, project appraisal– a means by which decision-makers could 
assess the virtue of their decisions and justify them to shareholders – was seemingly non-existent 
when decisions were taken to extend the company’s network. 
 
It can be suggested that the directors could act as they so wished for three reasons. Firstly, they 
were under little pressure from the capital markets to rigorously assess the virtue of each 
investment or reduce capital expenditure. Notwithstanding the LSWR’s network extensions 
performing poorly and the company’s operational management being very poor (see Sections 3 
and 4), its profits remained healthy enough to enable it to raise capital with relative ease. Indeed, 
between 1870 and 1884 its total capital worth rose from £18.1 million to £31.8 million.322  
 
Furthermore, before 1911 the LSWR’s shareholders put little pressure on the company’s directors 
to justify to them each investment decision, and they were largely passive in the decisions. At 
half-yearly general meetings between 1870 and 1884 the shareholders’ major concerns were 
seemingly the company’s poor quality train services and its operational costs.323 The lack of 
control the shareholders had over the company’s policies and strategies is also demonstrated by 
clauses in the LSWR’s 1876 Various Powers Act, which gave the directors power to appoint 
individuals to the board without the need for the shareholders to be consulted (see Chapter 2).  
 
Lastly, between 1870 and 1884 LSWR decision-makers had little reason to doubt that traffic and 
revenue growth would continue, or that it could be stimulated if need be. Thus, they probably 
believed that network extensions would provide good financial returns eventually, even if in the 
short-term they were poor performers. This assumption’s influence on decision-makers’ thinking 
is worth exploring in detail as it has been barely mentioned in the literature. Between 1840 and 
1870 the number of passengers the LSWR conveyed rose from 664,518 to 13,387,357, a twenty-
fold increase. Consequently, the company’s directors and managers believed in guaranteed 
traffic development long before 1870. For example, in 1857 the board created a special 
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committee to investigate a dip in traffic which was considered highly unusual at the time.324 
Additionally, at a special committee investigating the Nine Elms goods depot’s accommodation in 
1860, Scott commented that ‘should the traffic increase as may be seasonally expected’ in 
twenty years there would be insufficient space for the organisation of goods traffic.325  
 
After 1870 LSWR decision-makers’ trust in traffic growth possibly altered slightly. Two reports 
Scott wrote for the board in the early-1880s demonstrate that a decade earlier there had been 
some worry within the company about first and second class passenger traffic growth slowing, 
which could potentially have harmed its profitability. Nevertheless, Scott argued that profit 
growth had been maintained through improved third class accommodation increasing the 
number of passengers travelling by this means (see Section 4.9). The report heavily implied that 
decision-makers believed traffic could be easily developed through the manipulation of 
services.326  Reflecting this, their statements and actions around this time still suggest they felt 
traffic and revenue increases were assured. In February 1875 Dutton stated that he hoped and 
believed ‘that with the country we have at our command that within 30 miles of London, we shall 
increase [passenger traffic]…every year.’327 When in 1882 the LSWR directors considered moving 
the Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon works to Eastleigh due to the ‘future requirements of the 
Goods Department,’ they presumably expected future traffic growth.328 Slips were rare, but in 
1881 the board requested that Scott explain an unusual fall in traffic revenue.329 Consequently, it 
can be suggested that between 1870 and 1884 the LSWR’s decision-makers felt free to invest in 
new lines that initially performed poorly financially, confident in the knowledge that profitable 
routes could cross-subsidise them for decades if required, but expecting that in the long-term 
they would likely pay. 
  
Overall, between 1870 and 1884 the LSWR’s poor quality decisions to extend its network, which 
were unplanned and initiated only when its regional dominance came under threat, were the 
direct result of the company’s directors being under little pressure from any source to 
interrogate the quality of the investments they were making. They had ample freedom to pursue 
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their own goals to the detriment of company profitability, as was so in the competition with the 
GWR for territorial dominance in the West Country.  
 
4.5. Capital Purchases of Lines 1870-1884 
 
 
Around a third of the LSWR’s capital expenditure between 1870 and 1884 went on purchasing 
lines the company already leased or worked. Figure 4 shows when these acquisitions were made 
and their cost (also see Appendix 4.1). By 1884 the LSWR leased only thirteen miles of line, down 
from 124 in 1870.330  
 
Figure 4: LSWR capital purchases 1870-1891, Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/281, 283 and 284 LSWR Reports 
and Accounts 1870-1910 
 
The LSWR purchased these lines because the directors wished to consolidate the company’s 
ownership of the network it operated. Dutton, the chairman, commented in 1878 that ‘what we 
are about now is consolidating as fast as we can.’331 Despite this being the directors’ stated 
strategy, they only purchased lines when external factors presented them with the opportunity 
to do so. I shall argue, therefore, that between 1870 and 1884 the board employed a strategy of 
‘opportunistic network consolidation’, rather than planned consolidation. 
 
Before 1870 the LSWR made agreements to lease or work many smaller company’s lines within 
its territorial sphere. These arrangements allowed extension and maintenance of its regional 
control without major capital expense, while also providing the company with the possibility of 
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profit. For example, the LSWR agreed with the Salisbury and Yeovil (SYR), 332 Mid-Hants (MHR) 333 
and Devon and Cornwall Railways (DCR) 334  to work their lines for 42.5 percent of the gross 
revenue in 1859, 1865 and 1865 respectively. In agreements with the Staines, Wokingham and 
Woking Junction Railway (SWWJR), 335 Salisbury and Dorset Junction Railway (SDJR) 336 and Bishop 
Waltham Railways337 in 1856, 1866 and 1862 respectively, the LSWR received forty-five percent 
of gross receipts. These were not lines the LSWR would have necessarily chosen to construct 
itself: but given that they had been built at others’ cost, the company preferred to control them. 
 
Nevertheless, by the 1870s these agreements were increasingly putting the LSWR at a financial 
disadvantage. Principally because of the company’s outdated operating practices (see Sections 3 
and 4), its OR rose from 50.11 percent in 1870, to 55.85 percent in 1875 and 56.19 percent in 
1880.338 The LSWR was, therefore, working many of the lines at a loss. Indeed, in 1875 Scott 
stated the SWWJR was operated ‘at a percentage that did not cover its cost’,339 and he said the 
same of the MHR a year later.340 This placed pressure on the directors to eliminate the 
unfavourable financial agreements with these lines, and, thus, they took opportunities to do so. 
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Figure 6: Staines, Wokingham and Woking Junction Railway, (from 
Staines Junction to Wokingham). Source: Author's Collection 
The LSWR’s working agreement with the SYR most concerned the board. The SYR formed a 
portion of the LSWR’s western main line, meaning the traffic passing over it was heavy and 
profitable. Consequently, the amounts the LSWR paid to the SYR were considerable and in 1875 
the total was £42,068, or 1.69 percent of the former’s total receipts.341 As Ruegg, the SYR’s early 
historian, argued in 1879, the line was also operated ‘considerably under cost price’. Moreover, 
as the LSWR’s traffic increased in the 1870s the SYR came to pay some of the healthiest dividends 
in the British railway industry. These rose from 9.75 percent in 1875, to 11.25 percent in 1876 
and 12.50 percent in 1877.342  
 
Continuing this trend, in late 1877 the SYR set its dividend for 1878 even higher at thirteen 
percent. The LSWR’s 1859 
lease of the SYR was for twenty 
years,343 after which it had the 
option to re-lease it at a fixed 
price or purchase it. As the 
agreement neared its end, the 
LSWR’s directors considered 
that the higher SYR’s dividends 
would inflate the company’s 
lease or purchase cost in 1879. 
They therefore acted in 
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Figure 7: The Mid-Hants Railway (in lighter grey). 
Source: Author’s Collection 
advance of the existing lease ending344 and in late 1877 offered the SYR proprietors £250 of LSWR 
stock for every £100 of its ordinary stock. This very high offer, which cost the LSWR £653,694, 
was accepted in early 1878.345  
 
Between 1870 and 1884 the LSWR did not only acquire lines because they were diminishing its 
revenues. Some companies were occasionally uncooperative and unstable working partners, and 
therefore purchasing them gave LSWR control and removed a source of considerable uncertainty. 
For example, some of the lines did not 
adapt their infrastructure to accommodate 
changes in the nature of the LSWR’s train 
services. The LSWR’s agreements with the 
SYR and SWWJR specified they were to 
modify their facilities when it required.346 
Accordingly,  as the LSWR’s traffic 
increased and trains lengthened in the 
1870s, the SYR and SWWJR (Figure 6) were 
asked to augment accommodation at their stations.  Both companies procrastinated. In 1872 the 
LSWR requested the SYR extend its station’s platforms by 50ft. Initially it refused, but after 
negotiation it agreed to make the modifications.347 The SWWJR repeatedly declined to augment 
its station accommodation before 1875348 as it could not afford the expense.349 Initially, the LSWR 
refused to do the necessary work itself,350 but the situation had become so intolerable by early 
1877351 that it began modifying Bracknell and Egham Stations.352  The LSWR directors then took 
the matter to the railway commissioners to recuperate the expenditure, who ruled in their 
                                                          
344
 TNA, RAIL 1110/281, London and South Western Railway Reports and Accounts 1831-1879, Half-Yearly 
meeting of proprietors, 21 February 1878, p.4 
345
 Ruegg, The History of a Railway, p.55-56 
346
 Williams, The London and South Western Railway: Volume 2, p.69 
347
 TNA, RAIL 595/4, Salisbury and Yeovil Railway Company, Meetings of Proprietors with:- Board, 14 
February 1872, p.272 
348
 TNA, RAIL 660/3, Staines, Wokingham and Woking Railway Company, Director’s Meetings, 5 April 1875, 
p.167 
349
 Railway Commissioners, [C.1962] The Regulation of Railways Act, 1873. (1876-77.) Fourth annual report 
of the Railway Commissioners, with appendices 1878, 
http://gateway.proquest.com.ezproxy.york.ac.uk/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:fulltext:1878-054149 (1 June 2011), p.29-30 
350
 TNA, RAIL 411/243, Traffic Committee Minute Book, Minute 1143, 11 March 1875 
351
 TNA, RAIL 660/3, Staines, Wokingham and Woking Railway Company, Director’s Meetings, 12 February 
1877, p.216 
352
 TNA, RAIL 411/7, Court of Directors Minute Book, Minute 49, 23 November 1876 
140 
 
favour.353 Yet, the SWWJR’s inability to meet the 
expense forced its chairman to approach the LSWR 
directors to offer them the company for purchase. 
They took the opportunity and the takeover was 
completed in 1878.354  
 
The directors’ other concerns regarding lines the 
LSWR leased or worked varied in nature. The Bishops 
Waltham Branch, which the company leased from 
1863, was a particularly troublesome partner (Figure 
8). In 1881 it was in chancery and had ‘no engineer, 
no secretary – nothing except a lot of creditors.’355 It 
was, therefore, difficult for the LSWR to conduct the 
business of the line and it was purchased in 1882.356 
The MHR also caused problems for the LSWR (Figure 
7). In 1876 it applied for powers to run trains 
independently between Guildford and Winchester,  
as its directors considered the LSWR had provided 
the line with inadequate passenger services.357 These 
trains would have competed with some of the 
LSWR’s main line services and, thus, the board took 
the opportunity to neutralise the threat. After much 
wrangling and the institution of revised lease 
agreements, the purchase of the line was completed 
in 1884.358 
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Figure 8: The Bishops Waltham branch 
(from Botley to Bishops Waltham). 
Source: Author’s Collection 
Figure 9: The LSWR's line between the 
SWWJR and its main line (Ascot – Frimley – 
Ash Vale). Source: Author’s Collection 
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Lastly, as in the case of the SDR lease and the building of the ‘new’ Guildford line, territorial 
control was a major concern of the LSWR directors when purchasing some leased and worked 
lines. For example, the SWWJR was strategically important for the LSWR by 1878. It connected at 
Wokingham with the South Eastern Railway’s (SER) line to Reading, allowing the LSWR access to 
that place, but also the LSWR was about to open a new line between the SWWJR at Ascot and its 
main line (Figure 9) – this was built to defend against GWR incursions into its territory.359 
Therefore, when in 1878 the SWWJR could not pay for the modifications the LSWR had made to 
its stations, rather than letting the concern fail and potentially giving local competitors such as 
the GWR or SER the chance to acquire it, the LSWR took the opportunity to secure its regional 
hegemony and purchased it for £543,188.360  
 
4.6. ‘Opportunistic network consolidation’ 
 
That the LSWR acquired so many lines it leased or worked between 1870 and 1884 indicates that 
the directors undoubtedly pursued a strategy of network consolidation in the period, as Dutton 
stated.361 Yet, the cases above also demonstrate that lines were only taken over when the LSWR 
had the opportunity to do so, or when the company’s relationships with these companies had 
soured to a marked degree. Therefore, the directors’ policy regarding the acquisition of such lines 
can be considered one of ‘opportunistic network consolidation’. In part, this strategy was broadly 
consistent between 1870 and 1884, partly because, as Chapter 3 showed, in the 1870s the board 
had many long-standing members who likely provided the company with a steady strategic 
direction.  
 
It should be noted that the LSWR directors did not consider alternative courses of action to 
acquiring leased lines. Once the strategy of ‘opportunistic network consolidation’ had become 
established in their minds in the early 1870s, no pressure was placed on them from any source to 
reform or reconsider it. As stated, the shareholders were seemingly passive in the LSWR’s capital 
investment decisions, the company could access capital easily and the directors’ felt that in the 
long-run every investment would be worthwhile, because they expected traffic growth to be 
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continuous (See section 4.4). Therefore, there were few restrictions on their actions that may 
have led them to reconsider their investment strategies.  
 
It is unclear how the acquisition of leased lines affected the LSWR’s finances. The directors’ 
decision to consolidate the company’s network did have a positive effect on its profitability 
between 1870 and 1884. The overall amount it paid to such lines dropped from 3.42 percent of 
total company revenue in 1870, to 3.21 percent in 1875, 1.79 percent in 1880 and 0.99 percent in 
1884.362 Yet, what the LSWR saved by paying less to leased companies was small compared to the 
capital expense of purchasing them. Between, 1870 and 1884 it expended around £3,200,000 on 
acquiring fifteen lines, which was 236 percent higher than the £952,000 of revenue it paid to 
them over the fifteen year period.363 The capital burden of acquiring lines was further augmented 
by the cost of improving infrastructure after years of neglect; as was required in the case of the 
SWWJR, BWB and, to an extent, the SYR.  
 
Consequently, because the LSWR’s directors pursued, whenever possible, their strategy of 
opportunistic network consolidation without considering alternative courses of action, the 
company’s capital burden increased excessively for only small returns. However, it should also be 
considered that Scotter’s job of improving the company’s operating efficiency was possibly made 
easier because he commanded a network that was largely in the LSWR’s ownership. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
This section has demonstrated that many of the lines the LSWR built or acquired between 1870 
and 1884 probably dragged down its profitability. The directors extended the railway’s network 
despite recognising that the new lines would generate poor profits, and once they had begun 
taking over the lines the company leased or worked, this policy, opportunistic as it was, was 
seemingly never reappraised, regardless of the heavy burden it placed on the company’s capital 
account or its dubious benefit to the railway’s financial performance. 
 
It can therefore be considered that the LSWR directors between 1870 and 1884 were pursuing 
goals other than profit-maximisation.  For example, in the case of the extensions into the West 
Country the directors’ objective was seemingly no more complex than wanting to dominate 
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portions of territory before the GWR. The reason the directors could take this approach to capital 
investment was because they were under no pressure to improve the quality of their investments 
from shareholders, the capital market or a fear that traffic growth would slow.  
 
Nevertheless, as the next three sections show, between 1870 and 1884 the effect on the LSWR’s 
financial performance of the extension and consolidation of its network was small compared with 
exogenous changes in its trade and severe managerial weaknesses. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that despite some of the LSWR’s investment activity before 1884 unnecessarily increasing 
the burden on the capital account, after 1885 Scotter’s reforms of the company’s operating 
practices had by 1897 improved its ROCE to a point whereby it was 0.16 percent higher than in 
1872 (five-year moving average), and its ROCS was only 0.1 percent lower (see Chapter 5).364 
Thus, as Gourvish argued was the case for the British railway industry generally before 1900, 
‘misplaced investment’ was not the most important influence on the LSWR’s financial 
performance between 1870 and 1900.365 
 
Section 2 – Operational pressures 
 
4.8. Introduction  
 
As Chapter 1 discussed, it has been extensively argued in the literature that external pressures 
diminished the performance of the British railway industry before 1900. Therefore, before 
examining the quality of the LSWR’s operational management between 1870 and 1884, I shall 
analyse how three forces that are considered to have been partially or wholly outside of LSWR 
decision-makers’ control affected the company’s profitability. Firstly, it will be argued that 
growth in low-margin high-volume passenger traffic did depress the company’s revenue per 
passenger and profitability. Secondly, directors and senior managers acquiesced to some 
requests from employees for higher pay. Lastly, it will be demonstrated how government 
legislation on safety did not to any great degree affect the company’s operating costs.  
 
 
4.9. Increasing third class passenger traffic  
 
Analysis of the LSWR’s passenger business is integral to understanding the company’s 
performance between 1870 and 1884, as between sixty and sixty-four percent of its revenue 
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came from this traffic. Indeed, similar figures are found for the entire period between 1870 and 
1911.366  
 
This section argues that while between 1870 and 1884 the number of passengers the LSWR 
conveyed rose from the 13,387,357 to 34,643,978, it profitability was significantly depressed by 
the growth of high-volume low-margin third class passenger traffic, particularly in its suburban 
districts. Firstly, the proportion of LSWR’s passengers travelling by third class accommodation 
increased from 37.42 percent in 1870 to 79.05 percent in 1884. However, concurrently, Figure 10 
illustrates that the average revenue generated by each of these passengers dropped from 14.44d 
to 8.89d (9.59d),367 or by 38.43 percent. Consequently, because third class passengers became a 
larger proportion of the LSWR’s business over the period, its overall average revenue per 
passenger fell from 19.77d to 12.38d (13.36d); or by 37.38 percent. 
 
 
Figure 10: The average number of pence earned per passenger, 1870-1884, Source: Board of Trade 
Returns. 
 
Figure 11 shows how these changes affected the LSWR’s profitability by displaying its operating 
ratio if all its third class passengers between 1870 and 1884 had paid the same average fare as in 
1870. In this counterfactual scenario by 1884 the company’s OR would have been around ten 
percent lower than reality. This strongly suggests that after 1870 these changes in the structure 
of the company’s passenger traffic and revenue significantly affected its profitability. Using the 
limited available evidence, it is important to examine what caused these changes. 
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It is possible the LSWR lowered fares in the early-1870s, as Cain argued many railway companies 
did at the time.368 The company did change some of its fares in the period, standardising its third 
class fares at one penny per mile in 1875.369 This was possibly in response to the Midland 
Railway’s identical change that year.370 Nevertheless, Figure 10 shows the company’s revenue per 
third class passenger mostly declined before 1875, suggesting that standardisation did not 
significantly affect the LSWR’s passenger revenues. Thus, fare changes can largely be ruled out as 
lowering the company’s revenue per third class passenger in this period. 
 
Realistically, the LSWR’s revenue per passenger declined because more of its passengers were 
taking shorter, and therefore cheaper, third class journeys, especially in suburban districts. In 
part the LSWR was responsible for these changes. In the 1860s the company had augmented its 
suburban network; its Hammersmith, Thames Valley and Kingston lines all opening. This 
increased the number of routes it owned where shorter journeys were more likely to be taken.371 
Furthermore, from 1871 the LSWR added third class accommodation to all suburban loop line 
trains because the GWR, who it was in competition with to some places, did the same. This 
definitely grew the LSWR’s third class traffic,  and between 1871 and 1872 the proportion of its 
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passengers buying third class tickets rose by 11.65 percent; a greater increase than in any year 
before or after (Table 3).372 Moreover, in the 1870s many passengers, who may previously have 
taken first and second class accommodation for short journeys transferred to third class because 
of its improved availability and price. Indeed, in 1879 Dutton stated that first and second class 
passenger traffic revenue had declined as a result.373 
 
 
1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 
Percentage of 
Passengers Travelling 
Third Class 
23.42% 25.94% 29.07% 30.72% 34.69% 37.42% 40.85% 
Growth   2.52% 3.13% 1.65% 3.96% 2.74% 3.43% 
        
 
1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 
Percentage of 
Passengers Travelling 
Third Class 
52.50% 57.88% 60.58% 62.95% 66.55% 68.59% 70.32% 
Growth 11.65% 5.37% 2.70% 2.37% 3.60% 2.04% 1.73% 
        
 
1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1881 
Percentage of 
Passengers   
Travelling Third Class 
72.35% 73.63% 75.08% 76.03% 77.71% 79.05% 75.08% 
Growth 2.04% 1.27% 1.45% 0.96% 1.68% 1.34% 1.45% 
Table 1: Growth in third class passenger numbers 1865-1884, Source: Board of Trade, Railway Returns. 
 
Nevertheless, the improved availability of third class accommodation only accelerated the 
growth in the number of passengers travelling by this means, it did not fundamentally cause 
these changes to occur. Table 3 shows that between 1865 and 1871 – the year third class 
accommodation was added to all suburban trains – the proportion of the LSWR’s passengers 
buying third class tickets had already risen considerably from 23.45 percent to 40.85 percent. 
Therefore, augmentation of third class accommodation only quickened for a short period 
changes in the nature of the company’s passenger traffic that had been on-going for years. 
Indeed, after 1874 the proportion of the LSWR passengers travelling by third class 
accommodation returned to growing at a similar rate as in the late-1860s  
 
The evidence therefore tentatively suggests that after 1870 the LSWR’s reduced revenue per 
passenger and some of its decreased profitability can be attributed to the markets it served 
changing. Furthermore, it should be considered that because the LSWR served a large suburban 
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district, and the majority of its revenue was generated from passenger traffic, its profit margins 
were possibly more susceptible to the structure of its trade shifting in this way than other 
railways whose main traffic was freight or where they carried predominantly long-distance 
passengers. Yet, to prove this would require comparative case studies which are currently 
unavailable. 
 
How this change in the company’s traffic altered decision-makers’ thinking on policy and strategy 
is unclear. Scott’s report for the directors in 1881 expressed erroneously, as the above figures 
show, his belief that the expansion of third class accommodation in the early-1870s had caused 
the number of passengers travelling by this means to increase. He argued that with first and 
second class traffic becoming ‘non-elastic throughout the kingdom’ in the 1870s, railway 
companies kept passenger numbers and revenue growing by improving third class passenger 
accommodation. In his opinion they had hugely benefited from this policy, and going forward he 
believed that it was a ‘mistake to suppose that the increased accommodation for Third Class 
passengers is, in any respect or degree, an evil - something to be restricted or altogether stopped 
if possible.’374 Therefore, Scott did not feel company profits were under pressure from this traffic 
rising; rather he welcomed it as sustaining the business.  
 
Scott’s comments therefore tentatively suggest a reason why railway companies, at least those 
which principally carried passengers, provided improved service provision to customers from the 
1880s: they thought this was the only way of growing their business when first and second class 
passenger growth had stalled. If this was so, it would partially call into question the arguments 
made by Arnold and McCartney, Channon, and Irving that British railways tailored services to the 
needs of the communities and businesses they served in an attempt to preserve their commercial 
freedom, in a period when government was increasingly legislating over rates and safety.375  
 
4.10. Wages 
 
Railway companies’ increasing wage bills have long been considered to have reduced the 
industry’s profitability after 1870.376  The LSWR was no exception, and the pay and employment 
conditions of its staff also improved in this period. Figure 12 illustrates that between 1870 and 
1884 wage costs as a proportion of the Locomotive (including the Carriage and Wagon 
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Department’s) and Traffic Department’s overall expenditure rose. The question is why did the 
LSWR increase its employees’ pay and how did this affect its cost position?  
 
 
Figure 12: Wage costs of major departments (pence per train mile), Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/281 and 
TNA, RAIL 1110/283, London and South Western Railway Reports and Accounts 1870-1884 
 
Union pressure is unlikely to have influenced the LSWR’s wage policies after 1870. Three main 
unions were formed in this period. The first, the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS) 
– founded in 1871 – was, as Howell argued, initially more a ‘friendly society’ that lacked employer 
recognition and was poorly led. It was only when Edward Harford became leader in 1883 that the 
ASRS developed more coherent strategies of activism.377 However, as Chapter 6 argues, up until 
1911 few LSWR employees joined the unions and they remained weak within the LSWR.378 
Furthermore, Howell argued that until 1900 the smaller General Railway Workers Railway Union 
(founded in 1889) and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (founded in 
1880) never put credible pressure on industry chiefs to improve their members’ pay and 
conditions. 379 It cannot, therefore, be considered that between 1870 and 1900 LSWR decision-
makers were under much pressure from unions to improve the pay and conditions of their 
company’s employees.  
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Wage increases before 1877 
 
 
The Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Department’s (hereon known as the ‘Locomotive 
Department’) increased wage bill between 1870 and 1884 was principally the result of directors 
and senior officials acquiescing to employees’ requests for higher pay and reduced working 
hours. For instance, a memorial by drivers and firemen requesting these things was rejected by 
the Locomotive Committee in March 1872. Nevertheless, the committee conducted an inquiry 
into their pay,380 and after another similar memorial was submitted in October381 a revised scale 
of wages was presented to the board by William Beattie, the Locomotive Superintendent, in 
March 1873.382 It seems however that this new scale was not adopted; another petition from 400 
enginemen and firemen requesting increased pay and reduced hours was submitted to the 
directors in May 1874 (Appendix 4.2).383 This was agreed to shortly after.384 Other groups of staff 
in the department also asked for changed terms of employment around this time. In November 
1871 Nine Elms works employees asked for shorter hours,385 while carpenters and carriage 
cleaners at Clapham Junction and coal burners at Nine Elms also asked for increased wages in 
April 1874.386 While all these specific claims were rejected, department employees did generally 
receive higher pay and reduced working hours in the period, which, as Castleman (chairman) 
stated in 1874, grew the company’s wage bill.387 
 
Consequently, in the 1870s the proportion of the Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Departments’ 
expenditure attributable to wages increased considerably. Figure 13 shows that in 1870 wages 
constituted 39.98 percent of departmental costs, but by 1877 this had risen to 49.42 percent.388 
The department’s wage bill per train mile also grew from 3.98d to 5.56d (5.44d) over the same 
period (Figure 12). As a consequence, these increases permanently raised the Locomotive, 
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Carriage and Wagon Department’s expenditure on staff – which stayed around fifty percent of 
departmental expenditure until the late-1890s.389 
 
 
Figure 13: Wage costs as a proportion of department costs of the LSWR’s major departments, Source: 
TNA, RAIL 1110/281 and TNA, RAIL 1110/283, London and South Western Railway Reports and Accounts 
1870-1884 
 
Wage costs also increased in the Traffic Department in the 1870s. In the period the board 
received many individual applications for salary increases from the company’s clerical staff and it 
formed a Special Committee in March 1874 to examine the issue. 390  To monitor such 
applications closely, the committee ordered that all requests for salary increases were to receive 
its attention. Furthermore, each application was to be accompanied by a recommendation letter 
from the department head.391 Between then and April 1876 the committee approved increases 
totalling £3,499. Although, this only constituted 0.41 percent of the rise in the department’s 
wage bill over this period.392 Principally, the Traffic Department’s wage bill rose because 
expenditure on non-salaried employees’ pay increased.  In 1882 The South Western Gazette 
(SWG) mentioned that ‘for some years past’ they had received pay increases, while the salaried 
grades had not.393 Furthermore, the installation of block working after 1864 (see Section 4.13) 
required the company to employ larger numbers of signalman, further increasing the 
                                                          
389
 TNA, RAIL 1110/281, London and South Western Railway Reports and Accounts 1831-1879, Report of 
Half-yearly meeting, 10 August 1876, p.1; TNA, RAIL 1110/281, 282 and 284, London and South Western 
Railway Reports and Accounts 1831-1922 
390
 TNA, RAIL 411/220, Special Committee Minute Book, Salaries Committee, 16 March 1874, p.277 
391
 TNA, RAIL 411/220, Special Committee Minute Book, Salaries Committee, 29 April 1874, p.296 
392
 TNA, RAIL 411/220, Special Committee Minute Book, Salaries Committee, 28 May 1874, p.296; TNA, 
RAIL 411/221, Special Committee Minute Book, Salaries Committee, 28 January 1875, p.32-33; TNA, RAIL 
411/221, Special Committee Minute Book, Salaries Committee, 6 April 1876, p.113 
393
 South Western Gazette, August 1882, p.2 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
1
1
8
7
2
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
4
1
8
7
5
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
7
1
8
7
8
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
4
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
Year 
Traffic
Locomotive,
Carriage and
Wagon
Engineering
151 
 
department’s expenditure on wages.394 Consequently, the Traffic Department’s wage bill rose 
from 7.38d to 8.98d (8.79d) per train mile between 1870 and 1877 (Figure 12).  
 
The limited available evidence tentatively suggests that decision-makers raised employees’ 
wages and reduced their working hours because they feared losing skilled and trained labour that 
the company had fostered, in some cases, over decades. Exemplifying this, in January 1879, when 
Scott was challenged by other railways to reduce Traffic Department staff’s wages, he responded 
by stating that ‘he had got some good men and he meant to keep them.’395 Furthermore, Dutton 
commented in 1878 that the proprietors had to ‘accept’ a raised wage bill as part of railway 
operation, suggesting that, possibly, decision-makers felt that to keep hold of staff and ensure 
the company’s smooth working they had to raise employees’ pay.396  
 
Therefore, it can be suggested that before 1877 senior LSWR decision-makers’ fear of losing 
trained and experienced staff possibly led them to be more malleable when it came to 
responding to employee’s demands regarding their working conditions and wages. Although, 
without further evidence this remains largely conjecture. Whatever the cause, between 1870 and 
1877 the total wage bill spread across the company’s four main departments rose from 14.02d to 
17.57d (17.02d) per train mile; or by 25.28 percent.  
 
After 1877 
 
However, evidently in the late-1870s and early 1880s Scott, the General Manager, felt he could 
keep wages in the Traffic Department higher than perhaps was necessary. In the period most 
British railways were lowering their employees’ pay, and in 1881 Scott was under pressure from 
their officials to reduce his staff’s wages by five percent. Yet, he refused to prevent what the 
SWG described as a ‘breech in the good relations existing between the board of directors and the 
hard working servants.’397  Conversely, and despite the company’s wage costs increasing 
considerably since 1870, he seemingly favoured increasing wages in the Traffic Department.398 In 
January 1882 the department’s salaried staff submitted a memorial asking the directors for a 
revised salary scale. On Scott’s recommendation this was introduced in May.  380 individuals 
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received increases costing £4000 overall and a rule was introduced that when a clerk or station 
master was promoted his successor would receive the same wage as the outgoing individual. 399  
 
The wage increases these changes incurred were justified to the shareholders in the same terms 
as pay increases had been in the 1870s: that they were a natural part of railway operation. In 
August 1883 Dutton stated that the shareholders must accept that ‘the tendency of salaries and 
wages was upwards, and they must not look for a reduction in that direction.’400 Yet, realistically 
Scott did not need to raise wages in the early-1880s and, thus, his decisions are unlikely to have 
had the company’s cost position in mind. Indeed, his actions were very different to what Irving 
characterised as the ‘marked hostility’ of British railway managers at the time to forms of 
collective action by railways’ employees.401 Scott’s motivation for raising wages, it can be 
tentatively suggested, was that given he had been head of the Traffic Department since 1852, he 
had developed a long-standing paternalistic relationship with the traffic staff. The SWG 
evidenced this connection frequently, calling him ‘approachable’ and ‘beloved’. Indeed, Scott 
would sit every Sunday morning in his office and ‘listen to the pleadings’ of less fortunate 
members of staff and ‘seldom was a case of distress turned away.’402 Therefore, despite Scott 
obviously not trying to maximise company profits by raising wages in the Traffic Department, he 
was likely improving his subordinates’ lives. Indeed, in 1882 the SWG stated that: 
 
When we look around at the servants of other companies and see “cutting down” is 
the order of the day, we must thank our lucky stars that we are governed by a band 
of English gentleman, who…remember there are others beside shareholders and the 
public having some little claim on their consideration.403 
 
As Figure 13 shows, the result of the revised scale was that it raised Traffic Department wage 
costs as a proportion of departmental expenditure after 1882. Undoubtedly, this contributed to 
the LSWR’s OR being one of the poorest amongst the British railway industry’s major companies 
in the early 1880s. Indeed, between 1882 and 1886 the Traffic Department’s wage bill as a 
proportion of overall company revenue rose from 12.08 percent to 13.06 percent.   
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Conclusion 
 
This section has supported Irving’s argument that British railway companies’ increased wage bills 
were partially responsible for their declining performance between 1870 and 1900. 404 Indeed, 
between 1870 and 1884 the LSWR’s profitability was diminished by decision-makers acquiescing 
to employees’ requests for higher wages and shorter working hours, possibly because they 
feared losing trained labour that the company had fostered for years, possibly decades. Yet, it 
has also been suggested that Scott unnecessarily raised the Traffic Department’s wage bill in the 
1880s, which undoubtedly contributed to the LSWR being one of the poorest performing British 
railway companies in the period. Thus, this case tentatively supports Crafts, Mills and Mulatu’s 
suggestion before 1900 decision-makers had ‘ample opportunity’ to neglect cost reductions and 
productivity improvements while pursuing their own goals.405 However, without more evidence, 
or more case studies, this cannot be confirmed.  
 
4.11. Safety legislation  
 
As Chapter 1 discussed, the British railway industry came under increased pressure after 1880 
from government legislation on matters such as safety and rates. It is therefore important to 
address how this factor affected the company’s performance. It might seem more appropriate to 
consider this subject in the next chapter, as it covers the year of the Armargh accident (1889), 
after which the government made continuous brakes, interlocking points and signalling, and 
block working mandatory on all British railways.406 Yet by 1885 the LSWR already possessed or 
had started to install these safety devices and this is why this section is placed within this 
chapter. I shall assess why the LSWR’s senior decision-makers took such decisions between the 
1860s and 1880s, and shall show they had a negligible impact on company profitability. 
 
Technology installation  
 
By 1875 block working was installed throughout the LSWR’s network. In 1864 an accident 
occurred at the company’s Egham station because the established time-interval method of train 
control – where trains were released from stations after a set amount of time had elapsed since 
the preceding one had departed – failed. Yolland, the Board of Trade inspector, stated that block 
working – an alternative system of train control where distance intervals separated trains – could 
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have prevented the accident, and criticised the LSWR’s directors for being more willing to risk 
human life than incur the high cost of installing it.407  While after most accidents companies’ 
officials largely ignored such comments and public outrage, the LSWR’s board responded 
differently. Three minutes behind the crashed train was another carrying the Prince of Wales. 
Consequently, on 27 December 1864 C. Phipps wrote to the directors on behalf of Queen 
Victoria. She wished them to take ‘the greatest possible care to prevent accidents on the line.’ 
The company chairman, Mangles, responded that her ‘commands would be strictly adhered 
to,’408 and by 1875 block signalling had be installed across the company’s network.409 From 1865 
the LSWR also began interlocking its points and signals,410 and by 1880, 1008 of its 1,147 points 
were interlocked.411 Thus, by 1889, when the technology became mandatory, the likelihood is 
that all the company’s signals and points would have possessed it. Unfortunately, the LSWR’s 
expenditure on installing interlocking signals and block working is unknown. 
  
Another technology the 1889 Act made mandatory was continuous brakes, where all the wheels 
of a passenger trains would be braked simultaneously, thus bringing it to a halt more quickly than 
if just the locomotive was braking.412 The LSWR however had already applied this to all its 
locomotives and carriages by 1889. After much experimentation with different types of 
continuous brake systems, the automatic vacuum brake was progressively installed between 
March 1883 and June 1888413 as it was deemed much cheaper to maintain than the 
alternatives.414 The overall capital cost work was small, and the LSWR’s outlay on it between 
1883 and 1888 was £94,277; or 1.56 percent of its total capital expenditure in these years (Table 
1).  
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Year 
Annual Capital 
Cost of 
Continuous 
Vacuum Brake 
Percentage of 
Capital 
expended on 
Continuous 
Vacuum Brake 
1883 £21,724 2.00% 
1884 £21,881 1.79% 
1885 £19,940 1.92% 
1886 £12,453 1.31% 
1887 £13,434 1.31% 
1888 £4,844 0.68% 
Total £94,277 1.56% 
Table 2: Capital expended on vacuum brake 1883-1888. Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/283, LSWR Reports and 
Accounts, 1885-1897 
 
Why, then, did the directors decide to install these technologies when they did? The most likely 
explanation is that they wished to maintain the company’s public reputation. For a railway that 
predominantly carried passengers, accidents were public relations disasters. This is why, in the 
absence of another plausible explanation, it was directly after the Egham accident and Queen 
Victoria’s letter that block working and interlocking points were introduced across the company’s 
network in a period when so many other companies resisted doing the same. It can be suggested 
that similar motivations were behind the company’s decision to install vacuum brakes. By the 
early-1880s the imperative for LSWR officials to maintain the company’s reputation for providing 
a safe travelling environment was compounded by its exemplary accident record up to that 
point.415 Thus, only months after a major collision at Clapham Junction in 1882, which the Board 
of Trade inspector stated would have been averted if the trains had been fitted with continuous 
brakes,416 the LSWR committed to installing them on all its locomotives and carriages, one of the 
first major companies to do so.417 
 
Undoubtedly, these technologies did increase company expenditure. Firstly, block working 
increased the number of signalmen the company had to employ, which raised wage costs (see 
section 4.9). All three technologies also incurred maintenance costs; for example, a report to the 
Locomotive Committee from Adams stated that the maintenance of continuous vacuum brakes 
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cost the Locomotive Department £4 6s 10d per locomotive (he failed to specify over what period 
of time).418 Furthermore, continuous brakes also increased locomotives’ usage of fuel.419 
 
Years 
Compensation 
paid  
Proportion of 
company 
expenditure 
1870-1874 £23,003 0.41% 
1875-1879 £40,968 0.55% 
1880-1884 £54,552 0.63% 
1885-1889 £34,098 0.38% 
1890-1894 £28,014 0.27% 
1895-1899 £21,839 0.17% 
Table 3: Compensation paid to passengers for accidents between 1870 and 1900, Source: Board of Trade, 
Railway Returns 
 
On the other hand, the safety technologies also reduced the LSWR’s operational expenditure. 
Between 1880 and 1899 the compensation the company paid to injured passengers reduced, 
presumably because the number of accidents on its network fell (Table 2). Moreover, continuous 
brakes possibly reduced labour costs. Bradley stated that as the company’s trains got heavier and 
faster in the 1860s the practice developed of placing numerous brake vans throughout them so 
that drivers could stop them effectively. Yet, this was labour-intensive as most trains required 
several guard’s vans, each with a capable brakesman. Continuous brakes eliminated the need for 
so many vans and brakesmen in trains, which likely reduced working expenses.420  
 
Overall, it is very unclear how the LSWR directors’ decision to install block working, interlocking 
points and continuous brakes impacted on the company’s cost position between 1870 and 1884 
(and thereafter).  However, whatever the effect, findings presented in the rest of the thesis 
suggest it was marginal compared to the immense cost of the company’s operating and 
administrative practices. Ultimately, therefore, the LSWR’s case gives some weight to Gourvish’s 
argument that it is too easy to blame government intervention for railway companies’ declining 
performance between 1870 and 1914.421 Conversely, it also tentatively supports the conclusions 
of Mitchell, Chambers, Crafts, Leunig, Mulatu and Mills that weak government regulation did not 
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put sufficient pressure on industry decision-makers to improve railways’ performance or 
innovate.422 However, without more evidence this remains conjecture. 
 
Section 3 – Operational matters until c.1881 
 
Despite increasing wage costs, growth in high-volume low-margin third class passenger traffic, 
and the installation of safety technology all influencing the LSWR’s profitability between 1870 
and 1884 (and 1900), this chapter chiefly argues that the company’s poor financial performance 
was caused by severe weaknesses in its operational management. Scott, the Traffic Department’s 
head since 1852, persisted with using obsolete and inefficient train control practices; Beattie, the 
Locomotive Superintendent, was completely inept and managed the Locomotive Department 
incompetently; while his successor, Adams, introduced new heavy locomotives without 
considering that they would raise the Engineering Department’s costs. Furthermore, I argue 
these problems emerged partly because the department heads’ actions were poorly coordinated 
and overseen by the board before 1881, and then by the General Manager until 1884.  
 
The next two sections develop this thesis’ main arguments. Because the LSWR’s structure was 
excessively centralised, and senior officials potentially occupied positions of authority for 
decades with few restrictions on their autonomy, their concepts of railway management had a 
tendency to stagnate or become conservative over time, meaning established operational 
practices were infrequently reassessed and developed inefficiencies. Secondly, as operational 
practice within the company developed very slowly, significant advancements only occurred 
when new senior managers were appointed from external sources. Lastly, the company’s 
profitability was reliant on how effectively department heads’ actions were coordinated and 
overseen.   
 
4.12. Operational control structures, 1870-c.1881 
 
Until 1881 the LSWR’s directorate retained responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the 
different departments’ operational affairs – responsibilities that in other British railways of the 
period General Managers undertook.423 Chapter 3 argued the reason was two-fold. Firstly, the 
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directors’ few outside business interests meant they had time to dedicate to the business. 
Secondly, until the late-1870s most directors had joined the company before 1854 and, 
presumably, they felt they should still take a dominant role in the company’s operational 
management, as they had done in the 1850s. However, as the next two sections show, after 1870 
severe operational efficiencies developed in the Traffic and Locomotive Department because, as 
section 4.16 explains, the board was unable to oversee and coordinate the company’s 
operational functions effectively.  
 
4.13. Traffic Operations  
 
The Traffic Department was responsible for managing the parts of the LSWR’s business that were 
critical to its overall efficiency. Firstly, it was responsible for administering the company’s core 
business function, the movement of goods and passengers. Secondly, it formulated the 
company’s timetables, which largely determined how efficient its train movements were. Thirdly, 
its senior officials assessed and recommended what infrastructure and rolling stock alterations or 
additions were required for the service’s smooth working. Lastly, the Traffic Department 
employed more staff than any other department: 6,366 out of the LSWR’s 15,371 employees in 
1884.424 How efficiently the Traffic Department was run was therefore an important determinant 
of the LSWR’s overall financial performance between 1870 and 1911. 
 
Between 1870 and 1881 the inefficiencies that developed in the LSWR’s traffic operations 
primarily caused the company’s poor profitability. Scott was appointed the Traffic Department’s 
head in 1852, and until 1881 retained close control over its management.425 Yet, after 1870 he 
did not adapt its operational practices, which he had established in the 1850s and 1860s, to cope 
with the company’s rising traffic levels and increased operational complexity. This was because, 
having developed his knowledge of railway management in the 1840s and 1850s, and having not 
worked outside the company since he joined it, after 1870 he did not have the experience to 
adjust the company’s traffic practices to its changing requirements. As Section 4.16 shows, there 
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was also no pressure on him from inside or outside the company to improve or update his 
thinking on railway operation.  
 
Train Operations 
 
Between 1870 and 1881 the number of passengers the LSWR conveyed rose from 13,387,357 to 
31,121,274. 426  Over this period its train operations became progressively inefficient. 
Symptomatic of this inefficiency was increased congestion on the main lines; chiefly outside of 
Waterloo Station, the company’s London terminus, which was a bottleneck. Even though this was 
not reported in the company’s official files, trains were frequently criticised for being slow and 
keeping poor time by those outside it. For example, Funny Folks magazine in 1878 mentioned a 
LSWR season ticket holder who unsuccessfully brought an action against the company because of 
train delays.427 In 1880 a Standard reader argued that the ‘unpunctuality of the [LSWR’s] trains 
was notorious’ and that he had never arrived at Waterloo on time.428 Furthermore, in the mid-
1870s Hounslow residents formed an ‘Acceleration Movement Committee’ to campaign for 
improvements to the train service.429 Lastly, in February 1878 the problem was acknowledged by 
Dutton who stated that ‘we have very great difficulty getting trains into this [Waterloo] station 
faster than we do.430 
  
This congestion was partially caused by the lethargic approach the directors, who controlled the 
LSWR’s capital investment policy in the 1870s, had to augmenting the capacity of the LSWR’s 
network near London through investment. Investment ran behind demand.  The company’s first 
enlargement of Waterloo Station opened in 1878. It did not significantly relieve main line 
congestion, as it possessed only two extra platforms,431 and only three years later a further 
extension was planned.432  Furthermore, it was only in 1878 that directors’ started considering 
plans Scott had drawn up for widening the company’s main lines to increase their capacity (see 
Section 4.17).433 Thus, despite the LSWR’s expenditure on ‘lines open for traffic’ constituting 
£2,099,652 between 1870 and 1880, or 31.90 per cent of the company’s total capital spending in 
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the period, it was only late in the decade that the directors seriously considered major 
investment to alleviate congestion problems.  
 
It can be tentatively suggested that the directors’ slowness to invest in capacity enhancements in 
the 1870s was because while the company could raise capital easily in this period, the majority of 
what it had raised was being allocated to the purchasing and building of lines. Indeed, between 
1870 and 1879 £1.9 million was expended on ‘lines open for traffic’, while the construction and 
building lines cost much more at nearly £3 million.434 Possibly indicative of the underinvestment 
in the company’s infrastructure generally at the time, the LSWR’s poor quality stations were 
particularly criticised in this period. In 1880 Punch commented that the directors must have been 
rabbit fanciers ‘for the number of hutches scattered over their “system” is enormous.’ However, 
‘these hutches are not for rabbits, but for humans, and they are technically known as “Country 
Stations.”435 In 1876 The Richmond and Twickenham Times stated that the Hounslow loop line’s 
accommodation was ‘the vilest…found on any railway in England.’436 Lord Onslow described 
Guildford’s station as “one of the worst stations in England”437 and in 1881 the Board of Trade 
felt compelled to commission a report on its deficient state.438 Lastly, in 1877 a LSWR director, 
James Mangles, wrote to the Traffic Committee commenting on Iselworth Station’s poor 
condition. Improvements were not undertaken because of the large upcoming, although 
unspecified, capital outlay.439  
 
This evidence therefore cautiously suggests that within the company before 1884 there was poor 
strategic planning of its capital and operational requirements. Indeed, it is quite possible the 
directors lacked a clear understanding of why the company’s profitability was falling. As 
discussed, in many cases they initiated the purchase of leased and worked lines because these 
were being operated at a loss. Yet, had they truly understood the cause of the company’s 
excessive operating costs, inefficient train operations, capacity augmentations, not line 
acquisitions, may have been a better place to invest; although without more evidence this is 
conjecture.  However, possibly indicating that the leasing and working of lines was not the 
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primary cause of the LSWR’s diminished profitability before 1881, after 1885 the route mileage 
the company leased increased, while at the same time Scotter’s reforms of the company’s train 
services vastly improved the company’s efficiency and financial performance (see Chapter 5).440  
This tentatively supports the argument made in Chapter 3 and above: that because in the 1870s 
the LSWR’s board was increasingly unable to oversee the company’s operational functions 
closely, and given they had little experience of railway management elsewhere in the industry, 
they could not gauge effectively its operational requirements.  
 
Despite this, the inefficiency of the LSWR’s train services after 1870 can, to a large extent, be 
attributed to Scott and other traffic managers’ inability to adapt the company’s train control 
practices, which had been established in the 1850s and 1860s, to accommodate its increasing 
traffic and more complex operational requirements. Evidence of this from inside the LSWR at the 
time is unavailable, but in the early-1880s Adams, the Locomotive Superintendent from 1878, 
used what he knew of how operational practices had developed in the wider British railway 
industry to frequently criticise those within the company.  For example, in February 1883 he 
wrote to the Engineering Committee regarding locomotives’ increased fuel usage. While he 
argued that numerous factors played a role, a major contributory cause was the Traffic 
Department’s inefficient train operations. Firstly, drivers were directed not to sacrifice 
punctuality over fuel economy, presumably because of the criticism levelled at the company’s 
services. Secondly, he had called the ‘attention of the Traffic Department’ for some time to the 
‘unnecessary haulage of vehicles.’ He also considered that reducing trains’ number of carriages to 
their lowest possible level should receive serious consideration as this would result in ‘economy 
and increase the efficiency of the service.’441 This and other442 evidence suggests that the LSWR’s 
methods of train management before 1881 were inefficient because of Scott’s continued 
application of outdated practices. This was proven after 1885; under Scotter’s leadership the 
LSWR’s train mileage considerably reduced, improving company efficiency, while at the same 
time the reputation of its passenger services’ rose (see Chapter 5).443 
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Rolling Stock  
 
Between 1870 and 1881 the LSWR’s expenditure was also raised by its rolling stock (wagons and 
carriages) building and procurement policies being managed in a manner that was incoherent, 
unplanned and, as Adams again showed, obsolete. Scott, who recommended the procurement 
and rebuilding of new rolling stock to the Traffic Committee (see Chapter 2), did not, or was not 
able to plan for the LSWR’s long-term needs, and poorly managed what stock the company did 
have. Indeed, he seemingly did not appreciate the relationship, that many of his contemporaries 
understood, that existed between keeping the stock well maintained and the efficient working of 
the service.  
 
The LSWR’s wagon stock was inadequate to handle the goods traffic efficiently between 1870 
and 1880. Over this period freight the company conveyed rose from 1,605,341 to 3,567,172 tons 
(90.88 percent). Yet, the average weight of goods carried per wagon per year also increased from 
335 to 469 tons. In part this was because new wagons were introduced that had the capacity to 
carry ten tons; whereas previously most wagons’ maximum was eight tons. Nevertheless, 
between 1870 and 1884 the LSWR only bought or constructed around 275 ten ton goods 
wagons,444 out of a total stock of 7,502,445 and, as such, this cannot be considered the main cause 
of the increased tonnage the wagons were hauling. Rather, each wagon was simply carrying more 
goods because Scott seemingly never planned the company’s future rolling stock requirements 
and, as such, frequently lacked enough wagons to accommodate rising traffic levels. Indicative of 
this, between 1870 and 1880 the company had to hire 450 wagons from contractors, its own 
stock being insufficient. Most of these were returned by November 1880, but another 150 were 
hired between then and March 1881, costing £7 each per year.446 This hiring of wagons 
conceivably raised company costs unnecessarily. 
 
Additionally, between 1870 and 1881 the LSWR not only possessed insufficient wagons, the poor 
quality of those it did have also needlessly raised company expenditure. In 1883 Adams 
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complained to the Engineering Committee that many wagons were of obsolete types447 because 
the renewal rate had been low for ‘many years past.’ Consequently, many wagons, which should 
have been replaced with newer models in or before the 1870s, were of a ‘weak and defective 
construction’, meaning the cost of maintaining them was higher than it would have been for 
more modern types.448 Indeed, between 1870 and 1880 the LSWR’s average annual maintenance 
cost per wagon rose from £6.41 to £6.97 (£7.26).449  But the obsolete nature of the wagon stock 
raised company costs in other ways. Adams stated that because the Carriage and Wagon works 
had a large number of ‘crippled wagons’ under repair at any one time, this meant fewer carriages 
could be maintained.450 He claimed that if plans were adopted whereby wagons were replaced 
more readily, this would reduce their maintenance at the works, and that for every £1 he could 
save on maintaining them £3 could be possibly spent on the carriage stock.451  
 
Scott also pursued policies that kept the LSWR’s carriages in a poor state of repair between 1870 
and 1881. Consequently, they were frequently complained about. In August 1878 one proprietor 
stated that the company’s third-class accommodation was ‘the most humiliating receptacles for 
human beings that he knew; except for perhaps coffins.’452 William Acworth, a respected industry 
commentator, stated that before 1885 the majority of the LSWR’s carriages were ‘small and 
inconvenient.’453 
 
This situation developed because Scott did not push for enough new carriages to be procured to 
keep pace with requirements. The strain on the LSWR’s carriage stock, therefore, progressively 
increased after 1870. Between 1870 and 1880 the number of carriages the LSWR possessed grew 
from 1,266 to 1,543 (eighteen percent).454 Yet, in a period when the company’s carriages only 
increased in size to a small degree,455  the average number of passengers each conveyed yearly 
rose from 10,575 to 19,633 (eighty-six percent).456 Thus, in 1872457 and 1883458 it was reported to 
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the Traffic Committee that the company possessed insufficient carriages to handle the traffic. 
Furthermore, in November 1882 Adams commented that because there were insufficient 
carriages this was ‘a great drawback to the efficient reparation of the stock.’ He considered that 
particularly in busy periods, when more carriages were required, the works had to return some 
to traffic only partially repaired or without necessary repairs being done, which in the long-term 
increased maintenance costs.459 
 
Additionally, Scott kept carriage renewal rates low between 1870 and 1881. Weddell, the leading 
historian of the LSWR’s rolling stock, stated that the Traffic Committee, that was being advised by 
Scott, ‘loathed to part’ with older models.460 For instance, in March 1873 a carriage inspector, 
Hills, wrote to Verrinder, the Assistant Superintendent of the Line, about ‘Old Third Class 
Carriages with single doors’ that were ‘a very great abuse both to the company and the public.’461 
Indicative of Scott’s approach of extending carriages’ lives, Verrinder suggested to him this could 
be done by making them watertight and modernising them with extra doors. Scott agreed, but 
recommended to the Traffic Committee that the minimum be done to keep them in service: they 
were only made watertight and were re-painted.462 Such resistance to modernising or replacing 
old carriages meant that between 1870 and 1877 the LSWR renewed on average only 1.1 percent 
of its stock annually; whereas other companies’ renewal rate was between three and five 
percent. The result was that in March 1883 Adams reported that of the LSWR’s 2,485 carriages, 
1,379 were of obsolete types. He considered them ‘very weak’ and that their complicated 
construction significantly increased maintenance costs.463 Indeed, between 1870 and 1880 the 
LSWR’s cost of carriage maintenance per vehicle rose from £19.76 to £28.69 (£30.45); although, 
the extent to which changes in wage and maintenance cost contributed to this increase is 
unclear.464  
 
Between 1870 and 1881 Scott’s rolling stock procurement and renewal policies were to keep 
costs down in the short-term and to solve problems in an ad hoc manner when they arose. Yet, 
having experienced management practices in the wider British railway industry (see section 4), 
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Adams saw that in comparison Scott’s approach was unsophisticated and backward. Adams 
recognised the links that existed between planning a company’s future rolling stock needs, 
having enough rolling stock to facilitate its business, maintaining rolling stock in good order, and, 
ultimately, how these things promoted the service’s efficient and economical working. Thus, he 
wrote frequently to directors complaining about the antiquated nature of Scott’s methods of 
rolling stock management.  For instance, in April 1883 he showed in a letter that of twelve major 
British railway companies only three, including the LSWR, had not adopted standard rolling stock 
renewal rates.465 Those outside the LSWR also recognised that its rolling stock management was 
poor: the Board of Trade’s report on the accident between Downton and Breamore, described in 
detail below, commented that the company’s locomotives, stock and trains lacked any form of 
classification (see Section  4.18).466   
 
Consequently, like many other parts of the LSWR’s administration in the 1870s, Scott did not 
reform or modernise its rolling stock management practices to accommodate the increased 
complexity of the company’s operations, harming its operational efficiency and profitability.  
 
4.14. Locomotive stock during William Beattie’s superintendency 1871-1877 
 
The Traffic Department was not the only part of the company that was poorly and inefficiently 
run in 1870s. The Locomotive Department was also mismanaged by its superintendent between 
1871 and 1877, William Beattie, the only LSWR senior manager between 1870 and 1911 who can 
be considered just simply incompetent. He was the son of the previous superintendent, Joseph, 
and was appointed because directors hoped he had inherited his father’s talents.467 Yet, his 
experience of locomotive design was minimal – he had been a draughtsman between 1862 and 
1869 and then oversaw the company’s hydraulic machinery until 1871 – and he was a hopeless 
manager.468 Consequently, the Locomotive Department’s management quality deteriorated 
during Beattie’s tenure; yet, because the board’s oversight of the departments’ affairs was poor 
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in the 1870s and few directors had engineering experience (see Chapter 3) his failings went 
unnoticed until 1876.469  
 
 
Figure 14: LSWR locomotives renewal rate 1868-1882, Source: TNA, RAIL 411/470, Locomotives, boilers, 
rolling stock, etc: correspondence, 1882-1884, Statement of Engine Stock, renewals of same and train 
Mileage during the past 14 years., Undated, p.59 
  
Confronted with rising traffic levels, Beattie did not meet the company’s motive power 
requirements adequately. This is shown by contrasting locomotive renewal and construction 
practices during his tenure with those employed by his successor, Adams. During Beattie’s 
administration the LSWR on average renewed and built fewer locomotives than during Adams’. 
Between 1871 and 1877 the company added to stock on average 13.14 locomotives per year; 
whereas between 1880 and 1886 the figure was 20.00.470 Furthermore, as Figure 14 shows, the 
LSWRs locomotive renewal rate fell from 4.71 percent in 1870 to zero in 1876; while on average 
only 1.09 percent of locomotives were renewed per year during Beattie’s tenure; lower than the 
average rate during the early years of Adams’ superintendency (1878 to 1882) of 1.76 percent. 
Consequently, in 1879 Adams thought the company possessed too few locomotives and those it 
did have were under ‘excessive strain’. Indeed, LSWR locomotives ran on average 27,000 miles 
per annum, while those of other companies ran 17,700.471 This ‘excessive strain’ raised 
departmental expenditure. In 1883, when Adams was still rectifying the Locomotive 
Department’s mismanagement, he described how. When entering the shops for routine 
maintenance locomotives were, in his opinion, kept in longer than was necessary because of 
their poor state of repair. This put further strain on those still in service, meaning they in turn 
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required more maintenance when they entered the works, which raised the department’s overall 
maintenance costs.472   
 
The question then is why Beattie lowered the LSWR’s locomotive renewal and procurement rate 
after 1871. Partially, this was because of factors beyond his control. In March 1883 Adams wrote 
that renewal rates fell between 1871 and 1877 because of high fuel and material costs.473 Table 4 
supports this statement, showing they did indeed rise in the period. Furthermore, locomotive 
construction and renewal were possibly curtailed in the 1870s because of the company’s high 
capital spending on building and purchasing lines. Between 1870 and 1874 the LSWR’s total 
capital expenditure on ‘rolling stock’ per train mile totalled 2.41d (2.29d), whereas between 1875 
and 1879 the figure was 2.56d (2.54d). Yet, between 1880 and 1884, a period when the LSWR 
had purchased and built the majority of the lines it was going to, the figure rose to 2.99d (3.16).  
Thus, there were conceivably some constraints on Beattie’s freedom to augment the LSWR’s 
locomotive stock.  
 
  1870 1874 1878 1882 
Cost of Materials and Fuel Used for 
Operation as a proportion of 
Locomotive Department expenditure  
52.92% 55.07% 44.60% 45.19% 
Relative Cost of Materials and Fuel 
Used by the Locomotive Department 
per train mile (1870 = 100)  
100 129.54 97.99 101.45 
Table 4: Material costs as a proportion of Locomotive Department costs and per train mile relative to the 
cost in 1870 (100), Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/281 and 283, LSWR Reports and Accounts 1870-1898. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these extenuating factors, locomotive building and renewal rates remained 
low between 1871 and 1877 because Beattie poorly responded to the LSWR’s changing motive 
power needs. In January 1873 the Locomotive Committee asked him about locomotives for the 
new Lydford extension. Yet, he had given the matter little thought and was ordered to consult 
locomotive builders Beyer Peacock & Co as to suitable engines for the line.474 Beattie’s 
inadequate anticipation of the company’s locomotive needs continued until the end of his 
tenure. In March 1878, only months after his appointment, Adams’ pressed the Locomotive 
Committee for permission to purchase ‘at the least 12 new bogie tank engines’ to urgently meet 
the motive power requirements of the company’s suburban services; the company having not 
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had any tank engines constructed since 1875.475 Thus, Beattie’s inability to address the LSWR’s 
motive power needs principally caused the ‘excessive strain’ on the existing locomotive stock, 
which, as Adams argued in 1879, damaged departmental ‘efficiency and economy’.476  
 
Bradley also argued that those locomotives Beattie did design were unsuitable for the LSWR’s 
needs.477 Initially, he perpetuated his father’s ‘small’ locomotive designs. Their poor haulage 
power meant that the company’s trains were slow and short in length at a time when passenger 
numbers were rising. Indeed, William Acworth stated that in the period the LSWR’s locomotive 
stock had declined in quality and ‘engines which had been in the van of progress, were mere 
pigmies by the side of the giants of the present time.’478 Beattie did, however, order twenty 
heavy express locomotives in 1876. But a prototype was not built and because of design faults 
the class was considered an expensive failure.479  
 
Beattie did not just inadequately manage locomotive matters, he also oversaw his subordinates 
poorly, increasing departmental costs. Between half-year ending December 1871 and December 
1877, a period when the size of the company’s locomotives did not increase to any marked 
degree, their fuel consumption per train mile rose from 26.9lbs to 32.2lbs.480 While these levels 
of consumption were considerably less than on other southern railways,481 it is noticeable that 
the increase began from the June 1872 half year; directly after Beattie’s appointment as 
Locomotive Superintendent. This suggests that the oversight of drivers’ and firemen’s 
operational efficiency declined in quality during his superintendency.482 This suggestion is 
supported by a letter to the Locomotive Committee from another William Beattie, Joseph’s 
cousin and the Locomotive Department’s Assistant Superintendent,483 in 1881. In early-1880 he 
was drawn to the locomotives’ excessive fuel usage over the previous ten years. In his opinion, 
while trains’ augmented weight and speed was a factor, the cause was ‘deeper than that’. In one 
year he found that despite the London District having twice the number of trains in steam daily 
than the other two districts, cases of excessive fuel usage were five times greater. He considered 
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this was mostly attributable to poor oversight of drivers and firemen on the part of London 
District foremen; while the central and western district foremen acted with ‘greater zeal and 
activity’.484 This suggests that Winter’s activities were not adequately overseen by Beattie and 
this in turn meant his inadequate supervision of the drivers and firemen under his charge was not 
identified. Their cases of excessive fuel usage went unchecked and, thus, raised departmental 
expenditure. 
 
Beattie also poorly administered the Nine Elms locomotive works, meaning inefficiencies 
developed within them.  Despite material costs falling absolutely between 1871 and 1877 
(although as shown they did rise around 1874),485  the entire cost of the Locomotive works per 
train mile increased from 8.23d (7.99d) to 9.38d (9.11d).486 Adams, to improve their efficiency, 
had to extensively reorganise and reequip them. In 1879 he showed the Locomotive Committee 
around the works and stated that because he had introduced improved equipment and unskilled 
labour had replaced skilled in some places, piece work prices and foundry costs had been 
reduced. For example, expenditure on locomotive repairs reduced from 2.49d (2.51d) to 2.29d 
(2.42d) pence per train mile between December 1877 and December 1878.487  Furthermore, the 
paucity of Beattie’s management of the works is also possibly shown by the fact that in 1876 the 
company ceased constructing its own locomotives.488  
 
In sum, between 1871 and 1877 Beattie’s very poor management of the Locomotive Department 
contributed to excessively raising company costs. Indeed, as Chapter 5 shows, a decade passed 
before his mismanagement was fully rectified. 
 
4.15. Why Scott and Beattie failed 
 
Between 1870 and 1881 the LSWR’s poor profitability was principally caused by the managerial 
failings of Scott and Beattie.  They poorly anticipated the company’s changing needs, persisted 
with using obsolete management techniques, and sought short-term cost reductions at the 
expense of long-term efficiencies. It will be argued that to some extent they continued to use 
such management techniques, which most of their contemporaries, such as Adams, would have 
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considered inefficient, because they had little criticism of their actions from anyone above or 
below them in the hierarchy, and, thus, could manage their affairs as they saw fit.  
 
The board had little capacity to critique Scott and Beattie’s actions on three counts. Firstly, as 
discussed above, before 1881 it had responsibility for supervising and coordinating the 
company’s departments, and the company lacked a senior official, such as modern chief 
executive, who was doing these things on a day-to-day basis. Scott and Beattie therefore 
reported directly to the board and committees. Yet, these only met fortnightly and, 
consequently, as the company’s traffic and trade grew in the 1870s, and the directors were 
required to supervise an increasingly complex business, it is likely their ability to monitor the 
department heads’ actions progressively waned. This is evidenced by the fact that, as Bradley 
argued, Beattie’s inadequate management of the Locomotive Department went unidentified 
until 1877 because outwardly ‘the Nine Elms works and the Locomotive Department appeared to 
be functioning normally.’489 Indeed, the Way and Works Department scandal, described in 
Chapter 2, possibly suggests that as early as 1870 the directors were not adequately overseeing 
departmental operations; before the fraud was picked up on there was nothing to indicate to 
them that Strapp was inadequately overseeing activities within his department.490  
 
Secondly, Chapter 3 described how in the 1870s most LSWR directors had few external business 
interests. Therefore, the likelihood is that they lacked knowledge of the management practices 
used in other railways or industries, and had limited capacity to critique Scott and Beattie’s 
running of their departments. Indeed, it is probable most of them had learnt about railway 
management from within the LSWR. Indicative of this, the directors were only fully alerted to 
Scott and Beattie’s shortcomings after 1878 when a new department head, Adams, who had 
experienced how other railways’ were run, recognised the poor quality of the company’s 
operating practices and pressed for reform (see Section 4). Lastly, the board members were also 
possibly blind to Scott and Beattie’s failings as they had close and long-standing relationships 
with them. As Chapter 3 discussed, most of the directors had been with the company since the 
early 1850s. Thus, they had worked with Scott since that time, presumably meaning their working 
relationship with him was strong and they trusted his judgment. Additionally, the company’s 
relationship with the Beattie family stretched back to 1837 when William’s father, Joseph, was 
appointed to oversee the construction of the permanent way. Indeed, the mere fact the directors 
appointed William as Locomotive Superintendent, despite his lack of experience designing 
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locomotives, suggests they did not want to break the company’s ties to the family (indeed as 
shown William’s cousin, another William, also worked for the company491). The directorate’s 
close relationship with Beattie is further evidenced by the fact that a protégé of a Locomotive 
Committee member, who was a free-lance engineer, contributed to designing of the twenty 
locomotives that were failures.492 These factors collectively meant that the directorate could not, 
and possibly would not, challenge Scott and Beattie’s activities. 
 
The company’s traffic managers were also unable to effectively criticise Scott’s policies. Most had 
spent their entire careers in within the LSWR’s Traffic Department, or even one just part of it, as 
Chapter 3 showed, and they likely lacked the experience of how management practices had 
developed in the wider British railway industry. Consequently, given almost all of them had 
presumably learnt about railway management from within the LSWR, they were unable to 
effectively recognise how the management practices Scott was using were obsolete and 
inefficient. But even if they possessed such knowledge, the Traffic Department’s promotional 
ladders encouraged deference to authority, meaning it is unlikely they would have questioned his 
decisions anyway. There was, therefore, nobody within the LSWR in the 1870s that had the 
relevant knowledge to recognise and challenge Scott and Beattie’s inadequate, outdated and 
deficient management of their departments. 
 
With little limiting their authority over their department’s affairs, after 1870, it could be argued 
that by not improving the quality of the Traffic and Locomotive Department’s operational 
practices Scott and Beattie were knowingly keeping them in an inefficient state. But there is no 
evidence for this. It is more likely they simply lacked the skills and knowledge to adapt them to 
cope efficiently with the challenge of the LSWR’s increasing traffic and operational complexity. In 
Beattie’s case, he was simply an individual who did not have the aptitude to perform his role 
efficiently, as Bradley argued.493 Scott’s lack of ability is evidenced by statements and actions that 
suggest he believed he could not improve the efficiency and quality of the company’s train 
services further, despite Scotter’s reforms after 1885 clearly proving that enhancements could 
have been made (see Chapter 5). In February 1878, in reference to Hounslow loop line delays, 
Dutton, who presumably was advised on train operations by Scott, mentioned that alterations to 
suburban services were impossible without diminishing the quality of those going to and from 
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the company’s other districts. 494 Furthermore, Scott rarely satisfied requests for better services, 
whereas Scotter was regularly able to heed appeals for improvements. For instance, in May 1877 
Scott rejected requests for new trains on the Epsom and Leatherhead, and Wimborne and 
Bournemouth West Lines, and for more trains to stop at St. Margarets Station.495 This evidence, 
therefore, suggests that Scott had a limited understanding of how train services could be 
manipulated to better serve customers’ needs.496 Most damningly, in September 1879 Scott 
issued a circular asking all his subordinates, right down to station masters, how the company 
might reduce its train mileage. This implies that he lacked ideas about how to do this.497  
Therefore, it can be suggested that Scott was not wilfully managing the company’s train services 
inefficiently; he just lacked the knowledge to manage them better than he already was.  
 
Scott was not inherently a bad traffic manager; he had successfully reformed the Traffic 
Department’s practices after his appointment in 1852.498 Rather, having remained the 
department’s head since that time, and without having worked elsewhere, it is presumed that up 
to the 1870s he had gained little experience or understanding of how railway administration had 
developed outside the LSWR.  Consequently, with no knowledge on which he could draw on to 
effectively adapt the Traffic Department’ operational practices to rising traffic levels, and with no 
criticism of his actions, the department’s efficiency waned after 1870, significantly harming the 
company’s financial performance.  
 
In sum, the case of Scott and Beattie’s poor management of the Traffic and Locomotive 
Departments between 1870 and 1881 further develops the thesis’ main arguments. Firstly, the 
company’s poor management quality in this period was partially the result of their actions being 
inadequately overseen and critiqued by those above them in the hierarchy. For numerous 
reasons, after 1870 the directors were not alert to the fact that the operational practices 
employed by Scott and Beattie were unsuitable for efficiently managing the company’s 
increasingly complex operational requirements. This highlights that the LSWR’s management 
quality and financial performance between 1870 and 1911 was to an extent reliant on the 
activities of the functional department heads, who had almost complete authority over their 
departments’ affairs, being overseen and coordinated effectively. 
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Secondly, Scott’s case highlights that because a small group of senior individuals controlled the 
LSWR’s policies and strategies between 1870 and 1911, if they occupied posts for considerable 
periods of time with little criticism of their actions from those above and below them in the 
hierarchy, their concepts of railway management practice could stagnate or become narrow over 
time, possibly resulting in the value of established practices not being frequently reappraised, 
possibly increasing company costs. Indeed, the LSWR’s inefficiency after 1870 was largely caused 
by the fact that since 1852 Scott had been isolated from how management practice had 
developed in the wider British railway industry and, that because he had not been challenged to 
continually reform and update his knowledge and thinking, by the 1870s his beliefs on railway 
management had stagnated. Thus, the department’s operating practices were not adapted or 
reformed to accommodate the company’s rising traffic levels and inefficiencies developed within 
the department. 
 
Section 4 – Operational matters, c.1881-1884 
 
4.16. Scott’s changing role 
 
Between the late-1870s and early 1880s the directors increasingly realised, given the company’s 
increasingly poor financial performance, they were unable to effectively monitor and coordinate 
the company’s day-to-day operational affairs. After 1878 Scott’s role therefore began to change 
as the board delegated more responsibilities to him, presumably hoping that by giving him more 
authority for overseeing and coordinating the company’s operations he would be able to reduce 
its high operating costs. In 1878 the directors specified that he alone could make 
recommendations to them as to where investment in operational infrastructure should take 
place.499  This gave him considerable power to decide how the company’s infrastructure was 
adapted to cope with rising traffic levels. Furthermore, in 1881 Scott officially received a central 
position within the company’s hierarchy with considerable responsibility for coordinating the 
different departments’ activities and ensuring the company’s overall financial success. Verrinder 
took over as head of the Traffic Department;500 although it should be noted that Scott continued 
to play a considerable, perhaps excessive role in the department’s day-to-day running.501 
 
Despite these changes, between 1881 and 1884 the LSWR’s financial position deteriorated 
further. In 1884 its OR reached its highest ever level of sixty percent; seven points above the 
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fifteen largest British companies’ average. Additionally, while nine of the fifteen companies’ 
ROCS increased between 1877 and 1882 (five year moving average), the LSWR’s declined from 
5.17 to 4.90 percent (see Chapter 1).502 The LSWR’s financial performance continued to diminish 
after 1881 for three principal reasons. Firstly, Scott did not reform the inefficient operating 
practices in the Traffic Department. Secondly, the actions of the company’s department heads 
were still not coordinated or overseen effectively. Lastly, Scott and Adams, the Locomotive 
Superintendent from 1878, had incompatible and opposing philosophies on how railways should 
be managed, and, thus, the LSWR was seemingly unable to develop coherent operational 
strategies that could possibly have combatted some of its excessive expenditure. This section will 
describe these weaknesses in the company’s management. 
 
4.17. Traffic Operations 
 
As section 4.13 discussed, between 1870 and around 1880, when traffic levels were increasing 
rapidly, investment in the LSWR’s network capacity ran behind demand, which contributed to its 
main lines outside Waterloo Station being congested and its running costs increasing excessively. 
However, between 1881 and 1884 the LSWR took significant measures to augment the capacity 
of its main lines near London. Figure 15 shows that between 1880 and 1884 the LSWR’s capital 
investment in its ‘lines open for traffic’ substantially increased, constituting £1,627,428 of the 
£3,976,567 spent in this period (forty-four percent). Much of the expenditure went on alleviating 
main line congestion; another extension of Waterloo Station was constructed between 1882 and 
1885, adding six platforms,503 and after 1880 extra tracks were added to the main lines outside 
the station. Indeed, Appendix 4.3 shows that between 1880 and 1885 the number of route miles 
the company possessed that had three or more tracks increased from five to fifteen.504 It can be 
suggested that while the company was able to access capital with relative ease in this period, it 
increased its expenditure on infrastructure improvements because it was allocating less capital to 
purchasing lines that it leased or worked (Figure 4).505 
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Figure 15: Capital spent on 'lines open for traffic', Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/281 and 283, LSWR Reports 
and Accounts 1870-1884 
 
What was different about these projects was that whereas before 1878 the board had decided 
where and when infrastructure investments should be made, thereafter, as per the board’s order 
of that year, Scott seemingly played a heightened role in determining these things. For instance, 
the directors had driven forward Waterloo’s extension of 1878, with Scott overseeing the project 
and advising them.506 Yet, Scott seemingly initiated the second extension. On 21 December 1881 
he presented the Traffic Committee with Jacomb’s (Resident Engineer) plans for increasing the 
station’s accommodation ‘which he stated would be required for the Traffic [italics added].’ 
These were referred to the board and confirmed.507   Furthermore, Scott led the project; in 
August 1882 he pressed urgently for two lines and platforms to be constructed at Waterloo to 
accommodate traffic, which was done,508 and in late 1884 he successfully recommended to the 
Traffic Committee that the extension should not be opened ‘until the new year’.509  Possibly 
reflecting Scott’s increased responsibility for managing infrastructure improvements, he also 
initiated the company’s main line widenings; in October 1878 he presented to the Traffic 
Committee plans for a third lines between Surbiton and Malden and from Wimbledon to 
Clapham Junction510; while in April 1884, with work planned to expand the number of running 
lines between Clapham Junction and Barnes Stations, he presented further plans to widen them 
up to Queens Road Stations.511  
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Thus, Scott played a considerable part in directing the augmentation of the company’s main line 
capacity after 1878. It can tentatively be suggested that because he had more input on where 
investment took place and how the work proceeded, the augmentations better served the 
requirements of the traffic. This is possibly why the expansion of Waterloo in 1878, which was 
orchestrated by the board, only added two platforms and was clearly insufficient for the 
company’s requirements; while the expansion which opened in 1885, and which Scott had 
greater say over, added six platforms and considerably improved how many trains the station 
could handle.512 But without more evidence this suggestion remains conjecture, and it could also 
be posited that the 1878 expansion was small because at the time the company was spending 
much of the capital it had raised on building and purchasing lines. 
 
After 1881 criticism of the LSWR’s train services intensified, with main line congestion and 
suburban services’ lateness coming in for condemnation. The complaints culminated in fifteen 
letters published in The Times in October 1884. One commented that no company was ‘so badly 
managed as the South-Western, nor is there any time table which is so purely the work of 
supposition.’513  However, it is possible the congestion of train service congestion not only 
damaged the company’s public profile, the Running Department’s expenditure was also raised to 
an extent that cannot be simply explained by Adams introducing more powerful locomotives (see 
Section 4.21), possibly through trains’ idling times increasing. Indeed, locomotives’ fuel usage per 
train mile increased considerably between 1878 and 1884 from 32.8lbs to 41.8lbs (twenty-eight 
percent); while the Running Department’s costs per train mile also rose from 6.32d (6.33d) to 
6.83d (7.37d) at a time when coal prices were falling. 514  
 
Clearly, the LSWR was unable to reduce its train service congestion and inefficiency between 
1881 and 1884. This was, partially, because those infrastructure augmentations designed to do 
this were not opened until after this date. Waterloo Station’s extension was not fully inaugurated 
until 1885, while the company’s main line widenings were only entirely completed in 1890 
(Appendix 4.3). Nevertheless, there is good evidence that train service inefficiency was principally 
caused by Scott’s continued use of train management practices that were unsuitable for a 
company of the LSWR’s operational complexity and size.  Firstly, as Section 3 observed, most of 
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Adams’ criticisms of the company’s obsolete and inefficient train control practices were made 
between 1882 and 1884, evidencing that they were still in use at this time.515 Secondly, and more 
seriously, in June 1884 a train derailed between Downton and Breamore; four people died and 
fifty-one were injured. The Board of Trade’s subsequent report highlighted serious problems with 
the LSWR’s train operations, most of which stemmed from obsolete practice. The inspector, Rich, 
stated that unlike most British railways no part of the LSWR’s train services were classified; so 
rolling stock, locomotives’ and drivers’ suitability for running on different lines was not formally 
determined. He strongly suggested that ‘the company make a thorough examination of their 
system and stock, to classify their drivers, to classify their stock, to classify their several lines and 
to classify their trains.’ Writing on the company’s services generally, he also referred to the 
‘violent shaking’ that passengers experienced when travelling throughout the LSWR’s network. 
He believed this was caused by bad driving, old stock and trains being improperly coupled.516 
Overall, Rich described a railway of the 1880s where train operating practices had not advanced 
for twenty years.  
 
The company continued to employ obsolete and inefficient train control practices after 1881 for 
the same reasons as section 4.13 stated: Scott had considerable freedom of action because the 
LSWR’s directors and his subordinates did not critique the operational practices he was 
employing. Nevertheless, in the early 1880s things changed.  William Adams, the new locomotive 
superintendent, was the first senior company official for nearly thirty years to challenge how 
Scott managed his affairs. 
 
4.19. William Adams 
 
Scott never lost his authority over the LSWRs traffic matters before 1884. However, despite the 
board delegating to him responsibility for coordinating and directing department heads’ activities 
in 1881, in the hope closer management of the company’s functions would reduce its excessively 
high operating expenditure, as the railway’s financial performance continued to decline they 
became progressively disenchanted with his antiquated perspectives on railway management 
and lost their trust in his ability to manage the whole concern effectively.  
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The directors’ growing dissatisfaction with Scott’s thinking on railway management was 
underpinned by William Adams’ appointment as Locomotive Superintendent in 1878. Previously, 
Adams had been the North London (1855-1873) and Great Eastern Railways’ (1873-1878) 
Locomotive Superintendent.517 Thus, by drawing on his knowledge of how railways were run in 
the wider British industry, he considerably improved the Locomotive Department’s efficiency and 
reduced its cost per train mile from 13.38d (13.10d) in 1877 to 11.23d (12.12d) by 1884.518  
 
Adams began by reversing the under-investment in the LSWR’s locomotive stock that had 
occurred since 1870 and improved its suitability for the company’s needs.  In 1881 the 
locomotive renewal rate was increased to 2.22 percent yearly, whereas for the previous eight 
years the figure had never been greater than 1.75 percent.519 Furthermore, the eighty-nine 
locomotives he introduced between 1878 and August 1883 were larger, more powerful and 
better suited to the LSWR’s needs than any William Beattie had designed. Fay described them as 
‘a great advance upon previous South-Western practice and are fully able to cope with the 
heaviest traffic.’520 Also, the later Beattie classes, including the twenty failed locomotives, were 
considerably rebuilt to improve their efficiency.521 Consequently, because the LSWR’s locomotive 
stock was augmented and its standard raised, the excessive strain on it, which as shown was the 
result of the company possessing too few locomotives, was reduced; the average yearly train 
mileage LSWR locomotives ran dropped from 24,309 miles in 1881 to 22,323 miles in 1884, the 
lowest this figure had been since 1870.522 
 
The main drawback of the new locomotives was that, combined with the inefficiency of the 
company’s timetables, they raised the Locomotive Department’s fuel usage and expenditure at a 
time when the price it was paying for fuel fell  from 14.43 shillings per ton in 1878 to 12.78 
shillings in 1884.523 In 1876 the company’s locomotives used 29.4lbs per train mile. However, by 
1882 this had risen to 33.2lb and by 1884 it had reached 41.8lbs.524 Consequently, fuel costs as a 
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proportion of departmental expenditure increased over the period from 30.60 percent to 33.36 
percent between 1878 and 1884.525  
 
The locomotive works expenditure was also reduced after 1878. After a slight increase in 
locomotive repairs and renewals costs between then and 1881, from 3.05d (2.99d) to 3.21d 
(3.38d), the cost thereafter fell to 2.76d (3.00d) in 1884. It can be suggested that this decrease 
can partially be attributed to Adams’ new locomotives reducing departmental maintenance 
costs. In 1879 he had mentioned that because LSWR locomotives’ yearly mileage was high, this 
put them under excessive strain and raised maintenance costs when they came into the works 
(see section 4.15).526 Thus, by increasing the number of locomotives the company possessed, it 
meant repairs to the stock could be made in a timelier manner and less stress was placed on 
those still in service. Moreover, Adams successfully pushed for the rebuilding, reorganising and 
re-equipping of many parts of the Nine Elms works. 527 In February 1879 the Locomotive 
Committee toured them and noted that since February 1878 improvements in working practices 
had reduced costs; with locomotive repairs declining from 2.49 to 2.29 pence train per mile 
between December 1877 and December 1878.   Additionally, Adams suggested that savings 
would be made if the company started rebuilding its own boilers, although whether this went 
ahead is unclear.528 Lastly, in 1883 the LSWR employed Edward Frankland – the noted railway 
chemist – to test the materials used in company’s lubricants and paints with the goal of acquiring 
the best quality and most cost efficient products.529 Indeed, from 21 November 1883 an ‘Analysis 
of Stores’ report book was regularly presented to the Engineering and Stores Committee, 
suggesting regular chemical analysis of the company’s materials was being undertaken – whereas 
previously it had not been.530 
 
In sum, the company Adams came to in 1878 was, in terms of its operating practices, isolated 
within the British railway industry. Prior to then the directors’ external business interests or 
personal experience of the railway did not provide them with the skills or knowledge to 
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adequately oversee or understand fully the Locomotive Department’s operations (see Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, given that Beattie had succeeded his father, who had been the company’s 
Locomotive Superintendent since 1850, this possibly allowed for antiquated norms of 
management practice within the department to embed deeply. The likelihood was, therefore, 
that only an individual who was appointed from outside the company, and who had knowledge 
of developments in management practice elsewhere in the British railway industry, could 
successfully identify where within the Locomotive Department efficiencies could be found and 
managerial improvements could be made. Adams was just such a man, and in only six years he 
considerably improved the Locomotive Department’s management quality and efficiency.  
 
Adams’ case therefore supports one of this thesis’ major arguments; because only a small 
number of senior individuals had the power to influence the LSWR’s strategic course and policies 
between 1870 and 1911, and given the company’s own senior managers rarely developed new or 
innovative management or operational techniques, advancement was reliant on new senior 
managers joining the company who had worked in other railways.  
 
4.20. Scott verses Adams 
  
Despite Adams improving the Locomotive Department’s efficiency before 1884, he did not enact 
all the reforms he desired. This was because his thinking on two significant aspects of railway 
management, rolling stock and operational policy, was fundamentally different to Scott’s. Having 
acquired knowledge of how management practice had developed in the wider British railway 
industry,531 Adams applied modern, planned and systematic approaches to the management of 
the Locomotive Department. Conversely, as sections 4.14 and 4.18 argued, the management 
practices utilised by Scott, who had worked for the LSWR since 1852 and likely had little practical 
experience of how railway management had developed outside the company, lacked such 
sophistication. His approach, which was antiquated by the 1880s, was to reduce cost where 
possible and solve problems in an ad hoc manner when they arose. Consequently, while Adams 
and Scott had common views on some policies, there were more areas where their opinions 
differed and so they came into conflict over policy. The evidence also suggests that after 1881 
their relationship was not improved by the fact that Scott tried to get involved in the detail of the 
Locomotive Department’s management and, thus, possibly interfered too much in Adams’ 
business for his liking.532 
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The most notable dispute between Scott and Adams was over rolling stock policy. On 
appointment, Adams looked to end the lack of forward planning in rolling stock and locomotive 
renewal and procurement policies. Bradley argued that he quickly investigated the Locomotive 
Department’s ‘short and long-term requirements’533 and he pushed the directors for standard 
locomotive, carriage and wagon renewal rates which, while common throughout the railway 
industry, the LSWR lacked. 534 For example, by the 1880s he was replacing old carriages with 
improved designs when they came into the shops and in 1881 Dutton stated that ‘nothing but 
the best carriages’535 were being built, while Fay wrote that new carriages would ‘bear 
comparison with any in the country’.536 Nevertheless, the company’s carriage renewal rate 
actually fell between 1878 and 1882 to an average of 0.87 percent per year.537 The Traffic 
Committee, presumably acting in line with Scott’s established perspective of extending carriages’ 
lives, denied Adams request in March 1883 for a higher rate of four percent per annum, which he 
suggested would, as Section 3 described, reduce maintenance costs in the long-term.  
Nevertheless, after much debate, in mid-1884 the Traffic Committee came around to Adams’ 
perspective and agreed to the scrapping and renewal of passenger stock more readily.538  Also, 
Section 4.14 showed that in the 1880s Adams frequently criticised the manner in which the 
Traffic Department organised the company’s train services. In his opinion the Locomotive 
Department’s expenditure was unnecessarily raised through trains’ excessive mileage and the 
fact that the company’s locomotives were doing much more work yearly than those of other 
railways, meaning that the repairs they had to undergo when entering the shops for maintenance 
were needlessly heavy.539 The likelihood is that Scott and traffic officials did not appreciate such 
criticism on top of that they were already receiving from the travelling public.  
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4.21. The directors and the disputes  
  
Adams and Scott’s opinions on important areas of the company’s operational policies were at 
odds between 1881 and 1884, and they both attempted to gain support for their perspectives 
from directors who had little, if any, knowledge of railway engineering or management (see 
Chapter 3). Indeed, as the company’s profitability continued to decline after 1881, and as Adams 
increasingly challenged its established, but inefficient practices, the board increasingly came to 
favour his opinions over Scott’s on many matters. Thus, the LSWR lacked strong leadership 
between 1881 and 1884, and this is possibly why it never developed an overarching corporate 
strategy to counter its excessive costs.  
 
Initially the directors favoured Scott’s opinions on operational policies, presumably given he had 
been the company’s chief official since 1852. Indeed, his objections to Adams’ proposals – for 
example in the case of rolling stock renewal rates – meant that by 1884 Adams had not managed 
to modernise the Locomotive Department’s management or rolling stock policies to the extent 
he wished to.   
 
But by 1882 the directorate, and particularly the Locomotive Committee who Adams reported 
directly to, increasingly favoured his opinions on matters of policy over Scott’s views or in 
contrary to established operating practices. For instance, in late-1882, after finding some 
carriages running in a particularly poor state of repair, Scott suggested that a new carriage 
superintendent should be introduced under Adams to improve oversight within the department. 
Yet, the Engineering Committee sided with Adams’ view that the carriage works should be 
extended and rearranged. Possibly indicative of Scott’s waning authority in the company, he 
became frustrated and caustically suggested that the directors had a ‘view to prevent practical 
results…and put out of sight the present question of expense.’540 Also, Scott’s views on carriage 
and wagon renewal rates had fallen out of favour with the directors by his retirement, as 
discussed, and by 1884 the company had adopted Adams’ suggestions.541 Furthermore, while 
Scott had favoured extending carriages lives as much as possible, the LSWR began procuring and 
building a considerable number of new ones after 1880. Between 1875 and 1880 the number of 
the carriages the company possessed decreased from 1,548 to 1,543; yet by 1885 the number 
had risen to 1,929, an increase of 25.02 percent.  
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Therefore, despite Scott theoretically being given responsibility for overseeing and coordinating 
the department heads’ activities in 1881, this evidence suggests that in practice he never gained 
authority over Adams’ actions. Thus, Adams’ case gives weight to Bonavia’s argument that in 
companies that utilised functional department structures department heads could undermine 
the General Manager’s authority because they had direct contact with directors through the 
committees and could influence their decisions.542  
 
The directors’ increasing support for Adams’ opinions on policy was, however, just one of many 
indicators that suggest their trust in Scott’s ability to efficiently manage the company’s 
operations was decreasing. Possibly because Adams gave them an awareness of how the 
company’s operations were managed poorly, after 1881 some directors probed why expenditure 
was so high. For instance, in 1882 Beach questioned the company’s excessive spending in the 
previous half-year,543  while in February 1883 Mortimer raised the same concern, and the matter 
was discussed over seven board meetings.544 This heightened interest in the company’s poor cost 
position soon led the directors to become more active in its day-to-day running. In April 1883 a 
Special Committee specified that the Traffic and Engineering Committees should monitor very 
closely any alterations or additions to stations and rolling stock.545 In July 1884 the board 
increased their monitoring of company expenditure by ordering that all spending be based on 
estimates presented to it at the end of every half-year.546  Lastly, in late 1884 the Locomotive 
Committee began fortnightly inspections of Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon works.547 
Therefore, while Scott was not officially stripped of his responsibilities for supervising and 
harmonizing the whole of the company’s operations before 1884, it would seem the directors felt 
the need to reassert some of their authority to make good his deficiencies.  
 
There were numerous reasons why Scott’s authority within the company waned after 1881. 
Adams’ appointment was almost certainly a major factor. Chapter 3 highlighted that the LSWR’s 
directors had little, if any, experience of railway management outside the company in this period. 
As such, Adams’ criticisms of the company’s established operational practices, based on his 
knowledge of how other railways were operated, would possibly have been the first time the 
directorate was exposed to the reality that Scott’s management of traffic matters was inefficient 
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and causing the company’s poor financial performance. Furthermore, because many new 
directors had joined the company in the late-1870s and early 1880s, they were possibly more 
receptive to Adams’ criticisms of its established operating practices than their predecessors. 
Many of the directors they replaced had worked with Scott since the 1850s and had built up 
strong working relationships with him. Thus, as section 4.15 showed, they seemingly trusted his 
judgment. However, because the new directors had only worked with Scott for a short time, and 
did not have a long-standing connection with him, they were evidently far less willing to 
automatically favour his philosophies of railway management in light of Adams’ criticisms. 
Therefore, while scholars such as Channon and Irving focussed on how directors’ external 
business interests may have influenced nineteenth-century railways’ policies,548  this section has 
shown that the length of individuals’ directorships, the nature of their working relationships with 
senior officials, and the level of turnover amongst directors could also influence companies’ 
management quality. 
 
Scott’s loss of authority had serious implications for the LSWR’s financial performance after 1881. 
There was no individual within the organisation that had the authority to provide the company 
with strong leadership, who could get the department heads working together towards common 
goals or could provide organisation with a coherent strategy to bring down its excessive 
expenditure. Indeed, as Section 3 showed, the board were unable to coordinate and oversee the 
company’s functions effectively; while Adams’ responsibilities only covered the locomotive and 
rolling stock matters. The LSWR’s management between 1881 and 1884 can be labelled 
‘incoherent,’ and this is demonstrated by one policy Adams enacted which unexpectedly raised 
the Engineering Department’s expenditure. 
 
4.22. Heavy locomotives  
 
As Section 4.19 discussed, between 1878 and 1883 Adams introduced eighty-nine larger and 
heavier locomotives to address the deficiencies in the company’s engine stock.549 These 
locomotives did, however, increase the rate of wear on the company’s tracks; something that 
seemingly took Jacomb, the Resident Engineer (head of the Engineering Department), by 
surprise. In August 1883 Adams wrote to the Engineering Committee stating that Jacomb had 
mentioned to him that since 1878 track renewal rates had increased from sixty to ninety miles 
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per annum and that the greatest wear was where the new locomotives operated.550 It also can be 
plausibly suggested the increased wear on the company’s tracks eventually imperilled the 
company’s safe operation. The accident between Downton and Breamore of June 1884 was 
principally caused by the track being too weak to support two locomotives moving at speed.551 
 
The Engineering Committee and Department reacted quickly to enable the track to withstand the 
new locomotives more efficiently. Firstly, the network’s track weight was gradually increased552 
to 80lbs per yard.553 Furthermore, to better plan and manage the cost of renewals, any extra 
renewals above the ninety miles per year554 were charged against a ‘renewal suspense 
account.’555 By 1885 the Engineering Committee was also monitoring track maintenance more 
closely, and received fortnightly returns of the mileage renewed. Lastly, the Engineering 
Department negotiated more advantageous contracts for materials to reduce expenditure.556 
These emergency measures possibly raised company costs in the short and long-term. 
Expenditure on track renewals in 1876 (the last year such information was recorded 
independently in the company’s accounts) was £63,240 (£61,925), twenty-five percent of 
departmental costs; while Jacomb’s estimate of the cost in 1884 was £98,600 (£106,406), which, 
if accurate, constituted thirty-two percent of departmental expenditure.557  Furthermore, 
between 1879 and 1884 departmental expenditure per track mile rose from £383 (£405) to £430 
(£464) (12.29 percent). However, it should be recognised that the extent to which these 
increases were influenced by changes in the price of materials is unclear. 
 
The unexpected and excessive wear on the company’s tracks Adams’ new locomotives caused 
was, fundamentally, the result of insufficient coordination of, and communication between, the 
LSWR’s department heads. Indeed, because after 1881 Adams lacked effective oversight of his 
actions from an authoritative General Manager, and given that the directors supported his 
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position on many policies, he had the freedom to build new locomotives without reference to 
how they may have raised the Engineering Department’s costs. This case was therefore 
symptomatic of the poor leadership the LSWR received between 1881 and 1884, which will now 
be discussed. 
 
4.23. The disparate LSWR 
 
To a large extent, the LSWR’s deteriorating profitability between 1881 and 1884 was caused by 
the poor operating practices Scott continued using in the Traffic Department (see section 4.17). 
However, what this section has importantly shown is that the relationship dynamics of those at 
the head of the LSWR significantly influenced its overall management quality and, consequently, 
contributed to the company’s poor financial performance. The evidence suggests that in the 
period the company’s two most influential senior managers possessed opposing and 
incompatible approaches to railway management. Scott’s antiquated approach was to reduce 
cost in the short-term and solve problems in an ad hoc manner as they arose. Conversely, Adams 
possessed a systematic approach to management where long-term planning for the company’s 
future requirements was the key. The incompatibility of their management philosophies meant 
they conflicted over numerous areas of policy where their interests overlapped and, more 
seriously, the LSWR seemingly never attempted to develop a coherent strategy that may have 
brought down its excessive expenditure.  
 
The case of the LSWR’s management between 1881 and 1884 therefore gives weight to Bonavia’s 
argument that in railways that used functional department structures, department heads, who 
had considerable, if not complete authority over their own fiefdoms, could come into conflict in 
ways that damaged companies’ financial performance. Nevertheless, his argument needs some 
modification. He focussed on disagreements between railways’ officials that arose because of 
their differing day-to-day concerns. For instance, Traffic Departments needed variable numbers 
of locomotives at different times of the year, while Locomotive Departments needed to plan 
when the locomotive stock was maintained evenly so as not to overwhelm the works or render 
them idle.558 While this form of conflict has been shown to have existed within the LSWR before 
1884, Scott and Adams’ clashed over policy for another reason: their philosophies of railway 
management were unalike because of their differing employment experiences, backgrounds and 
the length of the time they had been with company. Indeed, the LSWR’s case suggests that senior 
                                                          
558
 Bonavia, The Organisation of British Railways, p.17-18 and p.153-154; Channon, Railways in Britain and 
the United States, 1830-1940, p.42 
187 
 
managers’ differing management philosophies, which may arise from a new department head 
joining the railway from an external source, could potentially have been more damaging to 
companies’ performance than the disagreements Bonavia considered. In cases he described 
where department heads disputed when locomotives would enter the works, it is likely a 
settlement could be arranged so that both branches of the company would still operate relatively 
smoothly. But as Adams and Scott’s disagreements show, where senior officials’ fundamental 
beliefs about railway management were at odds this could severely impinge on a company’s 
ability to develop coherent responses to the challenges they faced. Consequently, given that 
most British railways possessed functional department structures between 1870 and 1914, future 
academics must consider how companies’ management quality and financial performance were 
shaped by the compatibility of senior officials’ management philosophies, rather than simply 
analysing what their immediate operational concerns were. 
 
Most importantly, the findings of this section develop one of the two chief arguments of this 
thesis: because between 1870 and 1911 LSWR department heads had almost absolute authority 
within their fiefdoms, the effectiveness of the company’s management and, consequently, much 
of its profitability, was dependent on how effectively their actions were coordinated and 
overseen by those above them in the hierarchy: the General Manager and the directors. Indeed, 
Adams and Scott came into conflict because no individual or body within the LSWR was able to 
negotiate between them, get them working together or give the company a strategic direction to 
which they had to shape their policies. In short, between 1881 and 1884 the LSWR lacked 
effective leadership, and its case gives weight to Channon’s suggestion that the operational 
effectiveness of railways that possessed functional structures was dependent on a General 
Manager’s ‘authority, skill and energy’ to persuade department heads to cooperate.559    
 
The case of the LSWR’s management between 1881 and 1884 also reveals something about the 
nature of the relationship between directors and senior managers in nineteenth-century British 
railways. Essentially the LSWR’s directorate in this period was responsible for creating the 
disputes between Scott and Adams, and the subsequent lack of operational cohesion within the 
company. Scott had been given the responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the 
department heads’ activities in 1881. Yet, his authority within the company waned thereafter 
because the board shifted its allegiance away from his philosophies of railway management 
towards Adams’. Thus, while it is unlikely Scott had the knowledge or ability to transform the 
General Manager’s position into something akin to modern chief executive, as Scotter did from 
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1885, he was never realistically given opportunity or authority to do this by the directors. This led 
to the activities of the company’s departments being largely uncoordinated. This case therefore 
suggests that because within the majority of nineteenth-century British railways only a small 
number of individuals had decision-making authority, their management quality and operational 
cohesiveness could still be highly dependent on which senior managers’ opinions on policy the 
directorate favoured. Indeed, as the LSWR’s example shows, the official with the directors’ favour 
may not, necessarily, have been the General Manager.  
 
Section 5 - Conclusion 
 
By demonstrating that numerous factors influenced the LSWR’s poor financial performance 
between 1870 and 1884 this chapter contributed to debates surrounding the causes of the British 
railway industry’s declining profitability between 1870 and 1914. 
 
While it was shown that wage increases and growth in high-volume, low-margin passenger traffic 
did affect the LSWR’s profitability between 1870 and 1884, principally its financial performance 
was determined by the quality of the decisions its directors and senior officials made. The 
chapter’s first section described how the LSWR’s directors added routes to the company’s 
network when its regional hegemony was threatened and purchased lines it leased or worked as 
the opportunity arose. However, many of these lines were poor performers financially, and, 
therefore, this chapter attempted to determine why the directors made such investments.  
 
Fundamentally, the board had considerable scope to invest where they saw fit.  Despite the 
LSWR’s profitability being poor after 1870 relative to the largest British railway companies’, it 
made enough profit to satisfy shareholders and external financial markets. Thus, the 
shareholders were largely passive in the company’s decision-making processes and it could raise 
capital with relative ease. Additionally, the company’s constant traffic growth since the 1830s led 
decision-makers to believe this would continue and that all investments would be worthwhile in 
the long-run. Thus, because their actions were not constrained by these factors, the LSWR 
directors developed no detailed strategies or project appraisal to guide their investments. Rather, 
they were far more inclined to make decisions on the basis of ‘gut-feeling’, the circumstances 
they were immediately presented with and, in the case of the extension of lines into the West 
Country, their own competitive aims. For example, with regard to the purchase of lines the 
company leased or worked, the directors only possessed the vague goals of consolidating the 
company’s network, eliminating unfavourable working agreements and removing unstable 
partners. They did not, however, consider alternative strategies to acquisition that possibly 
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would have been more cost-effective. Additionally, the board also built lines to protect the 
LSWR’s territorial dominance. In many cases they had been reluctant to build into some 
territories because they suspected – rightfully in many cases – that lines through them would not 
pay. Nonetheless, when faced with the company’s territorial hegemony being challenged they 
overrode these concerns and built the routes anyway, likely thinking that if they underperformed 
they could be cross-subsidised by profitable lines for years or even decades after they opened. 
 
Therefore, between 1870 and 1884 the LSWR directors’ invested in lines for reasons other than 
profit-maximisation, as Aldcroft, Casson, and Dodgson argued occurred generally within the 
British railway industry before 1900.560 Nevertheless, this chapter has suggested that the effect 
these capital investments had on the LSWR’s overall financial performance was small compared 
with the major impact that its deficient management had; a finding that supports Gourvish and 
Hodgkins’ arguments that network extensions that performed poorly did not significantly impact 
on British railways’ profitability after 1870.561  
 
Chiefly, this chapter has argued that the LSWR’s poor profitability and ROCS between 1870 and 
1884 was caused by deficiencies in the company’s management. This case therefore supports 
Arnold, McCartney, Crafts, Mills, Mulatu and others’ arguments that between 1870 and 1914 
British railways’ management quality was the prime determinant of their financial 
performance.562 Through making this argument the chapter has also developed this thesis’ two 
principal arguments. 
 
Section 3 and 4 argued that in the 1870s and early 1880s the LSWR’s excessive running costs and, 
thus, its poor financial performance was primarily the result of Scott’s obsolete management of 
train control and rolling stock matters. Scott was allowed to persist with using such management 
practices because there was little constraining his freedom of action. The LSWR’s directors placed 
him under little such pressure; they had worked with him for decades and presumably trusted his 
judgement. Most importantly, they had little practical experience of railway or industrial 
management outside the company and it is unlikely they had the knowledge to criticise his 
                                                          
560
 Dodgson, ‘New, disaggregated, British railway total factor productivity growth estimates, 1875 to 
1912’p.639; 
560
 Casson, The world’s first railway system, p.17; Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition, p.9-15 
561
 Gourvish, ‘The Performance of British Railway Management after 1860, p.198; Hodgkins, The Second 
Railway King, p.639 
562
 Gourvish, ‘The Performance of British Railway Management after 1860, p.198; Arnold, and McCartney 
‘Rates of return’, p.56; Mitchell, Chambers, and Crafts, ‘How good was the profitability of British railways 
1870-1912?’,  p.829; Crafts, Leunig, and Mulatu, ‘Corrigendum: Were British railway companies well 
managed in the early twentieth century?’, p.355; Crafts, Mills and Mulatu, ‘Total factor productivity growth 
on Britain’s railways 1852-1912’, p.632 
190 
 
actions (see Chapter 3). This chapter has therefore done what Channon and Hughes’ studies of 
the GWR and LNER’s directors did not,563 it has demonstrated how the external business 
activities, or lack thereof, of one railway company’s directors may have influenced its 
management quality. Moreover, almost none of the LSWR’s traffic managers had worked outside 
the section of the Traffic Department that had recruited them and, consequently, they would 
have had little opportunity to acquire knowledge that would have enabled them to criticise 
Scott’s actions. Furthermore, even if they had possessed such knowledge, the company’s 
promotional ladders promoted deference to authority and meant they lacked the position in the 
organisation to criticise him (see Chapter 3). 
  
Thus, between 1870 and 1884 Scott was under little pressure to reappraise and enhance how he 
ran his affairs; this is the bedrock of one of the thesis’ principal arguments. This thesis contends 
that because department heads had almost complete authority over their departments before 
1900 with little criticism of, or constraints on their freedom of action, over time their thinking on 
railway management could stagnate or become narrow, and inefficiencies could develop in the 
operational practices they were employing. Scott’s case supports this argument. He had never 
worked outside the LSWR between 1852 and 1870 and, as such, he did not acquire experience of 
how railway operation and administration had developed in the wider British railway industry. 
Consequently, with few constraints on his freedom to manage the department as he saw fit, his 
thinking on railway management stagnated over this period. The result was that when the 
company’s traffic and operational complexity increased dramatically in the 1870s, he simply 
lacked the knowledge or ability to adapt the Traffic Department’s operational practices to 
efficiently manage this changed situation. Indicative of the stagnation in his thinking, when 
Adams was appointed Locomotive Superintendent from outside the company in 1878, his 
challenges of Scott’s management techniques highlighted to the directorate their obsolete 
nature.  
 
But there was another factor that contributed to diminishing the LSWR’s profitability between 
1870 and 1884. No one within the company had the ‘authority, skill and energy’, as Channon 
phrased it, to get the largely independent department heads working together, to consider 
matters beyond their immediate remits, or to provide the company with strategic leadership.564 
This chapter has also developed this thesis’ second main argument: that between 1870 and 1911 
the quality of the leadership and oversight the LSWR’s independent department heads received 
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was an important element of the company’s financial success. Before 1881 the board was unable 
to oversee or coordinate the company’s different branches effectively, for reasons outlined 
above.  Scott was therefore not the only individual who had the freedom to manage his affairs 
inefficiently. For example, Beattie managed the Locomotive Department very poorly between 
1871 and 1877. However, with the company’s profitability progressively declining, by 1881 the 
directors realised they were not effectively overseeing the company’s increasingly complex 
operational affairs, and, so, they delegated authority to Scott to do this. He failed, principally 
because of Adams, the Locomotive Superintendent. Scott and Adams possessed opposing and 
incompatible philosophies of railway management. As the latter repeatedly challenged the 
company’s established operational practices, and vastly improved the quality of the Locomotive 
Department’s management, the directors increasingly favoured his opinions on policy. Yet, 
because both individuals had authority within their departments, neither of their philosophies of 
railway management came to dominate the company’s policies and, consequently, between 
1881 and 1884 the LSWR never developed unified operational strategies that would possibly 
have reduced its excessive operational costs.  
 
The disparate and uncoordinated nature of the LSWR’s management was, therefore, a significant 
contributory factor in its operating ratio being the poorest amongst Britain’s fifteen largest 
railway companies by 1884. 
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Part 6 – Appendices 
 
4.1. LSWR line purchases, 1870-1884 
 
Line Year Cost 
Direct Portsmouth Line 1871 £352,250 
Devon & Cornwall Line 1871 £106,731 
Lidford Extension 1874 £206,667 
Barnstaple & Ilfracombe 1875 £139,968 
Stokes Bay Line 1875 £40,227 
Salisbury & Yeovil Line 1878 £653,694 
Staines, Wokingham & Woking Junction Railway 1878 £543,188 
Devon & Cornwall for Plymouth line 1878 £244,639 
Exeter & Crediton 1879 £106,301 
Lymington Branch 1879 £45,378 
Holsworthy Line 1880 £305,213 
Botley & Bishops Waltham 1882 £21,666 
Salisbury & Dorset Line 1883 £188,054 
Cattewater Branch 1883 £34,494 
Mid-Hants Railway 1884 £212,022 
 
Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/281 and 283, LSWR Reports and Accounts 1870-1884 
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4.2. The LSWR driver’s and firemen’s petition to the LSWR board -May 1874, Source: Tamworth 
Herald, 16 May 1874, p.3 
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4.3. Track width of the LSWR’s lines 1878-1890 
 
Year  ‘78 ‘79 ‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 
One 220 222 223 223 223 220 210 210 228 228 228 230 221 
Two 471 490 490 490 489 490 497 532 513 536 543 553 579 
Three 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 8 14 14 15 
Four (or 
more) 
5 5 5 6 7 9 12 15 14 16 17 17 17 
                            
                            
Number 
of miles 
above 
two 
lines 
7 7 7 8 9 11 15 18 18 24 31 31 32 
% of 
miles 
above 
two 
lines 
1.00
% 
0.97
% 
0.97
% 
1.11
% 
1.25
% 
1.53
% 
2.08
% 
2.37
% 
2.37
% 
3.05
% 
3.87
% 
3.81
% 
3.85
% 
 
Source: Board of Trade, Railway Returns 1878-1890 
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Chapter 5 – Company policy during Charles Scotter’s tenure:  
1885-1897 
 
After Scott’s general managership, when the LSWR’s financial performance had deteriorated, the 
directors looked for a new General Manager that could transform the company’s fortunes. In 
March 1885 they appointed Charles Scotter, who through wide-ranging reforms significantly 
improved the LSWR financial performance. During his tenure its OR fell from being seven percent 
higher than the fifteen largest railway companies’ average when he was appointed in 1885, to 
aligning with it by 1889. Additionally, by 1897 its ROCS had been restored to 1872 levels (five 
year moving average). Furthermore, during Scotter’s General Managership the company’s share 
price and dividends became amongst the highest in the British railway industry. Consequently, on 
Scotter’s retirement in 1897 Railway Magazine commented that ‘there is no instance on record 
in this country where such striking results have been produced by a railway manager as those 
which have, within the short period of twelve years, attended the policy pursued by Sir Charles 
Scotter.’565  
 
Scotter’s considerable improvement of the LSWR’s operational management meant he obtained 
decisive influence over its capital investment strategies because the directors, who still lacked 
experience of railway management from outside the company (see Chapter 3), increasingly 
trusted his judgement. He significantly influenced the company’s decision to purchase the 
Southampton Docks in 1892, as well as many other significant capital projects. Some of these 
investments were successful; others were not, especially in the late-1890s.  
 
Section 1 – Company Operations 
 
5.1. Scotter’s Appointment 
 
Analysing the process by which Scotter was appointed to the LSWR’s General Managership 
demonstrates one of this thesis’ main arguments. Because between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR’s 
managers, particularly the traffic managers, rarely developed management techniques that were 
more progressive than those they were already using, the advancement of the company’s 
operating practices was principally dependent on new senior managers being appointed from 
external sources. 
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The conditions for Scotter’s appointment were created from the mid-1870s onwards. Many of 
the company’s old directors, who had joined it in the 1850s, were replaced. The newcomers, who 
dominated the board by 1885, would therefore have had no long-standing loyalty to the LSWR’s 
existing managers or Scott, and would not be wedded to established operational practices. Thus, 
faced with the poor state of the company’s finances in 1885, it can be suggested that they were 
more open to radical and wide-ranging reform of the company’s management practices as a 
result, as demonstrated by the fact that in the early-1880s they had increasingly favoured Adams’ 
viewpoints on matters of policy over Scott’s (see Chapter 4). 
 
Clearly they realised that no existing LSWR senior manager possessed the ability to reform and 
enhance the company’s management. Indicative of this, in December 1884 they rejected a 
memorial from the company’s principal station agents that Verrinder, the Traffic 
Superintendent,566  be appointed General Manager.567 Furthermore, they rejected applications 
for the post from White, the Western District Superintendent568 and Copus, who had resigned as 
Southampton Station superintendent in 1880.569 It is therefore plausible to suggest the directors 
rejected these individuals’ applications because they felt that appointing a long-standing LSWR 
employee as General Manager would have led to the company’s obsolete and inefficient 
operating practices persisting or not being reformed in the way they desired. They likely 
recognised that the Traffic Department’s introverted clerical promotional structures (see Chapter 
3) were possibly producing managers that had inferior skills to those elsewhere in the British 
railway industry, who lacked a capacity to innovate, and did not have the range of employment 
experiences to recognise the faults in the company’s existing management practices. 
 
Conversely, the directors evidently realised that only someone with considerable experience of 
management in the wider British railway industry could effectively reform the company’s 
obsolete operating practices. Demonstrative of this fact, in addition to Scotter, the other 
shortlisted candidates for the LSWR General Managership in 1885 were Irvine Kempt of the 
Caledonian Railway and Frederick Harrison of the LNWR.570 Interestingly, both eventually became 
General Managers of their respective railways, possibly suggesting the directors had developed 
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an awareness of the skills the LSWR’s new General Manager would need to turn the company’s 
fortunes around.571  
 
5.2. Scotter’s authority 
 
Scotter’s successful reformation of the LSWR’s financial performance relied on him gaining 
authority over the company’s department heads, coordinating their actions effectively and giving 
them strong leadership – something the company lacked between 1870 and 1884. As Chapter 4 
argued, in 1881 Scott had theoretically been given responsibility for harmonising and overseeing 
the department heads’ actions.572  Yet, because the directors increasingly favoured Adams’ 
perspectives on policy he was unable to do this. Scotter quickly altered the relationship between 
the General Manager and the rest of the company. Primarily, he delegated many responsibilities 
to the departments, such as staff management and the company’s other routine functions. By 
availing himself of the detailed management of the company this allowed him to be a far more 
authoritative, decisive and effective General Manager than Scott, as near-contemporaries 
recognised. Railway Magazine stated that by detaching from the detail of the company’s 
administration Scotter had ‘ample time to give the necessary close attention to the real 
management of the undertaking.’573    
 
Scotter’s authority over the department heads was also bolstered by his comprehensive 
knowledge of all branches of railway work. His MSLR career had been varied; he had worked in 
the company’s passenger, goods and continental sections, and was involved in the Grimsby 
Docks’ management. 574 He had worked under two of Britain’s leading nineteenth-century railway 
managers, Sir Edward Watkin and Sir James Allport. Presumably he learned much of railway 
management from them.575 Unlike Scott, who never gained authority over Adams’ actions (see 
Chapter 4), Scotter’s wide-ranging experience of most branches of railway management gave him 
the ability to effectively critique department heads’ activities where necessary and understand 
their needs. Reflecting this, in 1897 he stated that ‘a railway manager is the head of a varied as 
well as an extensive concern, and he needs to know somewhat of most things.’576   
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Soon after his appointment Scotter had asserted his authority over the department heads and 
directed their actions in line with his two corporate strategies: to reduce the company’s excessive 
expenditure and grow its business (see sections 5.2 and 5.3). Furthermore, Scotter created a 
‘team spirit’ within the company that promoted collegial working and company cohesiveness. In 
August 1886 Dutton stated that expenditure reductions had occurred ‘only by [officers] amicably 
working together’577 and, unlike before 1885, between 1885 and 1897 no disputes can be found 
between department heads, or between them and the General Manager. Scotter’s case 
therefore highlights one of this thesis’ main arguments: the LSWR’s financial performance 
between 1870 and 1911 was to an extent dependent on its department heads’ being actions 
overseen and coordinated effectively by those above them in the hierarchy. 
 
5.3. Expenditure reductions 1885-1892 
 
Chapter 4 argued that because activities of the LSWR departments were uncoordinated before 
1884, the company never developed a coherent strategy to reduce its excessive operating costs. 
Scotter reversed this situation. The years from 1885 to 1892 stand out as a period when the 
company was provided with the most cogent set of strategic objectives by its decision-makers 
between 1870 and 1911. Scotter’s primary goal was to reduce its excessive operating 
expenditure. In 1887 Higgs, the Running Department Superintendent, evidenced the economy 
drive Scotter had initiated, expressing his hope that the company would soon regain its title as 
‘the most economical working line in the kingdom,’ and stated this was achievable if ‘no stone 
was left unturned.’578 
 
Scotter improved the LSWRs cost position in two ways. Firstly, he instructed the department 
heads to find ways to reduce departmental expenditure, and presumably gave them beneficial 
knowledge of how other British railways were managed at the time. Additionally, he reformed 
along modern lines the Traffic Department’s obsolete and inefficient operations which, as 
Chapter 4 demonstrated, were injurious to the company’s financial performance before 1885. 
Describing Scotter’s reforms of the LSWR’s management therefore develops one of this thesis’ 
main arguments: because developments and improvements in its operating practices were so 
slow between 1870 and 1911, major advancements principally occurred when new senior 
managers joined the company from other railways. 
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Traffic Department 
 
Looking back in 1905, Sam Fay, by then the GCR’s General Manager, claimed that in the Traffic 
Department Scotter reformed many long-established administrative practices. 579 Unfortunately, 
the surviving records make it impossible to describe these reforms in full, as is the case with the 
reforms in most of the company’s departments. However, it is possible to gain some sense of 
what was involved. 
 
Scotter firstly created straightforward lines of command and accountability in the department, 
which likely improved the effectiveness and rapidity of decision-making within it. Firstly, he 
phased out the small district superintendencies that had been established in 1864580; leaving the 
company with three large administrative districts (see Chapter 2).581  He also rationalised the 
Goods Department structures. In 1878 this department had been split and a portion under Mills, 
the Assistant Goods Manager, was removed from Nine Elms to Waterloo to administer the 
company’s goods business in ‘the country’.582 When Haddow, Goods Manager, and Mills died in 
1887583 and 1888 respectively,584 all the department’s functions were placed under the new 
Goods Manager, Charles Owens. Concurrently, the Goods Manager’s status within the company 
was raised and the post was made directly answerable to Scotter, rather than to Verrinder, the 
Traffic Superintendent, as was previously the case.585 It is not wholly clear why this change was 
made. However, Haddow’s obituary in the South Western Gazette recorded that the post of 
‘Goods Manager’ had for some time been a none too desirable one’ because he had been unable 
to manage his affairs effectively.586  It is therefore plausible to suggest that by making the Goods 
Manager directly answerable to him, Scotter could consult Owens directly if problems arose in 
the Goods Department and manage them more effectively, rather than having to go through 
Verrinder.   
 
Scotter also transformed the way wage increases and promotions were administered. Before 
1885 Scott directly controlled these matters. Scotter placed all staffing under a ‘Chief of Traffic 
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Department Staff.’587 With dedicated oversight of staff matters efficiencies were achieved. The 
Traffic Department’s wage bill, which constituted approximately seventy-five percent of its 
expenditure, fell from 8.46d per train mile in 1885 to 8.00d in 1892 (8.07d)588; or by 5.44 percent 
(Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Cost of the Traffic Department and its wages per train mile 1885-1897; Source: RAIL 1110/283, 
LSWR Reports and Accounts, 1885-1897 
 
After 1885 Traffic Department employees were also seemingly encouraged to use stores more 
efficiently. In June that year the SWG, which Traffic Department staff produced, printed its first 
instructive editorial stating that all staff members should practice economic usage of ‘gas, stores, 
coal and stationery.’589 The stress on economy remained until the 1890s and efficient fuel, gas 
and supplies consumption was heavily mentioned throughout the company’s 1892 Appendix to 
the working timetable.590  
 
Such reforms significantly improved the Traffic Department’s efficiency. Between 1885 and 1892 
its expenditure per train mile fell from 11.44d to 10.03d (10.42d) (Figure 2); while its cost as a 
proportion of overall company revenue fell from 17.53 to 16.08 percent.591  
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Figure 3: Alterations to train services on numerous lines 
Source: Exeter and Plymouth Gazette, 28 June 1886 
Figure 2: Alterations to train services on numerous lines. 
Source: Western Times, Monday 28 September 1885 
 
 
Train operations  
 
 
Chapter 4 argued that during Scott’s 
General Managership a substantial 
portion of the LSWR’s excessively high 
expenditure was attributable to the 
inefficient working of its train services 
and congestion on the main lines outside 
of Waterloo Station. Consequently, after 
1885 Scotter, with Verrinder’s (Traffic 
Superintendent) support, reduced the 
company’s train mileage by reorganising 
timetables.592 This did not always mean 
services got worse. Bradley stated that 
train schedules were improved593 and 
adverts from regional newspapers show 
that trains were accelerated and added 
in this period, as well as discontinued 
(Figures 2 and 3). Consequently, in 
November 1885 Scotter reported to the 
Traffic Committee that in the previous 
month the company’s trains had run 
10,000 fewer miles per week than in 
September 1884. Indeed, factoring in the 
‘new’ Guildford line’s opening, they still 
ran 2,381 fewer miles overall.594  
Furthermore, in January 1886 Verrinder 
stated that the Salisbury and Yeovil line 
goods trains were running 1,666 fewer 
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miles monthly than in 1885,595 while other similar mileage reductions were made to services 
thereafter.596   These improvements to the company’s train services were aided by a major 
expansion of the company’s main running lines near Waterloo, as Section 2 discusses. 
 
Overall, despite train mileage continuing to increase after 1885 because of traffic growth, 
Scotter’s reorganisation of train services ensured they were operated more efficiently than 
before 1885. For example, Dutton reported in 1886 that improved train working had saved the 
company £7,299 in that half-year, or 0.54 percent of total company expenditure.597 Furthermore, 
in 1887 Higgs stated that operational efficiencies had reduced the company’s expenditure on oil 
by £6,000 in 1886.598   
 
Engineering Concerns 
 
 
The Engineering Department’s expenditure was also reduced after 1885; yet limited evidence 
means how this was achieved is unclear. Firstly, between 1884 and 1885 its expenditure on 
materials dropped from £103,417 to £77,934 (-24.64 percent). 599 Much of this cost reduction was 
because stores contacts were renegotiated. For instance, in August 1885 a new contract reduced 
the amount the company was spending per loads of logs600  (this was at the same time as many 
other contracts were being renegotiated for the company by the storekeeper.601) Additionally, 
between 1885 and 1892 departmental labour costs reduced from 2.65d per train mile to 2.51d 
(2.53d); suggesting its operational efficiency improved over this period.602 These and possibly 
other unknown reforms reduced the Engineering Department’s overall expenditure per train mile 
from 6.25d in 1885 to 5.90d (5.95d) in 1892 (-7.23 percent); while as a proportion of company 
revenue its costs dropped from 9.57 to 9.16 percent.  
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Figure 4: Engineering Department costs and wages per train mile 1885-1897; Source: TNA, RAIL 
1110/283, LSWR Reports and Accounts, 1885-1897 
 
Rolling Stock  
 
 
Scotter also enhanced the oversight of the Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Department’s 
functions to improve its efficiency. On his urging, in March 1885 an independent Locomotive 
Committee was established consisting of two members from both the Engineering and Traffic 
Committees (see Chapter 2).603 With input on locomotive and rolling stock matters coming from 
members of both committees, the activities of the Locomotive Department were possibly better 
coordinated with those of the Traffic and Engineering Departments.  
 
Furthermore, as Chapter 2 discussed, before 1885 Adams’s control of all the LSWR’s rolling stock 
matters had overburdened him.604 On Scotter’s recommendation the Locomotive, Carriage and 
Wagon Works were therefore split into two departments in January 1886.605  While the creation 
of two departments out of one might appear to have raised the possibility of weakening their 
management, this was not the case. Scotter could more efficiently coordinate the activities of 
both the Locomotive and Carriage and Wagon works, and he did not have to rely on one 
overburdened official for information as to their activities. Also, the works’ separation enabled 
the two departments’ activities to be better overseen by their heads. Consequently, after 1885 
the efficiency and output of both improved, as will now be discussed.  
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Locomotive Department 
 
 
Once freed from overseeing the Carriage and Wagon Works, Adams – whose philosophies of 
railway management seemingly aligned with Scotter’s – improved the Locomotive Department’s 
efficiency to a greater extent than he was able to between 1878 and 1884. Helped by the LSWR’s 
train services being more efficiently worked, after 1885 the department used fuel more 
economically.  
 
From 1885 the LSWR investigated scientific means of reducing fuel usage. On 19 March 1885 
Adams wrote to numerous locomotive superintendents asking about the tests their companies 
employed to ascertain the efficiency of the fuel they used. The superintendents of the GWR, 
Midland, LNWR and GNR (all apart from the GNR had chemical testing facilities)606 all reported 
that they conducted no such experiments. Only the Admiralty, who was written to subsequently, 
reported that it undertook such testing.607 These investigations’ results are unknown. 
Additionally, in mid-1887 Edward Frankland was re-employed and tasked with analysing the 
quality of water used in LSWR locomotives and how it affected their efficiency (see Chapter 4).608 
The enquiry’s result was that Adams recommended fitting ten of them with a Mr Maignen’s 
‘process’, which softened the water in their boilers609  and, presumably, reduced the rate at 
which boiler tubes wore out.610 From 1885 Adams also employed other means of reducing the 
LSWR’s fuel consumption. In September that year he trialled on some locomotives a new vortex 
blastpipe611 designed by his nephew.612  This was eventually fitted to most locomotives. It 
reduced their fuel usage by an average 4.5lb of coal per engine mile, and between 1886 and 1888 
saved the company £34,000, or approximately 2.67 percent of locomotive department costs in 
this period.613  Around this time other economical technologies were also investigated. As far as 
can be determined feed water heaters were only considered by Adams and never 
implemented.614 In June 1885 he also experimented with metallic packing on locomotive 
boilers615 and in late 1886 compounding on a principle designed by William Worsdell of the LNWR 
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was applied to one locomotive.616 Furthermore, drivers and firemen were also incentivised to 
maximise fuel economy. Beattie had ceased footplate crew’s premiums for efficient driving in 
1877;617 Adams reinstated these in 1887.618    
 
Consequently, after 1885 these policies and innovations, combined with more efficient train 
operations, reduced the Locomotive Department’s fuel usage. The average annual amount of 
coal LSWR locomotives burned per engine mile the usage dropped from 31.2lbs to 26.90lbs over 
the same period.619 Indeed, in February 1888 Dutton announced that despite the company’s train 
mileage increasing it was still consuming 3,300 fewer tons of fuel per annum than in 1884.620 It 
was only when Adams introduced heavier locomotives after 1888, to accommodate heavier train 
loads and quicker schedules that fuel usage increased again.621 Although, after 1891 the fuel 
locomotives burned per engine mile stabilised at around 29.lbs.622 
 
With the Nine Elms locomotive works’ receiving dedicated oversight from Adams, its efficiency 
was improved. His rebuilding, expansion and reorganisation of the works allowed the LSWR to 
restart locomotive construction in 1887, reducing expenditure by £5,700 annually.623 
Additionally, before 1891 locomotives underwent considerable repairs at Northam and Exeter 
sheds. Yet, between then and 1894 general repairs were consolidated at Nine Elms, which 
presumably allowed the department to find economies of scale.624 These and other possible 
reforms contributed to reducing works expenditure from 2.89d to 2.11 (2.13d) per train mile (-
26.99 percent) between 1885 and 1892. However, it is not easy to determine how changes in 
material prices, which directors’ comments suggest fluctuated in the period,625 affected works 
spending over this period. Nevertheless, labour costs will be taken as an approximate measure of 
overall works efficiency, as these were largely determined by the company setting employees’ 
wages, compared with material costs which were more closely tied to external market 
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fluctuations. Between 1885 and 1892 the Locomotive works’ labour costs per train mile fell from 
1.65d to 1.19d (1.20d),  or by 27.88 percent,626 suggesting that a large portion of the works’ 
overall decrease in expenditure came from more economic working practices. Indeed, it is known 
that between January 1887 and July 1888 decreases in piecework prices in the works saved the 
company an average of £2,400 per annum.627 
 
 
Figure 5: Cost of the Locomotive Department per train mile 1885-1897; Source: RAIL 1110/283, LSWR 
Reports and Accounts, 1885-1897 
 
Combined with the company’s train services being managed more efficiently, these 
developments collectively improved the Locomotive Department’s cost position after 1885. 
Between then and 1888 the department’s expenditure per train mile dropped from 9.86d to 
8.16d (8.42d) (-14.69 percent), largely because of a fall in fuel prices (which constituted the 
department’s largest single outgoing). However, as Figure 5 shows, enhancements in the 
department’s management, both in the works and in locomotives’ fuel usage, allowed it to 
absorb rising fuel costs between 1888 and 1891, and maintain much lower expenditure 
thereafter.628 Overall, this evidence suggests that the removal of Carriage and Wagon affairs from 
Adams’ remit meant he had more time to commit to reforming and supervising the Locomotive 
Department’s business, which contributed to improving its efficiency.  
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Carriage and Wagon Concerns 
 
 
After receiving its own dedicated head in 1886 (Panter), the Carriage and Wagon Department 
was managed more efficiently and responded better than previously to changes in the LSWR’s 
trading environment. Before 1885 Scott had favoured stretching the company’s rolling stock to 
the limit before repairs and renewals were undertaken. In the mid-1880s many carriages the 
company had built in the 1860s were still in service and Adams frequently complained that they 
were hard to maintain and their complicated construction raised maintenance costs (see Chapter 
4).629  
 
Conversely, Scotter and Panter favoured modernising and augmenting company’s rolling stock to 
reduce maintenance costs. With Scotter’s support, Panter quickly replaced most obsolete 
carriages with modern types630 and Acworth stated in 1888 that while the company’s carriage 
stock was not wholly modern, it had ‘vastly improved’ in three years.631 Indeed, many of the new 
carriages for long-distance services were new modern ‘bogie’ types, which had larger capacities 
and better ride comfort than existing fixed wheel carriages.632 Furthermore, the company’s 
carriage stock was grown at a quicker pace than before 1885 to better accommodate traffic 
increases. Between 1878 and 1884 only 332 carriages were added to the LSWR’s rolling stock; 
between 1885 and 1892 the figure was 560. 633 Consequently, between 1884 and 1889 the 
number of passengers each carriage conveyed yearly fell from 19,384 to 18,528 (-4.42 
percent).634  
 
This modernisation and enlargement of the LSWR’s carriage stock contributed to reducing 
maintenance costs. Between 1885 and 1889 the Carriage Department’s expenditure on repairs 
and renewals declined from an average of £30.22 per vehicle to £26.16 (£26.84).635  However, 
because of a lack of data it is again unclear how department costs were affected by changing 
material prices.  
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After 1891 an undeterminable portion of the Carriage and Wagon Department’s efficiencies 
possibly came from its new works opening. As Chapter 4 discussed, the removal of the Carriage 
and Wagon works into ‘the country’ had been resisted by Adams and Scott in 1882.636 Yet, 
Scotter rapidly became aware that such a transfer was necessary given the Goods Department 
required extra space at Nine Elms to cope efficiently with increasing traffic.637 In the late-1880s, 
Scotter, with Panter’s support, initiated the construction of a new works at Eastleigh. The LSWR 
purchased sixty acres of land there in December 1886 638 and the works was constructed 
between 1889 and 1891.639 The project’s capital cost was £212,961, or 5.20 percent of the 
company’s total capital expenditure between 1889 and 1893.640   
 
The degree to which the new works improved departmental efficiency is unclear. Labour costs 
will again be taken as an approximate measure of the works’ efficiency. Between 1885 and 1889 
the Carriage and Wagon Department’s labour costs per train increased from 1.20d to 1.31d 
(1.35d), and from then until 1891, when the works were under construction, there was no 
change. However, thereafter they fell to 1.22d (1.24d) in 1893. 641 This reduction, therefore, 
tentatively suggests the new Carriage and Wagon works improved the department’s efficiency 
after 1891. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has shown how under Scotter’s strategic direction many aspects of the LSWR’s 
operating practices were reformed and enhanced after 1885, which improved considerably the 
company’s cost position. Indeed, between 1885 and 1892 the company’s total expenditure per 
train mile reduced from 39.04d to 35.89d (36.19d), as Figure 6 shows (-8.07 percent). This 
reduction was an important contributory factor in transforming the LSWR from being one of the 
worst performing major British railway companies in 1884, into being one of the best by 1892 
(see Chapter 1). However, it also demonstrates clearly, how under Scott and the board’s 
leadership before 1884, many of the company’s operating practices had exhibited inefficiency 
and waste. 
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Figure 6: The expenditure of the LSWR and its four main departments per train mile 1885-1897. Source: 
Source: RAIL 1110/283, LSWR Reports and Accounts, 1885-1897 
 
 
5.4. Improving the service 
 
Scotter did not simply reduce the company’s costs and his second strategy for increasing the 
LSWR’s profitability between 1885 and 1892 was to grow the company’s business by improving 
and expanding services to attract traffic. This was certainly a key to the LSWR’s marketing. Thus, 
on his retirement in 1897 Railway Magazine commented that Scotter had wished to give ‘the 
best possible facilities to the travelling public.’642   
 
Fundamental to improving the company’s service provision was Scotter’s engagement with the 
transport needs of the public and businesses within the company’s territory; something Scott had 
never done. For example, the Gazette stated in 1892 that Scotter had ‘[eschewed] a policy of 
isolation’ and ‘set about making himself personally familiar with the various chambers of 
commerce, corporations and the potential residents of towns served by the company.’ Overall, 
he ‘made troops of friends, and thus popularized the system he officially controls.’643 In 1893 the 
Hampshire Guardian reported on this changed relationship by stating that ‘a much better 
understanding has arisen between the company and the inhabitants of Southampton than 
existed a few years ago, and kindlier feelings have been entertained by both parties towards each 
other.’644  
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Firstly, Scotter improved passenger services to towns the company had a monopoly on, whereas 
before 1884, either through Scott’s poor train management or wilful disregard, services to such 
towns were considered universally poor. Indeed, in 1883 Southampton and Bournemouth were 
not served by a single express train to or from London.645 Principally, Scotter responded to 
passenger’s requests for improved services. For instance, in 1888 the Alverstoke Local Board 
requested that through carriages be run between ‘Gosport, Stokes Bay and London’, which 
Scotter subsequently arranged. They also requested that the 7.25pm train from London convey 
through passengers to Gosport, which he placed ‘under consideration.’646 The Southampton 
Chamber of Commerce had asked for years for a train from Southampton to Waterloo that 
arrived around 10am so that individuals could be in London to ‘do business’ at a reasonable hour. 
In March 1889 Scotter arranged for a train to leave ‘Southampton West Station daily at 8.46 am, 
reaching Waterloo at 10.30am.’647 Such minor changes could reap considerable benefits for the 
company’s finances. In 1895 Southampton’s Mayor held a banquet in Scotter’s honour and stated 
that Southampton had ‘great reason to thank Sir C. Scotter for the quick and frequent train 
services the town now had, and from which it had ‘reaped the advantage.648 Also Simmons 
argued the LSWR came to take particular pride in Bournemouth, a seaside tourist destination, 
which the company considered ‘almost as its own creation.’649 
  
1878 1893 
A B A B 
Barnstable 
GWR 5.50 5 5.29 - 
LSWR 6.25 5 5.10 1 
Devonport 
GWR 6.32 4 5.45 2 
LSWR 7.02 5 5.17 4 
Exeter 
GWR 4.15 9 4.05 9 
LSWR 4.15 8 3.46 6 
Ilfracombe 
GWR - - 6.33 - 
LSWR 7.14 3 5.56 - 
Plymouth 
GWR 6.15 7 5.38 5 
LSWR 6.55 6 5.23 3 
Tavistock 
GWR 9.11 - 6.20 1 
LSWR 6.09 7 4.24 4 
Table 1: LSWR competitive express services to the West Country in 1878 and 1893, A) time of the fastest 
train B) Total number express trains daily. An express train is defined as any train running at 30 mph plus 
stops in 1878 and at 40 mph in 1893. Source: Simmons, ‘South Western v. Great Western,’ p.34 
 
Scotter also increased the speed of passenger services that were in competition with the GWR to 
the West Country. Table 1 shows that from a situation in 1878 where the LSWR had slower 
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services to all the competitive destinations it served, except Exeter, by 1893 the services were 
faster in all cases. Simmons called this competition a ‘Race for the West.’650 How this ‘race’ 
impacted on LSWR profitability is unclear, but it can be suggested it was marginal. Aldcroft and 
Cain argued that such service competition was seriously damaging to British railway companies’ 
profitability after 1880;651 yet such arguments are usually made without considering the context 
of companies’ individual business histories. Firstly, as Simmons argued, the evidence above 
suggests Scotter was far more concerned with growing the company’s non-competitive traffic, 
which was considerably larger than that which was non-competitive.652 Furthermore, this thesis 
demonstrates throughout that a multitude of other factors influenced the LSWR’s financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911. Indeed, given Scotter was improving the company’s 
competitive services at the same time as he was successfully transforming the railway into one of 
the best performing in the industry, this suggests that competition possibly had, at most, a 
marginal diminishing effect on its profitability. Chapter 6 presents further evidence that supports 
this argument for the period after 1900.  
 
Scotter also recognised that despite raising the standard of the LSWR’s goods and passenger 
facilities costing the company more in the short-term, such policies actually attracted custom to 
the railway and improved its long-term financial health. He was therefore instrumental in 
improving the accommodation at the LSWR’s stations.653 Chapter 4 discussed how during Scott’s 
General Managership facilities for customers were kept in a poor state of repair. However, after 
Scotter’s appointment the company began investing in stations and yards on Scotter’s advice. In 
the 1885 December half-year the company spent nothing on station ‘improvements, sidings, 
receiving offices and goods depots.’ The amount expended rose to £3,248 in 1886; £17,802 in 
1887 and £35,010 in 1888. It dropped in 1889 to £16,037, but reached £41,880 in 1890.654 Also 
not listed in the company’s financial reports were the many smaller improvements made around 
the network. For example, between November 1885 and July 1886 £374 was spent on a new 
footbridge at Axminster Station655; from August 1885 to June 1886 a new platform and station 
canopy was added at Bracknell costing £339,656 and between June 1886 and September 1887 
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£856 was spent on a new weighbridge at Wimborne.657 Overall, the result was that Charles 
Owens, at that point the company’s Goods Manager, could state that between 1885 and 1890 
the LSWR had undertaken works which were ‘commercially useful.’658 Indeed, Scotter’s obituary 
stated that he had improved ‘the quality of…[station] accommodation generally’659 and Railway 
Magazine in 1897 cited that a large number were rebuilt.660  
 
The effect of Scotter’s strategy of improving the LSWR’s goods and passenger services and 
facilities was that revenue was generated to offset the continued decrease in the company’s 
revenue per passenger, which fell from 11.92d in 1885 to 10.95d (11.04d) in 1892 (-11.90 
percent). After almost continuous deterioration since 1874, the LSWR’s passenger revenue per 
passenger train mile marginally increased between 1885 and 1892, from £50.04d to 50.39d 
(£49.97) (0.68 percent).661 A similar pattern was repeated regarding the company’s goods 
revenue. Per goods train mile this had fallen consistently since 1873; but this too largely 
stabilised between 1885 and 1892, only dropping a little from £67.87 to £67.59 (£67.03) (-0.42 
percent).  
 
Scotter’s improvement of the LSWR’s services, rolling stock and infrastructure supports Cain,662 
Aldcroft663 and Arnold and McCartney’s664 arguments that railway companies acquiesced to 
trader’s and passenger’s demands after 1870. Yet, while all these academics argued that such 
policies, which were attempts to ward off additional infringement on their commercial freedom 
from government, depressed companies’ profitability in the period, it can be concluded that in 
the LSWR’s case after 1885 such a policy actually improved its finances. However, the LSWR’s 
case may not be typical in the British railway industry. All these academics have simply argued 
that the industry as a whole started acting complying with demands for better services and 
facilities. Yet, none made the distinction between the policies of railways that principally carried 
freight, and those that were mainly passenger hauliers. Perhaps, as the LSWR’s example may 
suggest, passenger-carrying railways had more scope to benefit financially from tailoring their 
services to their customer’s needs; especially as additional passenger services were not as labour-
intensive as goods services, and therefore may have been cheaper to operate. Although, without 
comparable case studies, and more evidence, this remains conjecture.  
                                                          
657
 TNA, RAIL 411/613, Capital expenditure authorised, 01 January 1885 - 31 December 1889, p.22 
658
 South Western Gazette, March 1890, p.13 
659
 The Times, Wednesday, Dec 14, 1910; pg. 13 
660
 Railway Magazine, ‘Illustrated Interviews, No.5: Sir Charles Scotter,’ November 1897, p.388 
661
 Board of Trade, Railway Returns,  
662
 Cain, ‘Railways 1870-1914’ pp.120 
663
 Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition, p.14-18 
664
 Arnold, and McCartney, ‘Rates of return’, p.57 
213 
 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
Scotter’s effective reforms of the LSWR’s management practices after 1885 give weight to this 
thesis’ chief arguments. Firstly, given that within the company there was so little original 
advancement in its operating techniques between 1870 and 1911, such changes principally 
occurred when senior managers joined the company from other railways. Indeed, having come 
from MSLR, where he had acquired considerable experience of management in the wider British 
railway industry, Scotter swept away and reformed many of the obsolete management practices 
his predecessor had instituted, but which had persisted for decades.  
 
Furthermore, Scotter’s successful management of the LSWR demonstrated the extent to which 
the company’s financial performance was dependent upon the creation of a post broadly 
equivalent to a modern chief executive. Scotter both had a major hand in the creation of this 
position, and then in fulfilling its responsibilities. As stated throughout this thesis, within such a 
functional management structure, control of investment and operational policy was highly 
centralised. Consequently, between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR’s financial performance – and 
indeed its business results more generally – was highly dependent on the capacity of those above 
the department heads in the hierarchy to coordinate and oversee their affairs effectively, get 
them working together and provide them with leadership 
 
Chapter 4 already showed that between 1870 and 1885 the board and then Scott’s inability to 
coordinate the departments’ actions adversely affected the company’s management quality; 
leading to poor financial results. Scotter, however, gained authority over the company’s senior 
managers, and was, therefore, able to modernise and reform the company’s management 
practices, improving its financial performance.  
 
5.5. Management stagnation 1892-1900 
 
Scotter’s improvements of the LSWR’s managerial and operation performance evidences that he 
was undoubtedly one of Britain’s most able railway General Managers after 1870. Yet, he did not 
enact the sort of innovative reforms of the LSWR’s practices that Fay attempted after 1900 (see 
214 
 
Chapter 6) or that Gibb initiated within the NER from 1891 (see Chapter 1).665 Indeed, the LSWR’s 
management practices before 1900 were not greatly more advanced or sophisticated than those 
found in the majority of railway companies, and Scotter did not think outside the paradigms of 
railway management that were established within the industry by the 1880s. Consequently, once 
the company’s management had been reformed along contemporary lines, and once its 
profitability had been vastly improved, the zeal Scotter had to advance and enhance its 
management practices dissipated. Yet, there was clearly considerable scope for further 
improvements, and after 1900, in response to a fall in the LSWR’s profitability, senior managers 
were able to eliminate further operational inefficiencies (see Chapter 6). 
 
The diminishing pace of operational reform within the LSWR after 1892 again demonstrates the 
important influences on the company’s management quality between 1870 and 1911. By vastly 
improving the company’s finances, and consequently its dividend and share price (which was the 
highest of any major British railway), Scotter was under no pressure from the board to take 
further action. Indeed, demonstrating that he had won the board’s trust, by the 1890s, as the 
next section shows, he had almost decisive influence over the company’s capital investment 
strategies.  Furthermore, as most senior traffic managers in the 1890s had been trained during 
Scott’s general managership and were, presumably, familiar with his methods of railway 
management, and given almost none of them had worked outside the company, it is unlikely they 
would have possessed the knowledge or experience to critically appraise or suggest 
improvements to the operating practices Scotter introduced. But even if they possessed such 
knowledge, the Traffic Department’s promotional ladders promoted deference to authority, 
meaning it is unlikely they would have questioned his decisions anyway. Overall, as recent studies 
have argued of the British railway industry generally before 1900, even in the best performing 
railways there was considerable scope for cost reductions and efficiency gains to be 
disregarded.666    
 
Ultimately, Scotter’s case again supports the argument made throughout this thesis: where LSWR 
senior managers occupied positions of unassailable authority for long-periods with considerable 
scope to run their affairs as they so wished, their outlooks on railway management could 
potentially stagnate or become narrow. This possibly led to inefficiencies developing or persisting 
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within the company, because the value of existing operating practices were infrequently re-
evaluated. 
 
Section 2 - Major infrastructure improvements 
 
5.6. Introducing investment 
 
Before 1885 the directors dominated the LSWR’s capital investment policies. Yet Scotter acquired 
decisive influence over them thereafter. It is plausible to suggest that he gained this high level of 
control over the company’s strategic course because he had improved its financial performance 
and, given the directors had only learnt railway management from inside the company (see 
Chapter 3), they increasingly trusted his informed judgement. Using his control, Scotter gave the 
LSWR’s investment strategies a higher degree of cogency than before, with capital projects 
largely serving his objectives of improving the company’s efficiency and growing its business. 
Because of this they were largely successful. Only a small number of capital investment decisions 
were still taken in an ad hoc manner based on circumstances the company was facing; however 
only two of these are considered to have been disappointing. 
  
 
This chapter analyses six of the LSWR’s major investment decisions between 1885 and 1897 
(Table 2). These were chosen because they significantly impacted on its financial performance 
during and after Scotter’s general managership, or because they highlight important aspects of 
the company’s decision-making processes.  
 
5.7. Widening the Main Lines 
 
Between 1885 and 1897 the LSWR’s traffic continued to rise and its train mileage rose 
significantly from 11,369,244 miles to 16,367,906 (46.97 percent). This put considerable further 
pressure on the company’s infrastructure through increasing congestion of the main lines, 
Event Year Cost 
Main Line Widening Dec 1885-1897 £1,611,250 
Southampton Docks purchase 1892 £1,177,086 
New Plant, Graving Docks and Various Improvements 1892-1897 £1,226,705 
Total Expenditure on Southampton Docks 1892-1897 £2,403,791 
Meon Valley Railway construction 1897-1903 £619,021 
Basingstoke and Alton Light Railway construction 1897-1901 £106,923 
Waterloo and City Line 1892-1899 c.£500.000 
Table 2: The LSWR’s major capital investment decisions that will be studied in this chapter 
216 
 
particularly near London. It responded by initiating the widening of its main running lines near 
London to ease congestion. This was the company’s most expensive on-going investment after 
1885, costing £1,611,250 between 1885 and 1897, or 12.39 percent of its total capital 
expenditure in the period (Figure 7). 
 
While Scott had initiated some widening of the LSWR’s main lines after 1878 (see chapter 4), 
when Scotter became General Manager he started new such works and quickened existing ones 
as part of his general drive to improve the efficiency and quality of the company’s train 
services.667 Indeed, this was the first instance where Scotter’s strong influence over the 
company’s investment policies can be demonstrated. In February 1892 Portal, the LSWR’s 
deputy-chairman, stated that widening works between Waterloo and Clapham Junction had 
taken six years, placing their initiation in 1886 when Scotter was making his initial impact on 
policy.668 Furthermore, Appendix 5.1 shows that between 1880 and 1884 the length of the 
company’s network that had more than two lines of rails rose from seven to fifteen miles, an 
average increase of 1.6 miles per year. Yet, by 1890 thirty-two miles of the LSWR’s network had 
more than two tracks, meaning that the average expansion rate had risen to 2.38 miles per year. 
Particularly of note were the years between 1886 and 1888 when the length of the LSWR’s 
network with more than two tracks jumped from eighteen to thirty-one miles.669   
 
The effect these investments had on the LSWR’s operational efficiency and financial performance 
is unclear given the limited evidence. They did ease congestion on the main lines near London, as 
Dutton stated in August 1889,670 and so it can be suggested that they contributed to reducing the 
company’s operating expenditure, discussed in Section 1, as trains were able to be managed 
more efficiently and their idling times were reduced.  
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Figure 7: Capital spent on widening LSWR lines from December half-year 1885-1902, Source: TNA, RAIL 
1110/283 and RAIL 1110/284, London and South Western Railway Reports and Accounts 1880-1922 
 
Limited ideas 
 
It is noticeable that despite their differing abilities as operational managers, both Scott and 
Scotter responded network congestion in the same way; by adding extra tracks to the main line.  
Given the congestion of the LSWR’s network between 1870 and 1897, undoubtedly its main lines 
need additional capacity. Nevertheless, no evidence suggests that LSWR decision-makers 
considered solving this problem by using alternative or innovative means that may have been 
cheaper; like, for example, through improved signalling systems, like Fay introduced with limited 
success to the LSWR after 1900 (see Chapter 6).671   
 
Fundamentally, between 1870 and 1900 LSWR decision-makers never developed significantly 
new responses to operational challenges because they were under no pressure from any source 
to do so. They still believed that traffic and revenue growth was guaranteed. This belief was 
discussed extensively in Chapter 4; however clearly Scotter shared it. In March 1895 he stated to 
an audience of dignitaries in Southampton his desire to play a role in the company’s future 
success in a manner that suggested that he believed increased traffic and revenue was 
guaranteed.672 Because decision-makers had this belief, when faced with increased network 
congestion they were under little pressure to alter or reassess the established costly solutions to 
it, and likely considered that in the long-term all such investment would be worthwhile.  
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Furthermore, after 1885 decision-makers were not under any pressure from the capital markets 
to curtail investment in costly projects. With improving profitability the LSWR’s share price rose 
from 122 to 224 pence between 1884 and 1897 (83.61 percent) and investors found the company 
an increasingly attractive investment opportunity.673 The LSWR attracted finance easily during 
Scotter’s General Managership; its authorised capital rose from £31,814,063 in 1884 to 
£41,906,931 in 1897 (31.71 percent).674 Thus, expensive projects, such as the widening main 
lines, could proceed without fears that capital supplies would diminish. This fear was possibly 
lessened by Robert Williams joining the LSWR’s board in 1892. He was on the Williams Deacon 
and Manchester and Salford Bank’s board, which owned the Williams Deacon Bank who held the 
LSWR’s money (see Chapter 3). Through this interlocking directorship the LSWR possibly accessed 
finance on favourable terms;675 Williams possibly helped facilitate its loan capital growing from 
£10,843,821 in 1893 to £13,078,471 in 1894 (20.61 per cent), its highest year-on-year increase 
between 1870 and 1911. 
 
Lastly, before 1900 the company’s directors and senior managers possibly had little capacity to 
voluntarily generate new or innovative ideas when challenged by network congestion. After 1885 
the LSWR directors’ external business interests probably gave them little experience of industrial 
management that might have enabled them to think creatively about how to better manage the 
traffic. Additionally, because of the Traffic Department’s rigidly hierarchical management 
structure, almost all traffic managers had little experience of railway management outside the 
LSWR and were likely inclined to see widening of its main lines as the only solution to relieving 
traffic congestion. But even if they had developed different ideas on policy from those at senior 
management level, the Traffic Department’s promotional trees promoted deference to authority, 
meaning it would have been unlikely they would have criticised decisions made by their 
superiors, while innovative individuals, such as Fay, were hindered by the small number 
management posts from reaching positions where they could influence decision-making (see 
Chapter 3). 
  
In sum, the LSWR’s widening of is main lines before 1900 again demonstrates that the company’s 
decision-makers were under little pressure to revaluate their existing concepts of railway 
management and operation. They had considerable freedom to neglect potential efficiency gains 
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or productivity improvements, and fell back on established, but possibly not the most efficient 
solutions to recurring challenges.  
  
5.8. Southampton Docks 
 
The LSWR’s purchase of Southampton Dock Company (SDC) in 1892 was the clearest example of 
Scotter’s dominant influence over the company’s investment policies after 1885. The 
Southampton docks provided the LSWR with a large portion of its business and in 1885 9.88 
percent of all goods the company hauled passed through them. 676  Yet, in the 1880s shipping 
lines moved elsewhere because the SDC was progressively unable to accommodate the larger 
ships that were being built. In 1882 the Union Steam Ship Company stopped sailing to 
Southampton and Scott negotiated to prevent the Peninsular and Oriental company (P&O) 
leaving. The SWG  reported in 1882 that 'traffic...is rapidly and surely declining...' and '...shipping 
companies were availing...themselves of the dock accommodation which London alone can 
supply...'677 Thus, with trade diminishing, the SDC’s dividend payments fell from £2.00 per 
ordinary share in 1881 to nothing in 1885. Consequently, the SDC could not raise the capital to 
build modern dock accommodation and attract new shipping, and in 1892 the SDC Chairman, 
Steuart McNaughten, stated that the company’s authorised capital was £2,037,547, yet that 
£386,298 had not materialised.678 Thus, by the mid-1880s the LSWR’s largest single source of 
goods traffic was failing.  
 
Numerous efforts were made in the 1880s to reinvigorate the SDC’s business. In 1885 the 
Corporation of Southampton attempted to pass a bill whereby it would lend the SDC £220,000 to 
construct a deep water dock.'679 This failed and the LSWR was approached. The railway agreed to 
raise stock of £250,000 which would be subscribed to the SDC and then spent on a new deep 
water dock. Additionally, LSWR directors would occupy four seats on the SDC’s board and the 
LSWR engineer would have final say on all works.680  The bill passed and construction of the 
Empress Dock began in May 1886.681 Yet, when it opened in 1890682 £200,000 to £300,000 was 
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still required to make it fully functional,683 which, unsurprisingly, the SDC did not have. The 
capital from the 1886 agreement had been expended, as well as £50,000 of an advance upon the 
SDC's debenture bonds that the LSWR agreed to in 1889.684 Furthermore, in 1891 only £34,265 
out of £84,000 of a new second preference share issue by the SDC had been subscribed to.685 The 
SDC was facing ruin and consequently a proprietors’ meeting in February 1891 voted that 
negotiations be opened with the LSWR for purchase.686 The LSWR agreed to this687 and the take-
over bill received Royal assent in July 1892, with control being transferred in October.688 The 
purchase of the docks cost the LSWR £1,177,086, or 3.53 percent of its total capital expenditure 
between 1870 and 1911. 
 
It was Scotter who pushed for the purchase of the SDC, as he recognised that this was the only 
way the railway could prevent its traffic diminishing.689 Indeed, because steamship companies 
had moved from Southampton, the proportion of the LSWR’s goods tonnage generated by the 
docks had already fallen from 16.92 percent in 1881 to 9.88 percent in 1886.690 Thus, Scotter 
stated in May 1892 that unless the LSWR acquired and then augmented the docks he expected 
‘the trade of the town and of the port will diminish.'691 Dutton, the company chairman, expressed 
similar sentiments in a letter to the SDC’s board in 1891;692 while his successor from 1892, Portal, 
intimated the same.693 Beyond the company other interested parties also felt the LSWR needed 
to purchase the SDC to safeguard its trade. In 1892 the Hampshire Observer stated that there was 
‘consensus of opinion amongst businessmen’ that the acquisition of the SDC by the railway was 
the only way it could be returned to profit and attract custom.694  
 
The LSWR’s purchase of SDC was, therefore, forced on its decision-makers because of their need 
to safeguard the railway’s trade. Indeed, their public and private statements betray that if it were 
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not for the SDC’s imminent failure, they would have not taken the decision they did. In 1891 
Dutton wrote to the SDC board stating that 'it should be distinctly understood that the Railway 
Company are not to be regarded as in any sense seeking to acquire the docks.'695  Furthermore, 
Scotter was asked at the parliamentary enquiry if such docks should be handed over to a railway 
companies ‘rather than be kept in the public interest?’ He responded that ‘the railway company 
do not want it.’696 Furthermore, the LSWR’s heavily support for the SDC before 1892 also shows 
that the railway only purchased the docks when no other option was available to save it. 
Therefore, while acquiring the docks extended the LSWR’s empire, its acquisition was not a case 
of corporate empire-building, but, to a large extent, self-preservation.  
 
The LSWR’s development of the Southampton docks will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6. 
However, in line with Scotter’s goal of ‘expanding the concern’,697 between 1892 and 1897 the 
company expended £1,226,705 on augmenting the dock’s facilities. This investment steadily grew 
the number of shipping lines sailing from Southampton from 1892; for example the Inman line 
abandoned Liverpool for Southampton in 1893.698  Accordingly, the trade of the docks increased 
significantly between 1892 and 1897. The tonnage of goods passing through them rose over this 
period by 80.40 percent, with the coal traffic increasing by 116.88 percent. The number of 
passengers that passed through the docks also grew from 122,000 in 1892 to 214,400 in 1896, or 
by 75.74 percent. 699 This upsurge in trade positively impacted on the LSWR’s finances. Between 
1892 and 1897 the net revenue the company received from all maritime activities increased from 
£200,410 to £407,826, or by 103.05 percent; while the proportion of overall company revenue 
docks income constituted rose from 6.28 percent to 10.07 percent over the same period.700  
  
The LSWR’s decision to purchase and expand of the Southampton docks helped improve its 
profitability after 1892; these were the company’s most remunerative capital investments 
between 1870 and 1911. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, even when growth in the company’s rail-
borne traffic slowed in the 1900s, the docks’ trade continued to increase rapidly, off-setting a 
decline in its average revenue per ton of merchandise hauled. 
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Table 3: The traffic and trade of the Southampton Docks, 1892-1897, Source: London Standard, Thursday, 
13 October 1898; TNA, RAIL 1110/283 and RAIL 1110/284, London and South Western Reports and 
Accounts, 1880-1922; Railway Magazine, April 1909, p.402-406. *Inflation adjusted figures from 1892 
+Portal stated in 1897 that the railway carried away ninety-five percent of all docks traffic. Therefore, 
the figures in brackets are an estimate of the full tonnage that passed through the docks 
 
The acquisition and expansion of the Southampton Docks again demonstrates that between 1870 
and 1911 the introduction into LSWR of new ideas on policy and strategy was largely dependent 
on the appointment of individuals to senior management positions who had worked outside the 
company; this is one of this thesis’ main arguments. In the early 1890s few individuals within the 
LSWR had the necessary experience of managing docks to understand their potential value to a 
railway’s finances. The board’s many long-standing directors had few external business 
experiences that could have informed their thinking on dock ownership and management. 
Indeed, despite four directors receiving positions on the SDC’s board, none sat on other dock 
companies’ boards, and, consequently, their experience of docks management was likely shaped 
by overseeing a dock company they knew was failing. Thus, in these positions they presumably 
1892 
LSWR hauled 
In/Out of the 
Docks 
Total LSWR 
Hauled 
Docks 
Proportion 
All LSWR 
Revenue 
Approx. Docks  
Traffic 
Revenue  
Cargo tonnage 
inwards/outwards 
400,530 
(421,611)+ 
1,778,944 22.52% £739,699 
£166,580 
(£167,980)* 
Sea and rail-borne 
coal tonnage  
170,544 
(179,520)+ 
2,736,806 
(Minerals)+ 
6.23% 
£284,394 
(Minerals) 
£17,722 
(£17,871)* 
Other Marine Income 
LSWR Steamship Income 
£159,433 
(£160,773)* 
Net Docks Income (October-December) 
£6,113 
(£6,164)* 
Total 
£303,724 
(£306,276)* 
            
1897 
LSWR hauled 
In/Out of the 
Docks 
Total LSWR 
Hauled 
Docks 
Proportion 
All LSWR 
Revenue 
Approx. Docks  
Traffic 
Revenue 
Cargo tonnage 
inwards/outwards 
 718,552 
(756,370)+ 
2,274,047 31.60% £839,091 
£265,135 
(£279,089)* 
Sea and rail-borne 
coal tonnage 
369,871 
(389,338)+ 
3,135,521 
(Minerals)+ 
11.80% 
£329,357 
(Minerals) 
£38,851 
(£40,896)* 
Other Marine Income 
LSWR Steamship Income 
£179,926 
(£189,396)* 
Docks Income 
 £63,620 
(£66,968)* 
Total  
 £547,532 
(£576,349)* 
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had little scope to learn what constituted ‘good’ docks management.701 It is unlikely the introvert 
careers of the LSWR’s traffic management class would have given them knowledge of how docks 
were operated (see Chapter 3).  
 
Contrastingly, Scotter’s experience of docks administration was considerable. He had been the 
MSLR’s continental agent from 1866 to 1872 and Goods Manager from 1873 to 1885,702 and 
therefore had worked extensively with that company’s Grimsby Docks at a time when they were 
expanding rapidly.703 He therefore understood the value and importance of the LSWR acquiring 
and developing the SDC, and pushed these polices to great effect. Indeed, it is also plausible to 
suggest that if he had not been appointed LSWR General Manager in 1885, the company’s 
interactions with the SDC would have taken a far less successful course.  
 
5.9. Line building 
 
In late-1890s Scotter was instrumental in the building of three lines that influenced the LSWR’s 
financial performance. The LSWR had wanted to connect to the City (of London) since Waterloo 
Station had opened in 1848.704 Thus, when a deep-level tube line that ran between these places 
was promoted, Scotter took the opportunity to augment the LSWR’s business further, and 
recommended to the board in October 1891 that the company support the line.705 While 
remaining independent, the Waterloo and City Railway (WCR) received £500,000 and four LSWR 
directors on its board. After opening in 1898, the LSWR worked the line for fifty-five percent of 
the revenue; and if the WCR’s profits were insufficient for it to pay a three percent dividend on 
the ordinary stock the LSWR would make up the difference.706 
 
The available evidence suggests the WCR’s initial impact on the LSWR’s finances was beneficial. 
The WCR’s trade was large, with passenger numbers growing from 3,485,556 to 4,546,535 
between 1899 and 1902. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of these customers would have used the 
LSWR either before or after they had travelled on the WCR, and many would have taken up the 
‘through’ season tickets the former company offered.707 Indicative of WCR’s healthy trade, after 
1901 its profits were high enough to pay the guaranteed dividends itself. Furthermore, in each 
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Figure 8: The Meon Valley Line between Alton and 
Fareham. Source: Author's collection 
year between 1899 and 1906 the LSWR made a net profit from the line of around £19,000.708 
Tentatively, it can therefore be suggested that this attempt by Scotter to ‘expand the concern’ 
was successful. 
 
Conversely, the construction of the 
Basingstoke and Alton Light Railway (BALR) 
and Meon Valley Line (MVL) was not 
initiated by Scotter for the purposes of 
growing the LSWR’s business. Like many of 
the company’s line building projects before 
1884 (see Chapter 4) they were built to 
protect the company’s regional hegemony. 
 
In 1896 the GWR had projected the 
Portsmouth, Basingstoke and Godalming 
Railway which cut across the company’s 
territory south of Basingstoke and passed 
through the Meon Valley. The Act failed in 
parliament in 1896.709 However, it spurred 
Scotter into action to secure this sparsely 
populated region for the company.710  
 
In June 1896 Scotter inspected the Meon Valley and suggested to the LSWR’s board that a line be 
constructed from Alton to Fareham. They immediately approved this plan711 and it was built 
between 1897 and 1902 (Figure 8). Despite being single tracked, it was built to main line 
standards and possessed the space for a second line of rails.712 Consequently, its cost was high at 
£619,021, or 9.88 percent of the company’s total expenditure in the years of its construction. 
Indeed, it was the LSWR’s most costly line building project between 1885 and 1911, and the 
outlay on it was considerably greater than the expenditure on the company’s on-going 
extensions in the West Country.  
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The line was largely unsuccessful. In 1897 it was described by the company’s chairman, Portal, as 
being of ‘great advantage not only to the War Office, 
but to the public generally.’713 Despite this optimism, 
when it opened in 1903 the revenue generated never 
met expectations and after a few years services were 
cut back714 to such an extent that in January 1904 
residents along the line began asking for extra 
trains.715 Stone argued that the line ‘never prospered,’ 
and it was a drag on the LSWR’s financial 
performance, although the extent to which this was 
so is unknown.716  
 
Similarly, Scotter investigated the district between 
Basingstoke and Alton with Portal in late-October 1896. He recommended to the board that a 
line be built in the region under the Light Railways Act of 1896, which allowed railway companies 
to construct lines without a parliamentary act. Again, the board immediately accepted this 
recommendation717 and at a meeting of the Light Railway Commissioners on 28 January 1897 
Scotter gave evidence and the BALR’s order passed.718 Mr Jeffreys, a LSWR shareholder, 
recounted at the February 1897 half-yearly proprietor’s meeting that in front of the 
commissioners Scotter had ‘conducted the case as well as any leading council could have 
done.’719 The order was finally confirmed in December.720 The cost of building the line was small 
at £106,338, which during the years of its construction (1898-1901) constituted only 2.47 percent 
of the LSWR’s total capital expenditure.721 Opened in May 1901, the Basingstoke and Alton Light 
Railway was loss-making as its traffic was very light. Only months later Scotter commented that 
the line was ‘not likely to be of great benefit’, given he perceived it as feeding main line 
services722 and by 1913 it was losing more than £4000 per year.723  
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Despite it being unlikely that the MVL and BALR cut into the LSWR’s profit margins to any great 
degree – the BALR’s loss of £4000 in 1913 only constituting around 0.0987 percent of company 
expenditure724 – they still added excess route mileage to the company’s network for low returns. 
These cases therefore support Dodgson’s and Cain’s arguments that British railways’ constructed 
lines that performed poorly financially for territorial defence before 1900.725   
 
Like the LSWR directors before 1884, Scotter could initiate the construction of such lines because 
there was little limiting his liberty of action. As Section 5.8 discussed, as the LSWR’s financial 
performance improved significantly after 1885, the company could access capital easily and the 
shareholders remained passive in its decision-making process. Additionally, LSWR decision-
makers did not fear traffic growth would stop, so they likely perceived  that unprofitable lines 
could be cross-subsidised by profitable ones for years, or even decades, if need be. When the 
company’s territory was threatened, the urge to defend it overrode any concerns Scotter may 
had about the lines’ profitability. Indeed, reflecting his lack of detailed interest in how profitable 
the lines might be, and revealing a lack of project appraisal before the decisions were made, all 
he could vaguely say about the BALR’s future prospects was that it would be of ‘material 
assistance’ to the districts through which it passed.726  
 
Ultimately, therefore, the factors that lay behind Scotter’s initiation of the building of the MVL 
and BALR highlight that, despite his impressive skills as an operational manager, his underlying 
belief systems about how railways conducted their business were almost identical to those of the 
board in the 1870s and early-1880s. This therefore reiterates what was argued in the case of the 
widening of the company’s main lines: before 1900 the LSWR’s decision-makers had considerable 
scope to invest as they so wished and, thus, there was nothing pressuring them to reform their 
established responses to recurrent problems. 
 
5.10. Conclusion 
 
Between 1885 and 1897 Scotter’s capital investment strategy was unquestionably more cogent 
than the board’s had been before then. In that period the LSWR’s board took investment 
decisions in an uncoordinated manner in response to events occurring beyond their control. The 
directors possessed no more than vague objectives when making capital investments, for 
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example ‘opportunistic territorial consolidation.’ This is possibly why the purchase and building of 
weakly performing lines consumed most of the company’s capital before 1884, while the 
railway’s most pressing need, improvement of its infrastructure, was not addressed (see Chapter 
4).  
 
Undoubtedly, some of the decisions Scotter made were reactions to external events, three of 
which have been studied here: the Southampton Dock purchase, and the building of the MVL and 
BALR. Nevertheless, most of the capital projects he initiated were guided by the operational 
strategies he had established for the LSWR after 1885 of expanding the concern and improving its 
operational efficiency. They mostly succeeded in their aims. For example, the Southampton 
Docks’ expansion and the financial support for the Waterloo and City line expanded the 
company’s business considerably. Furthermore, the widening of the company’s main lines and 
the carriage and wagon works’ removal to Eastleigh considerably improved the railway’s 
operational efficiency (see Section 1).727 In contrast with the LSWR’s investment practices before 
1884, these examples demonstrate that the company’s capital projects between 1870 and 1911 
were, to large extent, most successful when they were serving a well-developed overarching 
strategic objective.  
 
Section 3 – Conclusion 
 
Fundamentally, Scotter’s improvement of the LSWR’s financial performance after 1885 hinged on 
two factors: his ability to get the department heads working together towards common goals and 
his reformation of the company’s inefficient operational practices along modern lines. Through 
describing these facets of his general managership this chapter has, therefore, strengthened this 
thesis’ two main arguments, as will now be discussed. 
 
One of this thesis’ main arguments is that between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR’s ability to mitigate 
potential problems caused by functional department structures, such as department heads acting 
independently and ignoring the overall revenue position of the concern, depended on how 
effectively those above them in the hierarchy provided them with effective oversight, 
coordination and leadership. This chapter has supported this assertion. By quickly gaining 
authority over the department heads, Scotter transformed the position of LSWR General 
Manager into something analogous to a modern Chief Executive. Consequently he was able to 
get the heads working together in line with his two corporate objectives: augmenting the 
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company’s business and, most importantly, decreasing its excessive operating costs. Scotter’s 
case therefore supports Channon’s suggestion that the operational effectiveness of nineteenth-
century British railways was, possibly, contingent on whether General Managers had the 
‘authority, skill and energy’ to persuade department heads to cooperate.728    
 
Describing Scotter’s General Managership has also strengthened this thesis’ other main 
argument. As is discussed throughout, between 1870 and 1911 within the LSWR, and particularly 
the Traffic Department, there was very little innovation in, or development of operating 
techniques, which meant in many cases the value of established practices were not reappraised 
and inefficiencies developed. In the Traffic Department’s case this was, as Chapter 3 discussed, 
because traffic managers had all passed through its insular and rigid clerical promotional ladders 
and, as such, had limited scope to think creatively or question established practices they had 
worked with for decades. Consequently, the advancement or improvement in managerial 
techniques within the company was largely dependent on the appointment of new senior 
managers who had worked outside it. Indeed, in 1885 Scotter brought to the LSWR his wide-
ranging experience of management practices in the wider British railway industry. This gave him 
the capacity to effectively oversee and critique the department heads’ activities, but also he likely 
suggested ways they could better manage their affairs. Secondly, he was able to considerably 
reform and modernise the Traffic Department’s management and the company’s obsolete train 
control practices. Lastly, his experience of working with docks facilities made him acutely aware 
of the value the Southampton Docks could be to the LSWR’s business. 
 
Collectively, these factors helped significantly improve the LSWR’s financial performance after 
1885. There was another important factor that aided this process. By 1892 Scotter had gained 
decisive influence over the company’s major investment policies, possibly because after his 
successes the directors, who had few external experiences of railway management, came to trust 
in his judgment (see Chapter 3). Before 1884, and despite the company having relative easy 
access to capital, the LSWR’s board had taken uncoordinated approach to investment which had, 
possibly, harmed its operational efficiency through restricting the spending on infrastructure 
improvements. However, the majority of the LSWR’s capital investments in the 1890s were 
guided by Scotter’s two main strategic objectives. Thus, they better served the company’s needs 
and contributed to improving its profitability.  
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Yet, despite Scotter’s considerable and impressive improvement of the LSWR’s financial 
performance after 1885, facets of his General Managership demonstrate that he still held many 
traditional and long-established concepts of railway management. His reforms of the LSWR’s 
inefficient management practices only remodelled them into resembling those found within most 
British railway companies at the time. The company retained the functional department 
structure, control of decision-making remained highly centralised, operating statistics were no 
more advanced that the train mile, and its management class was still deferential to authority 
and institutionalised. Furthermore, Scotter’s solutions to operational problems, such as the 
congestion of the LSWR’s main lines, replicated those utilised in previous decades; innovative 
problem solving was lacking within the company. Finally, like many managers and directors 
before him, Scotter reacted to threats to the company’s territorial dominance by building 
railways, possibly believing that if they were unremunerative or performed poorly financially they 
could be cross-subsidised by profitable routes for years after their opening.  
 
Thus, while Scotter was an exceptional General Manager, he was not a radical one. Absent from 
his General Managership was any form of operational or organisational innovation like Gibb 
enacted within the NER (see Chapter 1).729 Indeed, because Scotter had transformed the LSWR 
into one of the best financially performing British railways, and given no director or senior 
manager had the knowledge to experience to contradict his actions, between 1892 and 1897 
there was seemingly no pressure on him look for further efficiencies through managerial 
improvements or innovations. Consequently, as Chapter 6 shows, before 1900 the LSWR’s 
operations were not as efficient as they could have been. This case therefore supports recent 
scholars’ views that in the period British railways’ decision-makers had scope to neglect 
operational efficiencies and potential productivity gains.730    
 
Nonetheless, it is inappropriate to say that there was ‘management failure’ within the LSWR 
during Scotter’s General Managership, as Cain and Aldcroft argued occurred in the British railway 
industry generally before 1900.731 Compared with other railways the LSWR’s management quality 
was very high by 1897: Scotter had made numerous remunerative investment decisions, its 
employees and departments were working in a unified and cohesive manner, its train services 
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were run efficiently, and its business was growing at a quicker rate than before 1885. Thus, by 
1897 it would be more suitable to label the LSWR’s operating performance as being ‘sub-
optimal’. 
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Section 4 – Appendices 
 
5.1. Width of the LSWR’s main lines 1880-1890 
 
  1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 
One 223 223 223 220 210 210 228 228 228 230 221 
Two 490 490 489 490 497 532 513 536 543 553 579 
Three 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 8 14 14 15 
Four (or 
more) 
5 6 7 9 12 15 14 16 17 17 17 
                        
Number 
of miles 
above 
two lines 
7 8 9 11 15 18 18 24 31 31 32 
Proporti
on of 
miles 
above 
two lines 
0.97
% 
1.11
% 
1.25
% 
1.53
% 
2.08
% 
2.37
% 
2.37
% 
3.05
% 
3.87
% 
3.81
% 
3.85
% 
Source: Board of Trade, Railway Returns 1880-1890 
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Chapter 6 – Company policy during Charles Owens’ tenure  
1898-1911 
 
When Charles Owens became General Manager in 1898, the LSWR was one of the best financially 
performing British railway companies. Nevertheless, only three years after his appointment, like 
most railway companies in Britain, 732 its trading circumstances had completely changed, and the 
company’s managers and directors were faced with challenges which none of their predecessors 
had had to deal with.  
 
Firstly, traffic growth, which had been constant from 1838 to 1897, halted and the number of 
passengers the LSWR conveyed stabilised after 1899, largely because of competition from trams 
in suburban districts. Goods traffic growth also slowed, and between 1900 and 1911 the tonnage 
the LSWR hauled only grew by 9.55 percent. LSWR officials were also challenged by material, fuel 
and wage costs increasing significantly in the late 1890s. Appendix 6.1 shows that the price the 
LSWR paid per unit for various materials used by the Engineering Department, as well fuel costs 
per ton, all rose significantly after 1897. Furthermore, in the same period wage costs per train 
mile grew from 15.56d (16.38d)733 in 1897 to 16.62d (16.69d) in 1901.  These increases 
contributed to raising the company’s OR  from 57.49 percent in 1897 to 62.44 percent in 1900; 
and reducing its ROCS from 4.96 in 1897 to 4.54 in 1902 (five-year moving average). 734 
Furthermore, pieces of government legislation also constrained decision-makers’ freedom of 
action. The 1893 Regulation of Railways Act limited the hours railway employees could work; 
while the 1894 Railway and Canal Traffic Act fixed the maximum rates railways could charge for 
goods haulage at 1892 levels.735 Lastly, as with most British railway companies, the buoyant 
capital supplies the LSWR had enjoyed before 1900 disappeared.  Consequently, combined with 
the fact the board had initiated many expensive infrastructure projects between 1897 and 1900, 
decision-makers lacked the capital to invest in projects that may have improved the company’s 
profitability. 
 
This chapter discusses how, when their freedom of action was thus constrained, LSWR decision-
makers responded to the company’s reduced profitability after 1897. It argues that overall 
limited progress was made. Despite the company remaining an above-average performer in the 
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British railway industry, it financial position deteriorated before 1911: its ROCS declined from 
4.54 percent in 1902 to 4.42 percent in 1910 (five-year moving average); its OR increased from 
62.44 percent in 1900 to 63.82 percent in 1911; and its total expenditure per train mile grew 
from 41.91d (40.68d) to 44.02d (39.80d) over the same period. Some of this increase can be 
attributed to rising rates and taxes; which grew from 5.87 percent of company expenditure in 
1900 to 6.93 percent in 1911. Yet, if this expenditure is eliminated from the equation, the 
company’s expenditure per train mile still increased between 1900 and 1911 from 39.44d 
(38.29d) to 40.96d (37.04d), while its OR grew from 58.77 percent to 59.39 percent. 736  
 
This chapter argues that the LSWR’s financial performance did not improve after 1900 principally 
because of the careers of the company’s decision-makers. Firstly, because Owens, the General 
Manager, and Holmes, the Superintendent of the Line, had spent all their careers within the 
Traffic Department’s introvert and rigid promotional ladders, they found it difficult to reform 
their thinking on railway management, abandon long-established management practices or 
innovate. Furthermore, these managers’ perspectives on company policy were supported, 
seemingly uncritically, by a small cadre of long-standing directors who held similar viewpoints. 
Lastly, the Locomotive Superintendent (Chief Mechanical Engineer from 1904), Drummond, was 
unwilling to adapt his management style and ideas on locomotive design, which he had 
developed in the 1870s and 1880s, to the company’s changing requirements later in his tenure. 
In consequence of these factors, after 1902 innovation within the company stalled, efficiencies 
persisted unchallenged, external threats to the business were not effectively combatted and, 
ultimately, its profitability did not improve.  
 
Section 1 – Capital investment, 1897-1901 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This section examines the LSWR’s capital investment strategies between 1897 and 1901, as its 
capital projects were an important influence on how decision-makers reacted to the railway’s 
decreased profitability after 1900. 
 
As Chapter 5 described, before 1898 Scotter, as General Manager, had significant influence over 
when and where the company invested its capital. Yet, after 1898 it was the board which 
formulated and enacted capital investment policy; while the senior managers arranged the 
details. This shift occurred because on retirement Scotter was elevated to the LSWR’s board. In 
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this position he retained, and perhaps even enhanced, his control over the company’s investment 
strategies. Indeed, Chapter 3 showed how he was highly active in the company’s affairs. His 
dominance of the company’s investment policies was reinforced between 1898 and 1902 by the 
board possessing two ex-LSWR railwaymen (Scott and Macaulay) and two long-standing 
members (Campbell and Govett). All these individuals had worked with Scotter since his 
appointment as General Manager and, presumably, trusted his judgement given his successful 
improvement of the company’s finances (see Chapter 3).  
 
Consequently, as Scotter remained the driving force behind the LSWR’s investment strategies 
after 1898, the capital projects the company initiated served the corporate objectives he had 
established as General Manager. Further investment in the Southampton Docks fitted his goal of 
‘expanding the concern’; while the widening of the company’s main lines, the locomotive works’ 
movement from Nine Elms to Eastleigh, the augmentation of stations and yards to deal with 
traffic increases, and Waterloo Station’s rebuilding, all improved the efficiency and quality of the 
LSWR’s train services. 
 
As a result of these projects the LSWR’s investment in its infrastructure was heavy between 1898 
and 1901, and constituted £4,310,404, or 12.69 percent of its total capital expenditure between 
1870 and 1911. Indeed, the company spent more capital between 1898 and 1905 than in any 
other period of its history. The next section describes the company’s investment into its 
operational infrastructure, while section 6.3 discusses the expansion of the Southampton Docks. 
Lastly, section 6.4 explains why the board felt it could increase the company’s capital burden so 
extensively between 1898 and 1901.  
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6.2. Adapting to traffic growth 
 
Figure 1: Number of passengers conveyed by the LSWR between 1890 and 1911, Source: Board of Trade, 
Railway Returns 
 
Between 1890 and 1900 the number of passengers the LSWR conveyed grew considerably (Figure 
1). Table 1 indicates that over this period the number conveyed per passenger train mile rose by 
14.47 percent; while the number carried per carriage and per route mile also increased by 30.98 
percent and 19.30 percent respectively.  
 
  1890 1895 1900 
Overall 
increase 
Passengers Conveyed 40,772,873 52,934,040 63,710,860 56.26% 
Passenger Train Miles 9,357,014 10,816,322 12,773,066 36.51% 
Passengers per Passenger Train Mile 4.36 4.89 4.99 14.47% 
          
Passenger Carriages 2,104 2,218 2,510 19.30% 
Passengers per Passenger Carriage 19,379 23,866 25,383 30.98% 
          
Company Route Mileage Worked 836 890 914 9.33% 
Passengers per Route Mile 2,104 2,218 2,510 19.30% 
Table 1: Increase of LSWR passenger traffic expressed numerous ways, Source: Board of Trade, Railway 
Returns. 
 
Consequently, between 1898 and 1901 56.29 percent of the LSWR’s capital expenditure went on 
augmenting its ‘lines open for traffic.’737 This investment took four main forms: developing the 
capacity and facilities at the company’s stations and yards; the continued widening of its main 
lines; the removal of the locomotive works from Nine Elms to Eastleigh; and the complete 
rebuilding of Waterloo Station. These investment decisions will now be described. 
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Augmenting Stations and Yards 
 
 
Figure 2: LSWR Expenditure at stations and yards, 1892-1906, Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/283 and RAIL 
1110/284, London and South Western Railway Reports and Accounts 1880-1922 
 
From around 1895, and particularly after 1898 when he was on the board, Scotter initiated the 
augmentation of station and good yards facilities, which enabled them to handle more efficiently 
the company’s higher volumes of traffic. For example, between 1870 and 1890 the LSWR had 
only spent £4,555 improving Hampton Court Station.738 But in 1897 a plan was approved to 
enlarge the passenger accommodation at a cost of £14,500.739 Furthermore, in 1898 plans were 
approved for additional sidings, a goods shed and a ten ton crane at a further cost of £3,000.740 
As such, the investment at Hampton Court was higher after 1897 than in any period since the 
station’s opening in 1849.741 As Figure 2 shows, from 1898 the capital the LSWR expended on 
developing similar facilities around its network was considerable. Between then and 1905 it 
constituted £1,210,231, or 10.49 percent of the total capital spent during Owens’ General 
Managership.742  
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Waterloo Station and Line Widenings 
 
By the late-1890s another problem was that increasing passenger traffic meant the main lines 
outside Waterloo station were again becoming progressively congested. Complaints regarding 
trains’ poor punctuality thus became more frequent. In August 1899, for example, a meeting was 
held in Woking to discuss ‘the grave loss and grave inconvenience caused to the residents on 
main lines of the London and South Western Railway by the gross unpunctuality of the train 
service.’743 In September 1898 ‘W.M.’ wrote to the Western Gazette stating that ‘for the 
callousness or incapacity of its management (probably both) I doubt if any railway company in 
England (or, for that matter out of it) can compete with the South Western.’744 The congestion 
was even acknowledged by the LSWR’s chairman, Portal, who stated in February 1899 that ‘those 
who travelled on their system must be aware of the congested condition which obtained 
particularly in the neighbourhood of that great city.’745  
 
Furthermore, Waterloo Station was difficult for passengers to use.746 Expansions in 1878 and 
1885 had created three interconnected stations which between them had eighteen running lines 
but only ten platform numbers.747 In 1889 Jerome K. Jerome fictionally recorded the confusion at 
the station in Three Men in a Boat: ‘We got to Waterloo at eleven, and asked where the eleven-
five started from. Of course nobody knew; nobody at Waterloo ever does know where a train is 
going to start from, or where a train when it does start is going to, or anything about it.’748 These 
problems with the LSWR’s infrastructure therefore seriously affected the company’s public 
reputation; although to what extent they affected its operational efficiency is unclear.  
 
To ease congestion, which other railway companies were experiencing at the time,749 Scotter 
initiated further widening of the LSWR’s main lines in 1896750 and, consequently, in 1905 Railway 
Magazine commented that the company had undertaken a ‘transformation which would seem 
incidental to the development of a great railway company.’751 The work was started in 1897.752 
Two extra lines were added between Waterloo and Worting Junction, south of Basingstoke on 
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the Main Line, and on the Windsor Line between Waterloo and Clapham Junction.753 Table 2 
shows that between 1898 and 1904 the extent of the company’s route mileage possessing above 
two running lines rose from 32.93 miles to 62.57 miles, or by 90.01 percent. The capital cost of 
these widening works was high. Between 1897 and 1905 £2,180,881 was invested in the project; 
or 25.04 percent of the company’s total capital expenditure in these years.754  
 
Number of running lines 
1
8
9
8
 
1
9
0
0
 
1
9
0
2
 
1
9
0
4
 
1
9
0
6
 
1
9
0
8
 
One 245.23 261.05 264.2 302.24 307.73 308.86 
Two 591.76 590.14 584.08 573.23 571.08 575.45 
Three 12.89 14.51 15.78 12.66 4.79 4.8 
Four 16.23 16.23 29.99 44.85 53.14 52.95 
Five 0 0 1.2 1.24 1.26 1.23 
Six 3.81 3.34 2.44 2.04 1.35 1.24 
Seven 0 0.48 1.3 1.78 3.40 1.99 
Eight 0 0 0 0 0 2.01 
Total Mileage above 
two lines 
32.93 34.56 50.71 62.57 63.94 64.22 
Percentage of company 
mileage above two 
running lines 
3.79% 3.90% 5.64% 6.67% 6.78% 6.77% 
Table 2: Track width of the LSWR's lines, 1898-1908, Source: TNA, RAIL 1110/284, London and South 
Western Reports and Accounts, 1895-1922 
 
In 1900 the LSWR also began to rebuild Waterloo Station to ease main line congestion and 
improve its navigability for passengers.755 The directors’ first proposal to increase the station’s 
capacity in 1897 had been to add an extension on its south side.756 However, local opposition 
thwarted the Bill and the decision was taken to completely rebuild the site.757 The revised plans, 
which received royal assent in August 1899,758 added to the station four more platforms and 
seven more lines,759 augmenting its capacity by twenty percent.760 Yet again, the capital cost of 
the project was considerable. When in early 1923 the Southern Railway (who took over the LSWR 
in that year) closed the Waterloo rebuilding account, the total cost had been £2,269,354.761 
Between 1903, when the major construction work began, and 1911, the LSWR spent £502,418 on 
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the project or 4.35 percent of its total capital expenditure during Owens’ General 
Managership.762 
 
The Locomotive Works 
 
In 1897 the LSWR also decided to relocate the company’s locomotive works from Nine Elms to 
Eastleigh. Possibly this decision was inevitable. The transfer of the works into ‘the country’ had 
been occasionally considered since 1860763 and the carriage and wagon works had moved to 
Eastleigh in 1889. However, with goods traffic passing at the Nine Elms yard growing and 
requiring more space, and with part of the locomotive works scheduled to be demolished to 
accommodate line widenings, the board decided to move them to Eastleigh also. This was 
despite the Locomotive Superintendent, Dugald Drummond, being reluctant for unknown 
reasons that this should occur.764 Plans for the move began in 1897765 when eighty-two acres of 
land at Eastleigh were purchased.766 The works’ designs were drawn up in September 1898767 and 
finally approved by the Locomotive Committee in February 1900.768 The works eventually opened 
in January 1909.769 The total cost to build and equip them was £393,717, or 3.41 percent of the 
company’s overall capital expenditure between 1898 and 1911.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Between 1897 and 1901 the LSWR initiated numerous on-going capital projects that increased 
the capacity of its infrastructure. How they affected its financial performance is very unclear 
given the available evidence. Because the Waterloo rebuilding finished in 1922,770 it cannot be 
ascertained how this improved the company’s operational performance before 1911, if it did at 
all. Furthermore, it is impossible to judge how the expansion of goods yards and station facilities 
impacted on the company’s efficiency, given such improvements were spread out across its 
network. However, the widening of the main lines likely eased congestion on them, possibly 
improving the train services’ efficiency, for example through a reduction of idling times. Indeed, 
the company’s expresses services to both competitive and non-competitive destinations were 
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accelerated after 1903, likely indicating that main line congestion had been reduced.771 
Conversely, the Eastleigh works, which contemporary reports suggest were designed to promote 
efficient working,772 did not seemingly improve the company’s expenditure on locomotive 
construction and maintenance. Materials costs fluctuated in this period and are therefore 
unreliable for measuring the works’ efficiency. The best, but highly imperfect measure of this is 
wage costs, which increased per train mile from 1.27d (1.22d) to 1.48d (1.28d) between 1904 and 
1910.773 Yet, this increase may not necessarily mean that the new works were less efficiently run 
than the Nine Elms works, and other factors possibly played a role in pushing up costs, for 
example increased staff numbers. Therefore, all that can be tentatively suggested about the 
capital projects the LSWR started between 1897 and 1901 is that they had both positive and 
negative effects on the company’s profitability.   
 
6.3. The Southampton Docks  
 
Southampton Docks 
 
 
Figure 3: Annual capital expenditure on the Southampton Docks, 1895-1911, Source: TNA, RAIL 
1110/284, London and South Western Reports and Accounts, 1895-1922 
 
After 1897 the LSWR also continued to expand the Southampton Docks in response to growing 
shipping volumes, increasing vessel sizes and even occasional visits from Royal Navy warships.774 
Between 1899 and 1904 the company constructed Britain’s largest graving dock,775  the Trafalgar 
Dock, which opened in 1905. The capital investment in this and other improvements at the docks, 
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which is shown in Figure 3, cost the company between 1899 and 1904 £991,990; or 8.60 percent 
of its total capital expenditure during Owens’ General Managership.776  
 
Towards the end of the decade further decisions to enlarge the Southampton Docks were not 
simply driven by traffic growth and increasing vessel sizes. As Chapter 3 discussed, Lord Pirrie 
joined the LSWR board in June 1907.777  He was chairman of Harland and Wolff, the Belfast 
shipbuilder and a director of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, which was known more 
widely as the White Star Line (WSL).778 Pirrie’s appointment to the LSWR board was a reflection 
of the stronger links that had been established between the railway and these companies; 
Harland and Wolff had established a repair station at the Southampton Docks in April 1907, while 
the WSL started sailing from them in June.779  
 
As stated, once Pirrie became director he was appointed to the Docks and Marine Committee, so 
his experience and knowledge could be utilised to maximum effect by the company.780  From 
here he helped to direct investment in the docks towards facilities for his companies; in October 
1907 the LSWR began work on ‘White Star’ dock to accommodate the WSL’s new ships 
(constructed by Harland and Wolff), Titanic and Olympic.781 Between then and the June half-year 
1911 the LSWR expended £726,294 on docks improvements; or 6.29 percent of the company’s 
capital expenditure during Owens’ General Managership (Figure 3). 782   
 
This investment was a rare example of practical decision-making on the LSWR’s part. The 
relationship with Pirrie anticipated a growth in business with the WSL. Through the first decade 
of the twentieth century the WSL was not the only the company to use Southampton. Twenty-
one steamship lines sailed from the docks by 1909. 783 Pirrie, along with Sir Owen Phillips who 
also had positions in shipping, would have brought to the railway considerable experience and 
insight that probably helped it attract shipping lines to Southampton and better manage the 
business there.784  
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The LSWR’s investment in the Southampton Docks resulted in trade growing dramatically in the 
1900s. As Table 3 highlights, between 1897 and 1908 the cargo tonnage passing through the 
docks increased from 756,370 to 1,113,132 (47.17 percent), while in and out coal tonnage 
increased from 389,338 to 598,100 (53.62 percent). Furthermore, between 1896 and 1908 the 
number of passengers embarking and disembarking at Southampton increased from 214,400785 
to 268,549, or by 25.26 percent.786 
 
The Docks’ Impact 
 
1897 
LSWR hauled 
In/Out of the 
Docks 
Total LSWR 
Hauled 
Docks 
Proportion 
All LSWR 
Revenue 
Approx. Docks  
Traffic 
Revenue 
Tons of Cargo 
Inwards/Outwards 
 718,552 
(756,370) 
2,274,047 31.60% £839,091 
£265,135 
(£279,089)* 
Tons of Coal 
Inwards/Outwards 
369,871 
(389,338) 
3,135,521 
(Minerals) 
11.80% 
£329,357 
(Minerals) 
£38,851 
(£40,896)* 
Other Marine Income 
LSWR Steamship Income 
£179,926 
(£189,396)* 
Docks Income 
 £63,620 
(£66,968)* 
Total  
£547,532 
(£576,349)* 
            
1908 
LSWR hauled 
In/Out of the 
Docks 
Total LSWR 
Hauled 
Docks 
Proportion 
All LSWR 
Revenue 
Approx. Docks  
Traffic 
Revenue 
Tons of Cargo 
Inwards/Outwards 
 1,057,495 
(1,113,132) 
2,505,040 42.21% £1,004,774 
£424,154 
(£410,016)* 
Tons of Coal 
Inwards/Outwards 
568,195 
(598,100) 
4,119,279 
(Minerals) 
13.79% 
£460,323 
(Minerals) 
£63,495 
(£61,379)* 
Other Marine Income 
LSWR Steamship Income 
£231,556 
(£223,837)* 
Docks Income 
 £289,193 
(£279,553)* 
Total  
 £1,008,398 
(£974,785)* 
Table 3: The traffic and trade of the Southampton Docks in 1897 and 1908, Source: London Standard, 
Thursday, 13 October 1898; TNA, RAIL 1110/284, London and South Western Reports and Accounts, 
1880-1922; Railway Magazine, April 1909, p.402-406. *Inflation adjusted figures from 1892. Tonnage 
figures in brackets denote the full total passing through the docks; the figure above them are the 
approximate amount the LSWR hauled based on the statement that the company hauled ninety-five per-
cent of all traffic passing through them, as outlined in Chapter 5. 
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The data does not exist to show precisely how the docks impacted on the LSWR’s finances after 
1900, but by utilising a counterfactual scenario, whereby the SDC had failed in 1892 and did not 
put any traffic on the railway thereafter, a rough calculation can be made. If the cost of running 
the docks and their approximate income (calculated in Table 3) is removed from the LSWR’s 
overall expenditure and receipts, the company’s OR would have theoretically been 2.16 per cent 
higher that it actually was in 1897, at 59.64 per cent, and 6.50 per cent higher in 1908, at 70.90 
per cent. This suggests the LSWR’s purchase expansion of the Southampton Docks was beneficial 
to its finances. 
 
The value of the expansion of the Southampton Docks to the LSWR is possibly further highlighted 
by examining changes in the nature of the company’s goods traffic from the late-1890s.  It has 
been argued by scholars that the 1894 Railway and Canal Traffic Act, which fixed the maximum 
rates railways could charge for goods haulage at 1892 levels,  was, as Cain argued, a ‘millstone 
around companies’ necks’, as after 1900 they could not raise rates to offset increased working 
costs (see Chapter 1). 787  In an attempt to understand how the Act affected the LSWR’s finances, 
Figure 4 shows the company’s average income per ton of merchandise and minerals transported 
between 1888 and 1910, and its revenue per head of livestock conveyed. Between 1892 and 
1899 the company’s revenue per ton of merchandise conveyed fell from 99.79d (102.29d) to 
87.26d (87.26d), or by 12.56 percent. Possibly, this decline was caused by the Railway and Canal 
Traffic Act and the LSWR’s inability to raise freight rates above 1892 levels. In February 1894, 
Portal, the chairman, stated that because the LSWR served mainly agricultural districts, the 
agricultural depression of the period was reducing the company’s goods revenues. Consequently, 
the Act may have meant the company was unable to raise rates to offset the income they were 
losing because of this depression – but without further evidence this is unclear.788  
 
                                                          
787
 Cain, ‘Traders versus railways: the genesis of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894,’ p.80 
788
 TNA, RAIL 1110/282, LSWR Reports and Accounts, 1880-1895, Half-yearly meeting of proprietors, 8 
February 1894, 7 February 1895 and 8 August 1895 
244 
 
 
Figure 4: LSWR average revenue per ton of merchandise and minerals, and livestock hauled in constant 
prices. Source: Board of Trade, Railway Returns 
 
Factors other than the Act may also have diminished the LSWR’s average revenue per ton of 
merchandise hauled. Cain argued that in the 1890s many companies began offering special lower 
rates to farmers if, rather than sending small loads of goods to a host of stations, they agreed to 
send mixed or aggregated consignments.789 The LSWR was no exception. In 1896 Portal stated 
that the company had made rates reductions varying from fourteen to thirty-six percent for 
various articles. It was willing to go further but ‘there must be two-fold co-operation – the farmer 
must combine and send his produce in bulk, and then the Railway Company would do what it 
could to make the combination easy.’790 This suggests that after 1892 the average revenue per 
ton of merchandise conveyed also fell because to some extent it reduced rates. 
 
Whatever the cause, the effect of the LSWR’s declining average income per ton of merchandise 
hauled on its profitability can be approximately calculated. If this had not fallen after 1892 and 
stayed at 98.40d (the company’s average revenue per ton hauled between 1883 and 1892) by 
1899 the company’s operating ratio would have been 1.41 percent lower than it was in reality. 
This suggests that the LSWR’s declining average revenue per ton of merchandise hauled 
diminished its profitability. Nonetheless, given the LSWR predominantly carried passengers this 
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decline likely impacted far less on its finances than it did on northern railways who were chiefly 
freight carriers; but again this cannot be proven. 
 
However, it can be suggested that Southampton Docks’ increasing trade started to have an 
important impact on the LSWR’s financial performance after 1899, and Figure 4 shows that 
between then and 1908 the company’s average revenue per ton of merchandise hauled began 
increasing. Before describing how the docks improved the company’s average revenue per ton of 
merchandise hauled, it is useful to explain briefly how the railways’ determined what they 
charged for the transportation of different types of goods after 1892. The rates were categorised 
into ‘classes.’ Classes ‘A’ to ‘C’ covered those goods that were conveyed in bulk, such as coal and 
grain, and, consequently, their transportation rates were low. Classes 1 to 5 covered the rates for 
transporting more valuable goods. These commodities’ classifications were determined based on 
a number of factors: their worth, how likely they were to be damaged in transit, their weight in 
proportion to their bulk, and the nature of their packing and handling costs. The charges for 
conveying goods in Class 1, for example ale and sugar, were the lowest, while those in Class 5, 
such as cigars and musical instruments, were carried at the highest rates.791  
 
As stated, after 1892 the trade at the Southampton Docks grew considerably. Therefore, 
determining the types of merchandise that was landed at the docks, and their classifications, is 
useful for understanding how this traffic growth may have impacted on the LSWR’s average 
revenue per ton of merchandise hauled.  Two articles in Railway Magazine from 1900792 and 
1909793 mentioned thirteen commodities that were landed at the Southampton Docks which had 
overseas origins. These were classified as follows:  
 
Class 2 - apples, bacon, wool  
Class 3 - hops, tobacco, wine, spirits 
Class 4 - oysters, skins, meat  
Class 5 - cigars, bicycles, fruit (The fruit came from the Cape and I have put them in 
the ‘fruit - hothouse’ classification.)794   
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Most commodities mentioned were categorised in the upper classes. It can, therefore, be 
suggested that the docks’ growing and varied trade meant the LSWR was moving larger volumes 
of merchandise that generated more revenue per ton than locally produced goods that were in 
lower classes. For instance, the LSWR had a healthy trade in Hampshire strawberries for six 
weeks a year during the harvesting season.795 Strawberries were, however, classified in Class 2, 
whereas exotic fruits grown overseas, which were likely landed at Southampton throughout the 
year, were in Class 5. Consequently, per ton the latter possibly generated more revenue for the 
LSWR over longer periods of time.796   
 
Thus, the development of the trade at Southampton, and the more diverse range of products this 
meant the LSWR conveyed, possibly offset the decreased revenue per ton of British-produced 
merchandise it transported. This is tentatively supported by the counterfactual scenario above. In 
1908 the LSWR’s OR stood at 64.40. Whereas in the counterfactual scenario, where the company 
charged an average of 98.40d for transporting a ton of merchandise in every year after 1892, the 
year this figure started falling, the company’s OR would have also been 64.40 percent by 1908. 
The fact that these figures are the same again suggests that the LSWR’s increasing revenue per 
ton of merchandise after 1908 contributed to improving the company’s finances and lowering its 
OR.  
 
Overall, it is likely the development of the SDC positively impacted on the LSWR’s finances after 
1892.797 Not everyone has agreed: Faulkner and Williams argued the docks were ‘a better 
investment for the nation than for the LSWR shareholders.’798  Yet, this argument was only based 
on the docks’ working expenses and did not consider the considerable traffic they put onto the 
company’s system. 
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6.4. The capital burden, 1898-1901 
 
Overall, the capital projects that were intimated between 1897 and 1901 were the last, largest 
and most expensive demonstrations of the factors that shaped the LSWR’s investment policies 
between 1870 and 1900. The directors and managers were under little pressure from any quarter 
to interrogate in detail the quality of the investment decisions they made. Shareholders were 
passive in the company’s decision-making processes; subordinates were deferential to authority; 
the LSWR could access capital relatively easily; and, crucially, decision-makers believed that the 
company’s traffic and revenue would continually grow, which in turn would make every 
investment worthwhile in the long-term (see Chapter 4). They therefore had considerable 
freedom to invest where and how they so wished.   
 
 
Figure 5: LSWR capital expended on major projects and its total capital expenditure, 1898-1911. Source: 
RAIL 1110/284, London and South Western Reports and Accounts, 1898-1922 
 
The absence of pressure on LSWR decision-makers to curtail investment is demonstrated by the 
fact that the projects mentioned above committed the company to the highest levels of capital 
expenditure in its history.  The capital spent on them amounted to £8,042,753, or 69.70 percent 
of the total between 1898 and 1911. Furthermore, between 1898 and 1904 the total outlay on 
them was £5,685,041, or 17.05 percent of the LSWR’s capital spending between 1870 and 1911. 
Thus, Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate when this expenditure was at its highest levels. 
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Figure 6: LSWR Expenditure on 'Lines open for Traffic' and the Southampton Docks, 1870-1911; Source: 
RAIL 1110/281/283/284, London and South Western Reports and Accounts, 1834-1922 
 
Furthermore, as Chapter 5 discussed, because there were few constraints on LSWR decision-
makers’ freedom of action before 1900, when faced with recurrent problems they simply 
replicated solutions they had utilised in previous decades and were not compelled to search for 
alternatives that possibly could have been more cost efficient. For example, the widening of the 
main lines in response to congestion had been previously undertaken in the 1880s. Furthermore, 
the reconstruction of Waterloo to increase its capacity was similar to the enlargements of the 
station in 1878 and 1885.799 Yet, the LSWR directors did not investigate how to ease main line 
congestion through alternative means, for example through improving methods of train control 
(see section 6.13 for an example), that may have been less expensive. Thus, while many of these 
investments were possibly necessary, in some cases this lack of innovation in investment policy 
may have raised the company’s capital burden excessively . Indeed, these projects likely explain 
why the LSWR’s ROCS fell from 4.92 in 1897 to 4.54 in 1902 (five-year moving average).800 Thus, 
as this thesis argues throughout, this case shows that where decision-makers could occupy posts 
for decades with few constraints on their freedom of action, their thinking on railway 
management and operation could stagnate to the detriment to the company’s financial 
performance.  
 
Overall, the scale and expense of the capital projects the LSWR’s directors initiated between 
1897 and 1901, which they expected would continue for many years thereafter, evidence their 
confidence in guaranteed future traffic growth and the relative ease with which they could access 
capital.  This is unsurprising, for more than thirty years they had never had to worry about such 
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things changing. However, as Sections 3 and 4 show, after 1900 these projects placed such a 
burden on the LSWR’s capital account that, in a period when its access to finance was limited, 
this restricted decision-makers’ ability to invest in projects that may have improved the 
company’s diminished profitability. Indeed, as Gourvish argued of British railway companies’ 
investment policies generally in the late-1890s, the LSWR ‘probably rushed into projects too 
enthusiastically.’801 
 
Section 2 – Wage increases 1897-1901 
 
6.5. Wages  
 
The LSWR’s wage bill increased from constituting 26.00 percent of gross revenue in 1897 to 26.98 
percent in 1901. This contributed to increasing the company’s costs and decreasing its 
profitability in this period (fuel and material costs also increased in this period – see appendix 
6.1). Given that decision-makers had considerable control over the LSWR’s wage policies, why 
they raised employees’ pay and increased the company’s operational expenditure needs to be 
examined. 
 
Some historians have argued that after 1870 greater government legislation over railway 
employees’ conditions of work increased companies’ costs. Particularly notable was the 1893 
Regulation of Railways Act which attempted to limit the hours employees worked, which 
theoretically augmented the number of individuals railways had to employ. 802  Yet, this 
legislation seemingly did not increase the LSWR’s wage costs. Between 1892 and 1895 the four 
major departments’ expenditure on wages actually declined as a proportion of company revenue 
from 27.36 percent to 26.00 percent, while the cost per train mile fell from 15.47d (15.60d) to 
15.41d (16.18d). This tentatively suggests, as some have argued, that the LSWR somehow got 
round the regulations contained in the Act. 
 
Major increases in the LSWR’s wage bill did occur in the late 1890s. This was because senior 
managers and directors altered employees’ working conditions and pay. For example, in 1899 
Campbell (Chairman) stated that wage increases in the half-year to 31 December 1899 been had 
not due to additional staff being employed, but because of ‘concessions they found it necessary 
to make in every department, involving additional pay, shorter hours of work, and extra hours of 
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Sunday duty, and this excess amounted to about £22,900 in the traffic and £13,200 in the 
locomotive departments.’803  
 
Unfortunately, only some of the detail of these changes has been found. Paid annual leave was 
extended to some employees. In 1895 signalmen at principal boxes east of Woking were given six 
days, while in 1898 shed porters at Nine Elms received three days leave for their first five years’ 
service and another day each subsequent year until they reached six. The most significant change 
to LSWR employees’ pay and conditions began in January 1898 when all Traffic Department staff 
became entitled to a half day’s pay for up to six hours of Sunday duty and a full day’s pay for over 
six.804 Overall, these and other changes to employment conditions, which were not the result of 
any government legislation, meant that by 1901 the chairman reported that the LSWR was 
employing more staff than in 1897.805 Partly as a consequence, the company’s overall 
expenditure on wages per train mile rose between 1897 and 1901 from 15.56d (16.38d) to 
16.62d (16.69d).   
 
This raised wage bill cannot be considered to be the result of unions’ pressure for better pay and 
conditions. Despite railway unions getting stronger in this period nationally,806 they never 
possessed many members within the LSWR. Scotter claimed in 1907 that only five percent of all 
employees were in the largest railway union, the ASRS, and when there was a national railway 
strike in 1911 only two of the company’s employees came out. Indeed, because senior LSWR 
officials did not fear union activity, in 1907 they dropped the company’s subscription to the anti-
union body, the National Free Labour Association.807 
 
Unlike many railway companies, for example the NER, whose officials met their employees’ 
requests for better pay and conditions with a hard-line approach,808  it can be suggested that the 
LSWR employees’ received improved employment conditions because their directors and 
managers possessed a highly paternalistic attitude towards those below them and, as such, were 
more willing to accede to their requests. Indeed, in 1901 at a headquarters staff dinner Owens 
stated that he ‘knew of no railway company which has so many social festivities as the South-
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Western, and I attribute it to hearty and unanimous loyalty which exists not only between the 
heads of department but on the whole staff throughout the service.’809 Indicative of this 
paternalistic attitude was also the lack of union membership within the LSWR, as presumably the 
majority of its employees felt they had no need to join such organisations. Furthermore, a letter 
to the Telegraph in 1911 stated that senior officials’ highly paternalistic and respectful attitude 
towards the staff was the root cause of LSWR employees not joining the national strike of that 
year. The writer, a company employee, noted that ‘we have our troubles, and, like the average 
Englishman, we sometimes grumble, but a general strike would be regarded as little less than 
treason.’810  
 
Giles argued this culture of paternalism, which also provided employees with a non-contributory 
pension scheme, education facilities, an orphanage, a savings bank and ambulance classes, was a 
calculated move by senior company officials to reduce employee militancy. In her opinion from 
some point in the 1870s and 1880s LSWR directors and managers began ‘to realise the need to 
appear benevolent’ and such a strategy was not from “compromise and cooperation” nor 
“negotiations and accommodations”’ but one of careful 'forward planning' by an astute 
management.811 Yet, Giles overplays the extent to which the LSWR’s management planned in 
detail the culture of paternalism. By the 1890s many of the culture’s elements had been built up 
gradually over the previous forty years under three different General Managers and nearly forty 
directors. Evidence presented in Chapter 4 suggests the culture became firmly established during 
Scott’s General Managership, a man who himself lacked an ability to think strategically, and later 
officials who joined the company were seemingly subsumed into it given its strong presence 
within the organisation. Hodgkins suggested the MSLR did not alienate its employees, yet he 
does not report that it possessed the sort benevolent culture the LSWR did.812 Nevertheless, 
Scotter, who had been employed by the MSLR before coming to the LSWR, accepted the 
heightened paternalism within the South-Western and eventually endorsed it wholeheartedly.813 
The evidence strongly suggests therefore that by the 1890s the heightened paternalism within 
the LSWR was not the result of strategies its managers and directors were employing. Rather, it 
was firmly established within the company and most, if not all directors and staff subscribed to it. 
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Irrespective of its origins, by the late-1890s the presence of this paternalistic culture possibly 
meant the company’s senior managers and directors were more willing to consider changing 
employees’ working conditions when requested to do so. These decisions therefore contributed 
to raising the LSWR’s expenditure in the period. Yet, it also considerably improved the nature of 
the company’s labour relations, at a time when other railways’ officials began coming into 
conflict with their increasingly militant staff over pay and employment conditions.814   
 
Section 3 – Operations after 1900 
 
Four main changes affected the LSWR’s financial performance after 1900. Firstly, the company’s 
suburban passenger business was attacked by tram competition and its passenger numbers 
stopped increasing. Secondly, the freight tonnage the company hauled did not increase as rapidly 
as before 1900. Thirdly, higher material, wage and fuel costs raised the company’s OR from 57.49 
percent in 1897 to 63.95 percent in 1901. Lastly, in a period when the company was engaging in 
numerous expensive capital projects, its ability to access finance became more difficult, thus 
limiting decision-makers’ ability to invest in schemes that would possibly have improved the 
company’s profitability. Confronted with this situation, the LSWR’s directors and senior managers 
were tasked with reducing company costs and maintaining profit when the underlying certainties 
of railway management that they had understood for decades, that traffic would always grow 
and capital was always available, had disappeared.   
 
The next two sections demonstrate how after 1900 the career paths of the LSWR’s senior 
managers – who in this period had considerable control of the railway’s operational policies – 
were important in determining their responses to the company’s depressed profitability. Only 
one highly innovative senior manager worked for the LSWR after 1898, the Superintendent of the 
Line between 1899 and 1902, Sam Fay. As Chapter 3 discussed, between 1892 and 1899 Fay had 
been the MSWJR’s General Manager. He therefore possessed a broader range of management 
experiences than his contemporaries, was not dedicated to the LSWR’s existing operational 
practices, and had developed a considerable capacity to think creatively. Thus, during his tenure 
he brought to the Traffic Department many innovations and advanced ideas about railway 
management, and began transforming it into one of the most enterprising lines in the country. 
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Nevertheless, on leaving to become the GCR’s General Manager in 1902815 many of the 
managerial and technological innovations Fay had pursued were not continued. Between 1902 
and 1911 the company’s operational policies were controlled by Owens, the General Manager, 
and Holmes, Fay’s successor. Nether had worked outside the LSWR and had been brought 
through the Traffic Department’s introvert clerical promotional structures from a young age (see 
Chapter 3).816 Consequently, because of their narrow employment experiences, and had only 
learnt about railway management from within the company, they had limited capacity to 
innovate or critically reassess how it was run, and many of their attempts to improve its 
management and find efficiencies were simply adaptations of established operational practices.  
 
Additionally, Owens and Holmes’ unadventurous and conventional approach to railway 
management was strengthened by the board’s constitution. Chapter 3 discussed how in the 
1900s most directors had considerable external business interests and, thus, were unable to 
dedicate much of their time to the railway. This left oversight of the company’s operational 
functions to two directors who had joined the board in the 1870s, Campbell and Govett, and two 
ex-LSWR employees who had served the railway for decades, Macaulay and Scotter.  Only one 
‘activist’ director joined the company after 1900, Drummond, but he lacked external business 
interests and presumably learnt about railway management from within the LSWR.817  
Consequently, given that four of these five active directors had had influence within the company 
since the 1880s, had since that time not worked outside it, and that all of them had few external 
business interests, it can be suggested that their views on railway management had stagnated by 
the 1900s. They therefore held similar views on railway management to Owens and Holmes, as 
will be demonstrated, while their ability to critically assess senior managers’ actions was limited.  
 
In sum, the traditional outlook on railway management held by the LSWR’s senior traffic 
managers, which were bolstered by similar views held by active directors, meant that after 1902 
the company never found the considerable efficiencies Owens’ successor from 1912, Herbert 
Ashcombe Walker, showed were possible. Thus, the company’s financial performance did not 
improve in the 1900s. Therefore, by contrasting Fay’s exemplary management of the company’s 
traffic matters (and through highlighting some of his initiatives as GCR General Manager), with 
Owens and Holmes’ conservative management, this Chapter develops one the thesis’ central 
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arguments: that because there was a dearth of development of, or innovation in managerial 
practice from within the LSWR between 1870 and 1911, the company’s operating techniques 
only advanced when new senior managers were appointed who had worked outside the 
company. 
 
6.6. The supply of capital 
 
The LSWR’s inability to improve its financial performance after 1900 cannot be solely attributed 
to senior managers’ traditional outlooks on railway management. At a time when the company 
was still undertaking major capital projects, described in Section 1, its ability to raise capital 
diminished. Decision-makers therefore had limited finance to invest in projects that may have 
improved profitability. After 1900 investors lost confidence in British railway securities. Irving 
argued this was because they were investing overseas.818 However, contemporary reports 
suggest the change was triggered by railway companies’ decreasing profitability.819 Either way, 
confidence in the LSWR’s shares declined after 1900 and its share price fell from 195.5 pence in 
1900 to 141.5 pence in 1911.820  
 
Steadily falling share prices both reflected and had an impact on the LSWR’s weakening ability to 
raise capital. Consequently, the directors attempted to curtail capital expenditure after 1900.821 
In 1901 the Engineering Committee ordered the Resident Engineer, Jacomb-Hood, to analyse 
expenditure on the company’s on-going projects. His report categorised the projects into three 
categories according to how he recommended they be proceeded with, as follows:- 
 
1. List A: works to be carried to completion. 
  (£652,195 capital [account], £6,608 revenue [account]) 
2. List B: works to proceed and finished at convenience. 
  (£298,500 capital, £748 revenue) 
3. List C: works to stop until further notice. 
  (£168,717 capital, £675 revenue)822 
 
                                                          
818
 Irving, R.J., ‘British Railway Investment and Innovation, 1900-1914’, p.39 
819
 Hull Daily Mail, Friday 26 July 1901; Lincolnshire Chronicle, Friday 11 May 1900; Manchester Courier and 
Lancashire General Advertiser, Wednesday 01 January 1902; unknown author, ‘English Railway Prospects’, 
The Saturday Review, (4 August  1900), p.139-140 
820
 Faulkner, and Williams, The LSWR in the Twentieth Century, p.216 
821
 Railway Magazine, June 1911, p.452 
822
 TNA, RAIL 411/28, Court of Directors Minute Book, 10 October 1901, p.129 
255 
 
The board endorsed his report, mirroring the NER and LNWR’s slowing and cancelling of projects 
in the same period.823 Yet, the majority of the works Jacomb-Hood analysed were continued with 
as planned, with only 15.07 percent of proposed capital expenditure being postponed until 
further notice. This suggests that in 1901 LSWR directors retained some confidence that capital 
supplies would be restored. Yet, by 1904 the capital situation had worsened and further action 
was taken to curtail expenditure. In February the Finance Committee requested that ‘In 
consequence of the increasing difficulty of raising capital at the present time not only by this 
company but all other railway companies …[that] capital expenditure for the current year…[be] 
kept down to the lowest possible limit.’ Owens thereafter was ordered to write a report on the 
LSWR’s capital expenditure824 which recommended that it not exceed £200,000 in that half year 
unless an emergency arose.825  
 
Curtailing expenditure was not the only means by which the LSWR attempted to deal with the 
problem of its decreased access to capital after 1900. As Chapter 3 discussed, directors with 
interests banking and finance joined the board in 1901, 1904, 1907 and 1910. These interlocking 
directorships may have been intended to allow the company to access capital on favourable 
terms, as well as acquire better information regarding financial markets. Unfortunately, there is 
no direct evidence to show they did. 
 
Overall, the LSWR’s inability to access capital easily after 1900 therefore negatively impacted on 
its financial performance. It slowed the progress of the company’s major on-going infrastructure 
projects, which could have possibly have improved its operating efficiency (see Section 1), while 
decision-makers’ ability to invest in schemes that may have improved its profitability and 
performance was, to some extent, limited, especially before 1905.  
 
6.7. Competition from trams 
 
One of the major challenges LSWR decision-makers faced after 1900 was the expansion of 
electric trams systems in its suburban district. These progressively attracted passengers away 
from the railway, diminishing its revenue.  The tram company that most challenged the LSWR’s 
suburban business was the London United Tramways (LUT). By 1899 it had obtained permission 
to build lines from Chiswick to Brentford and Hounslow; Acton to Ealing, and from Southall to 
Uxbridge. In that year it also placed before the Light Railway Commissioners further schemes for 
                                                          
823
 Irving, ‘British Railway Investment and Innovation, 1900-1914’ p.63 
824
 TNA, RAIL 411/31, Court of Directors Minute Book, 25 February 1904, p.19 
825
 TNA, RAIL 411/221, Special Committee on Capital Expenditure, 15 March 1904, p.390 
256 
 
lines from Hounslow to Hounslow Heath; from Brentford to Richmond and Twickenham, and 
from Twickenham to Hampton, Hampton Court, Hampton Wick, Richmond Bridge and 
Teddington.826 If built, this second tranche of lines would directly compete with the LSWR’s 
suburban services, and at the light railway commissioners meeting in June 1899 Fay stated the 
railway would lose between 1.5 and two million passengers yearly to them.  The LUT did not 
secure assent to build the lines and was ordered to take their plans before parliament. However, 
the company’s bill authorising them passed in August 1900827 and the lines were opened 
between 1901 and 1903. By 1906 the LUT had further connected to Kingston, Surbiton, New 
Malden and Wimbledon where it was also in competition with the LSWR.828 In addition to the 
LUT, in 1904 the London Country Council Tramways adopted plans to electrify its numerous horse 
tramways;829 further challenging the LSWR’s business in inner suburban areas around Vauxhall, 
Clapham Junction, Wandsworth and Putney.830  
 
Being clean, modern and more convenient than railways, electric trams were instantly successful, 
as predicted. In 1902 at the hearing of an LUT bill the LSWR’s solicitor stated that tram 
competition was depressing the railway’s revenue by £10,000 per annum and gross receipts on 
the Kew Bridge to Hounslow route had fallen from £1,516 to £524 in six months. 831 Later in the 
decade this competition had not abated and in August 1908 Scotter stated the LSWR had lost 
£11,000 from tram competition in the previous six months.832 Only increased income from the 
LSWR’s long-distance services, the speed and comfort of which were significantly improved after 
1900, offset the loss of trade on the company’s suburban routes.833   
 
Electrification Possibilities  
 
Electric traction was considered, especially on suburban lines, to be superior to steam in 
numerous ways. It was more reliable, incurred lower operating costs and, most importantly to 
the LSWR, provided a more comfortable travelling experience for passengers. Indeed, it was this 
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attribute that tempted passengers away from the trams when the LSWR eventually electrified its 
suburban lines between 1913 and 1916.834 
 
The possible electrification of the LSWR’s suburban network started developing its senior 
officials’ minds in the late-1890s as Scotter particularly supported the technology. He had 
initiated the company’s investment in and consequent working of the electrically powered 
Waterloo and City Railway (WCR) in 1891,835 and this had introduced LSWR officials to electric 
traction. For example, the company’s consulting engineer, Galbraith, supervised the line’s 
construction; the work was undertaken by Perry & Co, one of the company’s contractors, and the 
LSWR’s Signalling Superintendent, Annett, designed the signals. 836 Furthermore, between 1895 
and its absorption by the LSWR in 1907837 four ‘activist’ South-Western directors held positions 
on the WCR’s board. Their extensive experience of the advantages of electric traction probably 
helped develop amongst them the idea that parts of the company’s suburban network could be 
electrified.838 This thinking was bolstered in the late 1890s by Scotter’s belief that electric traction 
had the potential to be railways’ future form of motive power. In 1898 he stated that he was 
‘within a measurable period of electric traction’ and that it could theoretically replace steam.839 
Two years later he proclaimed that an unspecified invention in Austria would 'revolutionise 
electric traction in this country.’840 Scotter was further exposed to electric tractions’ portential in 
1899 when he joined the board of the Great Northern and City Railway841 (he later became 
chairman842). This was electrically powered and built to main line standards, demonstrating how 
electrification could be applied to trains larger than those on sub-surface tube lines.843 
Consequently, by 1902 the idea of electrifying the company’s network had become fully formed 
in officials’ minds; especially within the Engineering Department. For example, in that year 
Jacomb-Hood and the Waterloo Telegraph Office chief clerk (later Signal and Telegraph 
Superintendent844), Thorrowgood, gave papers to the company’s Main Line and Metropolitan 
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District Debating Society on ‘Electric Traction.’845 Jacomb-Hood’s paper even suggested 
electrifying the suburban routes that were eventually converted from 1913 onwards.846  
 
Electric Delay 
 
Therefore, even before the LUT trams were taking substantial portions of the LSWR’s passenger 
traffic, electrification was considered a plausible mode of traction for the company’s suburban 
services. Yet, despite enthusiasm within the LSWR for electrification before 1905, plans to 
convert its lines were only initiated in 1912.847 This delay was caused by numerous factors.  
 
Firstly, electrifying the LSWR’s suburban lines was expected to very costly. 848  With the company 
heavily committed to its other capital projects before 1905, and with its ability to access capital 
limited, it is unlikely that it could have funded a suburban electrification project easily. Indeed, in 
August 1902 Campbell stated that electrification would not occur until the main line widenings 
were completed and the reconstruction of Waterloo Station was well advanced.849   
 
Additionally, given that electrification of the LSWR’s suburban lines would make it one of the 
largest such networks in the world, there was considerable uncertainty as to the form of electric 
traction the company would use. Railways in Britain and abroad were adopting different systems; 
for example the LBSCR had an overhead electrical system,850 while the MDR’s trains were 
powered from a third rail.851 Chivers argued that delaying the implementation of electrification 
allowed the LSWR time to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of the different systems of 
traction.852 Indeed, Scotter stated in February 1905 that while the board was watching 
electrification elsewhere, only ‘at the proper time’ would the LSWR see whether the technology’s 
adoption on its suburban routes was possible.853 In this respect the LSWR was not unique; Irving 
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has argued that NER decision-makers were also uncertain as to what form of electric traction to 
use on their electrification schemes around this time.854 
 
Despite the LSWR decision-makers’ considerable experience with electric traction after 1905, it 
can be suggested that their delay in electrifying the company’s suburban network can largely be 
attributed to their conventional outlooks on railway policy and strategy. By the second half of the 
decade there was far more clarity about which forms of electric traction were efficient and 
reliable, and many electrified services, such as the MDR’s, were by that point demonstrably 
successful. Yet, within the LSWR, interest in the progress of electric traction seemingly waned 
after 1905. This diminished interest might be attributed to the fact that Scotter, who was largely 
responsible for the LSWR’s early enthusiasm for electric traction, was committing less time to the 
company’s affairs between 1906 and 1910 because he was serving on the vice-regal commission 
on Irish Railways. 855  
 
Most importantly, the demands on the LSWR’s capital account eased considerably after 1905. By 
this year the majority of the company’s main line widenings and infrastructure improvements 
had been completed. Indicative of this fact, in 1906 the LSWR had no trouble raising the capital 
to purchase the WCR for £627,340.856 This amount was, coincidentally, almost the same as 
Jacomb-Hood’s projected cost of a suburban electrification scheme in 1902857 (if inflation 
adjusted his figure of £630,000 is just short of the actual expenditure on the LSWR’s suburban 
electrification between 1913 and 1916 of £1,186,963858). It therefore seems unlikely that after 
1905 LSWR decision-makers would have been unable to find the capital for a suburban 
electrification project if they so desired.  
 
Also, the mere fact that the board decided to purchase the WCR, which was making adequate 
profits, demonstrates the directors’ traditional outlook on policy. The decision was taken 
because, allegedly, they feared that the WCR would lose traffic to increasing cab numbers and 
inner London tramways, and that the LSWR would, as per the agreement of 1894, have to make 
up the short-fall in its profits so it could pay the three percent dividend on its ordinary stock (see 
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Chapter 5).859 However, it can be tentatively suggested that had the board possessed a more 
ambitious approach to policy, the LSWR’s capital would have been better spent on electrifying its 
suburban lines to win back some of the passengers and revenue it had already lost. 
 
The LSWR’s delay in electrifying its lines after 1905 can therefore only be attributed to senior 
decision-makers’ possessing a conservative approach to policy. This view is given weight by the 
contemporary view of Drummond, the company’s chairman from 1912. He tied the delay directly 
to Scotter and Owens’ administration, saying that the former’s illness towards the end of his 
chairmanship and the latter’s impending retirement had caused electrification not to be 
initiated.860 Yet, these issues were only relevant in the years shortly before 1912 and do not 
explain why nothing was heard from within the LSWR about electrification projects between 
1905 and 1911. The LSWR decision-makers' conservative approach to the issue was not unique. 
Irving has argued that the NER and LNWR possibly delayed and curtailed electrification projects 
around the same time for similar reasons. Indeed, he argued that contemporaries were 
‘disturbed’ by numerous British companies’ reluctance to pursue electrification projects in the 
face of tram competition. For example, in November 1911 the Railway Times commented that 
‘the most serious lack of development is in the electrification of the busy passenger lines in and 
near our major cities. In the U.S.A. and in Germany, we see great schemes going forward, yet this 
country, which should be in the van, lags behind.’861   
 
Ultimately, the LSWR’s failure to electrify its suburban lines after 1905 caused profitability to 
wane further. By 1913 the company’s loss of a million passenger per year to the trams was 
costing it £100,000 annually. 862 Only when the LSWR received a new dynamic General Manager, 
Walker, supported by a new chairman, Drummond, was suburban electrification finally initiated 
in 1913. It was hugely successful; between January 1915 and June 1920 the number of 
passengers travelling on the LSWR’s suburban lines rose from around two million to nearly five 
million.863  
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6.8. Passenger services 
 
In the absence of an electrification project, responsibility for winning back traffic shifted from the 
directors to the company’s management, with Owens and his Holmes looking for ways to counter 
the tram threat without significant capital outlay. Firstly, bogie carriages were introduced on 
suburban routes, replacing six-wheeled carriages. By 1900 some of the LSWR’s suburban 
carriages had been constructed the 1870s, and as such in 1900 and 1901 the Locomotive 
Committee ordered that similar six-wheeled carriages be built.864  However, with the challenge 
from trams increasing, in May 1902 thirty-two bogie carriages four car block-sets were ordered 
for suburban routes,865  and by September 1912 145 block-sets had been built.866 These were 
more comfortable and the bogies gave travellers a smoother ride than the six-wheel carriages. 
What passengers thought of these new carriages is unknown; however, they were evidently not 
drawn back to the railway.867 Secondly, to reduce operational costs but increase service 
frequency on short branches Drummond, the Locomotive Superintendent, introduced railmotors 
which combined a locomotive and carriage in one unit and were cheaper to run than full trains.868 
Initially, two were constructed for the LSWR’s joint Fratton and Southsea branch with the LBSCR, 
on which the companies were in direct competition with trams.869 Deemed a success, the LSWR 
then built seventeen up to June 1906 for country branches, with two operating in its suburban 
territory between Twickenham and Gunnersbury in 1910.870 Nevertheless, with limited capacity, 
regular maintenance requirements871 and their uneconomical nature, the railmotors were 
ultimately unsuccessful and were all withdrawn in the late 1910s.872 
 
Owens also negotiated with the LUT in an effort to mitigate the damage it was doing to the 
LSWR’s business. The LUT’s 1904 Parliamentary bill gave it powers to extend its network to 
Staines; to which the LSWR naturally objected as the line would be another source of 
competition for its suburban services. However, Owens negotiated an agreement whereby the 
LSWR would drop its opposition to the bill if for three years the LUT did not promote further 
routes in the territory where the companies were in competition. Also, within this time-frame the 
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LUT’s Staines project was only to proceed with the LSWR’s consent.873 While this agreement did 
nothing to win back traffic to the railway, it prevented the further development of the LUT’s 
network and additional trade being lost to the trams. The LUT never connected to Staines.874 
 
Lastly, the LSWR manipulated passenger fares, particularly season tickets. As third class 
passengers particularly had deserted the railway for the trams, in 1902 the company started 
issuing third class season tickets in an effort to win them back. Furthermore, in 1911 Owens was 
considering widening the area covered by season tickets and reducing their cost, to encourage 
individuals to live in areas beyond the trams’ reach. Indeed, given the increased speed of the 
LSWR’s suburban services, the extra distance was not expected to be problematic for 
passengers.875 Ultimately, however, all these measures seemingly did little to reclaim passenger 
traffic from the trams.876  
 
Timetabling 
 
The LSWR’s inability to win back passenger traffic from the trams was not wholly due to the 
ineffectiveness of these measures or the failure to electrify its suburban network. Some of the 
blame can be placed on Henry Holmes, the LSWR Superintendent of the Line since 1902, who had 
charge of the company’s train timetables.877 When Walker became the LSWR’s General Manager 
in 1912 he identified the timetable as a significant weakness, stating the whole operating 
department needed ‘tightening up.’ While its excursion traffic was well-handled, he was 
dissatisfied with the timetabling arrangements of regular services, particularly in suburban 
districts. During Holmes’ superintendency the LSWR’s train service had seemingly become 
unappealing; presumably deterring passengers from travelling with the company in its suburban 
territories where trams were more regular. In an effort to improve suburban passenger services, 
in 1912 Walker asked Holmes to prepare draft ‘headway’ or ‘clock-face’ timetables for the 
Kingston Loop services, where trains arrived at stations at a set time on the hour and thus 
eliminated passengers’ need to check timetables. After a month Holmes returned and stated that 
while such arrangements were possible on smaller lines, their institution on the LSWR was 
impossible. Walker was astonished by this response and consequently transferred timetabling 
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planning department from Holmes’ remit and into his. Eventually headway timetables were 
produced four years later.878  
 
Personal circumstances may have explained part of Holmes’ resistance to headway timetables. 
There was always a likelihood Holmes would clash with Walker given that the former had 
expected to become General Manager on Owens’ retirement.879  Nevertheless, in large part his 
resistance to headway timetables was probably attributable to the same organisational 
traditionalism that hindered the LSWR’s initiation of an electrification project after 1905. This will 
now be discussed. 
 
6.9. Conservatism in passenger services 
 
Overall, despite the company’s profitability coming under pressure from tram competition (as 
well as other sources) between 1900 and 1911 the effectiveness of the LSWR decision-makers’ 
response to this situation was largely hindered, especially after 1905, by their highly conservative 
concepts of railway operation. Policies such as improved carriages, negotiating with rivals (the 
LUT), and fare manipulation had all been tried, in some form, in the company’s history, while 
policies that were radical, such as suburban electrification and the institution of headway 
timetables were resisted.  
 
It is interesting to note that at the same time Sam Fay was innovating to attract customers to the 
GCR’s services. In response to tramway competition in 1904 he introduced around Liverpool 
Britain’s first weekly zone season ticket for local journeys. Furthermore, in 1902 the GCR was the 
first British railway to establish, with considerable benefits for the company, a dedicated publicity 
department.880  It can therefore be considered that these innovations, which were eminently 
suited to a passenger railway such as the LSWR, possibly would have been pushed for or 
introduced by Fay had he not left the company. Yet, it was only in 1913, when Walker was 
General Manager, that the LSWR established its own Publicity Department.881  
 
The contrast between the level of innovation within the LSWR after 1902 and what Fay was doing 
at the GCR (and what he could have possibly done in the LSWR) is therefore important in 
demonstrating how the careers of the former company’s decision-makers shaped its financial 
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performance. Fay was far more of an innovator that Owens, Holmes or the LSWR’s Board. Apart 
from his natural skill as a railway administrator, he had spent a considerable portion of his career 
between 1892 and 1899 outside the LSWR. This presumably served him well. His thinking on 
railway management was not constrained by one set of established practices and he had 
developed a capacity to think creatively.  
 
Contrastingly, it can be suggested that LSWR decision-makers’ narrow outlook on policy after 
1902 was the result of them having worked within the company for decades, with little contact 
with business or railway administration outside it. Owens, Holmes and all the senior traffic 
managers had never worked outside the Traffic Department’s rigid, hierarchical and introvert 
promotional ladders, while the most influential directors (Scotter, Macaulay and Campbell) had 
joined the company, either as directors or managers, long before 1900, and had few external 
business interests (see Chapter 3). These individuals therefore had not the experience or 
knowledge to generate innovative ideas that may have won back traffic from the trams; while 
most of them were institutionalised within the company’s existing operational practices and 
found it difficult to critically assess their quality.  
 
As such, this section has shown the importance to the LSWR’s financial performance after 1900 
of the backgrounds and careers of its decision-makers. Fay’s range of employment experiences 
gave him the capacity to think creatively and critique effectively existing operating practices, 
while because those he left behind within the LSWR had little experience of railway management 
outside it, their capacity to do these things was severely limited and, as a result, the company’s 
financial performance did not improve after 1902. This argument will be developed in the next 
section of the chapter. 
Section 4 – Reducing operational costs 
 
6.10. Introduction 
 
Crafts, Leunig and Mulatu 
1899-1901 1910-12 Change % Change 
0.054 0.025 -0.029 -46.30% 
Mitchell, Chambers and 
Crafts 
1897 1910 Change % Change 
4.3 3.4 -0.9 -20.93% 
Table 4: LSWR cost inefficiency scores. Cost inefficiency in these studies is defined as the ratio of 
observed costs to minimum feasible costs.  Source: Crafts, Leunig and Mulatu, ‘Were British railway 
companies well managed in the early twentieth century’, p.853 and Mitchell, Chambers, and Crafts, 
‘How good was the profitability of British railways 1870-1912?’, p.808-09 
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While the LSWR never effectively countered the competition from trams after 1900, its senior 
managers did have some success in reducing operational expenditure in response to the fuel and 
material price increases that contributed to inflating the company’s OR from 57.49 percent in 
1897 to 63.95 percent in 1901.   
 
After 1900 Scotter’s management structure remained in place; the LSWR’s departments 
operating largely independently of each other, coordinated only by the General Manager’s 
strategic goals. Owens tasked all his department heads with reducing departmental costs and, as 
such, studies have shown that the LSWR’s cost inefficiency fell in the period (Table 4). However, 
the extent to which department heads found cost reductions was predominantly dependent on 
their knowledge and abilities and, thus, they had varying degrees of success. Indeed, what this 
section again demonstrates is that senior traffic managers’ introverted and insular careers 
impacted negatively on their ability to innovate or critically assess the worth of established 
management practices. Consequently, by 1911 the company’s operations were not as efficient as 
they could have been. 
 
6.11. Wagon Loading 
 
British railways between 1870 and 1914 were frequently criticised for their poor wagon loading. 
Contemporary commentators such as Acworth882 and Paish883 argued that larger wagons, better 
management and use of more sophisticated statistics, such as the ton-mile, would increase train 
loads and reduce operating costs. These arguments were restated, essentially unchanged, by 
Aldcroft decades later.884 
 
As in the NER’s case,885 the LSWR attempted, on a smaller scale, to improve goods train loads and 
reduce haulage by building wagons that had capacities greater than the standard of ten tons. In 
1899, on either Owens’ or Panter’s initiative, an experimental twenty-five ton capacity long bogie 
wagon was constructed.886 Presumably because its services were not in demand, no more were 
built. In October 1903 Owens and Malby, the Goods Manager,887 experimented with wagons that 
had capacities of fifteen tons,888 and by 1913 389 were in service.889 Again, the extra capacity 
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these wagons provided was seemingly unrequired. In 1913 the LSWR’s Carriage and Wagon 
Superintendent from 1904, Warner, stated that fifteen ton wagons were seldom loaded to full 
capacity (like ten ton wagons) and were only economical for ‘working between certain points 
where there is constantly a large quantity of medium-weight articles to be conveyed,’890 for 
example, on the NER where there was bulk haulage of minerals, particularly coal, over long-
distances.891  After 1903 ten ton wagons continued to dominate the company’s stock, with 9,325 
still running in 1913.892  
 
Nevertheless, like many railways at the time, the LSWR’s ability to use larger capacity wagons 
was possibly restricted by the interrelatedness of its capital: investment in larger wagons would 
require investment in developing workshops, yards, warehouses and docks to accommodate 
them, while its customers also would have to augment their facilities at considerable capital 
expense.893 Indeed, Scott has argued that the British railway industry’s persistence with small 
coal wagons can be ‘explained in terms of path dependence, network externalities, and the 
installed base of the industry’s fixed capital, which made it more costly to rationalise the existing 
system.’894 Nevertheless, lack of evidence means it is unclear if technological interrelatedness 
hindered the LSWR’s adoption of larger capacity wagons. 
 
However, LSWR’s decision-makers’ inability to pursue more vigorously the utilisation of larger 
capacity wagons may have also been down to their narrow outlook regarding the company’s 
goods operations. Statements from senior officials suggest they believed that wagon sizes were 
limited given customers’ demands for the quick despatch of small loads of goods.  In 1903 Judd of 
the Superintendent of the Line’s office, who was involved in rearranging the company’s goods 
trains at the time (see Section 6.14.), stated at the company’s Main Line and Metropolitan 
Debating Society that ‘small shopkeepers in the West of England are accustomed to order from 
the London warehouses and expect to receive those small consignments the day after 
dispatch…a small wagon, conveying a light load, is the only method of dealing with such 
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traffic.’895  Thus, it is possible that the LSWR could have found economies through the more 
fervent investigation of how larger capacity wagons’ could be used; although without more 
evidence this remains conjecture. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be strongly suggested that decision-makers’ narrow outlook on policy also 
impacted on the extent to which they believed they could improve the loading of the wagons the 
company did own. The LSWR’s wagons were usually despatched when they were not fully loaded, 
something Scotter acknowledged in 1910: the British railways had ‘so educated the public up to 
the advantages of speedy transit, that an express service is now demanded as a matter of course, 
and wagons cannot therefore be detained fully loaded.’896 Senior company officials rejected the 
idea they could utilise more sophisticated management statistics to mitigate this problem. Owens 
was on the Board of Trade’s 1908 committee investigating British railways’ accounts and 
statistical returns. He contributed to the final report, but with two other committee members 
wrote a dissenting addition. They rejected the idea that ton-mile statistics, which measured the 
distance each ton of goods travelled, would improve loading, and stated such statistics would 
never replace the ‘continuous supervision and check by subordinate officers over the efficient 
loading of wagons and trains and over the economical working of our railway.’897  Also, Scotter 
stated in 1905 that ton-mileage statistics  ‘would conceivable be useful where traffic was largely 
of a similar or like nature, and was also fairly regular throughout the year, but they must be 
useless if traffic was considerably varied in its nature and irregular in its volume,’ as it was in the 
LSWR’s case.898  
 
Therefore, between 1900 and 1911 Owens and Scotter believed the company’s wagons were 
being loaded as efficiently as possible given its trading environment. However, they were wrong. 
Reforms Walker introduced highlighted how improvements in the company’s wagon loading 
went unrealised before 1912, revealing Owens and Scotter’s narrow perspectives on policy. From 
December 1911 the average monthly load per wagon was recorded at Nine Elms Goods Depot; 
the exercise was repeated at eight other locations from January 1913. This was the first time the 
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LSWR collected such data. Outside Nine Elms only slight loading improvements were recorded 
between January 1913 and July 1914. However, at Nine Elms the average load per wagon rose 
from 3.268 tons in December 1911 to 3.959 tons in December 1913 (twenty-one percent).899 
Drummond, the chairman, put this improvement down to a newly appointed Outdoor Goods 
Manager (in addition to the ‘indoor’ goods manager). He provided the goods operation with 
better oversight compared with the previous situation where the whole department had been 
controlled by one Goods Manager, Malby, under whom Walker believed its efficiency had 
waned.900 The Railway Gazette noted that, consequently, the company’s better loaded wagons 
meant its goods train mileage and operating costs had been reduced.901   
 
The rejection by LSWR decision-makers of the idea that wagon loading could be improved, when 
Walker showed it clearly could have been, reinforces the argument they held conservative 
outlooks on railway management which limited capacity to innovate. Indicative of this, the 
Outdoor Goods Manager who improved the Goods Department’s wagon loading after 1912 was 
someone Walker recruited from the LNWR: George Tullidge Hedge. 902  This suggests Walker did 
not trust established LSWR employees to improve the company’s wagon loading given that they 
were too familiar with its established practices and did not have the experience or knowledge to 
reform them.  
 
6.12. Judd and goods train movement 
 
Goods train problems 
 
While the LSWR’s goods wagon loading did not seemingly improve between 1900 and 1911, 
better goods train management achieved cost reductions. In late-1902 Judd, a clerk in the 
Superintendent of the Lines office903 – who therefore had worked under Sam Fay –  spoke at the 
LSWR’s Main Line and Metropolitan Debating Society and identified three areas where more 
astute goods train and wagon movement could reduce company expenditure.  
 
Judd highlighted that the nature of the LSWR’s goods business meant proportionately its haulage 
of empty wagons was high compared with other railways. The region the company served 
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consumed more goods than it produced and, consequently, the returning of empty wagons, 
which generated no revenue, raised operating costs and caused difficulties as surplus empty 
wagons could accumulate at the Nine Elms goods yard and around the network. Conversely, at 
other times, when the company required wagons for special trains from London, sometimes 
empty wagons had to be worked up from country locations, again raising expenditure for no 
immediate return. Given these facts, Judd argued that the distribution and working of empty 
wagons needed better oversight to reduce unnecessary haulage. Judd also suggested there was 
scope to increase goods trains’ length. The LSWR ran some long trains between Woking and 
Basingstoke consisting of fifty-four or fifty-five wagons. However, the average length was thirty-
seven wagons, and travelling west of Basingstoke the number of wagons attached gradually 
reduced. Judd argued that just adding five extra wagons to each train would decrease train 
mileage and reduce haulage costs (although, he did not specify by how much). Furthermore, 
trains running direct between Aldershot and Southampton via Alton were limited to nineteen 
wagons over the Meadstead bank, requiring wagons from Winchester and Southampton to travel 
via Woking. Thus, he also suggested that more powerful goods locomotives might remedy this 
situation, stating that while some argued high coal prices prohibited these being constructed, in 
his opinion these claims were overstated and ‘opportunities for larger economies have escaped 
notice.’904 Indeed, it is possible that he had absorbed Fay’s belief – which was stated when 
visiting America in 1901 – that more powerful locomotives would improve the efficiency of the 
company’s goods train operations.905 
 
Lastly, the size of the LSWR’s marshalling yards hampered the goods operation’s efficiency. Many 
yards restricted the formation of fast ‘through’ goods trains, as space was insufficient to quickly 
shunt out of formed trains wagons that were not destined for their final destination. Similarly, 
small capacity yards at Willesden, Neasden, Clapham Junction and Brentford had to despatch 
trains quickly because of the need to create space for the high volume of incoming traffic. 
Furthermore, at Nine Elms only one train at a time could be broken up and this took 
approximately forty individual shunting actions. To remedy these problems, Judd proposed that 
the Neasden yard could be expanded and a new large marshalling yard be built near the four 
yards cited, with workings between it and them. In his estimation Brentford or, as would become 
reality in 1910, Feltham would be suitable sites (see Figure 7). He also proposed a new goods 
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yard between Wimbledon and Earlsfield stations to ease Nine Elms’ burden and allow more 
through goods trains to be sent quickly.906   
 
 
 
 
 
Solving the problems 
 
Judd’s lecture expressed concerns senior traffic managers had regarding the goods train service’s 
efficiency. Thus, by 1911 the three issues he had raised had all started to be addressed. Decision-
makers’ most pressing concern was the small size of the LSWR’s goods yards. In 1906 the 
Brentford yard was extended907 and in 1907 the Bevois Park yard near Southampton was also 
enlarged.908 Furthermore, when the Locomotive Works moved from Nine Elms in 1909 the vacant 
space was used to enlarge the company’s goods accommodation there.909  Lastly, in 1910 Owens 
presented to the Traffic Committee plans for a marshalling yard at Feltham.910 Despite land being 
acquired in 1911, construction work was not proceeded with until April 1916. The reason for the 
delay is unknown,911 but the yard eventually opened in 1922.912  
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However, it is important to note that the LSWR’s moves to build a marshalling yard took place 
nearly a decade after Judd’s lecture. Clearly Fay, Judd’s superior, saw the need for the company 
to build a marshalling yard near London while he was Superintendent of the Line. In 1901, while 
visiting America, he expressed his belief that the company’s goods train services were 
‘wasteful.’913 In 1900 the company considered a site near Byfleet for a marshalling yard, but this 
was too far from the points of exchange, and then they entered into negotiation for land at 
Feltham Junction in 1901, the price of which was too high.914 However, once Fay had left the 
company, and Holmes and Owens had taken control of traffic policy, there was no further talk of 
a marshalling yard being built until 1910. It can therefore be suggested that this delay occurred 
because of Owens and Holmes’ conservative outlooks on railway management, described at 
length above, meant they did not, or could not appreciate how such a yard would improve the 
company’s efficient and economical working. Fay, however, still did; the GCR opened a large 
marshalling yard at Wath in 1907.915 Thus, if Fay had not left the LSWR in 1902 the company may 
have built a marshalling yard sooner than it did.  
 
The movement of wagons around LSWR’s network was also more efficiently organised after 
1900. Comparative examination of the company’s 1892 and 1911 appendices to the working 
timetable, issued to all staff, shows that by the 1910s wagons’ routes and destinations were 
more closely overseen by company officials.  The 1911 appendices possesses far more 
instructions regarding the ‘formation and marshalling of goods trains.’ Additionally, it provides 
greater detail on the routes some wagons should take to specific locations; for example, wagons 
owned by other railways bound for the Brentford yard, wagons’ order in trains bound for Nine 
Elms, and the return of empty coal wagons via Salisbury. It would also seem that by 1911 the 
company had introduced a system of stock inspectors acting under the superintendent of the line 
who controlled closely the movement of all passenger and goods rolling stock. Lastly, the 1911 
appendices also instructed employees on how to label wagons correctly, indicating that their 
routes were more carefully monitored.916 Most significantly, from 1901 onwards the LSWR 
affected efficiencies through the rearrangement of its goods trains. In that year Judd917 and 
Evans, another Goods Department employee, were both given £20 gratuities by the board for 
their involvement in the ‘revision of goods trains throughout the line.’918  
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Collectively these measures considerably reduced the LSWR’s goods train mileage. Between 1900 
and 1911 this dropped from 4,787,119 to 4,429,880; a decrease of 7.46 percent. Furthermore, 
over the same period the mileage goods trains ran as a proportion of the company’s total train 
mileage decreased from twenty-seven percent to twenty-two percent. The company’s tonnage of 
goods hauled per goods train mile also increased from 1.34 to 1.59 tons (18.38 percent).919 
Presumably, therefore, this improved goods train mileage contributed to lowering company costs 
through reducing its expenditure on fuel 
 
The LSWR goods trains’ lower mileage after 1900 highlights what the last chapter argued: that 
before then, and despite Scotter’s reforms, the company’s operations were not as efficient as 
possible. Evidently, the LSWR’s profitability was healthy enough that senior traffic managers 
were under little pressure to maximise the elimination of cost inefficiencies; and only when the 
company’s cost position worsened after 1900 did they strive harder to find efficiencies within its 
established operating practices.  
 
6.13. Low-Pressure Pneumatic Signalling 
 
Conservatism amongst the LSWR’s decision-makers after Fay’s departure can, potentially, be 
found in other aspects of company policy after 1902. Fay expressed to the New York Times in 
October 1901 his admiration for low-pressure pneumatic signalling systems that many American 
Railroads used.920 This was unsurprising; some months earlier the LSWR, on Fay’s advice, had 
finished installing the country’s first such systems at Grately Station.921 This experiment was 
initially deemed successful, and by late-1902 pneumatic systems were installed on the main line 
between Woking and Basingstoke.922 It was expected that these systems would have two 
principal benefits. Whereas most existing systems were labour-intensive, for example at major 
junctions where large signal boxes were worked by multiple staff members, pneumatic signals 
were worked by levers on a panel. They therefore saved space next to the line and the expense of 
employing so many signalmen.923  
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Ultimately, low-pressure pneumatic signals did not spread throughout the British railway industry 
because the technology was quickly supplanted by the rival electro-pneumatic and all-electric 
systems. However, apart from installations at Clapham Junction and Staines, pneumatic systems 
did not spread to anywhere else on the LSWR’s network either.924 Faulkner and Williams argued 
this was because they were costly to install and maintain.925 No evidence has been found to 
verify this. Even if this was true, after 1902 the LSWR’s directors and senior traffic managers 
abandoned completely investigation of how enhanced signalling systems – which many other 
companies were examining at the time – could improve the efficiency of the company’s train 
services.926 As with so many aspects of the LSWR’s policies after 1900, it can be suggested that 
this was because after Fay’s departure the innovation and far-sightedness he had brought to the 
company dissipated, and its policies and strategies became dominated by traffic managers and 
directors whose outlook on railway management was conservative. Only when Walker became 
General Managership in 1912 did the company again investigate improved and more economical 
methods of signalling.927  
 
6.14. Competition and the GWR 
 
Another area where the LSWR sought economies after 1900 was through the elimination of 
competition with the GWR. The two companies had been competitors for West Country traffic 
since the 1840s, through the facilities they afforded to customers, the territories they claimed 
(see Chapters 4 and 5) and the speed of trains from London.928 However, from the 1890s the 
LSWR’s expenditure on this contest grew. After 1898 the company began improving its long-
distance carriage stock, and in that year introduced some tri-composite carriages, with improved 
toilet facilities. Indeed, increased numbers of corridor coaches were built through the decade;929 
and steam heating and electric lighting was installed on all new carriages from 1901. Restaurant 
cars also appeared in this year and these increased in number up to 1907.930 Furthermore, there 
was a gradual acceleration of the company’s competitive long-distance services. Fay, accelerated 
services to the West Country. In 1901 Exeter was reached from Waterloo in 210 minutes. 
However, by using Drummond’s new express locomotives this had decreased to 195 minutes by 
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1903 and to 192 minutes in 1911. Railway Magazine stated that the company ‘reaped the 
reward’ of such speed, with trains being full.931  
 
The precise effect of this competition on the LSWR’s profit margins is uncertain; however it 
evidently was doing some damage. In light of the successful working agreement between the 
Midland and LNWR932 in 1908 Scotter began negotiations with the GWR with the aim of the 
companies becoming ‘allies, instead…of rivals’ and ending competition.933 These conversations 
continued until midway through 1910 when an agreement for ninety years was signed whereby 
all competitive traffic was pooled and certain facilities for passengers were shared.934 This 
effectively ended the West of England competition and in August 1910 Scotter announced that 
while it would take some years to realise the financial benefits of the agreement, some 
economies had already been made.935 With the competition on West Country trains being 
eliminated, the time taken by the fastest expresses to reach Exeter had increased to 198 minutes 
by 1912.936 Furthermore, as a result of the agreement in 1911 the LSWR halted the doubling of its 
line between Copplestone and Umberleigh, presumably saving it capital expense.937  
 
Nevertheless, as the last chapter argued, the competition with the GWR probably did not harm 
the LSWR profits to the extent that historians such as Cain claimed it did.938 For example, 
competitive trains to Exeter constituted only a small proportion of the company’s passenger 
services. Between 1 June and 30 September 1909 there were five ‘down’ and five ‘up’ 
competitive express trains between London and Exeter daily, with four of these services only 
being run in the summer (competitive services are defined as those classified in the working 
timetable as ‘express’). The LSWR therefore scheduled approximately 2,558 competitive trains 
between London and Exeter in 1909.939 Given this route was 171.75 miles in length,940 these 
trains would have run about 439,337 train miles overall, only 2.21 percent of the LSWR’s total 
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train mileage in 1909.941  They might have been expensive to operate, but even so, if it is 
considered these competitive trains were ‘full,’ as the Railway Magazine reported,942 it is likely 
they only marginally affected the company’s financial performance after 1900.  
 
This tentative conclusion is supported by the fact that, in a period when senior LSWR decision-
makers were searching for economies, it was only at the decade’s end that they approached the 
GWR. The competition was possibly not considered an important factor in the company’s 
depressed profitability after 1900. The damage trams were doing to the LSWR’s suburban 
business was likely a far greater worry. 
 
6.15. Locomotive Department affairs 
 
Acting under Owens’ general direction, after 1900 Locomotive and Engineering Departments also 
attempted to reduce their operational expenditure. The majority of the LSWR’s increased 
expenditure after 1897 can be attributed to rising coal prices, which increased from 13.83s in 
1898 to 17.44s in 1902 (17.51), or by 26.19 percent (Appendix 6.1).943  Consequently, combined 
with other material and wage increases, the Locomotive Department’s costs as a proportion of 
overall company revenue increased in from 12.75 percent in 1897 to 17.14 percent in 1901. This 
growth in departmental costs also constituted 67.64 percent of the increase in the company’s OR 
over the same period 
 
Dugald Drummond, the LSWR’s Locomotive Superintendent from 1895, had almost total 
responsibility for the Locomotive Department’s performance and numerous measures he took 
improved the quality and efficiency of its management. He gave the Locomotive Department a 
discipline and professionalization that it had lacked during Adams’ administration.944 He came 
down particularly on drivers’ drinking. Indeed, in some cases they were known to have entered 
station refreshment rooms for pints of beer when stopped at stations.945 Furthermore, he 
strengthened oversight of departmental functions and in 1908 he established a running 
department inspectorate under Mr Eve the Running Superintendent. This consisted of five 
districts under inspectors who were responsible for the ‘running of the trains,’ which presumably 
included their timekeeping and the efficiency of the train crews. The institution of the 
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inspectorate suggests that oversight of the company’s drivers and firemen by the foremen and 
district foremen, officials who had had charge of it since 1872, was not as effective was as it 
could have been by the 1900s.946 Thus, Scotter improved the issue of departmental efficiency by 
replacing ad hoc management structures, some of which had not changed for decades, with 
more formalised and professional systems.  
 
With Urie’s help Drummond also improved the efficiency and quality of the locomotive works’ 
management, like he had done on becoming the Caledonian Railway’s Locomotive 
Superintendent in 1882.947 In his later years Adams had become vague and relied on Pettigrew to 
manage the works. However, under Drummond’s leadership they had reached full operational 
capacity by 1896, were ahead of schedule, and labour productivity had increased. General 
locomotive repairs now took five days and the time it took to construct a locomotive was 
governed by fixed terms.948   
  
Drummond was also of the opinion that educating his staff improved departmental efficiency and 
reinforced professionalism within the department. In March 1903 he wrote to the Locomotive 
Committee describing ‘the difficulty …[apprentices in the works had] in obtaining the necessary 
technical education.’949 Subsequently, he arranged for them to be taught at Battersea Polytechnic 
for one hour twice a week for three years.950 In 1909, when the works was transferred to 
Eastleigh, Urie ran these classes.951 Drummond also gave drivers and firemen lectures on engine 
management,952 with transcripts distributed to all,953 and encouraged them to attend mutual 
improvement classes held at Nine Elms, Northam, Exeter and Yeovil, where talks were given on 
various technical subjects.954  
 
Lastly, to encourage to efficient train operation, in 1900 Drummond reformed Adams’ premium 
scheme for drivers and firemen. The amount of fuel locomotives were supposed to use on 
particular journeys was specified. Therefore, if at the end of the month the train crews had 
collectively used less fuel than allowed amounts, twenty percent of the value of the coal they had 
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saved was divided up between them in proportion to their scale of pay.955 Overall, Scotter 
tightened up many aspects of the Locomotive Department’s operations after 1895. 
 
Drummond’s nineteenth-century management 
 
Despite these measures, because Scotter had given Drummond, who tended to the independent, 
closed minded, authoritarian and obstinate, a position of unquestionable authority within the 
Locomotive Department,956  he failed to improve its overall efficiency after 1900. Thus, the case 
of Drummond’s Locomotive Superintendency supports a main argument of this thesis; because 
departments were functionally separated within the LSWR’s structure, the company’s 
management quality was to a large extent dependent how effectively department heads’ actions 
were coordinated and overseen by those above them in the hierarchy: the directors and General 
Manager. 
 
Firstly, Drummond put his own needs before overall company efficiency. In 1899 he convinced 
the Locomotive Committee to allow him to build a small inspection locomotive. Nicknamed the 
‘Bug’, this ferried him around the LSWR’s network as he wished, meaning the Traffic Department 
had to arrange trains around its movement. This disrupted their timetables and possibly 
decreased departmental efficiency.957  
 
The main weakness of Drummond management after 1900 was that he continued to administer 
the Locomotive Department in a nineteenth-century style, and while systemising its practices he 
did not modernise them, possibly harming corporate efficiency. His nineteenth-century attitude 
to management was reflected by the fact that while he tightened up discipline in the Locomotive 
Department, he was overly interested in locomotive crews’ actions. He was the one who lectured 
drivers and firemen on efficient locomotive operation and wrote them a manual on driving. 958  
Furthermore, the Bug would arrive next to trains waiting at signals. If excess steam was detected, 
causing coal wastage, Drummond would chastise the driver across the gap and order him to 
report to his office the next morning. Drummond was also known to appear at stations, board 
locomotives’ footplates, and instruct drivers on how to drive their trains.959 Ultimately, he 
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addressed all drivers’ transgressions of the rules personally.960 Therefore, while he had a Running 
Superintendent who was officially responsible for ensuring locomotive crews’ efficiency,961 
Drummond was getting directly involved in overseeing this in a manner that was more suited to 
Locomotive Superintendent of a smaller mid-nineteenth century railway. But also, it is known 
Drummond rejected modern managerial methods that were introduced to other companies from 
America which were, presumably, more systematic and efficient (although Chacksfield did not 
specify anything about them).962 Therefore, while evidence is limited, it can be suggested that the 
outdated administrative methods Drummond persisted with using after 1900 possibly raised 
departmental expenditure, while potential productivity gains were neglected. 
 
Drummond’s outdated approach to departmental management can be attributed to the length of 
his career. He had first become a locomotive superintendent at the North British Railway (NBR) in 
1875, after which held the same post at the Caledonian Railway from 1882 until 1890.963 He had 
therefore learnt all he knew about locomotive department management in the late-Victorian 
period. Consequently, when faced with LSWR’s changed business environment after 1900, he 
was unwilling or unable to modernise the Locomotive Department’s administration given his 
familiarity with established working practices.  
 
This may not have mattered much, except that Drummond also had a nineteenth-century 
approach to locomotive design that hampered the LSWR’s construction of efficient, larger 
locomotives in the 1900s. Evidently, he only possessed the ability and knowledge to build 
locomotives suitable for the railways of the 1890s. While his smaller 4-4-0 locomotives were a 
success, Bradley argued that his early 4-6-0s, built in the 1900s to cope with the LSWR’s 
increasing carriage weights and growing long-distance traffic, ‘failed to meet expectation. Only 
those 4-6-0s built later performed adequately, yet they seldom exceeded [the quality or 
efficiency of] his 4-4-0s.’964 Drummond also dismissed innovative concepts of locomotive design 
towards the decade’s end. For example, he rejected the notion of boiler superheating which was 
being tried elsewhere at the time, was advocated by Urie, and which would have improved 
locomotives’ thermal efficiency, theoretically reducing their coal usage.965 Drummond’s 
conservative approach to locomotive design was reinforced by his refusal to hear criticisms or 
suggestions for improvements. When his chief draftsman, J.A. Hunter, suggested alterations to 
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the poorly performing 4-6-0s they were rejected immediately as Drummond let no one interfere 
with his designs.966 Likewise, when a driver suggested modifications to his 4-4-0 locomotives to 
improve ease of maintenance, Drummond rose from his chair and motioned that the driver sit in 
it. When the driver refused Drummond’s reply was ‘And why dinna ye like? Because ye know it’s 
my bloody job to build engines and yours to drive them.’967 Overall, Drummond’s abilities, 
temperament and opinions meant that by his death in 1912 the LSWR’s locomotive stock, while 
possessing a large number of good locomotives, was not as advanced, modern or efficient as it 
could have been.  
 
Locomotive expenditure 
 
  1901 1906 
Change 
+/- 
Percentage 
change 
Cost of Locomotive Department per train 
mile  (d) 
11.53 10.15 -1.38 11.97% 
Locomotive Department's expenditure on 
fuel per train mile  (d) 
5.16 3.93 -1.23 -23.84% 
Cost of coal per ton (s) 19.73 15.41 -4.32 -21.90% 
          
Changes in the cost of Locomotive 
Department fuel costs per train mile  NOT 
attributable to changes in fuel prices 
    0.12d 8.86% 
Table 5: Cost of Locomotive Department expenditure attributable to lowering fuel costs in 1901 and 
1906. Source: TNA, RAIL 111/284, LSWR reports and accounts, 1901 and 1906 
 
Overall, during Drummond’s tenure the Locomotive Department’s financial performance 
remained relatively static as factors that reduced departmental expenditure were balanced by 
those that raised it. Between 1901 and 1906 the Locomotive Department’s expenditure per train 
mile fell from 11.53d (11.24d) to 10.15d (9.77d), or by 1.76d. However, approximately 1.64d of 
this reduction can be attributed to falling fuel prices, as Table 5 shows, and only 0.12d of it can be 
credited to other sources, which included operational efficiencies. Thus, while Drummond was 
trying to make efficiencies in this period, they were clearly having little or no effect on 
departmental performance. 
 
After 1906 departmental expenditure per train mile rose from 10.15d (9.77d) in 1906 to 11.39d 
(10.29d) in 1911; or by 12.22 percent. Some of this increase can be attributed to rising wage 
costs (Table 6).968 There was also possibly an increase in the department’s expenditure on 
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materials over this period. Appendix 6.1 shoes that the price the Engineering Department paid 
for track chairs and fishplates increased between 1906 and 1910, suggesting that over this period 
the price the Locomotive Department paid for the metal it was using in the construction and 
maintenance of locomotives also rose. 
Table 6: Locomotive Department Costs in 1906 and 1911. Source: TNA, RAIL 111/284, LSWR reports and 
accounts, 1906 and 1911 
 
Between 1906 and 1911 the LSWR’s expenditure on fuel also rose considerably and to a greater 
extent than fuel prices increased (Table 6). This was because Drummond’s new larger 
locomotives used more fuel per train mile than his previous designs.969 In 1900 LSWR locomotives 
used on average 47.3 lbs. of coal per train mile; yet, presumably because of better locomotive 
management, by 1905 this had fallen to 45.81 lbs. Nevertheless, the introduction of Drummond’s 
larger engines increased the average fuel LSWR locomotives used per train mile to 55.09 lbs. in 
1910, reducing only to 52.09 lbs. in 1911.970  These locomotives were, of course, considered poor 
performers, even at the time, and so it is quite possible that different designs or the use of 
superheating might have reduced fuel usage. For example, Urie’s later, but even larger, H15 class 
                                                          
969
 Bradley, LSWR Locomotives: The Drummond Classes, p.3 
970
 TNA, RAIL 411/192 to RAIL 411/196, Locomotive Committee Minute Books 1899-1911, various minutes 
  1906 1911 
Change 
+/- 
% 
change 
Percentage of 
overall increase 
in 
departmental 
cost 
Locomotive Department expenditure per 
train mile  (d) 
10.15 11.39 1.24 12.22%   
  
   
    
Wages cost in the Locomotive Department 
(d) 
4.63 4.97 0.34 57.63% 27.42% 
Materials costs in the Locomotive 
Department (d) 
0.96 1.23 0.27 21.95% 21.77% 
  
   
    
Locomotive Department's expenditure on 
fuel per train mile  (d) 
3.93 4.52 0.59 15.01% 47.58% 
Cost of coal per ton (s) 15.41 15.7 0.29 1.88%   
Changes in the cost of Locomotive 
Department fuel costs per train mile  NOT 
attributable to changes in fuel prices 
    0.52d 87.48% 41.94% 
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locomotives, which were superheated, managed an average fuel usage in October 1915 of only 
48.39lbs per train mile – considerably less than Drummond’s locomotives.971  
 
Overall, after 1900 the Locomotive Department’s expenditure changed little. Between 1901 and 
1911 its costs as a proportion of company revenue only fell from 17.14 percent to 16.48 percent, 
while expenditure per train mile only decreased from 11.53d (11.24d) to 11.39d (10.29d), a 
reduction of 1.12 percent.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Drummond’s persistent use of obsolete management techniques and his rejection of both 
technological and managerial innovations meant that he contributed little to improving the 
LSWR’s financial performance after 1901. It is likely he was able to run the Locomotive 
Department’s affairs in this inefficient and unproductive manner because he had few constraints 
on his autonomy. In 1895 he had been given a ‘free hand’ by Scotter. It can therefore be 
suggested that with Scotter still on the board after 1898, that Drummond’s actions went 
unchallenged by the directorate. Furthermore, Drummond seemingly had considerable freedom 
from Owens’ oversight or control. This is, firstly, evidenced by the ‘Bug’, but also one incident 
that occurred early in Walker’s General Managership. In early-1912, because of a coal workers 
strike, Walker ordered some American coal to keep the company supplied. Drummond, who was 
presumably used to controlling such matters, was not consulted and in anger emptied a bucket of 
it on Walker’s office floor.972 
 
Consequently, after 1900, and despite the company’s senior managers being under pressure to 
reduce their departments’ expenditure, with few constraints on his freedom to run the 
Locomotive Department as he so wished, Drummond had considerable scope to neglect or reject 
means by which the it could become more efficient or productive, and act in ways that damaged 
the company’s overall cost position. Drummond’s case therefore supports this thesis’ two main 
arguments. Firstly, where between 1870 and 1911 LSWR senior managers occupied positions of 
unassailable authority for decades, over time their thinking on management practice (and in 
Drummond’s case locomotive design) could stagnate or become conservative in nature, meaning 
established practices potentially became obsolete and inefficient. Secondly, that the company’s 
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management quality was considerably reliant on the General Manager or directors’ ability to 
oversee and gain authority over department heads’ activities, and get them working together. 
 
6.16. Engineering concerns 
 
Broadly similar issues were to be found in the engineering functions of the LSWR, but the 
outcomes were different. Between 1895 and 1900 the Engineering Department’s expenditure 
considerably increased because of raised material costs (see Appendix 1), heavier train loads and 
greater traffic densities.973 Consequently, between 1895 and 1900 the department’s maintenance 
costs per track mile increased from £52.65 to £59.04 (57.31), an increase of 12.13 percent; while 
its renewal costs per line mile rose from £987.50 to £1,666.50 (1,617.84), or by 67.76 percent.  
Consequently, after 1900 maintenance procedures in the Engineering Department were 
completely reformed to reduce expenditure.  
 
In 1903 the LSWR’s new Resident Engineer, John Wykeham Jacomb-Hood, began assessing the 
Engineering Department’s track maintenance procedures. His investigation revealed that the 
materials used in track maintenance at different points on the company’s network bore no 
relation to the volume to traffic passing over them. He considered this was because prior to that 
point rising costs had simply been controlled rearranging the staff along the line, and the SWG 
stated that ‘little attention had been paid to obtaining the services of a better class of men, or 
educating up the existing class to a higher standard.’974 Jacomb-Hood therefore argued his 
findings ‘pointed the way to more methodical means of dealing’ with materials usage and 
departmental expense.975    
 
Unlike Drummond, Jacomb-Hood was open to new ideas from outside the LSWR and the British 
railway industry. In 1901 he had visited America with Fay to investigate railroad management 
there.976  Utilising what had learnt, he introduced to the Engineering Department a new track 
maintenance system. This roughly equalised the workload of every maintenance gang splitting 
the company’s network into sections (four miles for single track, two miles for double). However, 
the actual length of track each gang maintained depended on the number of points and sidings in 
their section, and the number of members in a gang reflected these variations. Each track section 
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would be regularly assessed by a committee of managers on a points system, with extra marks 
being added for ‘old’ (over 20 years old) parts of the network, reflecting the fact that gangs 
would have to work harder to extend their life, while ‘young’ sections incurred deductions. This 
system was used to motivate the workers. After the marks were tallied, challenge cups, silver and 
bronze prizes and small cash awards were presented to the best inspectors, foreman and 
gangers. 977 Thus, Railway Gazette reported in 1914 that ‘the system introduced a new spirit of 
efficiency amongst all ranks.’978    
 
This track maintenance system raised the permanent way’s quality and, most importantly, 
stabilised departmental expenditure.979 On the debit side, between 1903 and 1910 material 
prices increased. For instance, the price the LSWR paid for a ton of rails, a ton of chairs, a pair of 
fishplates and a sleeper rose from £9.65 (£9.29) in 1903 to £10.04 (£9.12) in 1910, or by 4.09 
percent. Yet over the same period the expenditure on maintenance per train mile only increased 
by 0.4 percent, from £55.30 (£53.23) to £55.32 (£50.24); while the cost of renewals per track mile 
fell from £1,390.5 (£1,338.36) to £1359.92 (£1,235.21), or by 2.20 percent.980 Thus, the 
Engineering Department’s more efficient working practices allowed it to absorb increased 
material prices after 1903. 
 
Jacomb-Hood therefore achieved what Drummond never did; he systemised the Engineering 
Department’s work practices while at the same time improving its efficiency. His track 
maintenance scheme was not simply a refinement of what had gone before it; it completely 
altered how the Engineering Department’s managers supervised the work of those under them. 
While Drummond incentivised staff to economise through the premium scheme, he generally 
preferred to pursue economies through stricter supervision and enforcement of the rule book. 
Conversely, Jacomb-Hood’s maintenance scheme replaced the punitive staff discipline of the 
nineteenth-century with a system which, through the promotion of teamwork as well as the 
usage of incentives, encouraged the men to work more effectively and use less material.  Indeed, 
Jacomb-Hood devolved some of the responsibility for departmental efficiency to the gangs. Thus, 
by completely reforming the Engineering Department’s established operating practices, Jacomb-
Hood was able to vastly improve the department’s efficiency.  
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Furthermore, Jacomb-Hood’s innovative track maintenance scheme reveals, once again, how the 
LSWR’s functional department structure may have negatively impacted on its operating 
performance between 1870 and 1911. There is no evidence that the innovative practices he 
introduced in the Engineering Department stimulated or influenced in any way similar 
operational reforms in the Traffic and Locomotive Departments after 1900, where, as shown, 
practices remained nineteenth century in character. As such, this highlights that because within 
the LSWR’s functional department structure departments were highly isolated operationally (see 
Chapter 2), innovative practices that may have been developed within one department, and 
which were beneficial for company performance, were never transferred to or influenced policies 
in another. This therefore suggests that potential operational efficiencies remained unrealised 
within the company both before and after 1870. 
 
Section 5 – Conclusion 
 
In late-1901 Sam Fay, before departing for the GCR, stated at a dinner in his honour that ‘we 
should see some great changes in the railway methods of this country.’ The British industry had 
‘hitherto relied too much upon the fact that we had invented railways and the steam engine, and 
therefore we had little to learn, a fallacy which it would be well for us to note.’981 Perhaps these 
comments demonstrate that Fay recognised how many of those in senior positions within the 
LSWR had perspectives on railway management that were nineteenth-century in character and 
that, to effectively counter the new challenges the company faced, they would have to 
reappraise their thinking. This chapter demonstrated they did this with very limited success. 
 
The end of the nineteenth-century LSWR 
 
Before 1900 many of the LSWR’s decision-makers held beliefs and concepts about railway 
management had remained unchanged for decades. Indicative of this, Scotter, who joined the 
company’s board in 1898, initiated between 1897 and 1901 major capital projects that were 
driven by his goals of improving the efficiency of the company’s operations and expanding the 
concern. The company’s main lines were widened, infrastructure at stations and yards was 
improved, Waterloo Station began to be completely rebuilt, the Southampton Docks were 
enlarged and the locomotive works were moved to Eastleigh. Some of these schemes were 
required and some were even successful on a financial basis. Yet, given most of them repeated, 
on a larger scale, projects the company had undertaken in previous decades, they demonstrate 
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how before 1900 senior decision-makers were under little pressure from any source to change or 
reassess their established responses to the operational issues they faced, for example traffic 
growth or main line congestion. Indeed, these projects were the final and largest demonstrations 
of the board’s confidence in ideas and beliefs that had underpinned the company’s investment 
policies since, at least, the 1860s: finance was easily available, shareholders were always passive 
in the decision-making process, and continual traffic growth would make all investments 
worthwhile in the long or short term.  
 
These capital projects were, however, symptomatic of a broader conservatism that existed 
amongst the LSWR’s directors and senior managers before 1900.  The last chapter argued that 
while Scotter had improved the company’s management between 1885 and 1897, the railway 
Owens inherited in 1898 was ‘sub-optimal’ as the value of many of its operating practices had not 
been called into question for some time, perhaps even decades, and thus had developed some 
inefficiencies. It can be suggested these inefficiencies developed because officials were under 
minimal pressure critically appraise established management practices as the company’s 
profitability was, given Scotter’s reforms, exceedingly healthy, and they were not under any 
external pressure from, for example, competition, legislation or union activity. The LSWR’s case 
therefore tentatively supports Mitchell, Chambers and Crafts (and others’) arguments there was 
‘weak competition, weak shareholders and weak regulation in a non-traded service sector’ acting 
on industry decision-makers and this gave them plenty of opportunity to neglect potential cost 
reductions and productivity gains.982  
 
Overall, therefore, LSWR decision-makers’ actions shortly before 1900 support one of this thesis’ 
central arguments. Given control of policy and strategy was highly centralised within the LSWR, in 
cases where individuals occupied senior positions over decades with little pressure on them to 
improve the quality of their management or innovate, their beliefs and ideas on railway 
administration possibly stagnated. This potentially caused the value of established management 
methods to be infrequently reassessed and for inefficiencies to develop within the company’s 
operations. 
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Management after 1900 
 
After 1900 the company’s trading circumstances changed. Its profitability was depressed by 
stagnating traffic levels, competition from trams, and rising material, wage and fuel costs. 
Consequently, between 1895 and 1901 the company’s OR rose from 56.94 percent to 63.95 
percent; and its ROCS fell from from 4.96 in 1897 to 4.54 in 1902 (five-year moving average).983  
  
This put greater pressure on the LSWR’s senior officials to address the waste and inefficiency that 
existed in the company’s operating practices. In some respects they were successful. Drummond 
enforced economy on the Locomotive Department; goods train mileage fell considerably; 
competition with the GWR was eliminated and the Engineering Department’s expenditure was 
significantly reduced. Furthermore, aspects of the company’s management were modernised and 
systemised. The Engineering Department changed the nature of labour and materials 
management by giving employees some agency over working practices, and Drummond 
introduced systemisation and routine within the locomotive works. These efficiency measures 
caused the LSWR’s cost inefficiency to decline after 1900, as Crafts, Leunig Mulatu, Mitchell, 
Chambers and Chambers’ econometric estimates showed.984 Furthermore, after 1900 the LSWR 
also grew its traffic in places; its long-distance passenger numbers increased in the period and 
the company’s investment in the Southampton Docks, which established it as one of Britain’s 
major trading ports, generated considerable revenue.  
 
Nevertheless, the LSWR’s financial performance did not improve after 1900: its OR increased 
from 62.44 to 63.82 percent between 1900 and 1911.985  To some extent the company’s reduced 
access to capital limited decision-makers’ capacity to tackle the company’s diminished 
profitability. Thus, infrastructure improvements that might have benefited its financial position 
were not initiated; for example a suburban electrification before 1905. Additionally, planned 
capital projects that would have improved company efficiency, such as the Waterloo Station 
rebuilding, the widening of the main lines and the movement of the locomotive works to 
Eastleigh, were also slowed.   
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After 1902 the LSWR’s profitability did not improve because, principally, senior officials only 
enacted limited reform of operating practices, potential efficiencies and productivity gains were 
not looked for, and managerial and technical innovation within the company diminished 
following Fay’s departure. For example, senior traffic managers felt parts of the business were 
managed as efficiently as they could be, where Walker’s reforms showed they were not: as in the 
case of suburban timetables and wagon loading. Fay’s steps to improve the company’s signalling 
systems and construct a marshalling yard lost momentum after he left the company. 
Drummond’s arrogant and dismissive nature meant he rejected out of hand innovations in engine 
design and new management techniques; while Owens and Scotter denied accurate statistics 
would improve wagon loading.  Most importantly, after 1905 conservatism amongst senior LSWR 
officials, particularly Owens and Scotter, unnecessarily delayed the initiation of a suburban 
electrification project. This allowed the trams’ business to increase up to 1916, severely 
damaging company profitability. Thus, after 1902 there were many areas where the company’s 
management quality and operational efficiency could have been improved, but were not.  
 
This chapter suggested that the backgrounds, careers and experiences of the LSWR’s senior 
officials and directors possibly predetermined that the reform of the company’s management 
practices would only be partial after 1900. Between 1900 and 1911 all traffic managers with 
decisive influence over the company’s policies, such as Owens and Holmes, had developed their 
careers within the Traffic Department’s highly rigid and insular clerical promotional trees. 
Without much experience of how other railways and businesses were managed, and having 
learnt about railway management from within the LSWR, it was difficult for them to critically 
appraise and then reform operational practices they had worked with for decades. Additionally, 
Drummond’s authoritarian leadership style, which was detrimental to company performance, 
was the result of him having learnt all he knew about locomotive department management in the 
1870s and 1880s, combined with his irascible and obstinate personality.  
 
The directors were no better placed. Between 1900 and 1911 all but one director identified as an 
‘activist’ had been with the LSWR since the nineteenth-century as either a board member or 
senior manager. Scotter still dominated company policy, while Campbell, Macaulay and Govett 
were still active in its affairs in the first half of the decade. Because these directors had few 
external business interests and had learnt all they knew about railway management from the 
nineteenth-century LSWR, they too lacked the knowledge and experience to reform the company 
along modern lines or critique managers’ actions (See Chapter 3).  
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Overall, therefore, this chapter develops this thesis’ main argument. Given those within the LSWR 
rarely generated or developed new or innovative operating techniques between 1870 and 1911, 
advancement or improvement in the company’s operating practices primarily occurred when 
new senior managers were appointed who had worked outside the railway, such as Fay. Indeed, 
it took another manager from outside the company, Walker, to fully drag the LSWR out of the 
nineteenth-century. 
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Section 6 – Appendices 
 
6.1. LSWR material costs 1890-1910 
 1890 1894 1898 1902 1906 1910 
1
8
9
0
-1
9
1
0
 
C
h
an
ge
 
Engineering Department 
COST 
       
Cost of Rails Per ton (£) 
 
£4.39 £5.00 £5.49 £5.86 £5.73 £1.34 
Cost of Chairs per ton (£) 
 
£3.32 £3.45 £3.91 £3.32 £4.03 £0.71 
Cost of Fish plates per 
pair (d)  
25.50 26.00 26.00 25.75 27.75 2.25 
Cost of Sleepers each (d) 
 
29.50 34.13 44.75 41.00 40.25 10.75 
4 YEAR PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE        
Cost of Rails Per ton 
  
13.90% 9.70% 6.84% -2.22% 30.52% 
Cost of Chairs per ton 
  
3.92% 13.19% -14.98% 21.39% 21.39% 
Cost of Fish plates per 
pair   
1.96% 0.00% -0.96% 7.77% 8.82% 
Cost of Sleepers each 
  
15.68% 31.14% -8.38% -1.83% 36.44% 
        
Inflation Rate (adjusted 
from 1885) 
98.33% 99.17% 93.33% 0.00% 99.58% 94.17% 
 
COST (INFLATION 
ADJUSTED)        
Cost of Rails Per ton (£) 
 
£4.35 £4.67 £5.49 £5.84 £5.40 £1.04 
Cost of Chairs per ton (£) 
 
£3.29 £3.22 £3.91 £3.31 £3.79 £0.50 
Cost of Fish plates per 
pair (d)  
25.29 24.27 26.00 25.64 26.13 0.84 
Cost of Sleepers each (d) 
 
29.25 31.85 44.75 40.83 37.90 8.65 
4 YEAR PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE (INFLATION 
ADJUSTED) 
       
Cost of Rails Per ton 
  
7.20% 17.54% 6.39% -7.54% 23.94% 
Cost of Chairs per ton 
  
-2.20% 21.27% -15.34% 14.78% 15.27% 
Cost of Fish plates per 
pair   
-4.04% 7.14% -1.37% 1.91% 3.34% 
Cost of Sleepers each 
  
8.87% 40.50% -8.76% -7.17% 29.56% 
        
Locomotive Department 
ACTUAL 
       
Cost of fuel per ton (s) 15.53 12.73 13.82 17.44 15.33 15.96 0.43 
Cost of fuel per ton 
(percentage increase)  
-18.03% 8.56% 26.19% -12.10% 4.11% 2.77% 
INFLATION ADJUSTED 
       
Cost of fuel per ton (s) 15.79 13.39 14.23 17.51 15.27 14.96 -0.83 
Cost of fuel per ton 
(percentage increase)  
-15.20% 6.27% 23.05% -12.79% -2.03% -5.26% 
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Chapter 7- Conclusion 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has demonstrated how the LSWR’s financial performance between 1870 and 1911 was 
principally determined by the quality of the decisions made and strategies employed by its 
directors and managers. This conclusion is important because, as Chapter 1 discussed, over the 
last fifty years scholars have presented numerous different explanations, some of which are 
incompatible with each other, for the British railway industry’s declining financial performance 
between 1870 and 1914.   
 
External factors have been blamed. Ashworth considered that growing high-volume, low-margin 
traffic diminished companies’ profitability after 1870,986  while Irving and Pollins contended that 
rising material, wage and fuel costs were a factor, particularly in the early-1870s and late-
1890s.987  
 
Most academics have, however, suggested that the industry’s decreased profitability was caused 
by the actions of management. Aldcroft and Dodgson argued that companies unnecessarily 
constructed weakly performing lines for competitive reasons.988  Similarly, Cain, Crafts, Mills and 
Mulatu, contended that decision-makers abandoned profit-maximisation and adopted strategies 
and policies that suited their own aims and desires, for example maintaining unnecessarily high 
technical standards.989 Aldcroft and Cain argued that service competition seriously damaged 
companies’ profitability after 1870, and raised companies’ working costs excessively.990 
Conversely, Mitchell, Chambers, Crafts, Leunig, Mulatu and Mills contended that the competitive, 
legislative and governmental pressures acting on industry leaders were weak and they therefore 
had considerable scope to neglect potential productivity gains and cost reductions. 991 Arnold and 
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McCartney, Channon, and Irving also argued that to some degree railways started to act like 
public services from the 1880s in an attempt to preserve their commercial freedom at a time 
when government increasingly legislated on rates and safety. However, this augmented 
companies’ facilities and services excessively, which increased their operating costs and 
decreased their profitability.992 
 
This thesis has helped clarify these debates. However, it has also added depth to them. It has 
gone beyond simply arguing that the quality of the LSWR’s operational management between 
1870 and 1911 principally determined its financial performance, it has also analysed the factors 
that underpinned the policies and strategies decision-makers adopted, for example the 
company’s management structure, traffic managers’ careers, and directors’ external business 
interests. Therefore, being only the second detailed study of a British railway’s management 
between 1870 and 1914, this thesis is a valuable addition to the historiography. This conclusion 
summarises my findings, highlights how they address issues in the literature and examines 
avenues for future research. 
 
7.2. Decision-makers 
 
Chapter 2 argued that the effectiveness, cohesiveness and efficiency of the LSWR’s management 
between 1870 and 1911 was underpinned by its corporate form. As Channon and Bonavia argued 
was the case for most British railways between 1870 and 1914, the LSWR possessed a structure 
where decision-making authority was concentrated at the organisation’s head and the 
departments were separated along functional lines.993  What this thesis has repeatedly 
highlighted, however, is that the centralisation of authority within the LSWR did, as Quail 
argued,994  undermine its operating performance. It put excessive responsibility for the ensuring 
the company’s efficient working on a small number of individuals at the organisation’s head, who 
rarely delegated decision-making authority to those below them. It was therefore their skills, 
abilities and capacity to work together that determined how well the company was managed 
between 1870 and 1911.  
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Because so few individuals had decision-making authority within the LSWR between 1870 and 
1911, it was deemed important to analyse their careers and lives, to see how these may have 
influenced the company’s strategies and policies. I first examined the lives of the traffic 
managers. Chapter 3 argued that almost all the LSWR’s traffic managers working between 1870 
and 1911 had spent their entire careers within the Traffic Department, or even one section of it, 
on the clerical promotional ladder. They therefore had little experience of management practices 
used within external businesses or railways, developed unadventurous views on railway 
administration, were highly socialised within the LSWR’s established operating practices and, 
ultimately, had limited capacity to think creatively about ways to improve the company’s 
management. The LSWR’s case therefore supports Gouvish, Pollins, Wilson and Thomson’s 
arguments that between 1870 and 1914 British railways had, as the latter put it, a ‘highly 
introverted approach to recruitment,’ which limited managers’ ability to think creatively.995 As 
Sections 7.6 to 7.8 discuss, these introverted career paths hindered the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company’s management between 1870 and 1911.  
 
This thesis has also done what Channon and Hughes’ studies of the GWR and LNER’s board 
members were unable to: to suggest how a railway company’s policies and strategies were 
influenced by its directors’ external business activities.996 Chapter 3 demonstrated how directors’ 
external business interests shaped their level of involvement with the LSWR’s management. 
Between 1870 and 1881 the board was highly active in the company’s affairs because, firstly, 
most directors had few external business interests and could dedicate their time to the railway. 
Secondly, many of them had been with the company since the 1850s, when it was geographically 
smaller and organisationally less complex, and they still expected to play a leading role in its 
operational management. However, as section 7.5 discusses, the high level of oversight and 
control the directorate had over the company’s operations was a negative influence on its 
financial performance in the period.  
 
A small group of directors were also active in the company’s management after 1898. It was 
suggested that because most directors were heavily engaged outside the company, those who 
oversaw its affairs closely were two ex-LSWR senior managers, Scotter and Macaulay, and two 
directors who had joined the board in the 1870s. As these individuals had been with the LSWR for 
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considerable periods of time, and presumably had little experience of how railways’ operating 
practices had developed outside it, their thinking on railway management was conditioned by the 
practices used within it. Thus, their narrow opinions on policy were similar to those of the senior 
traffic managers and the General Manager. The result was that there was minimal improvement 
of the LSWR’s financial performance after 1902, as all the company’s decision-makers had little 
basis upon which to critically appraise the embedded operating practices they had worked with 
for decades. They also seemingly lacked the capacity to innovate (see section 7.8).  
 
Overall, therefore, this is the first study to demonstrate in detail how the careers and lives of one 
British railway company’s decision-makers influenced its policies and financial performance 
between 1870 and 1914 (described in more detail in sections 7.6 to 7.8), and for this reason it is a 
valuable addition to the literature.  
7.3. Capital investment 
Before discussing the LSWR’s operational management between 1870 and 1911, it is important 
to examine the company’s capital investment strategies to see how these influenced its financial 
performance. I have demonstrated that while the LSWR’s capital projects had varied success in 
this period, overall they were not a significant drag on its profitability, if at all. 
 
Chapter 4 importantly established the environmental conditions that shaped decision-makers’ 
approach to capital investment. Before 1900 the LSWR’s directors and managers were evidently 
under little pressure to thoroughly examine the virtue of each investment decision they made or 
invest in projects that may have maximised the company’s profits. This was for numerous 
reasons. Firstly, the company’s profits were always high enough before 1900 to allow it to raise 
capital with relative ease: between 1870 and 1900 its capital value rose from £18.0 million to 
£44.3 million, or by 146 percent.997 Furthermore, the LSWR’s shareholders were largely passive in 
the decision-making process and seemingly never objected to capital projects the company 
initiated. Lastly, because the LSWR’s traffic levels had increased almost continually since the 
1830s, decision-makers actions were not constrained by fears that traffic and revenue growth 
would stop, and, thus, they believed that in the long-run every investment would be worthwhile. 
These conditions gave LSWR decision-makers considerable freedom to invest as they saw fit. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the LSWR’s line building projects between 1870 and 1897. Decision-
makers almost always initiated the construction of lines an ad hoc manner to defend the 
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company’s regional hegemony. Most of these lines performed poorly. But decision-makers 
expected this, as they possessed good knowledge that the territories through which they would 
pass were unlikely to generate much traffic. Yet, with few constraints of their freedom of action, 
and trusting that traffic would always grow, decision-makers possibly believed that profitable 
lines could cross-subsidise these new routes for decades if required. The most notable case of 
such line-building behaviour was the LSWR’s extensions into the West Country, which were likely 
constructed for competitive reasons, but performed poorly after they were opened. The LSWR’s 
case therefore supports Casson, Dodgson and Aldcroft’s arguments that after 1870 this form of 
capital investment activity was a drain on railway companies’ profits.998 Nevertheless, as Arnold 
and McCartney and Gourvish argued was the case for British railways generally after 1870, it is 
important not to overstate the effect such network extensions had on the LSWR’s profitability.999  
The thesis showed that compared with changes in the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
company’s operational management, poorly performing lines likely diminished its overall 
profitability to a small, even marginal degree.  
 
Additionally, I analysed in detail the LSWR’s purchase of lines it leased or worked between 1870 
and 1884, something that has never been looked at by scholars. Indeed, Irving did not mention 
that the NER engaged in this form of investment activity before 1900, and Gourvish did not 
indicate that the LCDR, Metropolitan Railway, SER, MSL or MDR did either.1000 Chapter 4 showed 
that when purchasing leased and worked lines the LSWR directors’ had a semblance of a guiding 
strategy before 1884. They wished to consolidate the company’s network to eliminate financially 
unfavourable working agreements and remove unstable elements within its sphere of influence. 
It is suspected these purchases, which were made when the opportunity arose, considerably 
raised the LSWR’s capital expenditure for poor returns. Yet, once the loose strategy of network 
consolidation became embedded in the board’s thinking, it was seemingly never reappraised 
until Scotter became General Manager in 1885; a reflection of the fact there were few 
constraints on directors’ freedom of action and little compelling them reassess the virtue of the 
strategy they had adopted. 
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What has been demonstrated is that the LSWR’s capital projects between 1870 and 1911 were 
most successful when they served a well-developed strategic objective. Like many other 
companies, 1001  the LSWR repeatedly initiated numerous major capital projects between 1880 
and 1901 to alleviate traffic congestion. While it is likely many of these investments improved the 
company’s working efficiency, it should be stressed that decision-makers’ responses to persistent 
capacity problems were always similar to actions they had taken in the past. Projects to widen 
the main lines near London were initiated in 1880 and 1896, while Waterloo Station was enlarged 
in 1878 and 1885, and then a reconstruction of it began in 1901.1002 This lack of innovation in how 
the company solved the problem of main line congestion was again indicative of the fact that 
before 1900 decision-makers were under little pressure from any quarter to investigate or 
develop alternative responses to the challenges they faced that may have been less of a burden 
on the capital account (see Chapters 4 to 6).  
 
Only the LSWR’s purchase and augmentation of Southampton Docks was an outright success. 
While this purchase in 1892 was a reactive measure to prevent the SDC failing, the aggressive 
policy of dock expansion the company pursued, principally under Scotter’s leadership, improved 
its profitability after 1900; it possibly offset a loss of revenue to suburban tram competition and 
halted the fall in its average revenue per ton of merchandise hauled (see Chapters 5 and 6).  
Indeed, the success of the development of the Southampton Docks mirrored Irving’s argument 
that the NER’s investment in the Hull docks grew its trade in the same period. This could suggest 
that when railways invested in docks facilities between 1870 and 1914 such ventures gave good 
returns; although without other case studies this is unclear.1003 
 
Overall, between 1870 and 1911 the LSWR’s different capital projects had mixed impacts on its 
profitability. Nevertheless, it was operating factors that principally determined the company’s 
financial performance between 1870 and 1911. Indicative of this fact, while over the whole 
period the LSWR’s capital burden increased considerably, it ROCE fluctuated. Amongst Britain’s 
fifteen largest railway companies it was below-average during Scott’s tenure as general manager 
before 1884, while by 1897 Scotter’s reforms of the company’s operating practices had restored 
it to the similar levels as in 1872 (five-year moving average).1004 Thus, this finding therefore gives 
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weight to Gourvish and Irving’s arguments that companies’ capital investment strategies were 
not the primary cause of the British railway industry’s diminishing profitability after 1870.1005  
 
7.4. External operating factors 
 
This thesis has also determined how external pressures shaped the LSWR’s profitability between 
1870 and 1911. Government legislation was possibly not a major influence on the company’s 
profitability after 1870, as Gourvish, Leunig, Mulatu and Mills, and others have argued was the 
case for British railways generally after 1870. 1006 The 1889 and 1893 Regulation of Railways Acts, 
which legislated on safety and employees’ hours of work respectively, 1007  seemingly did not 
increase the company’s operating costs to any great degree, if at all (see Chapters 4 and 6). I have 
tentatively argued that the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894, which fixed the maximum rates 
railways could charge for goods haulage, may have harmed the LSWRs profitability to some 
extent, as this possibly meant the company was unable to raise rates to offset a depression in its 
revenue because of the agricultural depression before 1900, as well as an increase in its 
operational costs from the late-1890s. However, it is unlikely to have been a ‘millstone’ around 
the LSWR’s ‘neck’, 1008   as Cain argued it was for the whole industry. The company primarily 
carried passengers, meaning the Act affected a smaller portion of its business compared with the 
larger, mainly freight-carrying railways. Secondly, because of the LSWR’s expansion of the 
Southampton Docks it is likely this increased its revenue per ton hauled after 1900, possibly 
because the company was hauling a more varied and more profitable array of goods (see Chapter 
6).  
 
Also, like Irving argued was the case with most railways, wage increases also augmented the 
LSWR’s operating expenditure.1009 However, the LSWR’s profitability was likely damaged more 
than it needed to be by rising wage costs in the 1880s (and possibly thereafter), as Scott, the 
General Manager, kept pay in the Traffic Department unnecessarily high (see Chapter 4). Thus, 
the LSWR’s case very cautiously supports Crafts, Mills and Mulatu’s suggestion before 1900 
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decision-makers had ‘ample opportunity’ to neglect cost reductions and productivity 
improvements and pursue their own goals.1010  
 
Additionally, competitive pressures on the LSWR’s decision-makers were not strong. Aldcroft and 
Cain argued that service competition significantly cut into railways’ profits, especially from the 
1880s.1011  By placing the LSWR’s competitive activity in the context of its overall business history, 
the thesis demonstrated that the company’s profitability was far more dependent on how 
effectively its functions were managed. Indeed, the competitive services the LSWR ran were on 
the margins of its activities, while, as Simmons argued, after 1885 the company was more 
interested in growing its more extensive non-competitive traffic.1012 Thus, the LSWR’s case gives 
weight to Mitchell, Chambers, Crafts, Leunig, Mulatu and Mills’ arguments that the competitive 
pressures acting on railways’ decision-makers were weak before 1900 (see Chapters 5 and 6).1013 
 
Only growing high-volume, low-margin third class passenger traffic, particularly in suburban 
districts, put significant pressure on the LSWR’s profitability after 1870, as Ashworth considered 
was the case generally in the British railway industry at the time.1014 Nevertheless, rather than 
thinking this growth diminished the company’s profitability, decision-makers believed it 
sustained its financial health (see Chapter 4). Indeed, this thesis has partially called into question 
numerous academics’ arguments that railways’ operating expenses rose from the 1880s because 
they started to act like public services in an attempt to preserve their commercial freedom, in a 
period when government was increasingly legislating on rates and safety.1015 Indeed, it has been 
suggested that Scotter’s improvements of the LSWR’s passenger services actually grew the 
business. 
  
This thesis has therefore attempted, given the available evidence, to determine how external 
pressures impacted on the LSWR’s profitability between 1870 and 1911. It showed that while 
growing third-class suburban traffic and increased wages did harm the company’s profitability; 
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competition and government legislation had little effect. Thus, my work is valuable as it has 
helped to clarify some of the outstanding issues in the literature. Nevertheless, what this thesis 
has principally shown is that all these factors were secondary influences on the LSWR’s financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911; the primary one being the quality of the company’s 
operational management. 
 
7.5. Coordination 
 
This thesis is only the second detailed study of the dynamics a British railway company’s 
management between 1870 and 1914.  It has argued two factors principally determined the 
LSWR’s management quality, operational cohesiveness and, ultimately, its financial performance 
between 1870 and 1911. Both were linked to the fact that the company’s functional structure 
meant only a small number of individuals at the organisation’s head controlled its operating and 
administrative policies.  
 
Firstly, I argued that because the department heads usually dominated activities within their 
functionally separate departments, the quality of the company’s management was partially 
determined by the board or General Manager’s capacity to provide them with leadership, 
oversee their activities effectively, and get them working together. Contrasting the coordination 
and oversight the LSWR department heads received between 1870 and 1897 demonstrates this. 
Chapter 4 described how between 1870 and 1881 the LSWR’s financial performance deteriorated 
to a point whereby at the end of the period it was Britain’s least profitable major railway. While 
the next section demonstrates that this was largely because of the poor quality of the company’s 
operating practices, it was also because the activities of the department heads were poorly 
overseen and critiqued by the board. The primary reason for this was that because the directors 
had few external business interests (see section 7.2), and given most had learnt about railway 
management from within the LSWR, they lacked the knowledge or experience to adequately 
assess or challenge the inefficient and outdated management practices used by Scott in the 
Traffic Department and Beattie in the Locomotive Department.  
 
Furthermore, between 1881 and 1884 the department heads’ activities were coordinated 
particularly poorly by those above them in the hierarchy. In the former year Scott, who until then 
had retained direct oversight of the Traffic Department, was given general oversight of the 
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company’s functions.1016 Yet, the LSWR’s management quality declined further. He never gained 
authority over the department heads’ activities and the directors increasingly favoured the 
opinions of Adams, who had joined the company from another railway, on matters of policy. This 
would not have been so bad, had it not been for the fact that Adams’ and Scott’s philosophies of 
railway management never aligned. Thus, before 1884 the LSWR never developed a coherent 
strategy to reduce its excessive operating costs. But also, because Adams gained considerable 
independence to make policy as he so wished in the Locomotive Department, he enacted a 
policy, the building of heavier locomotives, which unnecessarily and unexpectedly raised the 
Engineering Department’s costs (See Chapter 4).  
 
A different situation existed after 1885. Between then and 1892 Scotter used his considerable 
experience of railway management outside the LSWR to gain authority over the department 
heads’ activities and, consequently, oversaw and coordinated their actions effectively. Indeed, he 
provided the company with something it had lacked before 1884, leadership and a strategic 
direction. He tasked his department heads with working towards his goals of reducing operating 
costs and ‘expanding the concern’. Consequently, by 1892 the LSWR was one of Britain’s best 
performing railway companies (see Chapter 6). 
 
My study of the LSWR’s management between 1870 and 1911 is therefore important as it gives 
weight to existing arguments in the literature. It supports Bonavia’s contention that within 
railway companies that used functional department structures between 1870 and 1914, 
department heads, who could have considerable authority over their own fiefdoms, could act 
independently in ways that damaged overall company efficiency. 1017 However, it also supports 
Channon’s suggestion that the operational effectiveness of companies using functional 
governance structures possibly depended on whether General Managers’ had the ‘authority, skill 
and energy’ to persuade department heads to cooperate and consider operational matters 
outside of their immediate remits.1018  Indeed, Scotter’s effective oversight and coordination of 
the LSWR’s different departments demonstrates that to some degree the company’s financial 
performance between 1870 and 1911 was dependent upon a post broadly equivalent to a 
modern chief executive being created. 
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7.6. Senior managers’ stagnation 
 
While the quality of the oversight and coordination the LSWR department heads received was an 
important influence on the company’s financial performance between 1870 and 1911, this thesis 
has revealed that primarily it was decision-makers’ concepts and understanding of railway 
management that shaped its profitability. All the chapters demonstrated that within the LSWR 
there was a tendency for decision-makers to develop narrow views on railway management. 
Indeed, throughout the period there was little indigenous development or advancement of the 
company’s operational and administrative practices. 
 
Decision-makers’ thinking on railway management possibly stagnated or became narrow for two 
reasons. Firstly, in many cases decision-makers, particularly department heads, occupied 
positions of authority for decades where they had complete control over their affairs and little 
criticism of their activities. Thus, their thinking frequently stagnated or became narrow over time, 
meaning the value or efficiency of established operational practices was infrequently reassessed.  
 
Thus, Chapters 4 to 6 demonstrated many cases where, because senior managers had been in 
position decades, established operating practices were not updated to efficiently manage 
changes in the nature of the company’s business. Most notable was Scott’s management of the 
Traffic Department between 1870 and 1881. Scott had become the LSWR’s Traffic Manager in 
1852. By the 1870s, with the directors inadequately critiquing his actions, they not having any 
experience of railway management outside the LSWR (see Section 7.2), and with no known 
criticism of his policies by senior traffic managers, by the 1870s the train control methods he was 
employing in the department, which he had established in the 1850s and 1860s, were not 
adapted to manage the company’s increasing traffic efficiently. This was the principal cause of 
the LSWR becoming the poorest financially performing major British railway company between 
1870 and 1884. However, the stagnation in railway management thought and practice under 
Scott was not unique. By the end of Adams’ tenure as Locomotive Superintendent between 1878 
and 1895 the efficiency within the locomotive works had waned because established practices 
were not updated to manage efficiently its enlarged operation. Additionally, after 1900 Scotter 
and the LSWR’s three active directors had been with the company for decades and, thus, they 
too had developed narrow outlooks on company policy, which reinforced similar viewpoints held 
by senior traffic managers and the General Manager. Consequently, this alignment of the 
directors’ and managers’ outlooks on operating practice was, however, a detrimental influence 
on the company’s financial performance (see section 7.8).  
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7.7. Deficient career paths 
 
But LSWR decision-makers’ narrow outlooks operating practice had a second source between 
1870 and 1911. One of this thesis’ major contributions to the existing scholarship on British 
railway management between 1870 and 1914 is that it has demonstrated how the introvert and 
narrow careers of the LSWR’s traffic management class significantly influenced its financial 
performance. As section 7.2 described, these career paths meant that the majority had spent all 
their lives working within the Traffic Department and had experienced little of railway 
management outside it. Therefore, when they reached the few positions with decision-making 
authority within the company, they had little basis upon which to critically appraise or challenge 
embedded operational practices, and their scope to innovate was limited.  
 
Aspects of the Traffic Department’s management after 1902 most exemplify how traffic 
managers’ career paths influenced the company’s financial performance between 1870 and 
1911.  After 1900 the LSWR’s financial performance declined because of external factors. Firstly, 
from 1897 material, fuel and wage costs increased significantly. Furthermore, in the early 1900s 
the company’s suburban services came into competition with new tram systems and, 
consequently, passenger traffic growth stalled. Lastly, as Irving argued was the case for most 
British railway companies,1019  the LSWR’s ability to raise capital diminished, meaning the amount 
that was, theoretically at least, available to invest in projects that may have improved its 
profitability was lessened. These new trading circumstances therefore challenged LSWR decision-
makers to critically appraise how efficiently the company was run and engage in technological 
and managerial innovation. Indeed, this was a situation decision-makers throughout the British 
railway industry faced after 1900.1020 
 
Yet, after 1902 the attempts to do this by Owens, the General Manager, and Holmes, the 
Superintendent of the Line, were piecemeal. Because they had spent almost their entire careers 
within the Traffic Department and, thus, had learnt all they knew about railway management 
from within it, they were unable or unwilling to critically analyse and reform how the parts of the 
business were run. Indeed, their responses to the new challenges they faced were mere 
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adaptations of existing operational practices, while innovation of any sort within the Traffic 
Department was limited. Most seriously, senior decision-makers narrow outlooks on policy, 
combined with the fact the directors held similar perspectives, meant that after 1905 the LSWR 
delayed initiating a suburban electrification project to win back the considerable traffic it had lost 
to the trams. Thus, the evidence suggests that by 1911 the company was not as efficient or 
profitable as it could have been (see Chapter 6).  
 
This thesis is therefore the first study to demonstrate how a British railway company’s managerial 
recruitment patterns before 1914 actually influenced its financial performance (see section 7.2). 
Particularly, my findings have suggested how the nature of different railways’ management 
cultures may have been a factor that determined their responses to their depressed profitability 
after 1900, something most scholars analysing the performance of British railway management in 
this period have never discussed. Indeed, Crafts, Leunig, Mulatu, and Gourvish have simply 
argued that companies improved their operational efficiency, chiefly in the case of goods train 
workings, without going into much detail about how effectively different railways responded to 
their more difficult trading environment.1021  
 
7.8. Knowledge transfer 
 
However, the LSWR’s management practices did advance between 1870 and 1911, but only 
when new senior managers were appointed from external sources and brought to the company 
new, modern or innovative ideas on railway management. For this reason the thesis is important 
as it is the first study to discuss how information about operating practices may have moved 
between British railway companies between 1870 and 1914.   
 
Two examples of this knowledge transfer are worth noting. Firstly, before 1878 the LSWR’s 
directors had been largely isolated from developments in operating practice outside the 
company. Indeed, because of their few external business experiences, and the fact they had 
learnt about railway management from inside the LSWR, they lacked scope to understand how 
Scott’s obsolete train control and rolling stock policies were harming company’s financial 
performance (See Section 7.2). Consequently, when Adams became Locomotive Superintendent 
in 1878, after having worked within other railways, he bought to the LSWR experience of railway 
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operation used outside it, and thus was able to challenge, with limited success, Scott’s 
management of traffic matters (see Chapter 3). 
 
Most notably, Scotter’s considerable improvement of the LSWR’s financial performance after 
1885 hinged on him applying his wide-ranging knowledge of operating practices used elsewhere 
in the railway industry to the company’s operations. He modernised the role of the general 
manager, had the capacity to critique and direct the department heads’ actions and, most 
importantly, modernised the Traffic Department’s operating practices (see Chapter 5). 
 
Between 1870 and 1911 the transfer to the LSWR of knowledge on operational practices used 
outside it was therefore an important factor in determining how efficiently the company was run 
and its profitability. Indeed, there was no known knowledge transfer of management techniques 
or ideas between departments in this period, a symptom of the fact that the company’s 
functional structure kept them operationally isolated. It is important to note, however, that all 
the senior managers who joined the company from outside (Scotter, Adams, Drummond and 
Jacomb) were already working in other British railways. No managers joined the company from 
other industries. The LSWR’s case therefore gives some weight to Pollins’ argument that before 
1914 there was some degree of managerial inbreeding within the British railway industry. 
Nevertheless, as Gourvish argued of British railways’ chief executives, the LSWR’s case also 
suggests that there was not necessarily executive immobility within the industry.1022  
 
7.9. Conclusion 
 
Overall, the thesis’ major contribution to the literature is that it has supported scholars’ 
arguments that the British railway industry’s declining profitability between 1870 and 1914 was 
determined by how well companies were managed. Nevertheless, it has revealed that many 
questions remain unanswered as to what influenced railways’ financial performance in the 
period. 
 
Clearly, the trading environment British railway companies were working in before 1900 needs to 
be understood better. Indeed, little analysis exists as to whether other companies’ profit margins 
were under pressure to a lesser or greater extent than the LSWR’s was from such factors as high-
volume low-margin passenger traffic, competition, shareholders or government legislation. 
Indeed, the mere fact that this thesis is the first study to suggest that a railway’s directors and 
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managers had a belief that traffic and revenue would consistently grow, implies that it is not yet 
clear what industry leaders were thinking about the nature of their businesses.  
 
Furthermore, the capital investment strategies railways’ decision-makers employed have also 
been rarely discussed in detail by scholars and require more investigation. For example, did 
railways solely build lines to defend their territory, as was so in the LSWR’s case, and to what 
extent were other factors, such as directors’ external business interests, playing a role? What the 
findings of this thesis can also suggest is that scholars have focussed far too much on companies’ 
line-building projects. Other areas of capital investment have been rarely addressed. For 
example, how did the acquisition of leased and worked railways, and dock facilities impact on 
companies’ profitability, if they acquired them at all? 
 
Mostly, however, because of the lack of detailed research on British railway management 
between 1870 and 1914, this thesis has possibly raised more questions than it has answered on 
the subject. Principally, I highlighted the importance of knowledge transfer in improving the 
LSWR’s management between 1870 and 1911. However, given the company’s operating practices 
only advanced when new senior managers were appointed from other railways, and there was 
very little positive knowledge transfer between departments within the company, this suggests 
there was more innovation and development in practice outside the LSWR in the period. It is 
therefore important to understand the conditions that allowed this development to occur. Did 
directors transfer from their external business interests knowledge and experience of 
management techniques used elsewhere in industry to the railways they served? Were other 
railways’ managers as insulated from how operational practice was developing throughout the 
industry? Did the views of other companies’ senior officials on railway management become as 
narrow as the LSWR senior managers’ did? In other companies was greater decision-making 
authority devolved to managers lower down the hierarchy, which potentially gave them greater 
opportunity to think creatively about ways to improve operational techniques?  Lastly, how did 
information about railway organisation and administration move from one company to another?  
  
Ultimately, this thesis cannot even begin to answer these broader questions. But this is not to 
downplay its value. It is only the second detailed analysis of how a British railway company was 
managed between 1870 and 1914. My work on the LSWR is therefore an important contribution 
towards resolving the question that has challenged academics for over fifty years: what caused 
the British railway industry’s declining profitability between 1870 and 1914? 
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Appendix A: Chief Administrators and Officials 
 
Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen 
 
Chairmen 
Capt. Charles E. Mangles 1859-1872 
Charles Castleman 1873-1874 
The Hon. Ralph H. Dutton 1875-1892 
Wyndham S. Portal 1892-1899 
Lieut-Col. The Hon H.W. Campbell 1899-1904 
Sir Charles Scotter, Bart 1904-1910 
Sir Hugh Drummond, Bart 1911-1922 
  Deputy Chairmen 
Charles Castleman 1859-1872 
Edward J. Hutchins 1873-1874 
Wyndham S. Portal 1875-1892 
Lieut-Col. The Hon H.W. Campbell 1893-1898 
Sir Charles Scotter, Bart 1899-1904 
Sir Hugh Drummond, Bart 1904-1910 
William Wyndham Portal 1911-1922 
 
General Managers 
 
Archibald Scott 
1870-1884 (Traffic 
Manager from 
1852) 
Sir Charles Scotter 1885-1897 
Sir Charles Owens 1898-1911 
Sir Herbert Ascombe Walker 1912-1922 
 
Superintendent of the Line/Traffic Superintendent 
 
Superintendent of The Line 
William Williams 1868-1874 
Edgar William Verrinder 1874-1882 
John Tyler 1882-1884 
George Turner White* 1893-1899 
Sir Sam Fay* 1899-1901 
Henry Holmes* 1902-1916 
    
Traffic Superintendent 
Edgar William Verrinder* 1882-1893 
*Head of the Traffic Department 
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Goods Manager 
 
James Haddow 1865-1887 
Charles Owens 1887-1897 
Alfred Malby 1897-1912 
 
 
Locomotive Superintendent/Chief Mechanical Engineer/Mechanical Engineer 
 
Joseph Beattie 1850-1871 
William Beattie 1871-1877 
William Adams 1878-1895 
Dugald Drummond* 1895-1912 
Robert Urie** 1912-1922 
*Chief Mechanical Engineer from 1904 
** Mechanical Engineer  
 
Resident Engineer 
 
John Strapp 1853-1870 
William Jacomb 1870-1887 
Edmund Andrews 1887-1901 
William Jacomb-Hood 1901-1914 
 
Secretary 
 
Frederick Clarke 1862-1880 
Frederic Julius Macaulay 1880-1898 
Godfrey Knight 1898-1922 
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Appendix B: Biographies of LSWR’s major decision-makers  
1870-1911 
 
Adams, William – Locomotive Superintendent, 1878-1895 
 
William Adams was born in Limehouse on the 15 October 1823 and was the son of John Samuel 
Adams, Resident Engineer of the East and West India Dock Company. He joined the Engineering 
Department of this company, and eventually was apprenticed at seven years of age to Miller and 
Ravenhill, the marine engineers at Blackwall. He then worked for P. Taylor and Company at their 
yard at Marseilles and thereafter obtained a position with Sardinian Navy in the late 1840s. In 
1852 he returned to England and, after being employed in various capacities, was appointed as 
the locomotive superintendent of the North London Railway in 1855. In 1873 he took up the 
same post on the Great Eastern Railway, and moved to become locomotive superintendent of 
the LSWR in 1878. His health started to decline in the early-1890s and he retired in 1895. On 7 
August 1904 he died peacefully at his home in Putney.1023  
 
Andrews, Edmund – Resident Engineer, 1887-1901 
 
Andrews was born in either 1837 or 1838. By 1853 he was a pupil of Albinus Martin, a consulting 
engineer in Westminster (Martin had also been the LSWR’s resident engineer between 1837 and 
1849). He then worked on the Shadwell Extension of Works of the London Dock Company, after 
which he was engaged in the design and construction of numerous railway lines, including that of 
the Staines, Wokingham and Woking Junction Railway. Appointed to the LSWR’s staff in 1857, he 
became chief assistant to the William Jacomb, the resident engineer, from 1870, and in 1882 was 
made assistant engineer. On the death of Jacomb in 1887 he was made the company’s resident 
engineer and held the post until his retirement until 1901. He died on 15 October 1912 at his 
home, Warren Lodge, in Hampton Wick, where had lived for nearly thirty years.1024 
 
Beattie, Joseph – Locomotive Superintendent, 1850-1871 
 
Joseph Beattie was born in Ireland on 1 July 1808. He schooled in Belfast and was apprenticed to 
his father, an architect, before moving to England in 1835 to serve as assistant engineer to Joseph 
Locke. In this capacity he worked on the building of Grand Junction and London and South 
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Western Railways, and became the carriage and wagon superintendent of the latter in 1838. In 
1850 he was appointed the company’s locomotive superintendent, a post he held until he 
succumbed to diphtheria on 18 October 1871, aged sixty-three.1025 
 
Beattie, William – Locomotive Superintendent, 1871-1877 
 
William Beattie was born in 1842 or 1843 and was the son of Joseph Beattie, the LSWR’s 
Locomotive Superintendent between 1852 and 1871. Little is known of his early life; however, he 
joined the company as a draughtsman in the Locomotive Department in 1862 and seven years 
later became its inspector of hydraulic machinery. In 1871 Beattie was made locomotive 
superintendent. He was highly unsuccessful in this position, and while it was recorded that his 
resignation in 1877 was due to ill-health, the reality is that he was he was forced out of the 
company.1026 
 
Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel The Hon Henry Walter – Director, 1872-1811; Deputy-Chairman, 
1893-1899; Chairman, 1899-1904 
 
Born on 23 March 1835, Henry Walter-Campbell was the son of John Frederick Campbell of 
Cawdor, 1st Earl Cawdor of Castlemartin and Lady Elizabeth Thynne. He joined the army and 
obtained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the service of the Coldstream Guards. He served in the 
Crimean War, seeing action at the Battles of Alma and Inkerman, as well as the siege and fall of 
Sebastopol. It is unknown when he left the army, but he joined the LSWR board in 1872. He was 
deputy chairman between 1892 and 1899, and then chairman from then until 1904, when he 
returned to being an ordinary director. He died on 17 March 1910.1027 
 
Drummond, Dugald – Locomotive Superintendent, 1895-1912 
 
Dugald Drummond was born in Ardrossan, Ayrshire on 1 January 1840. At the age of sixteen 
years he began his engineering training at Forrest and Barr, Mechanical Engineers, Glasgow. He 
moved to become foreman erector at the Highland Railway company’s Lochgorm Works in 1864, 
and after only two years moved to become works manager at the London, Brighton and South 
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Coast Railway’s Brighton Works. He was appointed locomotive superintendent of North British 
Railway in 1875, and then took up the same post on the Caledonian Railway in 1882. He resigned 
his post in 1890 after accepting a post in Australia. Yet, this fell through and he founded the 
Glasgow Railway Engineering Company in Govan. In 1895 he became the LSWR’s locomotive 
superintendent, a post which he held his until his death in Surbiton in 1912. 1028 
 
Drummond, Brigader-General Sir Hugh Henry John– Director, 1900-1922; Deputy-Chairman, 
1904-1911; Chairman, 1911-1922 
 
Hugh Drummond was born at Covelly Court, Devonshire, on 29 November 1859. He was the son 
Sir James Hamlyn Williams Drummond, 3rd Baronet of Hawthornden, Midlothian, and 
Edwinsford, Llandilo. He joined the army, serving with rifle brigade in the Mediterranean and 
Ireland. However, on marrying Gertrude Rolle in 1880 he resigned his commission and accepted a 
partnership in the Exeter banking firm of Saunders & Company. This was merged with other 
banks and eventually became part of the National Provincial & Union Bank, of which Drummond 
was a director. He joined the LSWR board in 1900, became its deputy chairman in 1904, and took 
up the position of chairman in 1911. On the creation Southern Railway in 1923, which was 
formed from the merger of the LSWR, LBSCR and LCDR, he became its chairman. He died on 1st 
August 1924.1029 
 
Dutton, The Hon. Ralph Heneage – Director, 1854-1892; Chairman 1875-1892 
 
Dutton was born on 5 August 1821 and was the youngest son of John Dutton, 2nd Baron 
Sherborne and Hon. Mary Legge. He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and was 
appointed the Deputy Lieutenant for Hampshire in 1852 and High Sheriff in 1872. He was 
Member of Parliament for South Hampshire from April 1857 to July 1865, when he was elected 
the member for Cirencester, a seat he held until 1868. He joined the LSWR board in 1854 and 
was the company’s chairman from 1875 until his death in 1892.1030  
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Fay, Sir Sam – Superintendent of the Line, 1899-1901 
 
Sam Fay was born on 30 December 1856 in Hamble-le-Rice, in the New Forest. He was the 
second son of Joshua Fay, a farmer, and was educated at Blenheim House School in Fareham. In 
April 1872 he joined the LSWR as a junior clerk at Itchen Abbas Station, and thereafter was 
moved to Stockbridge in 1874, Turnham Green and Southampton in 1875, and Kingston in 1876. 
While here he completed a history of the LSWR, The Royal Road, and with two other clerks 
launched the South Western Gazette, the British railway industry’s first staff magazine. In 1884 he 
then moved to the Traffic Superintendent’s office at Waterloo, and soon after was appointed its 
chief clerk. His career then stalled. He appealed directly to Scotter, the LSWR’s General Manager, 
who advanced him by giving him the position of Assistant Storekeeper. Fay was then seconded to 
the Midland and South Western Junction Railway as General Manager in 1893, and, after 
removing the company from chancery, was appointed the LSWR’s Superintendent of the Line in 
1899.  He occupied this post for only a short time, becoming the General Manager of the 
financially weak Great Central Railway (GCR) in 1902. He considerably improved the company’s 
financial position. During the First World War he was the Deputy-Chairman of the Railway 
Executive Committee, which ran Britain’s railways during the conflict, until 1917, and between 
then 1919 he was Director of Movements at the War Office. After the GCR became part of the 
newly formed London and North Eastern Railway in 1923, he was not employed by it because of 
his age, but took up the chairmanship of Beyer-Peacock, the Machester locomotive building firm. 
Fay held this position until 1933 and died in Awbridge on 30 May 1953.1031 
 
Haddow, James – Goods Manager, 1865-1887  
 
James Haddow was born in 1831. Nothing is known of his early life. He was trained as a clerk in 
the offices of the LSWR’s solicitors, Bircham and Son, and moved to the Law Clerk’s office of the 
railway in 1852. After taking various posts he joined the Goods Department’s staff in 1854 and 
after holding positions in London and Portsmouth was made assistant goods manager in 1864. 
Appointed goods manager in 1865, he held the post until 1887 when he retired; although he 
continued to advise the company on the goods traffic until 1888. He died on 31 December 
1891.1032 
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Hedge, George Tullidge – Outdoor Goods Manager, 1912-1922 
 
George Tullidge Hedge was born in either 1865 or 1866. He joined the London and North 
Western Railway in 1881 as a junior clerk after a year working for the delivery agents, Messrs 
Pickfords and Son. He worked in many departments within the railway, including delivery, 
shipping, correspondence and outside working. Eventually, he became chief clerk to district 
goods superintendent, F.W. West, then to E Wharton, the company’s superintendent at 
Warrington and then to F.A. Sargent, the district superintendent at Garston. Lastly, in 1906, he 
was appointed to the company’s agency at Bond Street under F.H. Dent, the London traffic 
Superintendent. In 1912 he was brought to the LSWR by H.A. Walker, its new general manager, 
who had been a goods manager on the LNWR previously. In 1923, when the LSWR became part 
of the newly formed Southern Railway, Hedge became its outdoor commercial manager, a job he 
held until 1930 when he was made redundant at the age of sixty-four. He died in 1943 in 
Llandudno.1033 
  
Holmes, Henry – Superintendent of the Line, 1902-1916 
 
Henry Holmes was born in 1863 and entered the service of the LSWR as a Junior Clerk at Lapford 
Station in 1878. He served at many stations around the company’s network and was appointed 
Chief Clerk in the Superintendent of the Line’s office in 1897. Two years later he was promoted to 
Assistant of the Line and, on Sam Fay leaving the company, he took over as Superintendent of the 
Line in 1902. He resigned in 1916 at the age of fifty-three because, it is suspected, he did not get 
on with the company’s General Manager from 1912, Herbert Ashcombe Walker. He died in 
1933.1034  
 
 
 
 
Jacomb, William – Resident Engineer, 1870-1887 
 
William Jacomb was born in either 1831 or 1832. He served his apprenticeship under Isambard 
Kingdom Brunel, and with him he worked on many important works on the Great Western 
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Railway. He was also appointed by Brunel to supervise the construction of the steamship, Great 
Eastern. In 1870 Jacomb was appointed the LSWR’s resident engineer on the resignation of John 
Strapp and held the post until his sudden death on 26 May 1887.1035 
 
Jacomb-Hood, William – Resident Engineer, 1901-1914 
 
William Jacomb-Hood was born in Lewisham in 1859 and was the son of the LBSCR’s Engineer, 
and later director, Robert Jacomb-Hood. His education took place at Tonbridge, after which he 
entered the Crystal Palace School of Practical Engineering. He joined the LSWR in 1877 and was 
articled to William Jacomb, the company’s resident engineer. After being employed on numerous 
line building projects, he was appointed London district engineer in 1888 and western district 
engineer in 1897. Upon the resignation of Edmund Andrews as resident engineer in 1901, he took 
over the position. A keen Fox-hunter, he was died while out on a hunt on 6 March 1914.1036  
 
Macaulay, Frederic Julius – Secretary, 1880-1898; Director, 1898-1912 
 
Frederic Julius Macaulay was born in Antrim, Ireland, on 14 July 1830 and was the son of Frederic 
William Macaulay, a solicitor. After completing his education, at the age of eighteen he went to 
work as a clerk for his cousin the Right Honourable Hugh Law, M.P. for Londonderry. He then was 
then engaged by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland and then on the Donegal estates of the Earl of 
Leitrim in connection with various works. When this engagement was concluded, he was 
recommended to the chairman of LSWR and, as a result, became second clerk in the Secretary’s 
Office in 1850. In 1852 he was appointed chief clerk, in 1865 assistant secretary and in 1880 
secretary. On his retirement in 1898 he became a director of the company. He died at his home 
in Clapham on 18 July 1912.1037 
 
Malby, Alfred – Goods Manager, 1897-1912 
 
Alfred Malby was born in 1849 and in 1864 joined the LSWR as a junior clerk in the goods offices 
at Nine Elms. In 1887 he was removed to the Waterloo goods manager’s office and in 1893 was 
appointed the goods manager’s chief assistant. When the Charles Owens became the company’s 
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LSWR’s general manager in 1898, Malby succeeded him as goods manager. He retired from this 
post in 1912 and died in October 1916.1038 
 
Mortimer, Charles Smith – Director, 1852-1892 
 
Born in either 1808, Charles Smith Mortimer was the third son of Charles Mortimer, treasurer of 
the East India Company. Little is known about his life; however, he had a career as a stockbroker. 
He was elected to the LSWR board in 1852 and was one of the company’s longest serving 
directors, remaining on the board until his death in Thornton Heath on 12 January 1892.1039 
 
Owens, Sir Charles – Goods Manager, 1888-1897; General Manager, 1898-1911; Director, 1912-
1922 
 
Charles Owens was born in 1855 or 1856, and joined the LSWR as a junior clerk in Goods Audit 
Office in 1862 immediately after leaving school. In 1880 he was made chief clerk of the office and 
then in 1888, on the retirement of James Haddow, was appointed the company’s Goods 
Manager. In mid-1897 he was made assistant general manager, in preparation for his promotion 
to the post of general manager on the retirement of Charles Scotter at the end of that year. He 
was general manager of the LSWR until 1912, when he retired and was elevated to the board. On 
the absorption of the LSWR into the Southern Railway in 1923, he became a director of that 
company, and, after resigning his seat in 1930, died on 17 January 1933.1040 
 
Pirrie, William, 1st Viscount Pirrie – Director, 1907-1922 
 
William Hames Pirrie was born on 24 May 1847 in Quebec, the son of James Alexander Pirrie and 
Elizabeth Margaret Swan Montgomery. He was educated at the Royal Belfast Academical 
Institution between 1858 and 1862, after which he obtained a position as a premium apprentice 
at Harland and Wolff, the Belfast shipbuilders. In 1868 he was appointed the company’s chief 
draughtsman, and helped design the White Star Line’s first Atlantic liners. By 1874 Edward 
Harland and Gustav Wolff, the firm’s founders, wished to pursue other business interests and the 
twenty-seven year old Pirrie was made a partner. After Harland's death in 1895, Pirrie became 
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Harland and Wolff’s chairman, and around this time he was elected lord mayor of Belfast. By the 
late-1890s Harland and Wolff’s business was booming and he moved its headquarters to London. 
Pirrie also began to gain positions on the boards of various businesses related to shipping. One of 
these was on the LSWR’s board, which he joined in 1907. He held this seat until 1922. However, 
by this time he had lost control of Harland and Wolff and he died of pneumonia on 7 June 
1924.1041 
 
Portal, Wyndham Spencer – Director, 1861-1899; Deputy-Chairman, 1875-1892; Chairman, 1892-
1899 
 
Wyndham Spencer Portal was born on 22 Jul 1822 and was the son of John Portal of Laverstoke 
and Freefolk Priors. He was educated at Harrow and then the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, 
and held positions as a Cornet in the North Hampshire Yeomanry Cavalry from 1842, and then as 
a Captain between 1853 and 1865. In 1848 he succeeded his father as proprietor of the 
Laverstoke bank-note paper mills, which his family had had ownership of since the beginning of 
the eighteenth century when they had come to Britain as Huguenot refugees. He developed an 
interest around this time in the welfare of the poor and was one of the first to adopt measures to 
give labourers access to allotments. He also took up the issue of Poor Law administration, and 
from 1847, for fifty years, was chairman of the Whitchurch Board of Guardians. Portal was also 
chair of the Basingstoke Union for a considerable period, promoted adult education and 
circulating libraries, and was heavily involved in the temperance movement. Portal joined the 
LSWR board in 1861, and held the position of deputy chairman between 1875 and 1892, after 
which he was the company’s chairman until 1899, when he retired. He died on 14 September 
1905.1042 
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Scott, Archibald – Traffic Manager, 1852-1870; General Manager, 1870-1884; Director, 1885-
1902 
 
Archibald Scott joined the LSWR as its traffic manager in 1852. In 1870 he was made the 
company’s general manager, and held this post until his retirement at the end of 1884. At this 
point he was elevated to the board, and held his seat until 1902, when he left it because of old 
age. He died on Tuesday 6 December 1910 at his home in Surbiton, only five days before his 
successor as general manager, Sir Charles Scotter.1043 
 
Scotter, Sir Charles – General Manager, 1885-1897; Director, 1899-1910; Deputy-Chairman, 
1899-1904; Chairman, 1904-1910 
 
Charles Scotter was born in Hull on 22 October 1835 to Joseph and Mary Scotter. At the age of 
eighteen he joined the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway as a junior clerk at its Hull 
goods offices. His rise in the company was rapid and by 1860 he was made passenger 
superintendent at Hull, after which, in 1866, he was appointed the MSLR’s continental agent. In 
1872 he was appointed the company’s assistant goods manager, and a year later became full 
goods manager. He joined the LSWR as its general manager in 1885, a position he held until his 
retirement and elevation to the board at the end of 1897. Such was his success as the company’s 
general manager that in 1895 he was knighted. In 1899 Scotter became the company’s deputy 
chairman and its chairman in 1904. He held this position until his death at his home in Kingston 
on 13 December 1910.1044 
 
Strapp, John – Resident Engineer, 1853-1870 
 
Very little is known about John Strapp, apart from the fact that he was the LSWR’s Resident 
Engineer between 1853 and 1870. He resigned after serious financial irregularities were found in 
the Engineering Department.1045   
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Urie, Robert – Works Manager, 1895-1912; Locomotive Engineer, 1912-1922 
 
Robert Wallace Urie was born in Ardeer, Scotland, on 22 October 1854. He was educated at 
Glasgow High School and in 1869 had an apprenticeship at Gauldie, Marshall & Co.; Dubs & Co., 
and William King & Co. Various locomotive builders employed him thereafter as a draughtsman, 
and in 1885 he joined the staff of the Caledonian Railway’s St Rollox Works, and became chief 
draughtsman in 1890 and Works manager in 1896. He was appointed the LSWR’s Locomotive 
Works Manager in 1897, and when its chief mechanical engineer, Dugald Drummond, died in 
1912, he became the company’s locomotive engineer. He retired in 1922 on the absorption of 
the LSWR into the Southern Railway, and died at his home in Largs on 6 January 1937.1046 
 
Verrinder, Edgar William – Superintendent of the Line, 1874-1882; Traffic Superintendent, 1882-
1893 
 
Edgar William Verrinder, born in either 1836 or 1837, joined the LSWR as an apprentice clerk at 
Woking in 1851. He was moved to Wimborne in 1852, where he was made a full clerk in 1855. In 
1856 he was relocated to Fareham, then to the Goods Department in Nine Elms in 1858 and in 
1859 he was appointed station agent at New Godalming Station. Agencies at Andover followed in 
1860 and then at Barnstaple in 1862. He moved into management in 1863, when he was posted 
as superintendent of the North Devon Line. A year later he was appointed superintendent at 
Waterloo Station and in 1868 he became Metropolitan district superintendent. He succeeded 
William Williams as superintendent of the line in 1874, and was made Traffic Superintendent in 
early 1882. This post he held for eleven years until his death from an unknown illness at the age 
of fifty-six on 23 July 1893.1047 
 
Walker, Sir Herbert Ashcombe – General Manager, 1912-1922 
 
Herbert Walker was born in 1868 and educated at the North London Collegiate School, Camden 
Town. He also received schooling in Burges and privately. He joined the London and North 
Western Railway as a clerk in the district superintendent’s office at Euston in 1885, after which 
he became outdoor assistant to the company’s superintendent of the line in 1889. In December 
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1893 he was appointed assistant district superintendent of the LNWR’s Southern Division, and 
after nine years he was promoted to superintendent. He was made assistant superintendent of 
the line in 1909 and after only a year became outdoor goods manager of the Southern Division. 
He was headhunted for the position of LSWR general manager in late 1911 and started on 1 
January 1912. During the First World War Walker held the position as head of the Railway 
Executive Committee, which managed Britain’s railway throughout the conflict, and for his 
services to the nation he was knighted in 1915. In 1923, when the Southern Railway was formed, 
he became its first general manager. On his retirement in 1937 he became a director of the 
company and held this seat until the nationalisation of all Britain’s railways on 1 January 1948. He 
died in London on 29 September 1949.1048  
 
White, George Turner – Superintendent of the Line, 1893-1899 
 
George Turner White was born on 28 February 1854. At the age of fifteen he joined the company 
as a telegraph clerk at Cosham Station, where his father was the station agent. After holding 
various positions he was appointed as a clerk at Exeter Station in 1871 and then, in 1875, became 
a relief agent. Between 1876 and 1893 he held the post of western district (division) 
superintendent, after which, on the death of William Verrinder, he became superintendent of the 
line. He held this post until his death on 17 March 1893.1049 
 
Williams, William – Superintendent of the Line, 1868-1874 
 
William Williams was born in either 1820 or 1821. He joined the LSWR as a clerk at Nine Elms in 
1840. After holding the position of agent at Romsey from 1846, Basingstoke from 1852 and 
Exeter from 1860, in 1862 he was appointed the superintendent of Waterloo station. In 1864 
Williams became the company’s passenger superintendent and after four years, on the death of 
Godson, he was appointed superintendent of the line. He held this post until his death in 
1874.1050 
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Abbreviations 
 
ASRS    Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 
BALR    Basingstoke and Alton Light Railway 
BER    Bristol and Exeter Railway 
DofD    Directory of Directors 
DCR    Devon and Cornwall Railway 
GKLR    Guildford, Kingston and London Railway 
GER    Great Eastern Railway  
GCR    Great Central Railway 
GCRJ    Great Central Railway Journal 
GNCR    Great Northern and City Railway 
GKLR    Guildford, Kingston and London Railway  
GWR    Great Western Railway 
H&W    Harland and Wolff Shipbuilders 
LBSCR    London, Brighton and South Coast Railway 
LCCT    London County Council Tramways 
LCDR    London, Chatham and Dover Railway 
LNER    London and North Eastern Railway 
LNWR    London and North Western Railway 
LSWR     London and South Western Railway 
LUT    London United Tramways 
M.P.    Member of Parliament 
MSLR    Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway 
MHR    Mid-Hants Railway 
MR    Midland Railway 
MSWJR    Midland and South Western Junction Railway 
MVL    Meon Valley Line 
NER    North Eastern Railway 
NSR    North Staffordshire Railway 
OR    Operating ratio 
P&O    Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company 
RCH    Railway Clearing House 
ROCE    Return on capital employed 
ROCS    Return on capital spent 
SDC    Southampton Dock Company 
SDJR    Salisbury and Dorset Junction Railway 
S&DJR    Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway 
SER    South Eastern Railway 
SR    Southern Railway 
SWG    South Western Gazette 
SWM    South Western Magazine 
SWWJR    Staines, Wokingham and Woking Junction Railway 
SYR    Salisbury and Yeovil Railway 
WCR    Waterloo and City Railway 
WSL    White Star Line 
WRMR    Whitby, Redcar and Middlesbrough Railway 
WLER    West London Extension Railway 
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